The Solicitors' Journal. CURRENT TOPICS. LONDON, OCTOBER 21, 1882. WE PRINT elsewhere the order of transfer to Mr. Justice KAY of Vice-Chancellor HALL'S causes, to which we referred last week as shortly to be issued. IT IS UNDERSTOOD that Mr. Justice CHITTY will, on Mr. Justice NORTH's departure on circuit, take his place at the Judges' Chambers until the commencement of the Michaelmas Sittings. "ONE MAIN REASON," said the President of the Incorporated Law Society at Hull, speaking with reference to his refusal to sign the Remuneration Order, "which induced me, after careful consideration, to take the course I did, was that, having regard to a possible revision of the Order at a future date, it might put the profession in a somewhat better position, that one of its special representatives upon the Tribunal should have dissented from the Order as it now stands, though it is almost unnecessary to state there were many portions of it in which I fully concurred." Is it to be understood from this that there is a prospect of a "revision of the Order"? The Act provides that the Tribunal alter any order made by it, but we fear there is not much chance of this power being exercised at an early date. It is to be observed, however, that the President of the Provincial Law Society, who is a member of the Tribunal, is to be nominated from time to time by the Lord Chancellor; and it may be that hereafter the Tribunal will be so constituted as to bring the views of the solicitor members into unison. may revoke or observations on the habit of police constables to interrogate per sons on their arrest. The practice is extremely prevalent in rural districts, and it is distinctly opposed to the principles on which criminal justice is administered in this country. It is to be regretted that the rule as to the proper conduct of the policeman, which was laid down many years ago by Lord DENMAN in a case at the Maidstone Assizes, has been so much lost sight of. Addressing several policemen who were called as witnesses, the Chief Justice said :- "The distinction is very clear; you are not to suppress the truth, but you are not to take any measures of your own to endeavour to extort it." This seems to mark the reasonable compromise between, on the one hand, shutting out statements voluntarily made by prisoners to policemen, which often constitute a valuable means of arriving at the truth, and, on the other For a constable to hand, encouraging irregular cross-examination of prisoners on their AT NO TIME since the institution of the provincial meetings of the Incorporated Law Society have the questions of the day possessed graver importance for solicitors, yet at no provincial meeting has there been less discussion of the questions of the day than at the recent meeting. Changes of the utmost importance in the system established by the Judicature Acts are impend-used against him. Perhaps the best maxim for a constable to ing; they were briefly noticed in the president's address, but not a word appears to have been said about them in any of the papers or discussions. An Order has been issued under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act so unsatisfactory to London practitioners that the President of the Incorporated Law Society refused to append his signature; in his address he evidently anticipated that there would be keen debate on the subject, yet no public discussion took place and no suggestions were made either in favour of or against the course recommended by Mr. RUBENSTEIN; probably because time did not allow of any lengthened debate. Most of the papers, valuable and well-written as they were, related to matters which would have been just as appropriate for last year's meeting or any previous meeting. If this state of things is to be continued, the annual provincial meeting will soon cease to exist. An effort should be made next year to prevent this result, by making the papers and discussions fewer in number and of mere immediate interest. Two or three leading topics of the day should be selected, and papers upon them invited from members of the society possessing special knowledge of the subject, and full discussion should be allowed and encouraged. Unless this is done, the provincial meeting will have little effect upon professional or public opinion, or upon the action of the council of the society. THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, in charging the grand jury at the Hertford Quarter Sessions this week, made some well-timed AMONGST THE MANY ACTS of difficult interpretation which have been passed in the present session, the short but important County Courts (Costs and Salaries) Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 57), is especially noticeable. The 2nd section enacts that "so much of section 91 of the County Courts Act, 1846, as is still in force is hereby repealed, and the following provisions shall take effect in licu thereof." The "following provisions are to the effect that, with a saving for the rights of barristers, no other person than a solicitor may take a fee for appearing in a county court, and these provisions substantially re-enact an unrepealed portion of section 91 of the Act of 1846, of which the first two paragraphs were repealed by the County Court Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 54), s. 10. But section 91 of the Act of 1846 contained in its other paragraphs provisions of the highest importance to the profession, inasmuch as they limited county courts costs both as between party and party, and as between solicitor and client, the limit being £1 3s. 6d. for counsel in any case, and fifteen shillings or ten shillings for the solicitor in proportion to the amount claimed. All this is repealed; but whether by accident or on purpose, THE TELEGRAM relating to the conditions on which counsel are to be allowed to appear for ARABI is not very clear, but, we take it, the meaning is that the preliminary inquiry or " instruction" is to be conducted in private, according to the usual practice in Egypt, and that Mr. BROADLEY and Mr. NAPIER are to be allowed to conduct the defence at the subsequent public trial. Mr. BROADLEY, it is understood, speaks Arabic, and, as the trial will be conducted in that language, the main burden of the defence will rest with him. section 36 of the County Court Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108), is not included in the repeal. This section provides that " Where in any action the debt or damage claimed shall not exceed twenty pounds, an attorney shall not be entitled to recover from his client any further costs or charges in the conduct of such suit than those mentioned in the ninety-first section of the Act of the ninth and tenth years of the reign of her present Majesty, chapter ninetyfive, unless upon taxation of costs the registrar be satisfied, by writing under the hand of the client, that he has agreed to pay further costs or charges; and in such case the registrar may allow any costs or charges not exceeding the amount which may have been so agreed to be paid." Now, it is a well-known rule of construction (see Reg. v. Smith, L. R. 8 Q. B. 146, and the cases THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT. there cited) that where statute B. incorporates statute A., and statute A. is afterwards repealed by statute C., the incorporated part of statute B. remains still in force. Therefore, as between solicitor and client, and so far as regards claims of £20 or less, the repealed 91st section of the Act of 1846, with the limits of costs and charges "mentioned" therein, is still in full force, unless the client (to whom it would be somewhat difficult to explain the effect of Reg. v. Smith) should have agreed in writing to exclude its operation. This mode of legislation is a little inartistic. A CORRESPONDENT writes:-"I am a good deal perplexed as to the effect of the 56th section of the Settled Land Act, 1882. If I understand the 2nd sub-section aright, it will, in one_numerous class of cases, seriously hinder sales and leases of land, contrary to the professed object of the Act. This 2nd sub-section is as follows:- But, in case of conflict between the provisions of a settlement and the provisions of this Act, relative to any matter in respect whereof the tenant for life exercises or contracts or intends to exercise any power under this Act, the provisions of this Act shall prevail; and accordingly, notwithstanding anything in the settlement, the consent of the tenant for life shall, by virtue of this Act, be necessary to the exercise by the trustees of the settlement or other person of any power conferred by the settlement exerciseable for any purpose provided for in this Act. Now, by section 2 (6), if two or more persons are entitled as tenants in common or joint tenants or for other concurrent interests, they together constitute the tenant for life for the purposes of the Act. Also, by section 63 (1), two or more persons entitled concurrently for any limited period to the income of property settled upon trust for sale shall be deemed the tenant for life. Consequently, if the second half of this sub-section is to have full effect given to it, if a testator has left his real estate upon trust for sale, and settled the proceeds in shares upon half-a-dozen children and their issue, not a single sale or lease within the Act's leasing powers can be effected without the consent of all the tenants for life. Even if all the parties are in England and act harmoniously, this obtaining six consents in every case will greatly increase the expense of realizing and managing the estate. But one or more of the tenants for life may be abroad in India or Australia. Also one or more of them may differ from the others, or from the trustees, in which case nothing can be done except under the direction of the court under the 3rd sub-section, which will involve further expense. By section 2 (1) the Act will apply after the 1st of January to all existing settlements by deed or will, and therefore, if I understand this sub-section aright, it will oblige trustees who have hitherto been leasing and selling at their discretion (their settlors or testators not having thought it advisable to hamper them by any obligation to obtain the consent of the parties interested) to change their settled course of procedure and obtain the consent of all persons coming within the very comprehensive definitions of tenant for life. The latter italicised half of the sub-section is connected with the former half by accordingly,' and it has been suggested to me that this may, perhaps, limit its scope to cases where the tenant for life exercises, or contracts, or intends to exercise any power, but I do not see how this limitation is to be made out. The only object of the sub-section seems to be to prevent the exercise of powers by the trustees from interfering with the exercise of the statutory powers by the tenant or tenants for life. Would it not be sufficient to give the tenant for life, or (if more than one) all the tenants for life, power to prohibit the trustees from exercising any powers they wish to exercise themselves?" II. THE 1st section of the Act, which we examined in our last entitled to have and to hold and to dispose of in manner aforesaid as ber So far as wages and earnings are concerned, this enactment only repeats, with reference to all wages and earnings, the provisions of section 1 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870. The words "so gained or acquired by her as aforesaid," apparently refer to the words of section 2 of the new Act," gained or acquired by her in any employment, trade, or occupation, in which she is engaged, or which she carries on separately from her husband, or by the exercise of any literary, artistic, or scientific skill." Here the words, "which she carries on," seem to contem plate trade carried on by her by herself, and the words, "in which she is engaged," seem to contemplate trade carried on in partnership. But it is to be noticed that the new Act suggests by its punctuation that the words, "separately from her husband," relate only to the words, "which she carries on"; and that a married woman's earnings in any trade" in which she is engaged," even though it be in domestic quasi-partnership with her husband, will will also be her separate estate under the future law. The Act of 1870 contains no such suggestion; and it is not probable that the present Act will be differently construed. So far as items of property other than wages and earnings are concerned, the present Act effects a great theoretical extension of the principle of its predecessor; the latter (so far as the present branch of the subject is concerned) affecting only (1) personal property coming to a married woman by an intestacy; (2) personal property coming to her by deed or will, and not exceeding £200 in value; and (3) the rents and profits of real estate descending to her by an intestacy. The new enactment differs from the old in some important respects, not only abolishing the maximum limit formerly imposed upon personal property coming to the married woman by deed or will, and securing to her the rents and profits of real estate coming to her otherwise than by an intestacy; but also conferring upon her absolute power to dispose of the corpus of all her real estate without her husband's concurrence. We have already said that, in our opinion, there is reason to doubt whether the practical effect of this seemingly wide enactment will be very great. It is probable that the superseded enactment applies to nearly every case in which unsettled prop If erty ever does actually come to a married woman; and it is toler-will be less useful, and therefore less usual, after the Act's comably certain that the promoters of the old Act entertained this mencement than they are now, it may perhaps (though this is a opinion. This is, in fact, the reason which is commonly given very doubtful conclusion) become customary to insert only in for the shape taken by sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1870. special cases the provision for the settlement of after-acquired Since the present Act expressly abstains (section 19) from inter-property, which is now inserted almost as a matter of course. fering with the effect of existing or future settlements, it follows this should be the case, any inconvenience which may be caused that, in so far as the above-mentioned opinion is well founded, this by doubts such as those above mentioned, will tend to diminish important-looking change in the law will practically have very with the progress of time. Moreover, there seems to be no doubt little operation. that, if the settlement were executed after the Act's commencement, the wife might be sued upon the contract and the judgment would bind the after-acquired property in dispute. The main interest and importance of the Act is contained in the sections which we have noticed. There remain numerous further details, some of which are too curious to be passed over in silence. We reserve some mention of these for a concluding article. With regard to the effect of the section now under consideration, some curious doubts might be raised, which were evidently not foreseen, and have therefore not been provided against. What is the effect of the section upon the marriage settlements of women already married which contain covenants to settle afteracquired property of the wife? Section 19, to which we have above alluded, which provides that the Act shall not interfere with settlements, does not seem to affect this question; for a covenant to settle does not seem to be a settlement. In modern settlements such so-called covenants are commonly (but not very properly) expressed in the form of an "agreement and declaration," which is construed as a covenant, although it is more properly adapted to serve as a bar to an equity. REVIEWS. BILLS OF SALE ACTS. THE LAW RELATING TO BILLS OF SALE; WITH NOTES UPON FRAUDULENT THE LAW OF BILLS OF SALE, AS MODIFIED BY THE BILLS OF SALE ACT A CONCISE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF SALE, EMBRAC- Suppose that some property should devolve, in right of a title accruing after the Act's commencement, upon a woman previously married; and suppose, further, that she should refuse to settle, or concur in settling, it. What would be the result? Could a decree for specific performance of her quasi-covenant or contract be obtained against her, followed by an attachment for contempt if she should refuse to obey it? We find nothing in the Act to warrant this conclusion. Such a proceeding seems to have no resemblance to the civil suits contemplated in section 1; and, if possible, it seems to have still less resemblance to the criminal proceedings contemplated in section 16; nor do we perceive that it comes under the head of a husband suing his wife "for a tort," even granting this last proceeding to be within the purview of section 12. It may perhaps be suggested that the wife could, in such a case, be sued for damages, to be recovered out of her separate estate, for her breach of contract. This may, perhaps, be not improbable; but we must take account of all its possible contingencies. The wife might have no separate estate except the separate estate in dispute; and since she was not possessed of, or even entitled to, this property at the time when she entered into the alleged contract, a grave question arises, whether the contract in any way binds it. The contract would certainly not have bound it, independently of the Act; and this suggests yet another question :-Has section 1, sub-section (4), a retrospective effect? and does it apply to contracts made before the commencement of the Act? Its language seems rather to suggest the contrary; but the canons of interpretation in use at the presenting to write, not upon a single Act of Parliament, but upon one entire day are so largely determined by the necessity of finding some meaning for obscurities, and are capable of effecting such odd results, that we will not venture to give any decided opinion. So far we have been considering only the difficulty of compelling the wife to fulfil her quasi-contract. But other questions may arise ex parte mariti. If it should be found impossible to compel the wife to fulfil her contract, it will follow that the husband also will have failed to fulfil his. Could he then be sued for this breach? There is no doubt whatever, that A. is competent, if he chooses, to covenant with B. that C. shall do something; and then, if C. refuses, it is no defence, in an action by B., for A. to plead that he has done his very best to persuade C. to fulfil the covenant. We think that all the above-mentioned questions deserved from the ingenious framers of the Act a great deal more attention than they appear to have received. There is no need to cite at length section 2, which deals with the property of women married after the Act's commencement. In such cases, all real and personal property," whether belonging to the woman at the time of marriage, or subsequently acquired by her, is made her "separate property." Our remarks upon the limited practical scope of section 5 are equally applicable to section 2; but the latter, apparently by happy accident rather than design, is somewhat less awkwardly contrived, though not less awkwardly worded. Its general effect will sufficiently appear from the foregoing remarks. Though there is no reason to suppose that marriage settlements The Act for the amendment of the law with regard to bills of sale, which comes into operation upon the 1st of November next, is already proving a copious source of literary activity. Of the books already before us (to others of which we shall refer next week) some aim merely in which he is now likely to find himself, others attempt a more general at being immediate practical guides to the practitioner in the perplexity statement of the law; and amongst the writers who have had the latter object in view, Mr. Macaskie appears to us to be facile princeps. His endeavour has been to produce an exhaustive text-book upon the whole law relating to bills of sale. The accuracy of such a book is only to be ascertained by the test of a constant practical reference to it. But Mr. Macaskie's work is certainly worthy of being submitted to the test. Neither confining himself to general propositions on the one hand, nor he states the effect of all the decisions of the courts with that ease, precumbering his pages with the special facts of reported cases on the other, cision, and lucidity which indicate a complete mastery of the subject. It may be doubted perhaps whether the "sectional" method of treatment here adopted, by which each section of an Act is made the text for a separate disquisition, is the most useful where an author is endeavourbranch of the law. But the usefulness of the method adopted is to be need for reiteration or constant cross-references, and there seems to be judged by the success attained in dividing the subject logically, without upon this point no room for adverse criticism. A noteworthy feature in the book is the reference to every series of reports in which each case cited is to be found, and another is the use made of the cases to be found in the subsidiary but not in the authorized reports (for instance, we find, turning haphazard over the pages, cases cited on pp. 42, 47, 60, 77, 83, 97, 109, 112, and 162 which are reported in the WEEKLY REPORTER alone). Indeed, the book is essentially a text-book or statement of the law as it is to be found in the decided cases. gard to the doubts to which the practitioner will be introduced by the operation of the Act of 1882, not much light is here, or perhaps can be anywhere, given. Modest opinions are offered upon some of the questions of construction which that Act raises. these difficulties are not completely discussed, or even enumerated, as witness the author's silence upon the doubts arising upon the meaning of almost every section of the Act by reason of the limitation of its operation to bills given by way of security for the payment of money. A statement of the law as it is, however, is more valuable than any text-writer's opinion with regard to what it is likely hereafter to be held to be, and it is in this regard that we commend Mr. Macaskie's book to our readers. With re But With regard to Mr. Newson's little book, not much more can be said than that it contains a neat and handy reprint of the Acts and that some of the chapters are fair summaries of the law. The author can hardly be said, however, to have that grasp of the general subject which could make his book a satisfactory guide to persons unacquainted with the elements of it, and those who are already so acquainted will look for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject than they will find here. For short, clear, practical directions as to the future dealing with property by means of bills of sale, and for an outline of principles which will make the general bearing of the law easily comprehensible to those not familiar with it, Mr. Indermaur's volume, which is nearly of the same size as that last noticed, may be found very useful. There are passages which contain propositions requiring qualification or increase of precision, as where "the only things on the demised premises excepted from the landlord's right" of distress are enumerated absolutely, without reference to statutory exceptions, such as those created in respect of hired machines in factories by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 40, and in respect of rolling stock by 35 & 36 Vict. c. 50; and where, in the section upon the order and disposition clause, the author seems to say that, after the 1st of November, 1882, the security of a registered bill of sale holder will need to be perfected by getting the goods out of the grantor's apparent possession a statement which is perfectly unintelligible, and which must be due to some slip in the writer's English similar to that which, on page 13, causes him, by the omission of the word except, to state the exact contrary of what he intends. But, in spite of such minor errors as these, the book appears to be meritorious both in style and substance; and we may add that the suggestions which it contains as to the probable construction of the new Act are generally judicious and reasonable. CORRESPONDENCE. THE ACCOUNTANTS AGAIN. Sir, The Principal of Owens College in a recent speech, of which I enclose a newspaper account, refers to examinations proposed to be held by the New Chartered Institute of Accountants, the subjects including "considerable knowledge of certain branches of English law, as, for example, the rights and duties of liquidators, trustees, and receivers, the principles of the mercantile law, and the law of arbitrations and awards"; and offers to assist students. Would it be the correct thing for the solicitor branch of the profession to boycott any member of the bar who might be the lecturer selected for the above purpose? I also send you a statutory notice for creditors issued by an accountant. Such notices will probably become numerous after a few examinations have been held. These matters may not be sufficiently important to engage the attention of the Law Society, but may have some interest for your readers. CASES OF LAST WEEK. BEFORE THE VACATION JUDGE. C. SOCIETIES. INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY, [FROM OUR SPECIAL REPORTER.] The Incorporated Law Society held its ninth annual provincial meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday, the 17th and 18th inst., at the Royal Insti tution, Albion-street, Hull. The members were warmly welcomed to the town by the Mayor of Hull, Mr. Alderman LEAKE, who wore his chain of office. He remarked that the duty was doubly pleasing, inasmuch as he himself was a lawyer. Mr. THOMAS PAINE, of London, President of the Incorporated Law Society, then took the chair. THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS. The PRESIDENT delivered the opening address. After some introductory observations he said :-As years roll on, the diffi. culty of those filling the position I have now the honour to hold in finding a fit subject for an opening address on these occasions increases. The special branches of our profession which can be made generally interesting are few, and several of these have been dealt with by some of my predecessors in a way which leaves no room to follow them, until the lapse of years may have created a new condition of circumstances. I have, therefore, after consideration, deemed it expedient to devote this address to a general survey of the results of the more recent legislation (confined chiefly to that of the session just virtually concluded) peculiarly affecting lawyers, accompanied by a few remarks on professional subjects, which may be interesting to those present. It will be found, I think, that although, according to the general opinion the session has been almost wasted in the apparently everlasting discussions upon Irish affairs, this is by no means an accurate view as regards those legislative measures which are specially interesting to us, and that the alterations made in more than one important branch of our law have been greater and more extensive than for some years past, while in another direction a step has been taken towards that codification which is so desirable, but has hitherto seemed so difficult of attainment. I would propose commencing our survey with real property law. There must be many in this room, whose entry into the profession, like my own, nearly corresponded with the time at which the first impulse their studies in this branch with some research into the black letter law of of the reforming movement was felt, and who had, as it were, to commence fines and recoveries before they had been abolished by Brodie's masterly statute, and who had to trace the logical and beautiful sequences through which the now almost forgotten Fearne led the student in the abstruse subject of the law of contingent remainders. I will not take up your time by further referring to the changes which followed during the earlier years of the present reign, and which up to the year 1879 were all presented to you in the exhaustive paper on the subject, read at the Cambridge meeting of our society in that year, by one of my predecessors in this chair. Mr. Lawrence's address contained a long series of recommendations of further changes and improvements in real property law, a large number of which have been since substantially carried out by the enactments we are about to consider; and it is, I think, a subject of legitimate pride to us, that in lieu of the obstructive tendencies and passive resistance to all change with which our profession is frequently credited, the fact should be that the towards removing the remaining anomalies, and simplifying the practice of most important practical suggestions which have of late years been made fore, with the department of real property law, we shall find it convenient our real property law, owe their origin to a solicitor. Commencing, there to consider together the Conveyancing Acts of 1881 and 1882. The leading provisions of the former will ere this have become familiar to the great majority of us. It is, I think, indisputable that the effect of these Acts will be to bring about very much of a revolution in conveyancing practice as hitherto carried out; for not only will the common conveyancing docu alterations of detail on various points of law bearing chiefly upon convey ments be reduced to brief dimensions in the great majority of cases, but Sonthancing practice have been made. The provisions of the Vendor and Pur chaser Act, 1874, as to title and evidence of title, are supplemented and completed, so that a number of the ordinary conditions of sale can hereafter of their old and long deceased relations, assignments of satisfied terms. The be dispensed with. Covenants for production of deeds will share the fate meaningless duplicate receipt for the consideration money on deeds is abolished, and common sense has prevailed in the enactment, that a solicitor acting for a client and obtaining his execution of a deed is to be presumed to be clothed with authority on his behalf to receive for him the ing leases, as to apportionment of rent, covenants, and conditions, are also purchase or mortgage money payable thereunder. The provisions affectthe valuable sections limiting and restricting the powers of forfeiture of plainly in accordance with the requirements of modern business, as well as important, that it is almost matter for wonder how this necessary amend Leasehold interests, especially in large cities, have become so ment in the law, which has been long called for, can have been delayed until now. The necessity of referring to survivorship in giving powers to joint trustees, and in advances by joint mortgagees, is done away with. Lord Cranworth's Act is partially repealed, and fuller and more useful powers for mortgagees and trustees, which are to be incident to all future transactions, substituted. The mortgagor is to have (as certainly be ought) the right of getting at his deeds, and the unfair consolidation rule as to mortgagees will in future transactions be greatly restricted, and practically abolished. Objection has been taken, I think without reason, to the power given to mortgagors to grant leases without the concurrence of mortgagees, and a disposition shown in some quarters to make a stipulation to the con ORDER OF REVIVOR-ORD. 50, R. 4-FOREIGN EXECUTORS.-In the case of Morrice and others v. Smart and others, before North, J., on the 11th inst., counsel moved to discharge an order which had been made for reviving this suit against new defendants, who were the foreign executors of Smart, the original defendant. Smart had died abroad possessed of property in New South Wales and not having any property in this country, and his will had been proved in the New South Wales courts by the new defendants, Smart had been an accounting party in default. The plaintiffs had obtained the common order of revivor upon the representation that Smart was dead, and that the new defendants were his personal representatives. Counsel for the plaintiff's contended that under ord. 50, r. 4, the foreign executors were properly made parties; that they were Smart's personal representatives, and, inasmuch as he had no property elsewhere than in New Wales, his only possible representatives; that there was a "transmission" of Smart's "interests" and "liabilities" to them within the meaning of ord. 50, r. 4, and that if not, the plaintiff's action would be defeated by defendant's death, which was what the rule aimed at preventing. They relied upon the case of Jameson v. Marshall, decided by his lordship in the early part of this year, and which was reported in 46 L. T. N. S. 480. NORTH, J., after referring to the report of Jameson v. Marshall, said that there was some error somewhere. He was quite satisfied he had not decided the case as reported in the Law Times, or at any rate he had not intended so to decide it. In any case, the decision as reported was wrong, and was not binding upon him. It was clear that foreign executors of a foreign estate could not take in this country "transmission of interest or liability " without obtaining representation here. The order of revivor was wrongly obtained, and must be discharged with costs, to include the costs of the conditional appearances entered by the foreign executors. any On Wednesday a meeting of the justices for the city of Manchester was held for the purpose of considering the appointment of a successor to the late Mr. Higson, who was clerk to the justices for a period of forty-three years. It was unanimously resolved that Mr. Samuel Millner Barton, solicitor, of Manchester, who has been officially connected with the police-court for a considerable number of years, should be appointed to succeed Mr. Higson. leases. trary in arranging for large mortgages. The true view of the matter is, I think, to treat the mortgagee's interest as purely a security for money; and so long as the mortgagor is not in arrear with his interest, he ought to be intrusted with the control over leases, as well as with the general management of the estate. He is the person most interested in seeing that it is properly looked after, and in a better position, and with better means of knowing than the mortgagee what ought to be done. In building estates, or others, where numerous leases are likely to be required, it is a serious additional expense and a sensible hindrance to business to require the mortgagee's concurrence in leases. I have for years, when acting for mortgagors, been in the habit of insisting upon leasing powers in mortgages of this description, and can see no valid objection to the principle being extended to all mortgages, which was evidently the view entertained by the framers of the Act. The necessity and practice of devising trust and mortgage estates will, it is to be hoped, be finally and successfully abrogated, and these are for all purposes to devolve upon the personal representative, A provision of the Act of 1881, which will be found useful, and was much wanted, is that enabling a retiring trustee to get discharged in many cases without the necessity of appointing a new trustee at the time. So also the special powers given to the court in the case of sales of land subject to incumbrances or charges which could not otherwise be discharged. The Act of 1882 contains provisions under which official searches can be made for judgments and other registered incumbrances; and purchasers, including trustees and solicitors, will be protected against all the consequences which may arise from a defective search. It is to be regretted that these are not (perhaps under the circumstances they could not be) extended to searches in a register county which (as we all of us know in Middlesex, and as, I presume, you know in Yorkshire) in the case of vendors having extensive dealings with land or house property, form a serious addition to the purchaser's expenses, which will, under the proposed new scale of payment, fall upon his solicitor. This Act also contains a desirable provision restricting the effect of constructive notice to cases in which it arises in the same transaction, and another enabling parties to appoint separate sets of trustees where, on any appointment of new trustees, any portion of the trust property has come to be held on distinct trusts from any other portion, and it alters the 79th section of the Fines and Recoveries Act, and the corresponding section of the Irish Act, so that in future acknowledgments by married women will only require a single commissioner. The two Acts contain some new and very valuable provisions on the subject of powers of attorney. Not only are all payments made and acts done in good faith under such powers protected as against the death, bankruptcy, &c., of the donor, but they may now be made expressly irrevocable either altogether or for a fixed period, not exceeding one year from date, and in such cases are not to be revoked without the concurrence of the donee, nor by the death, marriage, lunacy, unsoundness of mind, or bankruptcy of the donor during the currency of the power; and protection is given to a purchaser having taken under the power against any acts done by the donor in viola tion of the last-mentioned provision, or against any of the circumstances therein mentioned having occurred to him. These will no doubt be found very useful provisions, and will much facilitate the settlement of purchases and other matters in which persons living in distant colonies, or other parts of the world, are interested. A section of the Act of 1882 also imposes a restriction on executory limitations, and two others extend or clear up doubts upon two of the sections of the Act of 1881 relating to long terms and re-conveyances of mortgages. The main object and aim of the Settled Land Act is evidently to put into the hands of the tenant for life of a settled estate the fullest powers of managing and improving it and controlling its alienation which can be given consistently with due protection of the interests of those entitled in remainder, and to remove as far as possible all those evils which have arisen or been supposed to arise from the previous state of the law to the prejudice of those interested in settled estates as compared with owners in fee simple. No doubt these evils were under many of the older forms of settlement in use during previous generations, both real and considerable; and though they have from time to time been to a great extent obviated by modern practice and legislation, some remnants of them still exist. In particular, the passive resistance which had to be overcome where trustees were indisposed to act was one of these difficulties, and the decisions as to the inexpediency of the exercise of their powers of sale where there was not a distinct prospect of early re-investment of the moneys in land was another. These decisions will probably, with the view which is likely to be taken by our courts at the present day, he considered inapplicable to the exercise by tenants for life of the powers of sale given them by the new Act, or at all events their operation will be greatly limited by the number of express objects enumerated in the Act for which the money arising from sales is to be applicable towards the improvement of the estate; and by the powers of re-investment given by the first clause of the 21st section, which extends the usual interim power of investment in Three per Cents. to railway debenture stock. The 22nd section directs that these investments, if made, shall not be altered without the consent of the tenant for life, and thus seems to imply that such investments are no longer to be considered as interim only. It cannot be questioned that the effect of all these enactments, taken together, must be greatly to simplify and facilitate all dealings with real estate, and probably to as great an extent as the habits of the present generation of Englishmen will allow; for the idea of assimilating transfers of real property to those of consols is only put forward by those who are utterly unacquainted with the various modes in which an owner of English land expects to be able to deal with it, and any attempt to interfere with which he would rightly resent as a breach of his liberty. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that the ease with which, under the facilities now given, all necessary dealings in connection with real estate can be managed, will mitigate, if not stop, for some time to come the cry for a general registry, which has in fact greatly diminished in the past few years. Any system of registry, unless confined to incumbrances (and, so far, I am not prepared to contest that it would be desirable), whether a registry of assurances or of title, while having one obvious theoretic advantage, would be certain to impose a serious additional expense upon owners of property, and in the latter case-that is, if confined to a register of title and legal estate only, with a system of caveats-would but partially answer the chief purpose a register is designed to serve; for the equitable titles (including those to all charges protected by caveats) would have to be investigated in every case of the smallest complication. The success of a register of this kind in new countries like the Australian colonies, where the great majority of dealings with land are by way of simple transfer charge or discharge, is no evidence of what would be the result here; and it is, I think, a matter of tolerably safe prediction, that if ever such a register should become compulsory in this country, the members of our profession would be the chief and immediate recipients of any benefits to be derived from it, so that the view expressed above is at least a disinterested one. Passing, now, to the consideration of another Act of the late session on a subject of still more general interest, our first impression will probably be that it is enough to make our legal ancestors of two or three generations past turn in their graves. The Married Women's Property Act, 1882, marks the epoch of our having arrived at a complete reversal, at all events as regards civil rights, of the old common law doctrine of the identity of husband and wife, and of the entire sacrifice made by the latter of all her rights of property on her marriage. The new Act may be briefly, and not inaccurately, described as consisting mostly of a series of provisions under which a married woman will, as regards all rights of property, be put as nearly as possible in the same position as a single woman. For, after the 1st of January, 1883, every married woman is to be capable of holding and disposing of all classes of property, and entering into contracts, and suing and being sued thereon as if she were a feme sole, and every contract entered into by her is to be deemed to be entered into as intended to bind her separate estate, unless the contrary be shown; and in like manner all property devolving upon married women after the above date is to be held as their separate property (section 5), though this (by section 19) will be without prejudice to any provisions in any settlement or agreement for settlement made either before or after marriage. As to women married after the commencement of the Act, everything which they have at the date of marriage, or may afterwards become entitled to, is to be at their absolute disposal, subject always, as above referred to, to any settlement or agreement for settlement. A wife may lend to her husband out of her separate property, but in case of his bankruptcy is literally treated as a sleeping partner, and her proof against his estate is to be postponed to that of other creditors (section 3), and any property over which she may have and exercise a general power of appointment is made subject to her debts and other liabilities (section 4). fer all kinds of personal investments in her own name and without the conThe Act contains provisions enabling every married woman to hold and transcurrence of her husband; and she may hold such investments in her own name jointly with other persons than her husband. She is to be liable after marriage, to the extent of her separate property, for all debts, contracts, or costs made or incurred before marriage, and as between her and her husband, unless there be any agreement between them to the contrary, primarily so liable; but subject ties to the extent only of the property acquired by him through his wife. If, to this provision her husband is also to be liable for all such debts and liabilishe clearly may do) all or any part of her separate property, the husband will, therefore, any married woman should after marriage give up to her husband (as to this extent, and if the wife have no sufficient separate property left, be liable (but apparently not otherwise) to her ante-nuptial debts and engagements, for if the husband and wife are (as the Act directs they may be) jointly sued upon found he is not liable in respect of property acquired through his wife, he is to any such ante-nuptial engagement, or if the husband alone is so sued, and it is have judgment for his costs of defence, whatever may be the result of the action against the wife. The husband and wife are to have all kinds of civil remedies against each other in respect of their property as ordinary persons. The wife is also (section 12) to have criminal remedies against her husband for the protection and security of her separate property but these latter are not to be exerciseable while the parties live together, unless in relation to some property wrongfully taken by the husband where deserting or about to desert his wife. Section 16 gives corresponding criminal remedies to the husband against the wife. Every married woman will, after the Act comes into operation, be capable of becoming an executor or trustee, and her separate estate will be responsible for all the legal liabilities of the office. Her separate estate is also to be subjected to the same liabilities for the maintenance of her husMarried Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1874 are repealed by the new Act, band, children, and grandchildren as the husband is now liable to. which contains, in substitution for some of the clauses of the first-named Act, a much fuller and more satisfactory power to the husband and wife to effect insurances on life for the mutual benefit of each other and the children of the marriage. Under the old Act the power was only given to the husband, and if the life fell in, the insurance company could in most cases not obtain any discharge for the policy moneys, except upon an application to the court to appoint a trustee. The new Act provides (section 11) that the insured may either by the policy or any memorandum under hand appoint a trustee or trustees, and from time to time appoint a new trustee or trustees thereof, but in default of any such appointment the right to receive the moneys is to vest in the legal personal representative of the insured upon trust for the beneficiaries under the policy. The power of the court to appoint trustees is kept on foot, and it is expressly provided that the receipt of a trustee or trustees duly appointed, or in default of such appointment, or in default of notice thereof to the insurance office, of the legal personal representative of the insured, shall be a discharge to the office. The provisions of the Act generally appear to be well conceived, and in accordance with the advancing spirit of the age; and protected as they are by a clause which is directed against frauds by a wife upon her husband, or by the two against the latter's The |