Page images
PDF
EPUB

creditors, I see nothing in them of which husbands have a right to complain. It can hardly, however, be anticipated that an Act making such sweeping changes in what was once considered one of the main principles of our law can take effect without giving rise to some litigation, and it has already been remarked that the present law of the wife's right to pledge her husband's credit as his agent for necessaries will probably have to be reconsidered, and that circumstances must arise in which the rule laid down in Debenham v. Mellon and other cases will have to be modified. For the presumption of the wife's right as her husband's agent to pledge his credit was obviously mixed up with and derived from her common law right to be maintained by him, and this again had its origin in the old doctrine of the merger of all the civil rights of the wife in her husband on marriage. But now it would appear that in every case in which the wife orders articles from a tradesman she is to be presumed to make her separate estate liable unless where the contrary is shown (e.g., if she orders them in her husband's name, and they are articles as to which her right to pledge his credit could be inferred from the circumstances). Astradesmen will not always know what ladies have and what have not separate estate, they may sometimes be placed in a difficulty whom to sue. These, however, are small matters, and the Act is, on the whole, a large step in what the majority will consider the right direction. Mr. Druce's address at our last provincial meeting contained some very sensible and judicious remarks upon the difficult subject of the codification of various branches of our law. Few of us then anticipated that an attempt in this direction would have been successfully made during the last session. This has been done in respect of the law of bills of exchange, cheques, and promissory notes, a subject, I need hardly say, of considerable importance to all members of the community who have anything to do with mercantile transactions. The Bill is understood to have been drawn by Mr. M. D. Chalmers, whose valuable and clearly arranged treatise on the subject will be known to many of you. The care and attention which he has evidently bestowed upon it, and the names of the members of the Select Committee in each House of Parliament to which the Bill was referred, and who devoted a more than usual amount of trouble to the consideration of its numerous details, are the best guarantees we can have for the work having been well done, of which time and experience must be the only real tests. The professional man and his client will now both have the advantage of being able to find the whole of this important branch of law comprised in an Act of 100 sections arranged under convenient heads. The 74th section of the Act, which was introduced in the Lords' Committee, contains provisions in the case of non-presentation of cheques for payment and the failure of the banker on whom they are drawn, which will to some extent modify, but in a direction which seems just, the law as to the absolute discharge of the drawers as it was considered to be settled by previous decisious. The discussion at our Brighton meeting last year showed how equally opinion was divided amongst us as to the policy which should govern legislation in reference to the vexed question of bills of sale. Most of us were probably disposed to take the view abstractedly, that there was no reason why a poor man possessed of furniture or other moveable chattels should be deprived of the ordinary right, which possessors of all other classes of property enjoy, to raise money upon the security of his chattels if he could find people to lend it. On the other hand, there were many who said that whatever might be the abstract merits of the question, it was found in practice that the classes who were most tempted to borrow upon their small moveable property were so exposed to oppressive treatment from the worst kind of moneylenders, that it was to the interest of the community at large that they should to a certain extent be protected from the consequences of their own follies or necessities, and their rights of borrowing upon such securities limited and prescribed. This latter has been the view ultimately taken by the Legislature, which, by the Bills of Sale Act just passed, and coming into operation on the 1st of November next, has absolutely prohibited all securities of this nature under £30. Moreover, every bill of sale is to be void (apparently not only as regards third parties, but as between grantor and grantee) unless registered with seven clear days after execution (section 8). A schedule of the effects comprised is compulsory, and it will not have operation over any other or over after-acquired property, but actual growing crops are exempted from the operation of this provision, and also new plant or trade machinery put up in substitution for any mentioned in the schedule. This Act is to be construed together with the Bills of Sale Act of 1878, and therefore it would seem that, under the 6th section of the new Act and the 5th section of the principal Act taken together, a mortgage of a factory comprising any plant and machinery which come within the definition of "personal chattels" under the 4th section of the Act of 1878 must still be registered as to the latter, and that in case of an addition to the buildings and plant after the mortgage, the new plant would not be covered by the old security. This is a point which has probably already attracted attention among our friends in the manufacturing districts, where securities on this description of property are most common. The Act also strictly defines in what cases only the mortgagee is to be entitled to take possession of his security; and as it repeals the 20th section of the Act of 1878, which took chattels comprised in a duly registered bill of sale out of the order and disposition clause under the Bankruptcy Acts, the effect would appear to be that all the old difficulties affecting a bill of sale from a trader in case of bankruptcy are revived as to bills of sale by way of security for money after November 1, 1882. Nevertheless as one of the cases in which, under the 74th section of the new Act, a mortgagee is to be entitled to seize the chattels comprised in a bill of sale is on the grantor's becoming a bankrupt, it is by no means clear what construction will be put upon these apparently inconsistent clauses of the Act. The logical result of making all bills of sale void which are not registered within seven days, would seen to have been to give full effect, even as against bankruptcy, to those which are so registered, at all events, unless there were some laches on the part of the secured creditor in asserting his rights. But it seems in doubt whether this will be the result under the

Act. The special requirements of the Act of 1878, as to the execution and attestation by a solicitor of bills of sale, is done away with after the 1st of November, 1882, and only the ordinary attestation required. As to the bill of sale itself, not only is a form given in the schedule of the Act, but the unusual provision made that the instrument shall be void unless “made in accordance with" the form. What construction will be put upon these words, or why they were used instead of the more ordinary phrase "in the form or to the effect" of that given in the Act, I have not seen explained; and it seems at first sight undesirable that the security of any document of importance should depend upon the verbal memory of the practitioner, or upon his having a copy of the Act at hand whenever he is called on to prepare a security. With the exception of the Inferior Courts Judgments Extension Act, 1882, which will enable the holders of judgments of inferior courts in England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively, to utilize these judgments in corresponding courts in other parts of the United Kingdom without the necessity of bringing fresh actions, and of a section in the County Courts and Salaries Act, which repeals the unrepealed portion of the 91st section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, and prohibits the recovery of fee or reward for appearing or acting on behalf of any other party in a proceeding in a county court by any other person than a solicitor of the Supreme Court, I believe we have now exhausted the legislation of last session specially interesting to our profession. Nothing has been done or attempted in bankruptcy, though doubtless this important subject will receive the early attention of the Legislature. Within the experience of many of us, public opinion has completely swung away from what has been termed the official side of the pendulum towards the plan of leaving entire control of the estate in the creditors' hands, and having learned by bitter experience that in a considerable proportion of cases this control is found in practice either not to exist or to be so weakly (and occasionally, I fear, corruptly) exercised as to be inoperative for any useful purpose, it is now swinging back again with full vigour towards the official side, in which direction any forthcoming changes of the bankruptcy law are almost certain to be made. The risks in this direction arise from the delays and red-tapeism which are sure gradually to grow around any official system, unless great care is taken to keep them at bay, but this ought not to be an insoluble problem; and they are certainly less serious both in kind and degree than those which have been found by experience to exist in acting upon the erroneous presumption that creditors may always be trusted to look after their own interests. A Bill to consolidate and declare the law of partnership, and another to give still further facilities to the enfranchisement of copyholds, were among the many legislative projects which broke down owing to the political exigencies of the session; and the same cause prevented any progress being made in the very desirable object of enacting a complete code of criminal law. With regard to quasi-legislative changes, the report of the Legal Procedure Committee appointed last year by the Lord Chancellor, together with the report of a committee appointed at a meeting of this society to consider the recommendations of the first-named committee, are understood to have been referred to and considered by the Rule Committee of Judges, who have come to their conclusions thereon, and such conclusions are, it is believed, being put by skilled draftsmen into the form of new rules to be submitted to Parliament in terms of the Judicature Act. Not much of the purport of the alterations which the new rules are intended to carry out has transpired, but the general impression is that they will tend to the simplification and partial abolition of the present forms of pleading in the more common classes of actions, and it is to be hoped that they will introduce other considerable improvements. This will be the proper place to allude to the proceedings taken during the year upon an Act of the year 1881 of great moment to our profession. I refer, of course, to the Solicitors' Remuneration Act. As you are all aware, this Act was avowedly passed as a complement to the Conveyancing Act of the same session, and because it was felt that the alterations made by that Act would render more than ever absurd the old method of paying solicitors by the length of documents, and that some new mode of remuneration, having regard to the professional skill and responsibility incurred rather than to verblage, ought to be adopted. You are also aware how the tribunal under the Act was constituted, and my excellent friend and immediate predeces. for excused himself last year from offering any remarks upon the subject, on the ground of the exceptional duties which were likely to devolve upon him as a member of the tribunal. In fact Mr. Druce, who worthily and efficiently represented this society, and had taken great pains to make himself fully master of the subject, attended all the earlier meetings of that body. They had arrived at their conclusions in the form of a draft order, which, by the terms of the Act, they were bound to send to the council of this society for their suggestions, just when I had the honour of succeeding to the chair; and it fell to my lot to attend the final meeting of the tribunal, when they had to consider and discuss the suggestions and objections the council thought it necessary to make upon the draft. The order, as you are aware, has since been made, and has recently been circulated among you by the council, together with a statement by them in reference thereto. It is unnecessary for me to add to that statement, but perhaps I may be permitted to say that one main reason which induced me, after careful consideration, to take the course I did, was that, having regard to a possible revision of the order at a future date, it might put the profession in a somewhat better position, that one of its special representatives upon the tribunal should have dissented from the order as it now stands, though it is almost unnecessary to state there were many portions of it in which I fully concurred. It is satisfactory for me to know that my predecessor entertained the same view, and had he remained in office would have acted in the same manner. Having said thus much, I am sure the meeting will excuse my adding that I do not think it would be becoming or decorous, or in accordance with the view usually taken in this country of the duties of a member of a quasi-judicial tribunal, for me to go into any further

detail here, or to take an active part in the discussion which will probably arise on the subject upon one of the papers which will be read to you by-andbye. We have thus rapidly gone through the main features of the year's legislation especially affecting our profession. With the exception of the Settled Land Act, which goes to a certain extent upon new lines, all the changes made bave, as regards practice, been in the direction of simplification, and as regards alteration in the law, in the direction of getting rid of fictions and doctrines or decisions which, often useful or right in their origin, have become ill-adapted to the requirements of modern business and society. Indeed, this has been the constant tendency of our legal legislation during the past fifty years. And what immense changes have been made in that period, as to almost all the important branches of the law, during the professional life of many still practising! Let us briefly glance at a few of the most striking. They may be said to have begun just after the passing of the Reform Act of 1832, and to have continued almost without interruption to the present day. It is not quite fifty years since the Uniformity of Process Act (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 39) became law. There are those amongst us who can still remember the course of actions before the passing of that most useful statute, and the famous new rules which were contemporary with it. Those were the days of latitats and original writs, when it was often a matter of the gravest consideration in what form an action apparently of the simplest character should be brought, for no mistake could afterwards be set right. There was no such thing as a consolidation rule in those days. If proceedings had to be taken upon a marine policy bearing the names cf twenty underwriters (no uncommon case), twenty actions had to be commenced, and it not unfrequently occurred that legitimate costs to the extent of several bundred pounds were incurred by the plaintiff's solicitor in a few days after the first step in the actions. In pleadings almost every question could be raised upon the general issue, and a plaintiff, therefore, hardly ever knew what case was going to be set up by the defendant, and had, at enormous cost and great risk of failure, to prepare all kinds of evidence accordingly. This was altered by the new rules before referred to, under which special pleading grew to a sort of science; and these in their turn were displaced by a simpler system with which we are now familiar, originating in the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854. County courts were unknown. A tradesman in a country district, who had sold goods to the amount of £10, unless he and his debtor had the good fortune to reside in some borough which had a court of record, had no remedy against a dishonest debtor, except by action in the superior courts. If he laid the venue in London, the costs of trial there were too serious to be thought of in small matters, while if his solicitor laid it in the country, it could be tried only twice in the year, and from July to the following April his debtor could set him at defiance. Even the assizes of his county were not always held in a central county town, but sometimes in a little place of three or four thousand inhabitants in one corner of the county with no accommodation, and to which he and his witnesses would have to travel perhaps the best part of one hundred miles over roads where there were few coaches and very bad means of access. In those days the simplest bill in chancery extended to 100 folios or more, and the whole case the plaintiff intended to make had to be put three times over, by way of statement, charge, and interrogatory, many of which in simple suits, such as those for administration of estates, grew to be fictitious in their nature, and merely common form. The defendant's answer was nearly or quite as voluminous, and it took weeks and months to get it in; and it was often years before a cause could be brought completely to issue and set down for hearing, when again it had to wait an indefinite period before it could be heard. In real property law, before the passing of the Fines and Recoveries Act, 1834, if an entail had to be barred, the whole fiction first legalized by the decision in Taltarum's case in the time of Edward IV. had to be resorted to at a great cost. It was often very doubtful who should be made tenant to the præcipe; and if a mistake was made as to this (and I can remember several instances of titles where it has occurred) the whole thing had to be gone over again. If a poor married woman inherited a cottage, she could only sell it by levying a fine, which involved a cost of perhaps twenty or thirty per cent. on its value. Every property of any magnitude had one or more satisfied terms assigned to attend the inheritance, to protect it against mesne incumbrances. The titles to all these had to be investigated separately and traced to the origin of the term, and separate deeds prepared for their assignment, which often had to go through the hands of various solicitors unconnected with the purchase, whose charges had to be paid by one of the unfortunate parties interested. These are only a few of the points in which improvements have been introduced. Many of them were not carried without great opposition, and almost all had to wait for years after their necessity was demonstrated to thoughtful minds by the kind of passive resistance which abuses of long standing almost invariably offer to improvement. There were not wanting croakers in those days who insisted that the changes proposed were undesirable, and who predicted the ruin of the profession as the consequence of any alteration, just, as I have no doubt, there are some now who have been making the same prediction over the more recent changes in conveyancing which we have been considering. I advise the younger members of our profession to pay no credit to such vaticinations. The true policy for us to Jursue is to be in the foreground of all well-considered improvements, and as far as possible to facilitate the early and easy dispatch of all classes of business. We may rely upon it that as long as the commerce and business of this great country continue to prosper, the amount of professional work will increase, though the forms of it may change. The great point to secure the future well-being of our profession, and to maintain the social standing and position to which it is entitled, and which of late years have come to be gradually more recognized, is to take care that those entering it should be qualified, both by education and character, to keep and even to raise the standard which it has now attained. As far as professional education is concerned, I think we may say that this is now secured by the examinations which this society has from its earliest days done its best to promote, and

[ocr errors]

which at the present time are brought to a condition effectually keeping out those who are utterly unqualified. But the question of general education is in many respects even more important. The sphere in which an English solicitor is called upon to act has been immensely extended in the lifetime of the present generation. The rapid growth of our colonies, and the enormous increase in all directions of the commercial relations of the country, render it desirable that a solicitor should be a sort of "Admirable Crichton,' with encyclopædic knowledge. We all know that this is becoming increasingly impossible; but the man who has been well educated and taught how to learn has an immense advantage in picking up the needful information in any case of a scientific, technical, or otherwise abstruse character which comes before him. I hope I shall not be considered as going beyond my province if I add that even more important than these is the attainment of that high moral standard in our business relations which we should all endeavour to promote. We have been in times past much abused, and occasionally have still to hear something on this score. A dear friend of mine, who was cut off by long illness and premature death from the seat on the bench which he would have adorned, and to which his well-earned success at the bar would certainly have raised him, used to say that his experience of solicitors was the very reverse of what was often attributed to them; and that so far as he could judge, if other portions of society were in the habit of regulating their actions by as high a standard as that which solicitors were obliged to and did observe, the world would be a much better one than it is. This is the character which I hope our younger brethren will endeavour to maintain-to avoid anything approaching in the slightest degree to sharpness or trickery in the conduct of their business, and, as far as possible, to keep a control over their clients in the same direction; but above all things, to recollect in their conversation or negotiations with their professional brethren, that what they say must be, under all circumstances, implicitly relied on and kept to. Absolute truth and straightforwardness in our relations with each other are the surest method in the long run of conducting our business satisfactorily to ourselves and our clients, to say nothing of the respect of our fellows and other consequences, which the constant and steadfast practice of these qualities will assuredly bring in their train. Mr. TOURLE (London) thought that the time had arrived when no future entails should be permitted and the law of primogeniture in land should be materially altered.

:

Mr. C. T. SAUNDERS (Birmingham) remarked that it would be observed that the power of re-investment of the capital of an estate which had been sold by a tenant for life entitled him of his own motion apparently to reinvest such capital in the purchase, not of freehold estate, which had been the subject of sale, but of a wasting security-namely, an estate of a leasehold character. Thus, under the Act, the following might happen: A tenant for life of a large estate might convert it in the first instance into money, and then apparently of his own motion he might re-invest the whole of the money in the purchase of leasehold property having not more than sixty years' unexpired term. If the tenant for life should be a young man, say twenty-five years of age at the time he so forfeited the settled estate, it was manifest he would be entitled to "eat" the estate if he lived long enough, and practically to exhaust the settled estate. He thought this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Act, and it certainly involved very serious consequences. The powers given to a tenant for life in the way of accepting surrenders of leases and granting fresh leases also appeared to him to go too far. Referring to the very animated discussion which took place at Brighton last year with respect to bills of sale, he thought those who had spoken in opposition to the Act based their opinions upon an insufficient acquaintance with the valuable evidence to be found in the blue-books. He was satisfied the Act would be found to be beneficial to the honest portion of the community.

Mr. B. WAKE (Sheffield) spoke in opposition to the Married Women's Property Aot, which he looked upon as a step in the direction of dissolving the marriage tie. He protested against such an Act being passed without its being discussed by the law societies throughout the country. He ever been invented. observed that the Bills of Sale Act was one of the greatest puzzles that had

Mr. HOWLETT (Brighton) spoke in favour of bills of sale, and gave instances where persons in Brighton had been saved from rain by their

agency.

NEXT YEAR'S MEETING.

The PRESIDENT remarked that the time had now arrived for considering the place of meeting next year.

Mr. G. R. DODDS (London) observed that it was not fair to cast the heavy expenses of these meetings on small towns where there were few solicitors. He moved that before accepting an invitation from any town it should be made a condition that the members of the society should be allowed to pay at least for the banquet which was usually given on these occasions.

Mr. MILLER (Bristol) seconded the motion, which was supported by Mr. F. K. MUNTON (London), Mr. MARIGOLD (Birmingham), Mr. W. SMITH (Sheffield), Mr. M. BATESON WOOD (Manchester), and Mr. W. MELMOTH WALTERS (London), whilst Mr. HOWLETT (Brighton), spoke in opposition. The motion was carried mem. con.

Mr. MUNTON moved that Plymouth be the next place of meeting.
Mr. E. KIMBER (London) seconded the motion.

The PRESIDENT observed that it was usual to wait for an invitation, and the motion was withdrawn.

Mr. MARIGOLD (Birmingham) invited the society to meet there in 1884. He regretted that his society were not in a position to invite them for 1883.

THE LONG VACATION.

Mr. WILLIAM FORD (Gray's-inn, London) read the following paper:After some introductory observations, Mr. FORD said that: More changes

have been made in the law during the last fifty years than in the preceding three centuries. The life of the elder generation of lawyers has been one school-time, a never-ending process of learning and unlearning. Besides alterations in the law, we have seen the chiefships of the Common Pleas and Exchequer extinguished; almost every part of our legal system has been abolished or recast. Only one legal institution remains intact, and that is the time-honoured institution known as "the Long Vacation." This venerable institution has been assailed, and may be attacked again; it is proper therefore that the attention of the profession should be directed to its preservation. These attacks re-appear annually in the daily papers at the end of every summer, when there is a dearth of political news and the courts of law are closed. They mostly proceed from the pens of members of the bar who have not yet won their way to fame, and are naturally desirous to multiply their chances of early success, and to display on a fitting arena the talents of which they are conscious. It would be a shortsighted policy to hold cheap and disregard these periodical attacks on the Long Vacation, because they emanate from men who conceal their names, and have not yet made their mark in the world; and none the less because one of the members of our society has more than once expressed the same opinion in his place in Parliament. It is prudent, therefore, to investigate the merits and uses of the Long Vacation, and to ascertain whether it is for the benefit of the public and our clients that it should be preserved intact, for if this time-honoured institution will not stand that test, it will surely succumb to the assaults which annually recur in some portion or other of the London press. Lawyers can never expect, and ought not to desire, to preserve a state of things which is antagonistic to the general good; nothing is more certain than that in the long run the interests of solicitors are identical with those of their clients. What is good for the client must, in the end, be the best for the solicitor, and it is entirely from this point of view that the question should be argued and decided. Is it, therefore, to the benefit of the public that the courts of law should be open all the year round? I submit the answer should be "No," for the following reasons:-The judges are, for the most part, meu long past middle life, some well advanced in years. Men who work with the brain cannot toil day by day, and every day in the year, with impunity; they will break down and be absent from illness if driven too hard. If, therefore, justice is to be dispensed every working day throughout the year, the number of judges must be multiplied, with a corresponding increase of their satellites. The number of masters, chief clerks, taxing masters, and the staff of all the law offices generally, must, for the same reasons, be augmented, if the various law offices are to be at work de die in diem all the year round. It is easy to see that such an alteration would be costly, though it might be difficult to calculate the exact amount of such additional expense. If chancellors and judges require rest, so do advocates. If there is to be no "close time," the advocate who had advised or appeared in court during the earlier stages of an action might not be accessible or available when most needed at the trial, or in the Court of Appeal. It is not easy to transfuse into the mind of a substituted counsel the res gestas of the earlier proceedings. Still less is it feasible to transfuse into the mind of another solicitor, albeit a partner, all the details, cross-considerations, aims, and objects which ought to be present to the mind of a solicitor who tries an important cause. Again, much of the success of an action depends on the fencing in judges' chambers; it is, therefore, essential that the managing clerk who conducts it should be always at hand; for the knowledge of the details of such fencing, and of the papers, often voluminous and multitudinous, cannot be transferred from the mind of the clerk who conducted the skirmishes into the mind of another clerk who might suddenly attempt to take his place. It is easy to imagine that the interests of the client might suffer if the managing clerk conversant with the various petty, and yet oftentimes important, antecedents of an action should not be available either in chambers or at the trial. Solicitors and their clerks, as well as judges and advocates, need occasional or periodical rest; and as no solicitor can now tell when, or where, or by whom any cause will be tried, I submit that it is to the benefit of the suitor that there should be a recognized interval of leisure, during which the bench, the bar, solicitors and their clerks, should be at liberty to recruit their energies and to prepare for the next campaign. Again, if there is no "close time," will not scientific witnesses of mark and eminence expect larger fees to compensate them for sacrificing the expected ramble over the moors of Great Britain, or the mountains of Switzerland, or the soothing delights of a yachting cruise? Will Sir Frederick Bramwell, Sir William Gall, and Sir James Paget be contented to remain in England in August and September for the fees which they would accept at other times ? Witnesses of eminence, in other walks of life, would require additions to their remuneration if they are expected to be available at a season of the year devoted to rest and recreation. Scientific witnesses cannot be suddenly replaced. It often happens that their testimony, to be of any value, must be based upon inspection and observation of natural, physical, chemical, or other processes, extending over a lengthened period. It is not only supposable, but it is certain, that suitors would suffer if the scientific or skilled witnesses, who had been retained months before, should be absent when most wanted, and that the expenses of litigation would be seriously inflamed if scientific witnesses engage to be at hand at every season of the year, or their numbers would be swelled, to guard against the contingency of one or more absentees at the trial. The employment of a third counsel would be much more common than it is now, as it would be necessary to guard against the contingency of the absence of a single leader, and the devolution of his responsibility upon the inadequate shoulders of his junior. In this assembly I need not dilate on the inflammation of the costs occasioned by a third brief, a third copy of documents used at the trial, and of the shorthand writer's notes for the use of a third counsel. Whether, therefore, we regard the interests of judges, advocates, solicitors, suitors, or the public, it is undesirable that the period of annual relaxation should be annihilated or abridged, and I trust that you will unanimously pass the following resolution :-"That the Council of the Incorporated Law

Society be requested to resist any efforts that may be made from any quarter to abolish the Long Vacation or to curtail its length." These observations are intended to apply strictly to contentious business of an ordinary character during the Long Vacation. The Vacation Judges can continue to deal with exceptional cases. It is probable that the dispatch of administrative business in the chambers of the equity judges might be accelerated and improved by curtailing the Christmas Vacation. The Easter and Whitsuntide holidays are already confined within reasonable and even narrow limits in those chambers.

Mr. SIDNEY SMITH (London) seconded the motion.

Mr. W. H. HERBERT (London) considered the exceedingly long vacation a very great scandal, but did not think its entire abolition would be a benefit either to the public or the profession. He was, however, in favour of its abridg ment, and he would make it a real vacation, the sole business transacted to be confined to simple applications and injunctions, and business of that description.

Mr. E. KIMBER (London) thought the manner in which the business was conducted by the Vacation Judge was a disgrace to our boasted civilization. The burden imposed upon him was far too heavy, for how was it to be expected he could decide two hundred cases in three days? He animadverted strongly on the great pressure of business and crowded state of the courts.

Mr. COLBORNE (Newport) moved as an amendment: "That, in the opinion of the meeting, the Long Vacation might be considerably shortened, to the great advantage of the suitors, without any detriment to the interests of the profession." The shortened vacation, however, could not be made an absolute vacation, especially in the country.

Mr. DEBENHAM seconded the amendment.

Mr. PENNINGTON (London) observed that a committee of the council had passed a special resolution on the subject, which had been adopted unanimously at a very large general meeting of the society. That resolution was binding on the council, whilst nothing that could be done at this meeting could be binding. It would be very unfortunate if they were now to change their front and adopt such a resolution as that proposed by Mr. Ford. The business of the public ought not to be allowed to come to a stop. The amendment was put and carried with only two dissentients. It was then adopted as a substantive motion.

THE PROPOSED EXTENSION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COURTS.

Mr. J. T. WOODHOUSE (Secretary of the Hull Incorporated Law Society) read a paper with this title, as follows :—

After some observations on the evidence given before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1878 on the jurisdiction of county courts, Mr. WOODHOUSE said: The Bill introduced into Parliament for extending the jurisdiction of county courts best known to lawyers is that of the esteemed member for our town, Mr. Norwood, which proposes to increase the present common law limit of £50 to £200, and further proposes to confer upon these courts the same jurisdiction which they now exercise in all cases for the recovery of tenements under the 50th to the 52nd sections of the Act of 1856, where the value of the premises or the rent payable in respect thereof shall not exceed £200. The jurisdiction is now limited to cases where the value or the rent payable in respect thereof does not exceed £50, and the process is known as that for the recovery of small tenements. Further, it is proposed to substitute £40 for £20 as the limit of ejectment cases under the 11th and 12th sections of the Act of 1867, and to empower the court to entertain actions for damages for malicious prosecution; and the Bill contains a clause increasing the salaries of the judges to £2,000 exclusive of travelling expenses, with proper provisions for a pension. The only complaint I have to make of the Bill is that it does not go far enough, inasmuch as it makes no provision for increased equitable jurisdiction, and does not repeal section 39 of the Act of 1856. After thorough consideration of this Bill, and the examination of upwards of thirty witnesses representing all parties concerned, the Select Committee reported: (a) That there should be no increase in the juristhe plaint should be reduced; (e) that the salaries of the judges should be diction of county courts protected by costs; (b) that the court fees payable on increased to £2,000 per annum; (d) that a registrar intrusted with the discharge of judicial functions should not be permitted to practise within his district or elsewhere; and (e) that Mr. Norwood's Bill be approved and propresent exists for the trial of common law cases involving from £50, the ceeded with. The necessity for having some different tribunal from what at present limit, to £200, the proposed limit, was, I should have thought, too obvious for argument. Mr. Hollams, who occupied the presidential chair in succession to Mr. Burton, and who has perhaps had as great, if not greater, experience in contentious practice as any other professional man in the city of London, in his evidence stated that he believed there was an enormous amount of business which is nipped in the bud and cannot progress, on account of the expense of litigation in the High Court; and added that he stopped on an average one case a day of £50 to £200 on the score of expense. There are, therefore, hundreds of mercantile men who, having claims for say £100 or somewhat more, advised that they are quite right and are entitled to recover, are yet compelled to put up with their loss because the expense of litigation in the High Court is so great; and Mr. Hollams expresses his opinion, "that the system of the higher court is not only not adapted to cases of £100, but also £200 or even £300." Quite recently I had a good illustration of this complaint in my own experience. A client, who was an indorsee for value, held a dishonoured acceptance for £58, and after making the best inquiries he could as to the solvency of the acceptor, as he somewhat doubted the drawer, sued the acceptor by a specially indorsed writ in the High Court, the county court having, of course, no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The acceptor ignored application for payment, and the indorsee expected he would pay on receiving the writ; but an appearance was entered, and

application being made under order 14 for judgment, the defendant set up a
defence of fraudulent misrepresentation by the drawer as to some goods
which formed the original consideration for the bill, but of which the plaintiff
indorsee had no knowledge whatever, and so deposed. The master thought
the defendant's allegations were sufficient to shift the onus of proof, and
gave unconditional leave to defend; and as the master's order was made on
the last day for giving notice of trial at the assizes, it was deemed more
prudent to deliver claim and proceed instead of appealing to a judge. Plead-
ings were delivered, defendant administered interrogatories, obtained discovery
of documents, tried to create delay by applying to change venue, and ulti-
mately the action reached trial, and my client obtained his verdict at an expense,
even on this simple claim of taxed costs, amounting to £146, or nearly three
times the amount of the claim. This action, if the law had permitted, could
have been tried in the county court at a tenth of the cost and in much less
time; and this is an illustration of many men's daily professional experience.
There are those, however, who, admitting the necessity for some different
tribunal for dealing with the class of cases I have mentioned, deny the
expediency of making that tribunal the county court, and they desire the
creation of a new tribunal, intermediate between the High Court and the
county court, to be called a district court, but to be, in fact, a branch of
the High Court, with a judge ranking not so high as a paisne judge of the
High Court, but higher than a county court judge, and that these district
courts shall be held only at the larger centres of industry. They urge this
because they object to the county courts, and I think their objections may
be summed up under the following heads :-(1) The public have not
sufficient confidence in the courts. (2) The judges are not men of sufficient
ability or experience to make them a competent tribunal to deal with cases
that would arise under the enlarged jurisdiction. (3) The courts are not
suitable, because they mix up substantial business with trivial business.
(4) No proper bar practising before them. (5) Not sufficient facilities for
obtaining discovery or for hearing interlocutory applications. (6) No
pleadings-and therefore the contending parties do not know what the other
admits or disputes. (7) Interference with the business of the assizes. (8)
Court fees too high. (9) No sufficient appeal. (10) In equity no proper
machinery for working out decrees or taking accounts. Dealing with the
first two objections, it seems surprising, when Parliament has been for so long
continually adding to the very limited jurisdiction originally conferred upon
county courts, limited jurisdiction in equity, and, by the Bankruptcy Act,
869, unlimited jurisdiction in bankrupte y, that persons should be found to
question the fitness of the court to deal with a common law action involving
£200 in value, or to administer the trusts of a will, or otherwise exercise
equitable jurisdiction where the assets or property involved amounts to
£1,000. A county court judge may now hear and dispose of, on motion on
the bankruptcy side of his court, an issue involving, and may grant an
injunction affecting, property of unlimited and, as not unfrequently happens,
of enormous value; as, for example, in cases as to the validity of bills of sale,
the relative rights of trustees and execution creditors, of fraudulent prefer-
ence, and in the settlement of questions arising under the order and disposi-
tion clauses of the Bankruptcy Act, and out of the doctrine of "relation
back," and may exercise the power of committal for contempt for disobedi-
ence to orders of the court; and yet where the same issues are raised by
action at common law (and since the decision of Ex parte Dickin, Re Pollard,
L. R. 8 Ch. D. 377, they have unfortunately for the pockets of litigants,
and, as I venture to think-with all respect to the eminent judges who gave
that decision-for the proper and economical administration of the law of
bankruptcy, to be determined by action at law) a county court judge cannot
entertain them, if the value of the subject-matter of the dispute exceeds
£50. Nay, the anomaly does not stop here, for not only may he entertain
and adjudicate upon issues in bankruptcy of unlimited amount; but he has the
power-which is not unfrequently exercised-of delegating his judicial func-principally disposed of by his able registrar, and motions are heard
tions in bankruptcy (except that of committing for contempt) to his registrar,
who then has the power to exercise the delicate duty of ordering the arrest of
absconding debtors and of granting search warrants, and may sit and
determine, either with or without a jury, issues frequently raised before
him, involving the sifting of complicated facts, discrimination of conflict-
ing evidence, as, e.g. in a case of "custom" under the 15th section of the
Bankruptcy Act, and the consideration of some of the most difficult and
abstruse points of law that can be raised, and invariably are raised in any
bankruptcy issues; and this anomaly reaches truly the height of absurdity
when it is remembered that as the law at present stands, a registrar can-
not, when exercising common law jurisdiction, hear in his court any
defended case, whether it be a servant girl suing her master for a month's
wages, or however trivial it may be. Those who argue against any increase
in the jurisdiction of these courts are bound, therefore, to show that after
thirteen years' experience, the judges have not exercised the unlimited
jurisdiction vested in them by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (and which prior
to the check imposed by the decision I have referred to was very extensive
indeed), with satisfaction to the profession and the public. I challenge
any person to do so. I am aware that as there is a simple, cheap, and
valuable system of appeal, there have been in some districts many appeals;
but not more in proportion than occur in the higher courts. This displays
not so much a want of confidence in the tribunal of first instance as the
necessity of settling by the opinion of the ultimate Court of Appeal, the
construction of a new Act of Parliament, and in many instances where a
decision of the county court has been reversed on appeal to the Vice-
Chancellor sitting as Chief Judge, the ultimate Court of Appeal has
restored the decision of the county court judge. I am not aware that in
Judge Bedwell's extensive circuit (which, according to the number of
plaints issued, ranks second of all the courts of England) there have
been more than six appeals in bankruptcy since he sat eight years ago,
and I believe I am correct in stating that in no single instance has a

decision been reversed. Again, on the question of competency, it should
not be forgotten that, since 1868, many of the judges have had jurisdiction
in admiralty causes up to £300; and who has ever heard any complaint,
other than that the jurisdiction is not sufficiently extensive? As the only
court exercising jurisdiction in the greater portion of the claims cognizable
in admiralty is that of Sir R. Phillimore, the result is that where a claim
in a collision case exceeds £300, litigants with frequently a large number
of witnesses are compelled not to try at the assizes, but to go to London
and incur all the expense of a suit in the Chancery Division, and though
the court cannot now entertain any action of ejectment where title comes
in question, if the annual value or rent of the property exceeds £20, yet
in an action of replevin (another anomaly) its jurisdiction is unlimited,
though title to properties of large value may be involved. But though the
fitness of some of the judges originally appointed for exercising the
jurisdiction proposed to be given might perhaps be questioned, yet
few can cavil at the appointments made in recent years, and the confidence
of the public is best attested by observing the amount of business which
they have allotted to themselves. In 1880, on the common law side
of the courts, 1,095,869 plaints were issued to recover the total sum
of £3,366.474. Judgments were obtained for sums amounting to
£1,681,865; 13,694 of these plaints were for sums between £20 and £50;
that is, in cases where the court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the
High Court; and 296 cases were entered by consent above £50. In addition
to this 921 actions remitted or transferred from the High Court were tried
in the county court; and since the passing of the Employers' Liability Act,
by which it is provided that all claims of whatever amount under that Act
must be commenced in the county court, 118 actions were last year so tried,
and I am quite satisfied that in the current year they will be nearly twice that
number. This is exclusive of upwards of 10,000 petitions ia liquidation and
bankruptcy, and of 373 suits in admiralty. It is obvious that this result must
have greatly affected the High Court, which, if it had not been relieved by
the county court, must have been completely blocked with work. The
number of writs issued in the High Court in 1867 was 127,702. In the same
year was passed the Act which provided that costs should not be recover-
able in the Supreme Courts where the cause of action, if in contract, should
involve an amount less than £20; and in 1868 the number of writs fell to
83,174, being a decrease of 44,528, or nearly a third; in 1869 the writs
issued were 81,778; in 1870 they fell to 72,660; and in 1881 they numbered
only 55,783. The county court plaints in the same
year numbered
1,035,311, the High Court writs recovered £182,993; the county court
plaints recovered £1,601,648. These figures, I think, sufficiently answer
the objections with which I have been dealing. The third objection-
namely, that substantial cases are mixed up with trivial cases-is one which
is not exclusively applicable to county courts; it is a mere matter of classi-
fication and arrangement, and in all the larger courts now this classification
takes place. An excellent arrangement, which only wants a little further
classification to make it perfect, exists at our court. The judge (whose
constant study is to devise the best means for disposing of the work of his
court) sits at Hull three, and sometimes four, days every month. On the
first day he takes cases in which solicitors are not engaged and judgment
On the remaining days he takes cases in which advocates are
engaged according to a classified cause list, which is printed and circulated
a few days prior to the hearing. Each day's list is peremptorily called over
at the sitting of the court, and the undefended cages eliminated from the list,
and the parties at once liberated from further attendance; only fighting cases
remain in the list. This has been proved to work well, and removes any
such objections as the one I am dealing with, and though more days and a
different classification would be required with an extended jurisdiction, this
is a mere matter of internal arrangement. The bankruptcy business is
immediately the parties are ready. I will not stay to deal with the
objection as to the bar. Lord Bramwell is of opinion that bars would not
be prejudicially affected by the proposed change, and all the county court
judges are quite satisfied that there is nothing in this objection, and that the
bar do go and will go wherever there is business, if they are required, and
that the courts form an excellent training school for their subsequent
practice before the higher tribunal. I am quite satisfied from practical
experience that there is nothing tenable in the objections that there are not
sufficient facilities for obtaining discovery and hearing interlocutory appli
cations. The cases even in the High Court are not numerous where
discovery is absolutely necessary; it is a species of machinery that is
too often used to obtain costs, and is very much abused; but where it is
necessary, with some alterations of the rules of court, drawn more closely
upon the lines of the Judicature Rules, no difficulty need be experienced.
The registrar would hear and make orders upon summons, just as
he does now in the district registries of the High Court, with an appeal to the
judge. This appeal could always be heard within a few days, but I apprehend
appeals in such interlocutory matters as were necessary would be rare, and I
would discourage all unnecessary interlocutory applications by making the
applicant, if the court were of that opinion, pay costs. Nor after the resolu
tion passed last year by the Lord Chancellor's Committee, that it was desirable
to abolish pleadings in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, can it
seriously be contended that they should be introduced into the county court.
Nor are they in fact, I submit, in the great majority of cases at all necessary.
Mr. Hollams, whose opinion must always command amongst us the greatest
weight, says, "I have always been an advocate for having no pleadings at all.
I think they add seriously to the expense of litigation, and I think that the
Judicature Act has proved that pleadings are more costly since." If the par-
ticulars of claim at present required by the court rules were given on entering
plaint, and the defendant were required within a specified time before the
court day to give short particulars of defence, that, I am sure, would in nine cases

summonses.

out of ten be sufficient, and let both parties and the court know what the issue to be tried was. Time does not permit me at length to deal with the remaining objections. The High Court will never be short of work; the more facilities you offer for litigation the more work there will be. There is abundance of work now, and always will be, in the Chancery Division alone to occupy the time of the superior court judges, and probably the lords justices might then advantageously be saved the necessity of going on circuit. I admit the court fees are too high and operate most prejudicially on the business of the courts. The mode of appeal is also far from satisfactory. The suitor should be allowed to make use of shorthand notes, as in admiralty and bankruptcy appeals, and I see no reason why the appeal should not, as in bankruptcy and admiralty, be in effect a re-hearing; but the appellant, as in bankruptcy, should be required to give security at the discretion of the court, otherwise a successful suitor who was poor might be unduly harassed and deprived, by the mere length of his adversary's purse, of the benefit of his judgment. I strongly advocate the extension of the equitable jurisdiction to £1,000. It is said that there has been very little equitable business transacted in the county courts, but this is due to the niggardliness of the juris diction. The jurisdiction is not in any degree exclusive but concurrent, the court fees are high and the professional remuneration very low, and this in a great degree e plains why the jurisdiction has been so partially used. The machinery, too, provided for by the rules, is ill-considered and not at all adapted to small matters. The procedure should be settled by practical men. The object has clearly been to copy almost exactly the procedure of the High Court, but it is like utilizing a locomotive engine to draw a bath chair. In extending the jurisdiction to £1,000, I would either make it exclusive or protect it by costs. I venture to predict it would be largely used, and would prove a great boon, with a simplified machinery which the judges themselves can easily arrange by new rules. There would be no difficulty in working out the orders. I have worked three administration suits in the court during the past year most satisfactorily, and at much less expense-one of them being considerably above the £500 limit, and in which some most important points of construction as to the disposition of legacies had to be settled and to argue them in the High Court would have greatly diminished the estate. The county court judges were all of opinion that their several registrars were equal to any chief clerks. Under these circumstances there can be no reason to fear that orders once made would not be properly worked out. I think this makes out a strong case in support of my contention that the equitable jurisdiction should be increased as well the common law jurisdiction. In extending the equitable jurisdiction, I would include the jurisdiction to entertain petitions for winding up companies under the Companies Acts where the nominal capital of the company did not exceed £10,000. The procedure and machinery of the Chancery Division are too elaborate and costly for winding up small companies, and too often the expense entailed consumes all available assets. Surely if the county court is the proper and cheapest tribunal to administer an insolvent estate of a private trader where the assets and liabilities are unlimited, it is as competent, and should be the tribunal to bave the charge of winding up an insolvent business carried on by a number of traders incorporated as one person under the Companies Acts. To give the judges ample time to deal with the additional work that would be cast upon them by an increased jurisdiction, I would intrust the registrars with the power of hearing common law cases up to £5 or £10, with a right of appeal to the judge; and where a point of legal or mercantile importance was involved in any case within this limit, as, for example, in the case of the construction of a charter-party, the solicitor on either side should be at liberty to mark it for hearing before the judge; and it would then be desirable to give effect to the resolution of the House of Commons' Committee that registrars should not, where they exercise judicial functions, also carry on private practice. To make the courts more workable and more efficient, certain reforms must inevitably be introduced. First, the court fees must be reduced. At present a suitor on ordinary plaint pays, up to £20, 18. in the pound on entering plaint, 28. in the pound more before hearing, and when he has got judgment he has to pay a further 1s. 6d. in the pound to enforce it by execution; in other words, to pay £4 10s. to the court on the mere chance of recovering his debt. There would be in the High Court in fees on the same debt to the same point not more than £2 7s. This is, of course, exclusive of any professional remuneration or cost of attendance of witnesses, and is a hardship on tradesmen and suitors, and frequently operates to deter a tradesman resorting to his remedy for his customer's default in payment if he is not very sanguine of his solvency. I would fix a uniform fee on entering plaint of 3s. in all cases over £5, and 6d. in the pound on all cases under. I would do away with much of the routine and intricate procedure now in existence. To issue a default summons and serve it otherwise than by the bailiff of the court, no less than seven forms, inclusive of plaint note, must be prepared. It need not be such a matter of surprise, therefore, that these summonses should have been very little used, especially, indeed, in towns where courts are held at no greater intervals than a month; for, assuming a bailiff to serve a summons the day it is issued, by entering appearance on the sixteenth day a defendant can practically sometimes put off a plaintiff for five weeks. Why not adopt a form of writ similar to that in use in the High Court, on which particulars of claim should be endorsed by the plaintiff? The form should be obtainable at the court or otherwise, and sealed by the registrar in duplicate. Let the writ be served by the plaintiff or by any other person, as is now done in the superior court. If the defendant lives at a distance from the court, allow a fixed sum, whatever the distance, for mileage. I would require defendant to enter an appearance in cases under £20 in twelve days, and above £20 in eight days, and I would give a plaintiff the same facilities to obtain judgment if writ especially indorsed as under order 14 of the High Court. appearance be entered, I would, on an affidavit of service, give plaintiff immediate judgment without the necessity of having to go to the court and formally prove his debt. If appearance should be entered and any application made for judgment within five days, the case should

If no

stand, subject to any special application, and to the usual powers of adjourn. ment for hearing at the court, to be held on the next succeeding court day. I would do away altogether with bailiffs. They have long been the bane of the county courts. Sometimes great delay occurs in the service of a summons, for every defendant is not known to the bailiff. If the service be in the hands of the suitor, there is an interest in effecting service which can never be infused into a bailiff. In the levying of executions, too, the fees having been already paid, the bailiff has so little interest in the matter that he is only too prone to be satisfied with any allegation as to the ownership of the chattels seized, or as to their liability for rent, and to withdraw; and a poor suitor, after incurring great expense, is left perfectly remediless; whereas, if he had the power to intrust the execution of his judgment to a person of his own choosing (who, if deemed necessary, should be previously approved by the court as tit and responsible to undertake the duties of levying warrants), as landlords can do in distress for rents, he would probably, by the exercise of greater diligence, and the personal interest which would accrue. realize his judgment without difficulty. All that should be required to effect the levy should be an authority from the suitor or his solicitor attached to an office copy of the judgment. If bailiffs were abolished an immense amount of the expense which county courts entail would be saved, and I am convinced the result would be that justice would be administered more expeditiously, more certainly, and cheaply. At the conclusion he moved, "That in the opinion of this meeting it is desirable that the county court jurisdistion should be generally extended." Mr. SHACKLES (Hull) seconded the motion. He could not understand why machinery capable of dealing with amounts up to £500 should not be equal to dealing with amounts up to £5,000.

always hold diametrically opposite views with respect to the matter. The Mr. MUNTON (London) said that London and country solicitors would country solicitors availed themselves gladly of the system directly the courts were instituted, and whilst the solicitors in the country were quite satisfied with the way in which the business was conducted, the London solicitors thought that the majority of the county court business in London was carried on in a very unsatisfactory manner indeed, and so long as this was the case the London solicitors would continue to withhold their support from the system. He entirely disagreed with Mr. Woodhouse's motion. If the business of the county court was added to, the confusion would be greater than ever. He thought it desirable that successful juniors should be appointed to the county court bench instead of unsuccessful seniors. Mr. T. MARSHALL (Leeds) quite agreed that the desirability of the ingrease of jurisdiction really depended on the facilities given by competent judges and by amended rules of practice for the jurisdiction to be carried out. In the large towns, such as Hull, Leeds and so on, the practice was large, and the officials were able, by constant practice, to get through their work properly. If the increase of jurisdiction was to work well it ought to be in some way limited to those courts where there was practice enough to enable those who did the work to do it thoroughly and satisfactorily. It was absurd that a man should be obliged to take a case to a superior court when be, and perhaps the defendant also, were desirous of taking it to the county court; but satisfactory provision must be made for the satisfactory discharge of that jurisdiction in the county court. Mr. Woodhouse had auggested that bailiffs should be abolished. He thought this would work well where a solicitor was employed, bat in the vast majority of county court cases this was not so, and if the bailiffs were abolished the service of the summons would be left in the hands of a class of persons who would not, he thought, do the work satisfactorily. County court fees were admittedly high but it must be remembered that much work was done for them which in a superior court would have to be charged for in another way. The county courts, with their present high fees, oost the country £250,000 a year. If the fees were reduced it would be necessary to abolish a large number of the smaller and unprofitable county courts.

Mr. LEAROYD (Huddersfield) thought that if a superior class of solicitors went into the county courts, it would raise the tone of the county court bench. Mr. GRIBBLE (London) thought the expense would be much heavier than was anticipated.

Mr. ELLET (Cirencester) asserted that the country solicitors were not so unanimous in their desire that the county court jurisdiction should be extended as had been suggested.

Mr. HERBERT (London) spoke in high terms of the county court judges. He thought the high bailiff should be abolished, and that the solicitors should be entitled to employ other persons than their clerks for serving writs, &c. Mr. BIRKS (Hull) was in favour of the extension of county court jurisdiction.

to non-contentious business. Mr. VELEY (Chelmsford) suggested that the extension should be confined

Mr. M'LELLAN (Rochester) proposed (1) that the county courts should have action was commenced in the High Court; (2) that the county courts should exclusive jurisdiction up to £50, so as to deprive a plaintiff of his costs if the have concurrent jurisdiction with the high court up to £200, with power to remove to the high court as could now be done.

The PRESIDENT ruled that he could not accept this as an amendment. Mr. DEVONSHIRE (London) thought it unadvisable that the society should extended, unless the practice of the county courts be revised, and an adequate commit itself to a resolution that the county court jurisdiction should be scale of costs determined. He suggested that this should be added to the motion by way of rider.

Mr. E. KIMBER (London) seconded the proposition. He could not agree that the decisions of the county court judges were so infallible as had been represented. He asserted that they often refused to obey Acts of Parlia ment by declining to take a note

« PreviousContinue »