Page images


Would it not then be more correct to disallow all commissions on loans, not actually a chattel real, but an estate of inheritance. The words, "notand to charge for all goods the lowest cash price, and allow on all claims withstanding any testamentary disposition," do not (or at least, need not) qualify a fixed rate of interest, say simple interest at five per cent. from the date the mode in which a chattel real vests in the executor, but rather refer to of the loan or supply of goods, and disallow all extra interest ? Creditors

the fact that, but for the statute, the estate would never vest in the executor

at all. Since this gives a sufficient meaning to the words “notwithstanding would then be placed side by side according to their real advances, instead of being ranked according to the fictitious amounts for which

any testamentary disposition," why should not such a disposition have a

“qualified effect," if such an effect seems to be given by a subsequent part of they press the debtor to agree to make himself liable to them.

the enactment? The second point is this : no penalty is at present attached to an

“The personal representatives are to be deemed in law' the deceased's omission on the part of a bankrupt to have kept proper accounts, and it

heirs and assigns. Can a man liave two sets of heirs and assigns in this would, no doubt, be too much for the law to lay down rules as to the | matter ? class of accounts to be kept in all kinds of business, and require con. [This was the very question we ourselves put. And why not " in this formity to these rules. But there is one safeguard for solvency which matter' as well as in others ? There can be no doubt that the deceased has is, I believe, required by the law of some continental nations, and does two sets of heirs and assigns in fact, one at common law, and the other by not throw any heavy burden upon men of business. This is, to require this statute. Herein we see some reason for & doubt; and we regret that every trader to make out a balance-sheet of his affairs once in every

“ H.” has no lawful authority to remove it by another akase.] twelve months, and to enact that if he goes bankrupt, and cannot produce

“With reference to section 31, sub-section (1), you say the interpretation his last balance-sheet, or produces one which is manifestly fictitious, he

clause defines the term instrument absolutely as meaning .deed, will, inclosure is guilty of a misdemeanor. Would it not be well to introduce some

Award, and Act of Parliament'; but it only says ' Instrument includes deed,'

&c. There are instruments which do not come under the terms, deed, will,' similar provision into our law ?

&c., and a writing declaring trusts of land is one." The third point is this : the object of white-washing a man is to induce

[If" H.” will ponder the interpretation clause, we think he will discover him to be industrious, which he will not be if he knows that the fruit that includes" obviously does not always mean "includes, among other of his labours will go to his creditors and not to himself. It is well things." In the present case, the things wbich are enumerated as being enough, therefore, that after a discharge in bankruptcy, the bankrupt included under 'instrument,' are all things which every body would have should be entitled to keep whatever he can earn. But is there any prin Gupposed to be so included, without being told. Thero was therefore do ciple which makes it desirable that he should be allowed to keep whatever sense in enumerating them, unless the enumeration was intended to be may come to him by successior, devise, bequest, or by any means other exhaustive.] than his own industry? Would it not be right that all such property

“ In article 10 you see in the use of the word 'income'in section 10, sub. should vest in his trustee in bankruptcy until all the just claims of his section (!), ambiguity leading to

section (1), ambiguity leading to the inference that a beneficiary under a creditors were satisfied? If the law were framed on this principle, and

settlement of real estate may exercise the rights and powers given by the sec

tion. But section 2 (iii.) says, 'In relation to land, income includes rent and the claims of creditors were adjusted according to the first point men. tioned in this letter, I fancy it would be found that the deficiencies shown

[This remark of our correspondent agrees remarkably ill with bis last one. under bankruptcies would be very much less than at present.

For it would be quite enough to justify us in what we said if “income" I hope to elicit some expression of opinion upon these matters.

includes, besides rerts and profits, the other kind of income to which our PRUDENS.

remark referred.]

"In reference to section 11, sub-section (1), you foreshadow 'inconvenient consequences' from your inference that the latter part of the sub-section does

not, like the preceding part, affect to give a remedy to the termor after a THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVEY. severance of the reversion, the words 'the several parts thereof ' not being

repeated in such latter part. The obligation aforesaid,' in the latter pari, ANCING ACT,

is the obligation .. . . incident to .. . the several parts' of We have recently received several queries on this subject. “O.” (not

the reversionary estate ; and in the previous part of the sub-section the our former correspondent) writes :

reversionary estate is still spoken of as that reversionary estate,' even after

severance, and as including the several parts.'“ With reference to the wording of section 60 of the Conveyancing Act, is

[We venture to think that the words “the obligation aforesaid” mean there anything in the following doubt ?

simply " the obligation of a covenant entered into bg a legsor with reference "A power to enter the premises and view their state of repair is ordinarily

to the subjeot-matter of the lease," and that by no rule of grammar to be given to lessors by means of a covenant that it shall be lawful for the lessor

found anywhere outside the letter of our correspondent can those three words to enter, &c. Now, if the lessor only were Damed, would the benefit of such

be permitted to carry on their back the whole of the previous enactment in & covenant enure to his heirs or his executors, administrators, or assigns, as the

| which they occur.] case might be ?

" You say the parties are nowhere empowered to exclude the operation of " It does not appear to be a covenant to do any act to the lessor or for bis

sections 10, 11, apd 12. Does not section 66, sub-section (2), empower them benefit.

to do so ? It provides that nothing in this Act shall be taken to imply that “Nor, perhaps, does section 10 help in the matter, because, although it is a

the . ..adoption in connection with .. .. any provision having reference to the subject-matter of the lease, it is not on

. .

transaction of any i... other powers, &c., is improper.'' the lessee's part to be observed and performed

[By this time H." seems to have puzzled himself into a very thick fog. " It might be held, however, to amount to a covenant to do the act

| We are quite unable to guess where his argument lies, but we are able without of permitting the landlord to enter, and in that way might inure to the benefit

the least difficulty to answer his question in the negative. We think that of his representatives.

section 66, sub-section (2), has no more to do with the matter than any “I should be glad, if you think it worth while, to see some remark opon

other section picked quite at random from the Statute-book. How on earth this point in your journal.

does the fact that anything which can be excluded may be excluded without (We think that such a covenant is properly said to be “on the lessee's part

impropriety, tell us whether or no we can exclude sections 10-12? Moreover, to be observed and performed.”]

those sections have notbing whatever to do with "powers.''] Our former correspondent “H." has sent us some further remarks upon our criticism of the Conveyancing Act, which are much more formidable from number than from strength of argument. We deal with them separately as follows :

Clause 25 of the Prisons Act, 1877, provides that a prisoner who is confined " In article 9 you say, in reference to section 30, sub-section (1), “The most in a prison situated beyond the limits of the county, borough, or place in obvious time to which to refer the words “is vested ” would be the time of which he was convicted of his offence, shall, at the time of his discharge, be the creation of tbe trust.'

taken back at the public expense to the county, borough, or place in which he “ This literal construction is excluded by the divisional heading • VI. was so convicted. By the Standing Order of the 24th of April, 1878, also, Trust and Mortgage Estates on Death.'

every prisoner is to be furnished with breakfast on the authorized scale on We have never been able to satisfy ourselves what degree of authority is thr morning of his release, and, if destitute, and his destination be at such a possessed by the heading to which “H.” refers; and we think the question a distance that he cannot reach it by mid-day, he is to be furnished with 12Jz. difficult one, though he seems to think it very easy. But at all events we of bread and 4oz. of cheese for his dinner, and, under the same circumstances, hardly think that the words "at death” can be allowed to fix the time of if the prisoner is unable to reach his destination on foot by mid-day, the every verb in the present tense occurring in the chopter. And we are quite governor may, at his discretion, provide for his passage by public conveyance clear that what “ H..” suggests is a very improper mode of drafting im. to his destination. Mr. Charles Leigh Clare, bon. secretary « Prison Confer. portant statutes.]

ence," of Park-lane, Higher Broughton, Manchester, has addressed a letter to “ You inquire, 'In what manner does a chattel real bequeathed by a testator the prison officials throughout the kingdom asking them for information as to vest in the executor ?' The language of the Act is a chattel real vestiog their practice as regards these provisions, and whether the prisoner's attention in' the personal representative; tbat is, of course, virtute officii, for the is called to either clause 25 of the Prison Act of 1877, or the Standing Order words, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition,' ignore any devise or of the 24th of April, 1878, either on or before his discharge. Mr. Clare bequest, and, if words mean anything, render it nugatory. How could the says : -"I find that in some prisons nothing is done for the prisoners unless personal representatives, by assenting to a devise of the trust estates, con, they make application, which they seldom do, because they have no knowstitate the devisee of such estates a trustee,' without giving a qualified effect ledge either of the clause in the Act or of the Standing Order. The system of to 'a testamentary disposition, which is plainly to have no effect ?"

alternative prisons is a strong argument in favour of the prisoner being made [Of course, if the matter is settled by the words, “which is plainly to hive aware of the provision for his return home, otherwise be may be turned no effect," there is an end of it. But we see nothing to justify this destitute upon the streets of a strange town, and liable at once to be taken as a peremptory ukase. “H." seems quite to have forgotten that the property is rogue and yagabond, or led to commit theft to supply his immediate wants."

[ocr errors]

been brought in Scotland or Ireland, were constantly brought in London, CASES OF THE WEEK.

Another objection raised was that the plaintiff's original affidavit ought to have stated, as was required by rule 3 of order 11, that the defendant was a

British subject. That rule, however, was only directory, and did not say that PRACTICE-ORDER FOR SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION-MOTION TO Dis.

the order for service out of the jurisdiction should be discharged if it was not CHARGE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW NO CAUSE OF ACTION

complied with. That was discretionary. If it turned ont that an affidavit on ARISING WITHJN JURISDICTION-AFFIDAVIT THAT DEFENDANT IS A BRITISH

that point was immaterial, the court would not discharge the order. The SUBJECT--ORD. 11, RR. I, la, 3.-In & case of Fowler v. Barstow, before the

object was this : a British subject might be served with the Queen's writ Coart of Appeal on the 1st inst., some questions of importance arose as to the

anywhere. But if the defendant was not a British subject, and was residing practice with regard to service out of the jurisdiction. 'Rule 1 of order 11 pro

out of the Queen's dominions, he must not be served with a writ, but only vides that "service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a writ

with a notice of a writ, because foreign Governments would object to the of summons may be allowed by the court or a jadge (inter alia) whenever any

service of the Queen's writ on one of their own subjects residing in his own act or thing sought to be restrained or removed, or for which damages are

country. The object of the requirement of rule 3 was that the court might sougbt to be recovered, was or is to be done or is situate within the jurisdic know whether a writ or a notice ought to be served. But if the defendant tion." And by rule la (June, 1876) it is provided that in actions relating to wag residing in Scotland, this was immaterial ; for anyone who was residing contracts, “ the judge, in exercising his discretion as to granting leave to serve

within the Queen's dominions might be served with the Queen's writ. If he suchi writ or notice on a defendant out of the jurisdiction, shall have regard to

was a foreigner, he owed the Queen a temporary allegiance while he was the amount or value of the property in dispute or sought to be recovered, and

| within her dominions. Though the rule was not so well expressed as it might to the existence in the place of residence of the defendant, if resident in Scot

bave been, that was the object of it, and no court would discharge an order for land or Ireland, of a local court of limited jurisdiction, having jorisdiction in

service of a writ out of the jurisdiction in Scotland or Ireland because the affi.

servi the matter in question, and to the comparative cost and convenience of pro

davit did not state that the defendant was a British subject. Upon the affidavits ceeding in England or in the place of such defendant's residence, and in all the

ha l his lordship came to the conclusion that it was proved that the plaintiff had not above-mentioned cases no such leave is to be granted without an affidavit & caus

avit , a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction. The order for service must, stating the particulars necessary for enabling the judge to exercise his discre

therefore, be discbarged, with costs in both courts. BAGGALLAY, L.J., thought tion in manner aforesaid, and all such other particulars (if any) as he may re.

that an affidavit might be made for the purpose of showing that there was not quire to be shown." And rule 3 provides that “every application for an order

any cause of action arising within the jurisdiction. But as a general rule (except, for leave to serve such writ or notice on a defendant out of the jurisdiction

perhaps, in a case of gross fraud) the affidavit ought not to go beyond that, shall be supported by evidence, by affidavit, or otherwise, showing in what

though, of course, it might sometimes be impossible to avoid going to some place or country such defendant is or probably inay be found, and whether

extent into the merits of the case. LUSH, L.J., said he was very giad to find such defendant is a British subject or not, and the grounds upon which the

that the practice had been established in the Chancery Division in the same application is made." In the present case the action was brought against a wa

way as it had been in the common law divisions ever since the Judicature Act, defendant, who was residing in Edinburgh, to recover some moners which had and, indeed, ever since the Common Law Procedure Act. Under that Act, been paid by the plaintiff, in consequence, as he alleged, of some false repre

the practice was for the plaintiff to effect service out of the jurisdiction at his sentations made to him by the defendant and some other persons with regard to

peril. If the defendant was a British subject, the plaintiff was at liberty to the value of a colliery. The plaintiff obtained, ex parte, an order giving him

serve him with a writ; if the defendant was (for instance) a French subject leave to serve the writ upon the defendant at Edinburgh. This order was ob

residing in France, the plaintiff must give him a notice in lieu of serving him tained upon an affidavit by the plaintiff, which purported to show that he bad

with a writ. The reason for this distinction was obvious; it would be an a cause of action against the defendant arising within the jurisdiction. The

affront to the Sovereign of a foreign country for an English court to assume writ having been served on the defendant, he entered a conditional appearance,

jurisdiction over bis subjects in their own country. Under the Common and then applied to Chitty, J., to discharge the order for service and to set

Law Procedure Act the question of jurisdiction arose upon the plaintiff ask. aside the service. In support of bis application be filed an affidavit contradict.

ing the leave of the court to proceed under the writ, and on that application ing the plaintiff'saffidavit, and the plaintiff filed another affidavit in reply. Chitty,

affidavits could be filed by both sides. Under the Judicature Act the leave J., did not allow either the defendant's affidavit or the plaintiff's affidavit

of the court must be obtained before the writ was issued at all, and this was a in reply to be used, and he refused the application. The defendant appealed,

very great improvement in the practice. Rule 1 of order 11 implied that the and it was urged on his behalf that, though the action did not relate to a con.

court was to ascertain the fact whether the cause of action arose within the juris. tract, still the affidavit required by r. la, ought to be made ; that the plain

diction, and it must, therefore, be open to the defendant to show that it did tiff's original affidavit on which the leave to serve the writ was obtained was

not.-SOLICITORS, Keeping & Co.; F. W. Snell & Greenip. insufficient, because it did not state that the defendant was a British subject; and that, at any rate, the defendant's affidavit and the plaintiff's affidavit in reply ought to be admitted, and that from them it appeared that the plaintiff LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT-CLOSE OF LIQUIDATION-DISCHARGE OF had no cause of action arising within the jurisdiction. On the other side it DebtoR-SALE OF PROPERTY TO TRUSTEE-BANKRUPTCY Act, 1869, ss. 15, was said that it was contrary to the practice to allow a contest of affidavits on 17, 47, 48, 49, 125—APPEAL FOR Costs—JUDICATURE Act, 1873, 8. 49.-In the question whether the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction. The a case of Ex parte Wainwright, before the Court of Appeal on the 1st inst., a court (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.), overruled the two question arose as to the effect of a sale of the property of a liquidating debtor objections to the plaintiff's first affidavit, but they held that the other affidavits to the trustee in the liquidation. The trustee, not having been able to sell ought to have been admitted. JESSEL, M.R., said that the note by way of the property of the debtor, which consisted mainly of a hotel which was subpreface to the rules provided that the old practice was to remain in force where Lject to some mortgages, made an offer to buy it himself, and the creditors at no other provision was made by the Act or Rules. It sometimes happened that a meeting summoned for the purpose passed a special resolution Accepting the practice in the Court of Chancery differed from that of the Common Law the offer. The resolution authorized the trustee "to purchase the debtor's Courts, and the Court of Appeal bad decided that in such cases the better estate, which consists among other assets of the Queen's Hotel and premises, practice was now to be adopted in both divisions of the High Court. But and certain tenements adjoining, at such a price as will, after paying the prin. where the old practice had been the same in chancery and at common law, of cipal and interest on the mortgage, leave sufficient to pay the creditors a course it still remained in force, if no other provision was made by the dividerd of five shillings in the pound and all the costs, charges, and exrules. Under the Common Law Procedure Act, which was rather stricter penses of the liquidation." The resolution was afterwards sanctioned by the in its terms as to service out of the jurisdiction than the Judicature Act, court. The trustee made the payments mentioned in the resolution, and the it was the practice to allow a defendant who bad been served out of the hotel and all the other then existing assets of the debtor were transferred to jurisdiction to enter a conditional appearance and to file an affidavit to him, but no resolution was passed by the creditors formally closing the liqui. show that the plaintiff had no canse of action arising within the dation, or granting the debtor a discharge. The debtor was not in any way jurisdiction, and, if the court was satisfied that this was so, it discharged a party to the purcbase by the trustee or the resolution which approved of the service out of the jurisdiction. But, if the court doubted where the it, nor did he know of it for some time afterwards. But when he did know of cause of action had arisen, it put the plaintiff under an undertaking to it he set up in business again, and carried it on for several years without any insubmit to have his action dismissed if it should ultimately turn out that the terruption by the trustee, who was not aware of the fact. When however, he did cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction. The practice was equally become aware of it, he took possession of the debtor's stock-in-trade, claiming well settled in the Court of Chancery, though it was in some respects more lax it on behalf of the creditors in the liquidation. The judge of the county court than that at common law. The Court of Chancery made the original order beld tbat the effect of the resolution authorizing the sale to the trustee was to for service simply upon the statements in the plaintiff's bill, but even then close the liquidation, and to release the debtor's after-acquired property, and the defendant could enter a conditional appearance, and could put in an affi- that it would under the circumstances be inequitable for the creditors to claim davit denying that there was any cause of action within the jurisdiction. The it, and he ordered the trustee to withdraw from possession. Bacon, C.J., held very point was decided by Lord Westbury in Foley y. Maillardet (1 D. J. & S. (30 W. R. 62) that the after-acquired property had not been released, and 389), and that settled the practice. This being so, the practice as to the ad- that the trustee was entitled to it. But he ordered the trustee to pay his costs missibility of affidavits to contest the question whether the cause of action of the applications to the court personally, on the ground that he ought not to arose within the jurisdiction was before the Judicature Act the same in the have purchased the estate without first resigning his office of trustee. And be courts of equity and common law, and the practice was, therefore, still the ordered that the debtor should also pay his own costs. The Court of Appeal same. But it must not be supposed that his lordship intended to decide that (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and Lush, L.JJ.) affirmed this decision, affidavits were admissible to try the merits of the case; he only decided that except as to the costs. JESSEL, M.R., said that the requirements of section 125 they were admissible upon the question of the forum. The affidavits in the as to the close of the liquidation and the discharge of the debtor bad not been present case ought, therefore, to have been admitted. It had been argued complied with. By sub-section 5 of section 125 the property of the debtor that the affidavit which was required by rule la of order 11 in cases of action vested in the trustee in a liquidation just as it would do in a trustee in a bank. on contract ought to be required also in other cases. But that was not the ruptcy—that is, all the debtor's property at the commencement of the liquida. true construction of rule la. That rule was carefully limited to that part of tion, and all his after-acquired property, so long as the liquidation lasted and rule 1 which dealt with cases of contract. Rule la was made because of com- | be was undischarged, vested in the trustee. In a bankruptcy the afterplaints which had arisen that actions for small debts, which ought to have acquired property of the bankrupt would never be free from the claims of the

[ocr errors]

creditors except for the provisions of sections 47 and 49 as to the close of the before it by a notice of motion, that being the ordinary mode appointed by bankruptcy and the discharge of the bankrupt, but sub-section 9 of section rule 50 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, for bringing persons before it. 125 expressly provided that the provisions of those seccions should On behalf of the bill of sale holder it was argued that a re-hearing ought not to not apply to a liquidation by arrangement. The close of a liquidation and the be granted, because the original order could not have been appealed from, and, discharge of the liquidating debtor were, by sub-section 9, made to depend therefore, an appeal ought not to be allowed indirectly by means of a re-hearing. entirely on a resolution of the creditors, and it might bapped, though it was It was said tbat, inasmuch as by section 17 of the Common Law Procedure Act, found by experience that this was not generally the cage, that the debtor 1860, a summary order in interpleader, if made by a judge of one of the superior would be worse off, if the oreditors were hostile, in a liquidation than in a common law courts was final, any order of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, in bankraptoy. The resolation which was passed in the present cage said pothing exercising the same jurisdiction by virtue of section 65 of the Bankruptcy Act, about the close of the liquidation or the discharge of the debtor. If a must also be final. The Court, however, held that they must construe section resolation amounted in substance to a cloge of the lignidation or a digobarge, no | 71 of the Bankruptcy Act, which says that "any order of the Chief Judge doubt that would be enough, but in the present case the resolution amounted

in Bankruptcy . .. shall be subject to an appeal” literally. to bothing more than a sale of the debtor's existing assets to the trustee. The

JESBEL, M.R., said that the Legislature might well have thought sanotion of the court was necessary, because without it the trustee could

tbat the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy did not stand in the same position as a not have become the purohaser. BAGGALLAY and Lush. L.JJ., pointed out judge of one of the superior courts, and that an appeal should be allowed in that the case of Ex parte Tinker (22 W. R. 794, L. R. 9 Ob. 716), was distin

the one case which was not allowed in the other. The salary of the Chief guishable, because there the sale of the property was to the debtor himself,

Judge was inferior in amount to tbat of a judge of one of the superior courts, at a price to be paid by instalments, and it was clearly intended that he

and it was a mere accident that the present Chief Judge was also a judge of should pay for it by means of his future earnings. It would, therefore,

the High Court. At any rate the words of section 71 were plain, and the have been inequitable to allow the creditors after the sale to seize the

court was bound to follow them. And in the course of the argument JESSEL, property which he bad since acquired.

M.R., intimated a doubt whether, notwithstanding the decision to the contrary The question of costs was raised by a cross- notice of appeal given by

of the Exchequer Division in the case of Dodds v. Shepherd (24 W. R. 322, the trustee. And the court held that, inagmuob as, if the trustee had not

L. R. 1 Ex. D. 75), an appeal cannot, since the Judicature Act, be brought acted improperly, he would have been entitled to his costs out of the

from a summary decision on an interpleader summons by a judge at cham.

bers to a divisional court. He said that, if Dodds v. Shepherd was rightly estate, the case was within one of the recognized exceptions from the

deoided, the provision of section 20 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876 rule that there cannot be an appeal for costs ; in this respect, as in the

(39 & 40 Vict. c. 59) that when by any Act of Parliament the decision of any recent case of Farrow V. Austin (25 Solicitors' JOURNAL, 640, L. R. 18

court or judge whcse jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court is made final, Cb. D. 58), not following the rule which was laid down in Taylor y. Dowlen (17 W. R. 779, L. R. 4 Ch. 697), and in In re Hoskins' Trusts (25 W. R.

an appeal sball not lie in any such case from a decision of the High Court to

the Court of Appeal was unnecessary, and the ratio decidendi of Dodds v. 779, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 281), that a trustee who had been ordered to pay costs Shenherd was inconsistent with that of Garnett v. Bradley (26 W. R. 698. Dersonally could not appeal from the order, though he claimed the costs ont L R 3. Apo. Cas. 944). of the trust fand. And the coort held that, in buying the property openly

| On the question whether a re-hearing ought to be allowed the material with the sanction of the court, the trustee had been guilty of no impropriety,

he court, the trustee bad been guilty of po impropriety, facts were these:- When the interpleader motion was heard by the registrar and that he ought to bave been allowed bis costs out of the estate, and

the managing clerk who appeared for the execution creditor (and whom they varied the order of the Chief Judge in this respect. And, as to the

the registrar in the first instance believed to be a solicitor, and there. debtor's costs, the court were of opinion that tbe case was one of great fore entitled to address the court as an advocate) asked that the hearing hardship, and that all parties believed at first, when the sale was made, might be adjourned, in order that his client might have an opportunity that the liquidation was at an end, and that the debtor was free to trade of considering and answering the affidavit which had been made by the bill of sale on his own account. They therefore ordered his costs of the proceedingsholder. The registrar declined to accede to this application, and said that the to be paid out of the estate, but directed that the trustee's costs should clerk could cross-examine the bill of sale bolder who was present. The clerk bave priority.-SOLICITORS, Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co.; Pyke & Parrott. accordingly cross-examined him, and it was not till after the cross-examination

that the registrar discovered that the clerk was not a solicitor. Upon

making this discovery the registrar declined 10 hear him any further, and INTERPLEADER ORDER-COURT OF BANKRUPTCY-RIGHT OF APPEAL

made the order in favour of the title of the bill of sale holder, the order ORDER IN DEFAULT OP APPEARANCE-ORDER ON MOTION-RE-HEARING

purporting to be made “upon hearing the evidence" of the bill of sale holder. 1 & 2 WILL. 4, c. 6-1 & 2 VICT. C. 45—COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1860

Under these circumstances the Court of Appeal beld that the re-hearing asked (23 & 24 Vict. c. 126), ss. 14, 17-BANKRUPTCY Act, 1869, ss. 65, 71–

for ought to have been granted. JESSEL, M.R., said that what had taken JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, ss. 19, 50–ORD. 1, R. 2.-In a case of Ex parte Streeter,

place was contrary to the ordinary rules which govern the administration of before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question was raised whether justice in this country. The ordinary practice on an interpleader summons an order in interpleader, made by the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy opon motion

was to give the party in possession an opportunity of considering and answerby the sberiff, determining the rigbts of the parties in regard to the goods

ing the affidavit of the adverse claimant. The registrar ought to have granted which were the subject of the adverse claims, could be appealed from, the

an adjournment when it was asked for. Moreover, it was not the practice of amount in dispute being under $50. Goods were seized by the sheriff under

the court to decide without bearing both sides. When the registrar found & f. fa. for costs, taxed at £32, wbich had been ordered to be paid by

that the managing clerk was not a solicitor he was right in declining to hear the Court of Bankruptcy, and the goods were claimed by the holder of a bill of

him as an advocate, but he ought not to have decided against the client sale wbich the execution debtor bad given to secure a sum of £75. The

without giving bim an opportunity of being heard, either personally or by counsel sberiff served on the execution debtor and the bill of sale holder a notice of

or by a solicitor. The case was really decided against him without bis being motion in the Court of Bankruptcy, that they sbould appear on a day named

heard at all, and this was a miscarriage. And, if the managing clerk was and state the nature of their respective claims to the goods, and maintain or

not qualified to act as an advocate, he could not be treated as qualified to relinquish the same, and abide by such order as might be made. On the

cross-examine å witness. The client was entitled to employ some qualified bearing of this motion on the day named, the registrar, acting as Chief Judge,

person to cross-examine, and it did not follow that the result of a crossdecided in favonr of the bill of sale holder. The order, on the face of it,

examination so conducted would not be different from that which had already appeared to have been made in default of appearance of the execution creditor,

taken place. A re-hearing must, therefore, be allowed. But the miscarriage inasmuch that it stated that he was "not legally represented.” In fact, a

bad, to a great extent, been caused by the solicitor's clerk taking on himself to managing clerk of some solicitors appeared for him, but, as the clerk was not himself a solicitor, the registrar declined to hear him as an advocate.

act as an advocate, which he ought not to have done. If he hud told the

The application to the Court of Appeal was by the execution creditor by way of

registrar that he was only a managing clerk, no doubt the registrar would at

once have adjourned the case. Therefore no costs would be given to either appeal from the refusal of the registrar to grant a ro-bearing of the inter

side. The sheriff's costs would be paid by the person who was ultimately pleader motion. It was urged on bebalf of the appellant that it was nécessary to apply for a re-hearing, because the order being, on its face, an order in

unsuccessful.-SOLICITORS, Smiles de Co.; J. E. S. King; W. Maynard. default” of appearance, could not have been appealed from. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and Lu$H, L.JJ.), however, held that this APPEAL TO CHIEF JUDGE IN BANKRUPTCY_TIME_NOTICE TO REGISTRAR was not so. JESSEL, M.R., said that, though the execution creditor did not OF COUNTY COURT_" FORTHWITH "_BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 143, appear on the hearing of the motion, he was still entitled to appeal from the 144.-In a case of Ex parte Lamb, on the 1st inst., the Court of Appeal order, on the ground that the bill of sale holder had not made out his title. affirmed the decision of Bacon, C.J. (30 W. R. 64). The question was as to LUSH, L.J., said that the execution creditor was in possession of the goods. the construction of rule 144 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870. Rule 143 provides The other claimant might have been barred if he did not appear ; not so the that an appeal from a decision of a judge of a county court shall be entered execution creditor.

with the registrar of appeals within, and not later than, twenty-one days from An objection was taken to the registrar's order, on the ground that the decision, and rale 144 provides ihat, “upon entering an appeal, a copy of he ought not to bave determined the rights of the claimants at once, the appeal notice shall be sent forthwith by the appellant to the registrar of but ought to have first made an order calling on them to interplead, by the court appealed from, who shall forth with file the same with the proceedanalogy to the practice of the common law courts under the Interpleader Acts, inge." It has already been decided that in computing the twenty-one days under which the adverse claimants were called on to interplead at first by under rule 143 Sundays and holidays on which the offices of the court are rule of court, or, after the Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 45, and the Common Law entirely closed are not to be counted. In Ex parte Lamb an order was made Procedure Acts, by summons in chambers, this being in either case the act of by a county court on July 12. An appeal was entered with the registrar of the court, not, as a notice of motion was, the act of the sheriff ; and it was said appeals at the London Bankruptcy Court on Friday, August 5, the last day that, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy in interpleader possible, and the deposit of £20, required by rule 145, was paid to the Bank of arobe under section 65 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, which conferred on it | England the same day. Both these things must have been done before four * all the powers, jurisdiction, and privileges possessed by any judge” of the p.m., inasmuch as the offiee of the Bankruptcy Court and the Bank are closed at superior courts of common law, the jurisdiction must be exercised in the same that hour on Friday. A copy of the appeal notice was sent by the London manner as it was exercised in those courts. The Court, however, held that agents of the appellant's country solicitors by post to the country solicitors, it was sufficient that the Court of Bankruptcy should have the parties brought and was received by them on the morning of Monday, August 8, and they sent it to the registrar of the county court the same day. The presumption there was, in fact, a majority of the sbareholders who desired that the company was that the letter was not posted until the night mail from London on should go on. CHITTY, J., was of opinion, on the evidence, that the directors Saturday, Angust 6. There was no evidence to show why the letter was not were not responsible for the advertisements, and that on the whole there was a posled on the afternoon of August 5, wbich could bave been done up to seven mine to be worked, and which was capable of being worked at a profit. The p.m., nor indeed when it was posted. If the letter had been posted before capital that the company now had consisted of a sum of some £9,000 or seven p.m. on August 5 it would, in the ordinary course of the post, bave £10,000 in addition to this mine, and having referred to the fact that the been received early the next morning, and the notice could bave been sent by majority of the shareholders desired to go on with the company, he could not the country solicitors to the registrar of the county court before the closing of say that the amount was inadequate. In his opinion the company could not his office, which closed at one p.m. on Saturday. Bacon, C.J., Leld that the be said to be a bubble within the meaning of the authorities, and he did not notice to the registrar of the county court had not been given “ forth with” | consider it was “just and equitable" it should be wound up. The petition within the meaning of rule 144, and consequently tbat the appeal was too late, would be diamissed, with costs, except that, as the company had caused some and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., aod delay and expense by not producing their books, he should allow the petitioner BAGGALLAY and Lush, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that the authorities to deduct a sum of £10 from his costs in respect of the delay.-SOLICITORS, showed that the word “forth with " must be construed having regard to the Best, Webb, f. Co.; Mead f Daubeny. circumstances of the case and the object of the enactment in which it was found. When the act to be done could be done without delay it ought to be done at once. The object of the rule was that in a country case the respond


CHARGE.—In the case of Holloway v. Cheston, also before Chitty, J., on the ent might have an opportunity of finding out at the end of the time for

5ta inst., an application was made for leave to appeal from an order made by appealing, and at the office of the court of the district in which he lived, whether there was to be an appeal or not. The present appellant chose to put

bis lordship on a summons heard in chambers. It was stated that the whole

sum involved in the action was very small, and that both parties desired to off entering bis appeal in London till the last day, and under the circum

save the expense of re-hearing the summons before his lordship in court. stances the notice had not been sent to the registrar of the county court

CHITTY, J., said that the practice of the Master of the Rolls was to adjourn within a reasonable time. Lugh, L.J., said that all that the rules required to be done was in effect a continuous act to be done within a reasonable time,

into court all summonses on which an opportunity was desired of appealing

to the Court of Appeal; the object of such a practice was to enable the court and it was not reasonable, under the circumstances, to lose the opportunity of

above to have (as it was entitled to have) the benefit of the decision of the posting the letter between four p.m. and seven p.m. on August 5.-SOLICITORS,

judge in the court below. The applicant's proper course was to move to disPritchard, Englefield, & Co.; Phelps, Sidgwick, & Biddle.

charge the order made in chambers, and then after the matter bad been argued in court, the decision given might be appealed from.-SOLICITORS,

Goldberg & Langdon ; Kingsford, Dorman, & Co. PRACTICE-LUNACY_LUNATIC TRUSTEE-APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEE - VESTING ORDER-TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, s. 5.-In a case of In re Watson, before the Court of Lunacy on the 3rd inst., a question arose as to a vesting PRACTICE-ISSUE DIRECTED BY CHANCERY Division-NEW TRIAL-MOTION order under the Trustee Act, 1850, with regard to stock in the name of trus POR WHERE MADE.-In a case of Nordon v. Nordon, also before Chitty, J., on tees, one of whom was a lunatic. The petition was by two trustees of a legacy the 5th inst., a motion for a rule nisi for a new trial was made before him (the third being a lunatic so found by inquisition), and it asked for the ap. in an action commenced in the Chancery Division, where an issue had been pointment of a new trustee of the will of the testatrix, so far as related to the directed by the Master of the Rolls, and had recently been heard by Pollock, legacy, jointly with the petitioners, and in substitution for the lunatic, and B., and a special jury at Westminster. A question was rais-d as to the court that the right to call for a transfer and to transfer into their own names the

in which the motion ought to be made, and reference was made to the case of sum of bank anpuities in which the legacy was invested, and to receive the Jones . Baxter (L. R. 5 Ex. D. 275). CHITTY, J., was of opinion that the dividends thereon, might vest in the petitioners jointly with the new trustee. avotion was correctly made to him.-SOLICITORS, A. Abrahams & Co. The petition was entitled in Lunacy and in the Chancery Division, and in the matters of the Trustee Act, the lunatic, and the trusts of the will, and was addressed to the Lord Chancellor and to the High Court. The court (JESSEL,


1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 61), s. 3.-In the case of Richards v. McBryde, M.R., and BAGGALLAY, L.J.) ordered the petition to be amended by striking

which came before a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division at Westout the beading in the Chancery Division, and they made an order vesting the

minster on December 7, by way of appeal against a conviction by justices, the right to transfer the stock in the petitioners alone. They held that it was un

question which has before been pointed out as likely to arise under the Sunday necessary to appoint a new trustee, thus departing from In re Nash (29 W. R.

Closing (Wales) Act, 1881-viz., when the Act came into operation-was 294, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 503), and that under section 5 of the Trustee Act the

decided. The justices had convicted the appellant, a duly licensed victualler, right to transfer could be vested at once in the petitioners. And they held that

for keeping open his premises on Sunday, September 11, 1881, during hoars tbe petition ought not to be entitled in the Chancery Division, in this

and under circumstances which would have been lawful but for section 3 of the respect not following In re Pearson (25 W. R. 853, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 982), and In re Currie (27 W. R. 369, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 93), which, however, were not

Sunday Closing (Wales) Act, 1881. That section provides that the Act shall cited to the court.-SOLICITORS, J. H. Hortin; Freshfields of Williams ;

commence and come into operation with respect to each division or place in Pawle & Fearon.

Wales on the day next appointed for the holding of the general annual licensing meeting for that division. Under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, ss. 1 and 2, annual licensing

meetings must be held between August 20 and September 14, and they must be PRACTICE-SETTING ASIDE AWARD-RULE NISI-STATEMENT OF GROUNDS. appointed twenty-one days before, The Act was passed on August 27, so that -In a case of Mercier v. Pepperell, before Chitty, J., on the 2nd inst., a all the days for holding the general annual licensing meetings throughout Wales motion was made to set aside an award, and the notice of motion did not bad then been fixed. The court (GROVE and LOPES, JJ.) held that the day next state the grounds upon which the motion was made. An objection was taken appointed meant the day next appointed after the passing of the Aci, and that the notice of motion shonld state with particularity the grounds upon that, as po day could be appointed after August 27, the Act could not come which the application was based in analogy to the practice at common law, into operation this year. They accordingly quashed the conviction.-SOLICIwhere the rule nisi stated distinctly the several grounds upon which it had TORS, Churlon, Chester ; Simpson & Co., for Kelly d Keene, Mold. been granted. There was also a cross-motion to enforce the award. CHITTY, J., said that the rule of practice adopted at common law was a convenient one, and should be held to apply to the Chancery Division. Where a rule nisi was obtained, the grounds of objection to the award were fully stated, as the

SOLICITORS' CASES. court required great particularity in such matters, and in analogy to such

CHANCERY DIVISION.—Before Fry, J. practice he thought the grounds for the motion should be stated on its face.

Dec. 1.-In re Raven, A Solicitor. In his opinion it was improper to allow a person to challenge an award unless This was a motion on behalf of a client, asking to have it declared that a he stated the grounds upon which he intended to move. The only ground certain letter signed by her was not a binding agreement in writing within the alleged at the bar against the award was wart of finality on the face of Solicitors Act, 1870, or that it should be set aside and declared void as not being the award, but no such ground was stated in the notice of motion, fair and reasonable, to have certain costs taxed, and the balance of certain sums and, therefore, he thought the motion should be dismissed, and with costs. received by the solicitor for her paid over to her. He should state that he bad offered terms upon which he would have The agreement set up by the solicitor as binding under the Act was in the allowed an amendment of the notice of motion, but they had not been accepted.

form of a letter signed by the client as follows:He did not consider tbat the objection as to want of finality could, moreover

“In consideration of your obtaining for me a loan of £3,100 at six per cent. be raised on the cross-motion to enforce the award, upon which an order was of interest, with life assurance on the security of my annuity of £400 per course.-SOLICITORS, Hooper; Labrou.

annum, you are to pay thereout the old law costs due to you, agreed at fifty guineas, and the legal expenses of my mortgagees' solicitors, to retain the

balance as commission for procuring the loan, you banding me a net sum of COMPANY - WINDING UP — "JUST AND EQUITABLE" - INSUFFICIENT £2,850, less principal and interest, and expenses due on mortgage payable to CAPITAL-FRAUD.-In a case of Re Shepherp's Wheal Rose (Limited), Messrs. Taylor & Co., and on receipt of the £2,850 I will give you a full disbefore Chitty, J., on the 5th inst., an application was made by a charge.” shareholder for the winding up of the company, on the ground that such This agreement was not signed by the solicitor. winding up was “just and equitable.” The petitioner alleged that there were It appeared from the affidavit of the client that in April last she requested various misstatements in the prospectus; moreover, that improper advertise- | Mr. Edwin James (formerly Q.C.) to endeavour to oblain a loan on an annuity ments had been inserted in the newspapers by the directors, that only in which was subject to a prior mortgage, and that on the instructions of Mr. adequate capital had been obtained, that the company was a bubble and a James Mr. Raven acted as her solicitor in negotiating the payment off of the sbam, and that the company bad no mine capable of being worked at a profit. old loan, and raising a new one of a larger amount ; that the letter in question Actions had also been commenced against the directors by shareholders seek was prepared by Mr. Raven, and brought to her by Mr. James, and she signed ing to set aside their allotments, on the ground of misrepresentation in the it at bis instance without explanation, and that a new loan for £3,100 was ob. prospectus. The petition was supported by a large number of shareholders, but tained from the National Life Assurance Society, which, as far as she could recollect, was disposed of in the following way:-£2,073 38. 2d. was paid to Term, 1866, and has been for several years a puisne judge for the colony of the prior mortgagee, £32 was paid to the solicitor of the lending company for British Guiana. his costs, £156 98. 7d. was retained by the insurance company for one year's

Mr. Justice CHITTY and Mr. Justice North have received the bonour of premiums on an insurance on the borrower's life, £250 was deducted by Mr. Kn

Raven or his clerk for alleged costs, £50 retained for sums owing by Mr.
James to Mr. Raven, £50 was retained by one Signor Barri, a gentleman con- |

Mr. John GREENFIELD, solicitor (of the firm of Greenfield & Abbott), of 37, nected with Mr. James, and who had acted in the matter while he was ill, and Queen Victoria-street, E.C., has been appointed a Commissioner for the pur. which was subsequently paid to Mr. James, and £200 retained by Signor Barri pose of examining Witnesses and taking Affidavits in the Supreme Court of the for services rendered, and tbat not more than a balance of £288 78. 3d, was / Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. ever received by herself.

The solicitor alleged that the sums actually retained by him or his clerk amounted only to £213 8s. 7d., and that the sums received by Barri and James

DISSOLUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS. were paid to them by the client herself.

ALFRED CHARLES CRONIN and John LEDBROOK Rivolta, solicitors, 22, Cookson, Q.C., and Oswald, for the client, contended that the case was Southampton-street, Bloomsbury (Cronin & Rivolta). October 13. The said governed by the decision of the Queen's Bench Division in In re Lewis (24 business will, in future, be carried on by the said Alfred Charles Cronin alone W. R. 1017, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 724), that an an “agreement in writing" at the aforesaid address. within Fection 4 of the Act must be an agreement by both parties, and that Thomas ENGLISH STEPHENS and WILLIAM Danger, solicitors, Liverpool, both parties must sign their names upon the agreement; otherwise a soi.itor (Stephens & Danger). November 15. The suid William Danger will continue could always place a document signed by himself only and containing terms to carry on the practice.

[Gazette, Dec. 2, 1881.] favourable to himself before the client, and then contend that the client was bound by it. In In re Lewis the document was signed by the solicitor and not by the client, whereas in the present case the document was signed by the client and not by the solicitor, but the principle of the decision applied. At any rate, the agreement, if it was an “agreement in writing” onder the Act,

COMPANIES. was not, under the circumstances, “ fair and reasonable," and the court would set it aside. J. Pearson, Q.C., and H. R. Hodson, for the solicitor.

WINDING-UP NOTICES. FRY, J., said that the solicitor set up the agreement as precluding the

Joint Stock COMPANIES. jurisdiction of the court to order delivery and taxation of his bill of costs. The agreement was signed by the client only, and she said that it was not an

LIMITED IN CHANCERY. "agreement in writing" within the meaning of the statute. He thought that


for winding up, presented Dec 1, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Dec 10. proposition was correct. What was an “agreement in writing" ? There

Few, Fenchurch st, solicitor for the petitioner must be a document showing all the terms of the bargain between the parties, | GENERAL PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Chitty, J, has fixed Deo sbowing by writing the accession of both parties to those terms. It was 80

13 at 12 at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator

ANDRINDOD WELLS FREEHOLD LAND AND BUILDING COMPANY. LIMITED,-Creditors decided in In re Lewis, a decision which, in his opinion, was necessarily

are required, on or before Jan 6, to send their names and addresses to Edwin Alfred correct, having regard to the words of the Act. He therefore held that

Wright, Brecon Friday, Jan 20 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating the alleged agreement was do bar to the jurisdiction. But the court had, also, upon the debts and debts power under section 9 to declare such an agreement void if its terms should


presented Nov 29, directed to be heard before Bacon, V.C., on Dec 10. Carter, oid not be deemed by it to be “fair and reasonable.” It was clear that before

Jewry chmbrs, solicitor for the petitioners the client could be bound by such an agreement, the matter ought to have OIL VÄRNISI MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Bacon, V.C., has fixed Dec 7 at 12 been fully explained to her, and it was not suggested that any explanation

at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator

UNIVERSITIES CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, LIMITED.-Hall, V.C., has, by an order dated of any sort was given to her. On the contrary, it appeared that the letter

Nov 26, appointed Frederick Whinney, 8, Old Jewry, to be official liquidator. Creditors was prepared by Raven, and sent by him to James, who was personally inter are required, on or before Dec 31, to send their names and addresses, and the ested in getting the client to sign it. Therefore, if it was necessary to set particulars of their debts or claims, to the above. Tuesday, Jan 10, at 12, is appointed the agreement aside, his lordship would do so on the ground that it was not

for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims.

WALA WYNAAD INDIAN GOLD MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, fair and reasonable. Therefore, the order asked for must be made, and, having

presented Nov 30, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Dec 10. Venning and Co, regard to the solicitor's conduct, all the costs of the application must be paid Gresham House, solicitors for the petitioner. by him.-SOLICITORS, T. & E. T. Randall ; Raven.

WETLY BRICK AND POTTERY COMPANY, LIMITED.---Creditors are required, on or before

Dec 31, to send thair names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William Cornish Cooper, 20, King's Arms yd, Coleman st. Monday, Jan 9 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts or claims.

(Gazette, Dec. 2.] CAMBRIAN MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V.C., dated Nov 25,

it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the above company be continued.

Linklater and Co, Walbrook, solicitors for the petitioner

GENERAL PRINTING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, Mr. WILLIAM JOHN CARRICK, solicitor. of Wigton, has been appointed / J., dated Nov 5, it was ordered that the above company be wound up. Flower and

Nussey, solicitors for the petitioner Registrar of the Wigton County Court (Circuit No. 3), on the resignation of | LIBERIA Coffee COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before Jan 7, to his father, Mr. Joseph Carrick. Mr. Carrick, jun., was admitted a solicitor send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to in 1873.

William Lewis Clifton Browne, 5 Queen st. Monday, Jan 16, at 12, is appointed for

hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims Mr. WILLIAM EDWARD GRAY, solicitor, of Exeter, has been appointed a Photo-CERAMIC COLOURING COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V..., Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

dated Nov 25, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Gibney, Queen st pl,

Cannon st, solicitor for the petitioner The Right Hon. Sir ROBERT JOSEPH PHILLIMORE, D.C.L., one of the ROTHERHAM, MASBRO', AND HOLMES COAL COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required,

on or before Dec 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their judges of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, has been created a

debts or claims, to Robert John Evans, Rotherham. Wednesday, Jan 11, at 12, is

appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims more, chancellor of the diocese of Oxford, and was born in 1810. TAWE TIN PLATE COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V.C., dated Nov 25, He was educated at Westminster, and at Christ Church, Oxford, where

it was ordered that the winding up of the company be continued. Crowder and Co. he graduated second class in classics in 1831. He was admitted a mem.

Lincoln's inn fields, agents for Gaskoin and Fry, Swansea, solicitors for the peti.

tioners ber of the College of Advocates in 1839, and he was called to the bar at THAMES AND CHANNEL STEAMSHIP COMPANY, LIMITED.--Chitty, J., has fixed Friday, the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1841. He was M.P. for Tavistock in the Dec 16, at 2, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator Liberal interest from 1853 till 1857, in which year he became a Queen's


up, presented Dec 2, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Dec 17. Hillearys and Counsel. He was for several years chancellor of the dioceses of Oxford and Taylor, Fenchurch bldgs, solicitors for the petitioner Chichester, and in 1862 he was appointed Queen's Advocate and received the

[Gazette, Dec. 6.] honour of knighthood. In 1867 he succeeded the late Dr. Lushington as judge


HULL RECIABITE SAVINGS FUND AND EQUITABLE LOAN SOCIETY.-By an order made of the Admiralty Court, dean of the Arches, and master of the Faculties, and

by Chitty, J, on Nov 26, it was ordered that the society be wound up. Collyer. he was also sworn a Privy Councillor, and on the passing of the Judicatare Bristow and Co, 4, Bedford row, agents for Leak and Co, Kingston-upon-Hull, soliciActs he became a judge of the High Court.

tors for the petitioner.

[Gazette, Dec. 6.] The Right Hon. EDWARD SULLIVAN, Master of the Rolls in Ireland, has

COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. been created a Baronet. Sir E. Sullivan is the eldest son of Mr. Edward | BLACKBURN AND DISTRICT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.--Creditors are required, on or

before Jan 2. to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or Sullivan, of Dublin, and was born in 1822. He was educated at Trinity College,

claims, to Henry Edge, Tackett's st, Blackburn, or to Thomas Hayes Sheen, North Dablin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in 1848. He became a Queen's Johr. st, Liverpool. Monday, Jan 16, at 11, is appointed for hearing and adjudicaCounsel in 1858, and a serjeant-at-law in 1860. He was Law Adviser to the

ting upon the debts and claims

GUARDIAN PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-The V.C. has, by an order dated Lord-Lieutenant from 1861 till 1865, and was Solicitor-General for Ireland from

Nov. 21, appointed Adam Murray, King st, Manchester, to be official liquidator. March till June in the following year. In December, 1868, he became Creditors are required, on or before Jan 3, to send their names and addresses, and the Attorney-General and was sworn a member of the Irish Privy Council, and in particulars of their debts or clainis to the above. Jan 17 at ll is appointed for hear. 1870 he became Master of the Rolls in Ireland. Sir E. Sullivan was M.P. for

ing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

[Gazette, Dec. 2.1 Mallow in the Liberal interest from 1865 till his elevation to the bench.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. Mr. SAMUEL SOUTHALL, solicitor, of Worcester, has been elected Towa Clerk BABNSTAPLE SECOND ANNUITANT SOCIETY, Boutport st, Barnstaple, Devon. Dec 3 of that city, on the resignation of his father, Mr. Thomas Southall.

(Gazette, Dec. 6.] Mr. Hugh REILLY SEMPER, who has been appointed Chief Justice of Gibraltar, in succession to Mr. George Philippo, who has been appointed Chief

HEALTH, COMFORT, AND ECONOMY PROMOTED by Chappuis’ Reflectors, 69, FleetJustice of Gibraltar, was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Hilary street. CÁDVT. 1


[ocr errors]


« PreviousContinue »