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Would it not then be more correct to disallow all commissions on loans, and to charge for all goods the lowest cash price, and allow on all claims a fixed rate of interest, say simple interest at five per cent. from the date of the loan or supply of goods, and disallow all extra interest? Creditors would then be placed side by side according to their real advances, instead of being ranked according to the fictitious amounts for which they press the debtor to agree to make himself liable to them.

The second point is this: no penalty is at present attached to an omission on the part of a bankrupt to have kept proper accounts, and it would, no doubt, be too much for the law to lay down rules as to the class of accounts to be kept in all kinds of business, and require conformity to these rules. But there is one safeguard for solvency which is, I believe, required by the law of some continental nations, and does not throw any heavy burden upon men of business. This is, to require every trader to make out a balance-sheet of his affairs once in every twelve months, and to enact that if he goes bankrupt, and cannot produce his last balance-sheet, or produces one which is manifestly fictitious, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. Would it not be well to introduce some similar provision into our law?

The third point is this: the object of white-washing a man is to induce

him to be industrious, which he will not be if he knows that the fruit of his labours will go to his creditors and not to himself. It is well enough, therefore, that after a discharge in bankruptcy, the bankrupt should be entitled to keep whatever he can earn. But is there any principle which makes it desirable that he should be allowed to keep whatever may come to him by successior, devise, bequest, or by any means other than his own industry? Would it not be right that all such property should vest in his trustee in bankruptcy until all the just claims of his creditors were satisfied? If the law were framed on this principle, and the claims of creditors were adjusted according to the first point mentioned in this letter, I fancy it would be found that the deficiencies shown under bankruptcies would be very much less than at present.

I hope to elicit some expression of opinion upon these matters.

PRUDENS.

not actually a chattel real, but an estate of inheritance. The words, "notwithstanding any testamentary disposition," do not (or at least, need not) qualify the mode in which a chattel real vests in the executor, but rather refer to the fact that, but for the statute, the estate would never vest in the executor at all. Since this gives a sufficient meaning to the words "notwithstanding any testamentary disposition," why should not such a disposition have a "qualified effect," if such an effect seems to be given by a subsequent part of the enactment?]

"The personal representatives are to be deemed in law' the deceased's heirs and assigns." Can a man have two sets of heirs and assigns in this matter ?"

[This was the very question we ourselves put. And why not "in this matter' as well as in others? There can be no doubt that the deceased has two sets of heirs and assigns in fact, one at common law, and the other by this statute. Herein we see some reason for a doubt; and we regret that "H." has no lawful authority to remove it by another ukase.] "With reference to section 31, sub-section (1), you say the interpretation clause defines the term instrument absolutely as meaning 'deed, will, inclosure award, and Act of Parliament'; but it only says Instrument includes deed,' &c. There are instruments which do not come under the terms, 'deed, will,' &c., and a writing declaring trusts of land is one."

[If " H." will ponder the interpretation clause, we think he will discover that "includes" obviously does not always mean "includes, among other things." In the present case, the things which are enumerated as being included under 'instrument,' are all things which every body would have supposed to be so included, without being told. There was therefore no sense in enumerating them, unless the enumeration was intended to be exhaustive.]

"In article 10 you see in the use of the word 'income' in section 10, subsection (1), ambiguity leading to the inference that a beneficiary under a settlement of real estate may exercise the rights and powers given by the section. But section 2 (iii.) says, 'In relation to land, income includes rent and profits.'

[This remark of our correspondent agrees remarkably ill with his last one. For it would be quite enough to justify us in what we said if "income includes, besides rents and profits, the other kind of income to which our remark referred.]

"In reference to section 11, sub-section (1), you foreshadow 'inconvenient consequences' from your inference that the latter part of the sub-section does not, like the preceding part, affect to give a remedy to the termor after a THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVEY- severance of the reversion, the words the several parts thereof' not being repeated in such latter part. 'The obligation aforesaid,' in the latter part, ANCING ACT. is the obligation the several parts' of the reversionary estate; and in the previous part of the sub-section the reversionary estate is still spoken of as that reversionary estate,' even after severance, and as including the several parts.'"

We have recently received several queries on this subject. "C." (not our former correspondent) writes:"With reference to the wording of section 60 of the Conveyancing Act, is there anything in the following doubt?

"A power to enter the premises and view their state of repair is ordinarily given to lessors by means of a covenant that it shall be lawful for the lessor to enter, &c. Now, if the lessor only were named, would the benefit of such a covenant enure to his heirs or his executors, administrators, or assigns, as the case might be ?

"It does not appear to be a covenant to do any act to the lessor or for his

benefit.

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"It might be held, however, to amount to a covenant to do the act of permitting the landlord to enter, and in that way might inure to the benefit of his representatives.

"I should be glad, if you think it worth while, to see some remark upon this point in your journal.

[We think that such a covenant is properly said to be "on the lessee's part to be observed and performed."]

Our former correspondent "H." has sent us some further remarks upon our criticism of the Conveyancing Act, which are much more formidable from number than from strength of argument. We deal with them separately as follows:

"In article 9 you say, in reference to section 30, sub-section (1), 'The most obvious time to which to refer the words "is vested" would be the time of the creation of the trust.'

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"This literal construction' is excluded by the divisional heading VI. Trust and Mortgage Estates on Death."

[We have never been able to satisfy ourselves what degree of authority is possessed by the heading to which "H." refers; and we think the question a difficult one, though he seems to think it very easy. But at all events we hardly think that the words "at death" can be allowed to fix the time of every verb in the present tense occurring in the chapter. And we are quite clear that what "H." suggests is a very improper mode of drafting`im. portant statutes.] "You inquire, 'In what manner does a chattel real bequeathed by a testator vest in the executor ?' The language of the Act is a chattel real vesting in' the personal representative; that is, of course, virtute officii, for the words, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition,' ignore any devise or bequest, and, if words mean anything, render it nugatory. How could the personal representatives, by assenting to a devise of the trust estates, con. stitute the devisee of such estates a trustee,' without giving a qualified effect to a testamentary disposition,' which is plainly to have no effect ?" [Of course, if the matter is settled by the words, "which is plainly to have no effect," there is an end of it. But we see nothing to justify this peremptory ukase. "H." seems quite to have forgotten that the property is

incident to

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[We venture to think that the words "the obligation aforesaid" mean to the subject-matter of the lease," and that by no rule of grammar to be simply " "the obligation of a covenant entered into by a lessor with reference found anywhere outside the letter of our correspondent can those three words be permitted to carry on their back the whole of the previous enactment in which they occur.]

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sections 10, 11, and 12. Does not section 66, sub-section (2), empower them "You say the parties are nowhere empowered to exclude the operation of to do so? It provides that nothing in this Act shall be taken to imply that the adoption in connection with any transaction of any 939 other powers, &c., is improper.' [By this time "H." seems to have puzzled himself into a very thick fog. We are quite unable to guess where his argument lies, but we are able without the least difficulty to answer his question in the negative. We think that other section picked quite at random from the Statute-book. How on earth section 66, sub-section (2), has no more to do with the matter than any does the fact that anything which can be excluded may be excluded without impropriety, tell us whether or no we can exclude sections 10-12? Moreover, those sections have nothing whatever to do with "powers."]

Clause 25 of the Prisons Act, 1877, provides that a prisoner who is confined in a prison situated beyond the limits of the county, borough, or place in which he was convicted of his offence, shall, at the time of his discharge, be taken back at the public expense to the county, borough, or place in which he was so convicted. By the Standing Order of the 24th of April, 1878, also, every prisoner is to be furnished with breakfast on the authorized scale on thr morning of his release, and, if destitute, and his destination be at such a distance that he cannot reach it by mid-day, he is to be furnished with 125z. of bread and 4oz. of cheese for his dinner, and, under the same circumstances, if the prisoner is unable to reach his destination on foot by mid-day, the governor may, at his discretion, provide for his passage by public conveyance to his destination. Mr. Charles Leigh Clare, hon. secretary" Prison Conference," of Park-lane, Higher Broughton, Manchester, has addressed a letter to the prison officials throughout the kingdom asking them for information as to their practice as regards these provisions, and whether the prisoner's attention is called to either clause 25 of the Prison Act of 1877, or the Standing Order of the 24th of April, 1878, either on or before his discharge. Mr. Clare says:-"I find that in some prisons nothing is done for the prisoners unless they make application, which they seldom do, because they have no knowledge either of the clause in the Act or of the Standing Order. The system of alternative prisons is a strong argument in favour of the prisoner being made aware of the provision for his return home, otherwise he may be turned destitute upon the streets of a strange town, and liable at once to be taken as a rogue and vagabond, or led to commit theft to supply his immediate wants."

CASES OF THE WEEK.

PRACTICE-ORDER FOR SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION-MOTION TO DISCHARGE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW NO CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING WITHIN JURISDICTION-AFFIDAVIT THAT DEFENDANT IS A BRITISH SUBJECT-ORD. 11, rr. 1, la, 3.—In &. case of Fowler v. Barstow, before the Court of Appeal on the 1st inst., some questions of importance arose as to the practice with regard to service out of the jurisdiction. Rule 1 of order 11 provides that "service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a writ of summons may be allowed by the court or a judge (inter alia) whenever any act or thing sought to be restrained or removed, or for which damages are sought to be recovered, was or is to be done or is situate within the jurisdiction." And by rule la (June, 1876) it is provided that in actions relating to contracts, "the judge, in exercising his discretion as to granting leave to serve such writ or notice on a defendant out of the jurisdiction, shall have regard to the amount or value of the property in dispute or sought to be recovered, and to the existence in the place of residence of the defendant, if resident in Scotland or Ireland, of a local court of limited jurisdiction, having jurisdiction in the matter in question, and to the comparative cost and convenience of proceeding in England or in the place of such defendant's residence, and in all the above-mentioned cases no such leave is to be granted without an affidavit stating the particulars necessary for enabling the judge to exercise his discretion in manner aforesaid, and all such other particulars (if any) as he may require to be shown." And rule 3 provides that "every application for an order for leave to serve such writ or notice on a defendant out of the jurisdiction shall be supported by evidence, by affidavit, or otherwise, showing in what place or country such defendant is or probably may be found, and whether such defendant is a British subject or not, and the grounds upon which the application is made." In the present case the action was brought against a defendant, who was residing in Edinburgh, to recover some moneys which had been paid by the plaintiff, in consequence, as he alleged, of some false representations made to him by the defendant and some other persons with regard to the value of a colliery. The plaintiff obtained, ex parte, an order giving him leave to serve the writ upon the defendant at Edinburgh. This order was obtained upon an affidavit by the plaintiff, which purported to show that he had a cause of action against the defendant arising within the jurisdiction. The writ having been served on the defendant, he entered a conditional appearance, and then applied to Chitty, J., to discharge the order for service and to set aside the service. In support of his application he filed an affidavit contradicting the plaintiff's affidavit, and the plaintiff filed another affidavit in reply. Chitty, J., did not allow either the defendant's affidavit or the plaintiff's affidavit in reply to be used, and he refused the application. The defendant appealed, and it was urged on his behalf that, though the action did not relate to a contract, still the affidavit required by r. la, ought to be made; that the plaintiff's original affidavit on which the leave to serve the writ was obtained was insufficient, because it did not state that the defendant was a British subject; and that, at any rate, the defendant's affidavit and the plaintiff's affidavit in reply ought to be admitted, and that from them it appeared that the plaintiff had no cause of action arising within the jurisdiction. On the other side it was said that it was contrary to the practice to allow a contest of affidavits on the question whether the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.), overruled the two objections to the plaintiff's first affidavit, but they held that the other affidavits ought to have been admitted. JESSEL, M. R., said that the note by way of preface to the rules provided that the old practice was to remain in force where no other provision was made by the Act or Rules. It sometimes happened that the practice in the Court of Chancery differed from that of the Common Law Courts, and the Court of Appeal had decided that in such cases the better practice was now to be adopted in both divisions of the High Court. But where the old practice had been the same in chancery and at common law, of course it still remained in force, if no other provision was made by the rules. Under the Common Law Procedure Act, which was rather stricter in its terms as to service out of the jurisdiction than the Judicature Act, it was the practice to allow a defendant who had been served out of the jurisdiction to enter a conditional appearance and to file an affidavit to show that the plaintiff had no canse of action arising within the jurisdiction, and, if the court was satisfied that this was so, it discharged the service out of the jurisdiction. But, if the court doubted where the cause of action had arisen, it put the plaintiff under an undertaking to submit to have his action dismissed if it should ultimately turn out that the cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction. The practice was equally well settled in the Court of Chancery, though it was in some respects more lax than that at common law. The Court of Chancery made the original order for service simply upon the statements in the plaintiff's bill, but even then the defendant could enter a conditional appearance, and could put in an affidavit denying that there was any cause of action within the jurisdiction. The very point was decided by Lord Westbury in Foley v. Maillardet (1 D. J. & S. | 389), and that settled the practice. This being so, the practice as to the admissibility of affidavits to contest the question whether the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction was before the Judicature Act the same in the courts of equity and common law, and the practice was, therefore, still the same. But it must not be supposed that his lordship intended to decide that affidavits were admissible to try the merits of the case; he only decided that they were admissible upon the question of the forum. The affidavits in the present case ought, therefore, to have been admitted. It had been argued that the affidavit which was required by rule la of order 11 in cases of action on contract ought to be required also in other cases. But that was not the true construction of rule la. That rule was carefully limited to that part of rule 1 which dealt with cases of contract. Rule la was made because of complaints which had arisen that actions for small debts, which ought to have

been brought in Scotland or Ireland, were constantly brought in London. Another objection raised was that the plaintiff's original affidavit ought to have stated, as was required by rule 3 of order 11, that the defendant was a British subject. That rule, however, was only directory, and did not say that the order for service out of the jurisdiction should be discharged if it was not Complied with. That was discretionary. If it turned ont that an affidavit on that point was immaterial, the court would not discharge the order. The object was this: a British subject might be served with the Queen's writ anywhere. But if the defendant was not a British subject, and was residing out of the Queen's dominions, he must not be served with a writ, but only with a notice of a writ, because foreign Governments would object to the service of the Queen's writ on one of their own subjects residing in his own country. The object of the requirement of rule 3 was that the court might But if the defendant know whether a writ or a notice ought to be served. was residing in Scotland, this was immaterial; for anyone who was residing within the Queen's dominions might be served with the Queen's writ. If he was a foreigner, he owed the Queen a temporary allegiance while he was within her dominions. Though the rule was not so well expressed as it might have been, that was the object of it, and no court would discharge an order for service of a writ out of the jurisdiction in Scotland or Ireland because the affidavit did not state that the defendant was a British subject. Upon the affidavits his lordship came to the conclusion that it was proved that the plaintiff had not a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction. The order for service must, therefore, be discbarged, with costs in both courts. BAGGALLAY, L.J., thought that an affidavit might be made for the purpose of showing that there was not any cause of action arising within the jurisdiction. But as a general rule (except, perhaps, in a case of gross fraud) the affidavit ought not to go beyond that, though, of course, it might sometimes be impossible to avoid going to some extent into the merits of the case. LUSH, L.J., said he was very giad to find that the practice had been established in the Chancery Division in the same way as it had been in the common law divisions ever since the Judicature Act, and, indeed, ever since the Common Law Procedure Act. Under that Act, the practice was for the plaintiff to effect service out of the jurisdiction at his peril. If the defendant was a British subject, the plaintiff was at liberty to serve him with a writ; if the defendant was (for instance) a French subject residing in France, the plaintiff must give him a notice in lieu of serving him with a writ. The reason for this distinction was obvious; it would be an affront to the Sovereign of a foreign country for an English court to assume Under the Common jurisdiction over bis subjects in their own country. Law Procedure Act the question of jurisdiction arose upon the plaintiff asking the leave of the court to proceed under the writ, and on that application affidavits could be filed by both sides. Under the Judicature Act the leave of the court must be obtained before the writ was issued at all, and this was a very great improvement in the practice. Rule 1 of order 11 implied that the court was to ascertain the fact whether the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction, and it must, therefore, be open to the defendant to show that not.-SOLICITORS, Keeping & Co.; F. W. Snell & Greenip.

did

LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT-CLOSE OF LIQUIDATION-DIScharge of DEBTOR-SALE OF PROPERTY TO TRUSTEE-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 15, 17, 47, 48, 49, 125-APPEAL FOR COSTS-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 49.—In a case of Ex parte Wainwright, before the Court of Appeal on the 1st inst., a question arose as to the effect of a sale of the property of a liquidating debtor to the trustee in the liquidation. The trustee, not having been able to sell the property of the debtor, which consisted mainly of a hotel which was subject to some mortgages, made an offer to buy it himself, and the creditors at a meeting summoned for the purpose passed a special resolution accepting the offer. The resolution authorized the trustee to purchase the debtor's estate, which consists among other assets of the Queen's Hotel and premises, and certain tenements adjoining, at such a price as will, after paying the principal and interest on the mortgage, leave sufficient to pay the creditors a dividend of five shillings in the pound and all the costs, charges, and expenses of the liquidation." The resolution was afterwards sanctioned by the court. The trustee made the payments mentioned in the resolution, and the hotel and all the other then existing assets of the debtor were transferred to him, but no resolution was passed by the creditors formally closing the liquidation, or granting the debtor a discharge. The debtor was not in any way a party to the purchase by the trustee or the resolution which approved of it, nor did he know of it for some time afterwards. But when he did know of it he set up in business again, and carried it on for several years without any interruption by the trustee, who was not aware of the fact. When however, he did become aware of it, he took possession of the debtor's stock-in-trade, claiming it on behalf of the creditors in the liquidation. The judge of the cou uty court beld that the effect of the resolution authorizing the sale to the trustee was to close the liquidation, and to release the debtor's after-acquired property, and that it would under the circumstances be inequitable for the creditors to claim it, and he ordered the trustee to withdraw from possession. Bacon, C.J., held (30 W. R. 62) that the after-acquired property had not been released, and that the trustee was entitled to it. But he ordered the trustee to pay his costs of the applications to the court personally, on the ground that he ought not to have purchased the estate without first resigning his office of trustee. And be ordered that the debtor should also pay his own costs. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.) affirmed this decision, except as to the costs. JESSEL, M.R., said that the requirements of section 125 as to the close of the liquidation and the discharge of the debtor had not been complied with. By sub-section 5 of section 125 the property of the debtor vested in the trustee in a liquidation just as it would do in a trustee in a bankruptcy-that is, all the debtor's property at the commencement of the liquida. tion, and all his after-acquired property, so long as the liquidation lasted and be was undischarged, vested in the trustee. In a bankruptcy the afteracquired property of the bankrupt would never be free from the claims of the

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creditors except for the provisions of sections 47 and 49 as to the close of the
bankruptcy and the discharge of the bankrupt, but sub-section 9 of section
125 expressly provided that the provisions of those sections should
not apply to a liquidation by arrangement. The close of a liquidation and the
discharge of the liquidating debtor were, by sub-section 9, made to depend
entirely on a resolution of the creditors, and it might happen, though it was
found by experience that this was not generally the case, that the debtor
would be worse off, if the creditors were hostile, in a liquidation than in a
bankruptcy. The resolution which was passed in the present case said nothing
about the close of the liquidation or the discharge of the debtor. If a
resolution amounted in substance to a close of the liquidation or a discharge, no
doubt that would be enough, but in the present case the resolution amounted
to nothing more than a sale of the debtor's existing assets to the trustee. The
sanction of the court was necessary, because without it the trustee could
not have become the purchaser. BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ., pointed out
that the case of Ex parte Tinker (22 W. R. 794, L. R. 9 Ch. 716), was distin-
guishable, because there the sale of the property was to the debtor himself,
at a price to be paid by instalments, and it was clearly intended that he
should pay for it by means of his future earnings. It would, therefore,
have been inequitable to allow the creditors after the sale to seize the
property which he had since acquired.
The question of costs was raised by a cross-notice of appeal given by
the trustee. And the court held that, inasmuch as, if the trustee had not
acted improperly, he would have been entitled to his costs out of the
estate, the case was within one of the recognized exceptions from the
rule that there cannot be an appeal for costs; in this respect, as in the
recent case of Farrow v. Austin (25 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 640, L. R. 18
Ch. D. 58), not following the rule which was laid down in Taylor v. Dowlen
(17 W. R. 779, L. R. 4 Ch. 697), and in In re Hoskins' Trusts (25 W. R.
779, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 281), that a trustee who had been ordered to pay costs
personally could not appeal from the order, though he claimed the costs out
of the trust fund. And the court held that, in buying the property openly
with the sanction of the court, the trustee had been guilty of no impropriety,
and that he ought to have been allowed his costs out of the estate, and
they varied the order of the Chief Judge in this respect. And, as to the
debtor's costs, the court were of opinion that the case was one of great
hardship, and that all parties believed at first, when the sale was made,
that the liquidation was at an end, and that the debtor was free to trade
on his own account. They therefore ordered his costs of the proceedings
to be paid out of the estate, but directed that the trustee's costs should
have priority.-SOLICITORS, Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co.; Pyke & Parrott.

INTERPLEADER ORDER-COURT OF BANKRUPTCY-RIGHT OF APPEALORDER IN DEFAULT OF APPEARANCE-ORDER ON MOTION-RE-HEARING 1 & 2 WILL. 4, c. 6-1 & 2 VICT. c. 45-COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1860 (23 & 24 VICT. c. 126), ss. 14, 17-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 65, 71JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, ss. 19, 50-ОRD. 1, R. 2.—In a case of Ex parte Streeter, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question was raised whether an order in interpleader, made by the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy upon motion by the sheriff, determining the rights of the parties in regard to the goods which were the subject of the adverse claims, could be appealed from, the amount in dispute being under £50. Goods were seized by the sheriff under a f. fa. for costs, taxed at £32, which had been ordered to be paid by the Court of Bankruptcy, and the goods were claimed by the holder of a bill of sale which the execution debtor had given to secure a sum of £75. The sheriff served on the execution debtor and the bill of sale holder a notice of motion in the Court of Bankruptcy, that they should appear on a day named and state the nature of their respective claims to the goods, and maintain or relinquish the same, and abide by such order as might be made. On the bearing of this motion on the day named, the registrar, acting as Chief Judge, decided in favour of the bill of sale holder. The order, on the face of it, appeared to have been made in default of appearance of the execution creditor, inasmuch that it stated that he was "not legally represented." In fact, a managing clerk of some solicitors appeared for him, but, as the clerk was not himself a solicitor, the registrar declined to hear him as an advocate. The application to the Court of Appeal was by the execution creditor by way of appeal from the refusal of the registrar to grant a re-hearing of the interpleader motion. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that it was necessary to apply for a re-hearing, because the order being, on its face, an order in default of appearance, could not have been appealed from. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.), however, held that this was not so. JESSEL, M.R., said that, though the execution creditor did not appear on the hearing of the motion, he was still entitled to appeal from the order, on the ground that the bill of sale holder had not made out his title. LUSH, L.J., said that the execution creditor was in possession of the goods. The other claimant might have been barred if he did not appear; not so the execution creditor.

An objection was taken to the registrar's order, on the ground that he ought not to bave determined the rights of the claimants at once, but ought to have first made an order calling on them to interplead, by analogy to the practice of the common law courts under the Interpleader Acts, under which the adverse claimants were called on to interplead at first by rule of court, or, after the Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 45, and the Common Law Procedure Acts, by summons in chambers, this being in either case the act of the court, not, as a notice of motion was, the act of the sheriff; and it was said that, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy in interpleader arose under section 65 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, which conferred on it "all the powers, jurisdiction, and privileges possessed by any judge" of the superior courts of common law, the jurisdiction must be exercised in the same manner as it was exercised in those courts. The Court, however, held that it was sufficient that the Court of Bankruptcy should have the parties brought

before it by a notice of motion, that being the ordinary mode appointed by
rule 50 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, for bringing persons before it.
On behalf of the bill of sale holder it was argued that a re-hearing ought not to
be granted, because the original order could not have been appealed from, and,
therefore, an appeal ought not to be allowed indirectly by means of a re-hearing.
It was said that, inasmuch as by section 17 of the Common Law Procedure Act,
1860, a summary order in interpleader, if made by a judge of one of the superior
common law courts was final, any order of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, in
exercising the same jurisdiction by virtue of section 65 of the Bankruptcy Act,
must also be final. The Court, however, held that they must construe section
71 of the Bankruptcy Act, which says that " any order of the Chief Judge
in Bankruptcy
shall be subject to an appeal" literally.
JESSEL, M.R., said that the Legislature might well have thought
that the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy did not stand in the same position as a
judge of one of the superior courts, and that an appeal should be allowed in
the one case which was not allowed in the other. The salary of the Chief
Judge was inferior in amount to that of a judge of one of the superior courts,
and it was a mere accident that the present Chief Judge was also a judge of
the High Court. At any rate the words of section 71 were plain, and the
court was bound to follow them. And in the course of the argument JESSEL,
M.R., intimated a doubt whether, notwithstanding the decision to the contrary
L. R. 1 Ex. D. 75), an appeal cannot, since the Judicature Act, be brought
of the Exchequer Division in the case of Dodds v. Shepherd (24 W. R. 322,
from a summary decision on an interpleader summons by a judge at cham-
bers to a divisional court. He said that, if Dodds v. Shepherd was rightly
decided, the provision of section 20 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876
(39 & 40 Vict. c. 59) that when by any Act of Parliament the decision of any
court or judge whose jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court is made final,
an appeal shall not lie in any such case from a decision of the High Court to
the Court of Appeal was unnecessary, and the ratio decidendi of Dodds v.
Shepherd was inconsistent with that of Garnett v. Bradley (26 W. R. 698,
L. R. 3 App. Cas. 944).

facts were these:-When the interpleader motion was heard by the registrar
On the question whether a re-hearing ought to be allowed the material
the managing clerk who appeared for the execution creditor (and whom
the registrar in the first instance believed to be a solicitor, and there-
fore entitled to address the court as an advocate) asked that the hearing
might be adjourned, in order that his client might have an opportunity
of considering and answering the affidavit which had been made by the bill of sale
holder. The registrar declined to accede to this application, and said that the
clerk could cross-examine the bill of sale holder who was present. The clerk
accordingly cross-examined him, and it was not till after the cross-examination
that the registrar discovered that the clerk was not a solicitor. Upon
making this discovery the registrar declined to hear him any further, and
purporting to be made "upon hearing the evidence" of the bill of sale holder.
made the order in favour of the title of the bill of sale holder, the order
Under these circumstances the Court of Appeal held that the re-hearing asked
for ought to have been granted. JESSEL, M. R., said that what had taken
place was contrary to the ordinary rules which govern the administration of
justice in this country. The ordinary practice on an interpleader summons
ing the affidavit of the adverse claimant. The registrar ought to have granted
was to give the party in possession an opportunity of considering and answer-
an adjournment when it was asked for. Moreover, it was not the practice of
that the managing clerk was not a solicitor he was right in declining to hear
the court to decide without hearing both sides. When the registrar found
him as an advocate, but he ought not to have decided against the client
without giving him an opportunity of being heard, either personally or by counsel
heard at all, and this was a miscarriage. And, if the managing clerk was
or by a solicitor. The case was really decided against him without his being
not qualified to act as an advocate, he could not be treated as qualified to
person to cross-examine, and it did not follow that the result of a cross-
cross-examine a witness. The client was entitled to employ some qualified
examination so conducted would not be different from that which had already
taken place. A re-hearing must, therefore, be allowed. But the miscarriage
had, to a great extent, been caused by the solicitor's clerk taking on himself to
act as an advocate, which he ought not to have done. If he had told the
registrar that he was only a managing clerk, no doubt the registrar would at
once have adjourned the case. Therefore no costs would be given to either
unsuccessful.-SOLICITORS, Smiles & Co.; J. E. S. King; W. Maynard.
side. The sheriff's costs would be paid by the person who was ultimately

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APPEAL TO CHIEF JUDGE IN BANKRUPTCY-TIME-NOTICE TO REGISTRAR OF COUNTY COURT-"FORTHWITH "-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 143, 144.-In a case of Ex parte Lamb, on the 1st inst., the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Bacon, C.J. (30 W. R. 64). The question was as to the construction of rule 144 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870. Rule 143 provides that an appeal from a decision of a judge of a county court shall be entered with the registrar of appeals within, and not later than, twenty-one days from the decision, and rule 144 provides that, “ the appeal notice shall be sent forthwith by the appellant to the registrar of upon entering an appeal, a copy of the court appealed from, who shall forthwith file the same with the proceedings.' under rule 143 Sundays and holidays on which the offices of the court are It has already been decided that in computing the twenty-one days entirely closed are not to be counted. by a county court on July 12. An appeal was entered with the registrar of In Ex parte Lamb an order was made appeals at the London Bankruptcy Court on Friday, August 5, the last day possible, and the deposit of £20, required by rule 145, was paid to the Bank of England the same day. Both these things must have been done before four p.m., inasmuch as the office of the Bankruptcy Court and the Bank are closed at that hour on Friday. A copy of the appeal notice was sent by the London agents of the appellant's country solicitors by post to the country solicitors, and was received by them on the morning of Monday, August 8, and they

sent it to the registrar of the county court the same day. The presumption was that the letter was not posted until the night mail from London on Saturday, August 6. There was no evidence to show why the letter was not posted on the afternoon of August 5, which could have been done up to seven p.m., nor indeed when it was posted. If the letter had been posted before seven p.m. on August 5 it would, in the ordinary course of the post, have been received early the next morning, and the notice could have been sent by the country solicitors to the registrar of the county court before the closing of his office, which closed at one p.m. on Saturday. Bacon, C.J., held that the notice to the registrar of the county court had not been given "forthwith" within the meaning of rule 144, and consequently that the appeal was too late, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that the authorities showed that the word "forthwith" must be construed having regard to the circumstances of the case and the object of the enactment in which it was found. When the act to be done could be done without delay it ought to be done at once. The object of the rule was that in a country case the respondent might have an opportunity of finding out at the end of the time for appealing, and at the office of the court of the district in which he lived, whether there was to be an appeal or not. The present appellant chose to put off entering his appeal in London till the last day, and under the circumstances the notice had not been sent to the registrar of the county court within a reasonable time. LUSH, L.J., said that all that the rules required to be done was in effect a continuous act to be done within a reasonable time, and it was not reasonable, under the circumstances, to lose the opportunity of posting the letter between four p.m. and seven p.m. on August 5.-SOLICITORS, Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.; Phelps, Sidgwick, & Biddle.

PRACTICE-LUNACY-LUNATIC TRUSTEE-Appointment of NEW TRUSTEE -VESTING ORDER-TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, s. 5.-In a case of In re Watson, before the Court of Lunacy on the 3rd inst., a question arose as to a vesting order under the Trustee Act, 1850, with regard to stock in the name of trustees, one of whom was a lunatic. The petition was by two trustees of a legacy (the third being a lunatic so found by inquisition), and it asked for the appointment of a new trustee of the will of the testatrix, so far as related to the legacy, jointly with the petitioners, and in substitution for the lunatic, and that the right to call for a transfer and to transfer into their own names the sum of bank annuities in which the legacy was invested, and to receive the dividends thereoo, might vest in the petitioners jointly with the new trustee. The petition was entitled in Lunacy and in the Chancery Division, and in the matters of the Trustee Act, the lunatic, and the trusts of the will, and was addressed to the Lord Chancellor and to the High Court. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY, L.J.) ordered the petition to be amended by striking out the heading in the Chancery Division, and they made an order vesting the right to transfer the stock in the petitioners alone. They held that it was unnecessary to appoint a new trustee, thus departing from In re Nash (29 W. R. 294, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 503), and that under section 5 of the Trustee Act the right to transfer could be vested at once in the petitioners. And they held that the petition ought not to be entitled in the Chancery Division, in this respect not following In re Pearson (25 W. R. 853, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 982), and In re Currie (27 W. R. 369, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 93), which, however, were not cited to the court.-SOLICITORS, J. H. Hortin; Freshfields & Williams; Pawle & Fearon.

PRACTICE-SETTING ASIDE AWARD-RULE NISI-Statement of GROUNDS. -In a case of Mercier v. Pepperell, before Chitty, J., on the 2nd inst., a motion was made to set aside an award, and the notice of motion did not state the grounds upon which the motion was made. An objection was taken that the notice of motion should state with particularity the grounds upon which the application was based in analogy to the practice at common law, where the rule nisi stated distinctly the several grounds upon which it had been granted. There was also a cross-motion to enforce the award. CHITTY, J., said that the rule of practice adopted at common law was a convenient one, and should be held to apply to the Chancery Division. Where a rule nisi was obtained, the grounds of objection to the award were fully stated, as the court required great particularity in such matters, and in analogy to such practice he thought the grounds for the motion should be stated on its face. In his opinion it was improper to allow a person to challenge an award unless he stated the grounds upon which he intended to move. The only ground alleged at the bar against the award was want of finality on the face of the award, but no such ground was stated in the notice of motion, and, therefore, he thought the motion should be dismissed, and with costs. He should state that he had offered terms upon which he would have allowed an amendment of the notice of motion, but they had not been accepted. He did not consider that the objection as to want of finality could, moreover be raised on the cross-motion to enforce the award, upon which an order was of course.-SOLICITORS, Hooper; Labrow.

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COMPANY WINDING UP — "JUST AND EQUITABLE" INSUFFICIENT CAPITAL-FRAUD.-In a case of Re Shepherp's Wheal Rose (Limited), before Chitty, J., on the 5th inst., an application was made by shareholder for the winding up of the company, on the ground that such winding up was "just and quitable." The petitioner alleged that there were various misstatements in the prospectus; moreover, that improper advertisements had been inserted in the newspapers by the directors, that only inadequate capital had been obtained, that the company was a bubble and a sham, and that the company had no mine capable of being worked at a profit. Actions had also been commenced against the directors by shareholders seeking to set aside their allotments, on the ground of misrepresentation in the prospectus. The petition was supported by a large number of shareholders, but

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there was, in fact, a majority of the shareholders who desired that the company should go on. CHITTY, J., was of opinion, on the evidence, that the directors were not responsible for the advertisements, and that on the whole there was a mine to be worked, and which was capable of being worked at a profit. The capital that the company now had consisted of a sum of some £9,000 or £10,000 in addition to this mine, and having referred to the fact that the majority of the shareholders desired to go on with the company, he could not say that the amount was inadequate. In his opinion the company could not be said to be a bubble within the meaning of the authorities, and he did not consider it was "just and equitable" it should be wound up. The petition would be dismissed, with costs, except that, as the company had caused some delay and expense by not producing their books, he should allow the petitioner to deduct a sum of £10 from his costs in respect of the delay.-SOLICITORS, Best, Webb, & Co.; Mead & Daubeny.

PRACTICE-ORDER MADE IN CHAMBERS-APPEAL-MOTION TO DISCHARGE. In the case of Holloway v. Cheston, also before Chitty, J., on the 5ta inst., an application was made for leave to appeal from an order made by bis lordship on a summons heard in chambers. It was stated that the whole sum involved in the action was very small, and that both parties desired to CHITTY, J., said that the practice of the Master of the Rolls was to adjourn save the expense of re-hearing the summons before his lordship in court. into court all summonses on which an opportunity was desired of appealing to the Court of Appeal; the object of such a practice was to enable the court above to have (as it was entitled to have) the benefit of the decision of the judge in the court below. The applicant's proper course was to move to discharge the order made in chambers, and then after the matter had been argued in court, the decision given might be appealed from.-SOLICITORS, Goldberg & Langdon; Kingsford, Dorman, & Co.

PRACTICE ISSUE DIRECTED BY CHANCERY DIVISION-NEW TRIAL-MOTION FOR WHERE MADE.—In a case of Nordon v. Nordon, also before Chitty, J., on the 5th inst., a motion for a rule nisi for a new trial was made before him in an action commenced in the Chancery Division, where an issue had been directed by the Master of the Rolls, and had recently been heard by Pollock, B., and a special jury at Westminster. A question was raised as to the court in which the motion ought to be made, and reference was made to the case of Jones v. Baxter (L. R. 5 Ex. D. 275). CHITTY, J., was of opinion that the motion was correctly made to him.-SOLICITORS, A. Abrahams & Co.

1881 (44 & 45 VICT. c. 61), s. 3.-In the case of Richards v. McBryde, LICENSING STATUTE-COMMENCEMENT-SUNDAY CLOSING (WALES) Act, which came before a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division at Westminster on December 7, by way of appeal against a conviction by justices, the question which has before been pointed out as likely to arise under the Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, 1881-viz., when the Act came into operation-was decided. for keeping open his premises on Sunday, September 11, 1881, during hours The justices had convicted the appellant, a duly licensed victualler, Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, 1881. That section provides that the Act shall Wales on the day next appointed for the holding of the general annual licensing commence and come into operation with respect to each division or place in meeting for that division. Under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, ss. 1 and 2, annual licensing meetings must be held between August 20 and September 14, and they must be appointed twenty-one days before. The Act was passed on August 27, so that all the days for holding the general annual licensing meetings throughout Wales had then been fixed. The court (GROVE and LOPES, JJ.) held that the day next appointed meant the day next appointed after the passing of the Act, and that, as no day could be appointed after August 27, the Act could not come into operation this year. They accordingly quashed the conviction.-SOLICITORS, Churton, Chester; Simpson & Co., for Kelly & Keene, Mold.

and under circumstances which would have been lawful but for section 3 of the

SOLICITORS' CASES.

CHANCERY DIVISION.-Before FRY, J.

Dec. 1.-In re Raven, A Solicitor.

This was a motion on behalf of a client, asking to have it declared that a certain letter signed by her was not a binding agreement in writing within the Solicitors Act, 1870, or that it should be set aside and declared void as not being fair and reasonable, to have certain costs taxed, and the balance of certain sums received by the solicitor for her paid over to her.

The agreement set up by the solicitor as binding under the Act was in the form of a letter signed by the client as follows:

"In consideration of your obtaining for me a loan of £3,100 at six per cent. interest, with life assurance on the security of my annuity of £400 per annum, you are to pay thereout the old law costs due to you, agreed at fifty guineas, and the legal expenses of my mortgagees' solicitors, to retain the balance as commission for procuring the loan, you handing me a net sum of £2,850, less principal and interest, and expenses due on mortgage payable to Messrs. Taylor & Co., and on receipt of the £2,850 I will give you a full discharge." This agreement was not signed by the solicitor.

It appeared from the affidavit of the client that in April last she requested Mr. Edwin James (formerly Q.C.) to endeavour to obtain a loan on an annuity which was subject to a prior mortgage, and that on the instructions of Mr. James Mr. Raven acted as her solicitor in negotiating the payment off of the old loan, and raising a new one of a larger amount; that the letter in question was prepared by Mr. Raven, and brought to her by Mr. James, and she signed it at his instance without explanation, and that a new loan for £3,100 was obtained from the National Life Assurance Society, which, as far as she could

recollect, was disposed of in the following way:-£2,073 3s. 2d. was paid to the prior mortgagee, £32 was paid to the solicitor of the lending company for his costs, £156 9s. 7d. was retained by the insurance company for one year's premiums on an insurance on the borrower's life, £250 was deducted by Mr. Raven or his clerk for alleged costs, £50 retained for sums owing by Mr. James to Mr. Raven, £50 was retained by one Signor Barri, a gentleman connected with Mr. James, and who had acted in the matter while he was ill, and which was subsequently paid to Mr. James, and £200 retained by Signor Barri for services rendered, and that not more than a balance of £288 7s. 3d. was ever received by herself.

The solicitor alleged that the sums actually retained by him or his clerk amounted only to £213 8s. 7d., and that the sums received by Barri and James were paid to them by the client herself.

Cookson, Q.C., and Oswald, for the client, contended that the case was governed by the decision of the Queen's Bench Division in In re Lewis (24 W. R. 1017, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 724), that an an "agreement in writing" within section 4 of the Act must be an agreement by both parties, and that both parties must sign their names upon the agreement; otherwise a so itor could always place a document signed by himself only and containing terms favourable to himself before the client, and then contend that the client was bound by it. In In re Lewis the document was signed by the solicitor and not by the client, whereas in the present case the document was signed by the client and not by the solicitor, but the principle of the decision applied. At any rate, the agreement, if it was an "agreement in writing under the Act, was not, under the circumstances, "fair and reasonable," and the court would set it aside.

J. Pearson, Q.C., and H. R. Hodson, for the solicitor.

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FRY, J., said that the solicitor set up the agreement as precluding the jurisdiction of the court to order delivery and taxation of his bill of costs. The agreement was signed by the client only, and she said that it was not an "agreement in writing" within the meaning of the statute. He thought that What was an proposition was correct. agreement in writing"? There must be a document showing all the terms of the bargain between the parties, showing by writing the accession of both parties to those terms. It was so decided in In re Lewis, a decision which, in his opinion, was necessarily correct, having regard to the words of the Act. He therefore held that the alleged agreement was no bar to the jurisdiction. But the court had, also, power under section 9 to declare such an agreement void if its terms should not be deemed by it to be "fair and reasonable." It was clear that before the client could be bound by such an agreement, the matter ought to have been fully explained to her, and it was not suggested that any explanation of any sort was given to her. On the contrary, it appeared that the letter was prepared by Raven, and sent by him to James, who was personally interested in getting the client to sign it. Therefore, if it was necessary to set the agreement aside, his lordship would do so on the ground that it was not fair and reasonable. Therefore, the order asked for must be made, and, having regard to the solicitor's conduct, all the costs of the application must be paid by him.-SOLICITORS, T. & E. T. Randall; Raven.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. WILLIAM JOHN CARRICK, solicitor, of Wigton, has been appointed Registrar of the Wigton County Court (Cirenit No. 3), on the resignation of his father, Mr. Joseph Carrick. Mr. Carrick, jun., was admitted a solicitor in 1873.

Mr. WILLIAM EDWARD GRAY, solicitor, of Exeter, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

The Right Hon. Sir ROBERT JOSEPH PHILLIMORE, D.C.L., one of the judges of the Probite, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, has been created a Baronet. Sir R. Phillimore is the second son of Dr. Joseph Phillimore, chancellor of the diocese of Oxford, and was born in 1810. He was educated at Westminster, and at Christ Church, Oxford, where he graduated second class in classics in 1831. He was admitted a member of the College of Advocates in 1839, and he was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1841. He was M.P. for Tavistock in the Liberal interest from 1853 till 1857, in which year he became a Queen's Counsel. He was for several years chancellor of the dioceses of Oxford and Chichester, and in 1862 he was appointed Queen's Advocate and received the honour of knighthood. In 1867 he succeeded the late Dr. Lushington as judge of the Admiralty Court, dean of the Arches, and master of the Faculties, and he was also sworn a Privy Councillor, and on the passing of the Judicature Acts he became a judge of the High Court.

The Right Hon. EDWARD SULLIVAN, Master of the Rolls in Ireland, has been created a Baronet. Sir E. Sullivan is the eldest son of Mr. Edward Sullivan, of Dublin, and was born in 1822. He was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in 1848. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1858, and a serjeant-at-law in 1860. He was Law Adviser to the Lord-Lieutenant from 1861 till 1865, and was Solicitor-General for Ireland from March till June in the following year. In December, 1868, he became Attorney-General and was sworn a member of the Irish Privy Council, and in 1870 he became Master of the Rolls in Ireland. Sir E. Sullivan was M.P. for Mallow in the Liberal interest from 1865 till his elevation to the bench.

Mr. SAMUEL SOUTHALL, solicitor, of Worcester, has been elected Town Clerk of that city, on the resignation of his father, Mr. Thomas Southall.

Mr. HUGH REILLY SEMPER, who has been appointed Chief Justice of Gibraltar, in succession to Mr. George Philippo, who has been appointed Chief Justice of Gibraltar, was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Hilary

Term, 1866, and has been for several years a puisne judge for the colony of British Guiana.

Mr. Justice CHITTY and Mr. Justice NORTH have received the honour of Knighthood.

Mr. JOHN GREENFIELD, solicitor (of the firm of Greenfield & Abbott), of 37, Queen Victoria-street, E.C., has been appointed a Commissioner for the purpose of examining Witnesses and taking Affidavits in the Supreme Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

DISSOLUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS.

ALFRED CHARLES CRONIN and JOHN LEDBROOK RIVOLTA, solicitors, 22, Southampton-street, Bloomsbury (Cronin & Rivolta). October 13. The said business will, in future, be carried on by the said Alfred Charles Cronin alone at the aforesaid address.

THOMAS ENGLISH STEPHENS and WILLIAM DANGER, solicitors, Liverpool, (Stephens & Danger). November 15. The said William Danger will continue to carry on the practice. [Gazette, Dec. 2, 1881.]

COMPANIES.

WINDING-UP NOTICES.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN IRON AND TIN PLATE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Dec 1, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Dec 10. Few, Fenchurch st, solicitor for the petitioner GENERAL PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Chitty, J, has fixed Dec 13 at 12 at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator LLANDRINDOD WELLS FREEHOLD LAND AND BUILDING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before Jan 6, to send their names and addresses to Edwin Alfred Wright, Brecon. Friday, Jan 20 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and debts

NORTH VOREGUM GOLD MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Nov 29, directed to be heard before Bacon, V.C., on Dec 10. Carter, Old Jewry chmbrs, solicitor for the petitioners

OIL VARNISH MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Bacon, V.C., has fixed Dec 7 at 12 at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator UNIVERSITIES CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, LIMITED.-Hall, V.C., has, by an order dated Nov 26, appointed Frederick Whinney, 8, Old Jewry, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before Dec 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to the above. Tuesday, Jan 10, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims.

WALA WYNAAD INDIAN GOLD MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Nov 30, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Dec 10. Venning and Co, Gresham House, solicitors for the petitioner.

WETLY BRICK AND POTTERY COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before Dec 31, to send thair names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William Cornish Cooper, 20, King's Arms yd, Coleman st. Monday, Jan 9 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts or claims. [Gazette, Dec. 2.] CAMBRIAN MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V.C., dated Nov 25, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the above company be continued. Linklater and Co, Walbrook, solicitors for the petitioner

GENERAL PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J., dated Nov 5, it was ordered that the above company be wound up. Flower and Nussey, solicitors for the petitioner

LIBERIA COFFEE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before Jan 7, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William Lewis Clifton Browne, 5 Queen st. Monday, Jan 16, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

PHOTO-CERAMIC COLOURING COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V.C., dated Nov 25, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Gibney, Queen st pl, Cannon st, solicitor for the petitioner

ROTHERHAM, MASBRO', AND HOLMES COAL COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before Dec 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Robert John Evans, Rotherham. Wednesday, Jan 11, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

TAWE TIN PLATE COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V.C., dated Nov 25, it was ordered that the winding up of the company be continued. Crowder and Co, Lincoln's inn fields, agents for Gaskoin and Fry, Swansea, solicitors for the peti tioners

THAMES AND CHANNEL STEAMSHIP COMPANY, LIMITED.-Chitty, J., has fixed Friday, Dec 16, at 2, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator UNIVERSAL STEAM TRAMCAR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Dec 2, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Dec 17. Hillearys and Taylor, Fenchurch bldgs, solicitors for the petitioner [Gazette, Dec. 6.]

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY.

HULL RECHABITE SAVINGS' FUND AND EQUITABLE LOAN SOCIETY.-By an order made

by Chitty, J, on Nov 26, it was ordered that the society be wound up. CollyerBristow and Co, 4, Bedford row, agents for Leak and Co, Kingston-upon-Hull, solicitors for the petitioner. [Gazette, Dec. 6.]

COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. BLACKBURN AND DISTRICT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-Creditors are required, on or before Jan 2, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Henry Edge, Tackett's st, Blackburn, or to Thomas Hayes Sheen, North Johr. st, Liverpool. Monday, Jan 16, at 11, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

GUARDIAN PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-The V.C. has, by an order dated Nov. 21, appointed Adam Murray, King st, Manchester, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before Jan 3, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. Jan 17 at 11 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims [Gazette, Dec. 2.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. BARNSTAPLE SECOND ANNUITANT SOCIETY, Boutport st, Barnstaple, Devon. Dec 3 [Gazette, Dec. 6.]

HEALTH, COMFORT, AND ECONOMY PROMOTED by Chappuis' Reflectors, 69, Fleetstreet.-[ADVT.]

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