Under that Act, as our readers know, the vendor's solicitor's conveyancing costs, recoverable from the purchasers, are limited to the deduction of such title as the purchasers shall require, and the perusal and execution of the conveyance. But (as the council themselves point out), "in practice, as the purchasers have the means, by paying the purchase-money into court, of acquiring an absolute fee simple, titles are much less strictly investigated on these sales than on an ordinary purchase." The result of excluding these transactions from the scale cannot fail to be to hold out a strong inducement to the purchasers' solicitor to ask for an extremely short title, and he will, of course, use the very shortest form of conveyance. The result to the vendor's solicitor, who has to charge on the old system, will be at once appreciated. We do not at all understand either the reasoning used by the council in support of their proposal, or the motives which can have led them to make such a proposal. We know, as a matter of fact, that some of the practitioners most interested in the subject are greatly dissatisfied with the provision inserted in the Order at the suggestion of the council.

The rejected suggestions embrace only a few of the points which we have noticed in our remarks on the Order. We drew attention to the exclusion of plans from the list of disbursements. London solicitors will find the cost of the three plans required by the Middlesex Registry a heavy deduction from their scale remuneration. The council state the charge for the set as varying from ten shillings to two guineas or more; we should imagine it is comparatively rarely that they can be obtained for the former sum. The rejected suggestions relating to conveyancing transactions under registered titles, and charges on transactions over £100,000, are not of much practical moment. The most important rejected suggestion is that which relates to the provision for the division of the commission into negotiation and conduct of auction fees, and fees for deducing and investigating title and completing. Probably the course adopted by the council was the only feasible one under the circumstances, since every argument that could be used against the division of the scale would no doubt have been urged by Mr. Druce before the Tribunal. But we do not think that, even if the suggestion of the council had been adopted, and the increased scale had been made applicable to all solicitors who do not receive a negotiation fee, the result would have been satisfactory to the profession. It is little short of absurd that a scale for the general remuneration of solicitors should have been framed with reference to a course of practice which is adopted only by a small minority of solicitors. We think that the refusal of the Tribunal to modify the provisions with reference to the division of the remuneration will be regarded by the great mass of the profession as affording ample justification for the course taken by the President of the Incorporated Law Society of refusing to sign the Order.

women's property, is only the degree of protection which would be given by a marriage settlement which should merely give the property to the wife for her separate use, without in any way restricting her power to deal with it. But every legal practitioner is aware that the chief use of settlements, so far as the wives are concerned, is to protect them from the influence of their husbands; and this is a protection which the Act is powerless to give them. It is a generally received axiom, that if a settlement merely gives the wife a separate use, leaving her free to give the property to her husband, the property might as well have been allowed to go straight to him by the operation of the law, instead of by a more circuitous, but hardly less inevitable, route. Perhaps the courage and ingenuity of Lord Cairns may some day elude this difficulty by devising a ready-made "implied settlement" for everybody; but until this has been done, "marital influence" is likely (at all events for a long time to come) to have nearly the same effect, for all practical purposes, as "marital right."

It by no means follows from what we have said that such an Act is superfluous; and since the above-mentioned drawbacks upon its practical effect were inevitable, they are certainly not the Act's fault. Even if the Act had attempted nothing more than a consolidation of the existing law, there would have been quite enough to justify its existence, if it had also effected some of that improvement for which the old Acts afford abundant room. But we regret to say that, in our opinion, the Act is not very well qualified to claim this justification. It contains one judicious provision, in section 1, sub-section (4); and another, which is not well expressed, is inserted, in what we think a very clumsy manner, into the saving clause (section 19). With these exceptions, we find little in the Act which seems to deserve strong commendation; and if our hopes (chastened by previous experi(ence) had not been exceedingly moderate, we should have felt exceedingly disappointed.

The Act begins rather infelicitously in its preamble, not only speaking of "the Act of the thirty-third and thirty-fourth Victoria"which, we submit, is really carrying slovenliness too far-but falsely stating that the said Act is " intituled the Married Women's Property Act, 1870,'" whereas, in reality, it is intituled " An Act to amend the Law relating to the Property of Married Women." The Act of 1874 (which is profanely ascribed to a thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth Victoria) is "intituled" quite correctly. Perhaps some reluctance was felt to remind the world that once upon a time somebody invented such an Alexandrine monstrosity as "The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, Amendment Act, 1874," and in a marginal note styled it a "short title."

We own that, in our opinion, gross violations of the elementary rules of grammatical composition are no ornaments to an Act of Parliament; and we think that, judged by this very moderate standard, the present Act might, with a strong expectation of winning the prize, claim to stand high among the worst Acts ever drafted. We will give one specimen of the faults to which we allude, by inserting into section 23, in italics and between that section any meaning :

I.

"23. For the purposes of this Act the legal personal representative of any married woman shall, in respect of her separate estate, have the same rights would be [subject to] if she were living." and liabilities [as she would have] and be subject to the same jurisdiction as the

66

A married woman is hardly a 'right," and certainly is not a jurisdiction"; and if she is a " liability," this is in a different sense from that in which the word seems here to be used. Even after our necessary amendments, the composition remains very inelegant.

The most important sections of the Act are perhaps the 1st, the 2nd, and the 5th. Of these, the 1st essays to give, what has never before been so fully attempted, a complete definition of the sense in which the property of married women is, to speak familiarly, "made their own" by the Act. Its language exhibits a singular mixture of what is strictly appropriate to the old equity theory of a separate use, and what would serve to describe an absolute ownership at law. There is about it a curious air of being somewhat frightened at its own daring, begetting a tendency to minimize its decrees by a sort of qualifying clauses. It begins as follows::

"1. (i.) A married woman shall, in accordance with the provisions of this

Act, be capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing by will or otherwise, of any real or personal property as her separate property, in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, without the intervention of any trustee."

Not to cavil at the grammar (" capable of acquiring of property"), we seem here to have one expressed and one implied restriction, which we have marked respectively by italics, upon the extent, or degree, so to speak, of the soleness of the feme; which seem to imply some distinction between a feme sole by virtue of the Act, and a feme sole by virtue of the common law. They suggest the conclusion that the true intent of the enactment is merely to dispense with the appointment of a trustee; and that no greater rights, powers, and privileges are conferred by the Act upon a married woman in respect of the property to which it relates than would have been possessed by her before the Act in respect of property settled to her separate use with the intervention of a trustee. Some important practical consequences depend upon the reply to be given to the question thus raised. It is well known that, under the existing law, if a wife entitled to personal property to her separate use dies intestate and possessed thereof, her husband (holding it without account as her administrator) is entitled to take the property by his marital right. The Act makes no express provision for such a case; and the future rule of law seems to depend upon the question whether section 1 gives personal property to a married woman as to a feme sole to all intents and purposes whatever, in which case the property can of course be subject to no marital right; or whether it makes her for this purpose a feme sole only so far as the existing doctrine of separate use treats her as being a feme sole. This question we do not profess to decide; and we think that the Act ought not to have left it to be decided by mere inference.

66

The 2nd sub-section enacts, in curiously inelegant but not unintelligible language, that a married woman (1) may bind herself by any contract to the extent of her separate property; (2) may sue and be sued, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, without her husband being joined either as plaintiff or defendant; (3) that any damages or costs recovered shall be her separate property; and (4) that " any damages or costs recovered against shall be payable out of her separate property and not otherwise." It would seem that the provision of this section, that a married woman may sue and be sued as if she were a feme sole, is not intended to apply to cases where the litigation or proceeding is between her and her husband. Section 12 deals with this matter, and it provides that:

her

"12. Every woman

shall have in her own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same civil remedies, for the protection and security of her own separate property, as if such property belonged to her as a feme sole, but, except as aforesaid, no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort."

This is, we believe, the only place in the Act where any express mention is made of civil proceedings (section 16 provides husbands with the right to take criminal proceedings against their peccant helpmeets) to be taken by a husband against his wife. At all events, this is the first place in which such proceedings are expressly mentioned; and we hardly know whither, in this respect, to refer the words " except as aforesaid." The grammatical connection strongly suggests that the expression refers to something aforesaid in the same section-that is to say, that the case of a husband suing a wife "for a tort" was thought to be somehow included under proceedings taken by a wife for the protection of her separate property. The meaning is, no doubt, that, except in proceedings by the wife for the protection of her separate property, actions of tort shall not be allowed between husband and wife.

The 3rd sub-section provides that any contract by a married woman shall be deemed to be a contract entered into by her with respect to and to bind her separate property, unless the contrary be shown." This probably was meant to refer to the equitable doctrine that separate estate is not, strictly speaking, bound by the contract, but by the married woman's declaration of intention in that behalf, which intention was not necessarily to be inferred from the fact that she had contracted. We believe, however, that, at the present day, the contract would undoubtedly be regarded as prima facie evidence of the intention; and that, from this point of view, the present sub-section only declares the existing rule. We assume that it does not in any way affect the doctrine of the wife's authority to bind her husband as his agent. The 4th sub-section

reverses the now-established rule (Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 29 W. R. 551, L. R. 17 Ch. D. 454), that the contract of a married woman, when it binds her separate estate, binds only that of which she was possessed at the time of the contract. The 5th and last subsection, reversing the law as settled by Ex parte Jones, Re Grissel (L. R. 12 Ch. D. 484), makes a married woman trading apart from her husband subject, in respect of her separate estate, to the bankruptcy laws as though she were a feme sole. The former provision seems to be a very fair and judicious amendment of an 'equitable" rule, which never had any touch of equity to recommend it; and the latter seems to be a very proper supplement to the other provisions of the Act.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882.
[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,-What is the meaning of section 19 of the Married Women's

shall

render to be here.

Property Act of last session ? It enacts (1) that, "Nothing inoperative any restriction against anticipation after attached to the enjoyment of any property or income by a woman under any settlement," &c., but the last clause of the section provides that "no restriction against anticipation contained in any settlement or agreement for a settlement of a woman's own property to be made or entered into by herself shall have any validity against debts contracted shall have any greater force or validity against creditors of such woman by her before marriage, and no settlement or agreement for a settlement than a like settlement or agreement for a settlement made or entered into by a man would have against his creditors.”

No settlement, therefore, is to have any greater force or validity against creditors of a married woman than a like settlement entered into by a man would have against his creditors.

This sentence refers, not merely to creditors of a married woman in

respect of debts contracted before her marriage, but to creditors in respect

of debts contracted after marriage.

Now it is, I believe, still the law that, although a settlement may be made on a man or a feme sole determinable on bankruptcy or alienation by the addition of a proper gift over, yet that to use Mr. Davidson's expression-a person cannot in general settle his own property so as to take under the settlement an interest defeasible on alienation or bankruptcy.

It follows that as regards property absolutely belonging to a man it is, to say the least, extremely difficult so to settle it on his marriage as to defeat his creditors altogether, unless indeed the first life interest is given tect such life interest against his creditors or alienees. to the wife, for if a life interest be limited to him no gift over will pro

If then the latter part of section 19 is to be construed strictly, a woman about to be married cannot so settle her own property on herself as to prevent anticipation of the income by her; in other words, she cannot protect herself from her creditors if she retains a life interest in her own fortune. Where the lady's fortune is provided by her father or relations she may be restrained from anticipation as a gentleman may in effect be restrained now, but considering the numerous cases in which the lady's fortune brought into settlement is her own, the meaning of the part I have quoted of the 19th section is of no small importance. part of it-but is this clear? Possibly the whole section may be held to be controlled by the first H. Hereford, October 10.

STAMPING DEEDS AFTER EXECUTION.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I think your correspondent, "A Solicitor," is mistaken in his supposition that any authority can be found for the proposition which he advances.

before stamping, examined by a very acute and experienced official, Practically, the fact was as he suggests, for all executed deeds were, whose name, if I recollect rightly, was Earwaker, and who marked upon them the duty to which he considered they were subject, and I always found his dicta confirmed by the commissioners.

At that time a fee was payable for the commissioners' adjudication which was therefore only asked for in very exceptional cases. October 10. A LONDON SOLICITOR.

THE PONTEFRACT POACHING CASE.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Allow me to correct an error appearing in your issue of the 7th inst., where I find it stated that the Pontefract justices dismissed a

charge against a girl for poaching on the ground that the Prevention of Poaching Act applied to males only. This is entirely incorrect, as the following facts will show:-A girl of nine years of age was brought before the West Riding justices at Pontefract, on the 30th ult., charged with an offence under the 2nd section of the statute 25 & 26 Vict. c. 114. The only evidence against her was that three nets and some pegs were found in her possession in the main street of a village at nine o'clock in the morning by an officer then on duty. When charged she stated that she was taking them to be mended. To the surprise of everyone, the solicitor engaged for the defence contended that females did not come within the purview of the above-mentioned Act, which contention was at once overruled. The case was heard and dismissed on its merits. CLAUDE LEATHAM, Clerk to the West Riding Justices. Pontefract, October 11.

in the Times.-ED. S. J.]

THE REMUNERATION ORDER. THE following statement has been issued by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society with reference to the Order made under "The Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881":

Upon the reassembling of the council after the Long Vacation of 1881, a committee was, at the request of Mr. Druce, the then president, appointed to confer with and advise and assist him in preparing a Draft Order to be submitted to the Tribunal constituted by the Act.

This committee had frequent meetings, and devoted much time and attention to the principles on which the Order should be framed. The first question for consideration was whether the scale introduced by the council in 1880 should be adopted as a basis, and if so, with any and what modifications. Mr. Druce entertained a strong opinion that he should have great difficulty in advocating it, and the experience of most members of the committee pointed in the same direction, as it was found that the scale had been little used, except on mortgages. It was strongly urged that a uniform scale, based upon a moderate percentage, and made applicable to the solicitors on both sides in purchases and mortgages, would be preferable, and that simplicity would be one of the most important elements of success in popularising any scale. This view found favour with the committee, and ultimately with the council; and, after careful inquiries into its probable operation, as tested by reference to bills of costs for a great number of actual transactions of various amounts which had passed through the offices of members of the council, a commission of 10s. per cent. was adopted as the standard. This was identical with the commission charged by stockbrokers on dealings with railway and other stocks requiring transfer by deed. It was, however, felt that having regard to the large number of solicitors, both in London and the country, who were concerned chiefly in small transactions, this percentage must be increased as to sums below a certain amount, although it was obvious that such increase would afford an argument for some corresponding decrease on large transactions. After much discussion the first draft of an Order based upon these principles was put into shape and communicated to the various country law societies. A numerous deputation, representing the most important of those bodies, attended meetings of the committee of the council on December 16 and 30, 1881, and February 1, 1882, when various suggested alterations in detail proposed by the country societies were sidered and some of them adopted, and the draft in its amended form was at the last of such meetings reconsidered by the deputation apart from the committee of the council, and approved by all the country societies represented with one exception.

con

The Draft Order as so formally approved (which will be found in Appendix A.) was adopted by the then president, and laid by him before the first meeting of the Tribunal, which took place on May 13, 1882.

Several subsequent meetings of the Tribunal were held, and on July 4 the council received for consideration the Draft Order as proposed to be passed (see Appendix B,). The Act gave to the council the right of making suggestions and observations on the Draft Order, and the Tribunal were bound to take these into consideration before finally passing it.

The connoil found that the Draft Order of the Tribunal differed very materially from that proposed by their president, the commissions on sales, purchases, and mortgages having been divided into two portions, one for negotiating and the other for deducing the title and completing the business, and settlements having been excluded from the scale.

It was known that the scales which had for some years been in operation at Liverpool and Manchester were thus divided, and the question had been fully considered in the settlement of the President's Draft Order, in which any such division was designedly avoided as on the whole undesirable. But whether this was or was not so on principle, the council found that the negotiation fee was in the Tribunal's Draft Order clogged with conditions as to the non-payment of any commission to surveyors or auctioneers, which would practically render it inoperative in all but a small minority of sales and purchases, both in London and throughout the greater part of England, according to the established course of business.

Under these circumstances, and having reason to believe that the conditions above referred to would be adhered to by the majority of the Tribunal, the council came to the conclusion that the better chance of getting the Order put into a form satisfactory to the bulk of the profession would be to suggest an alternative scale under which solicitors, when not entitled to the negotiation fee, would get a higher commission for the conveyancing.

1. This order is to take effect from and after the 188

day of

2. The remuneration of a solicitor in respect of business connected with sales, purchases, leases, mortgages, settlements, and other matters of conveyancing, and in respect of other business, not being business in any action, or transacted in any court, or in the chambers of any judge or master, and not being otherwise contentious business, is to be regulated as follows, namely: (a) In respect of business connected with sales, purchases, and mortgages completed, the remuneration of the solicitor having the conduct of the business, whether for the vendor, purchaser, mortgagor, or mortgagee, is to be at the rates following, that is to say, two per cent. on the amount of the purchase or mortgage money up to and including £1,000, one per cent. on any further amount up to and including a total amount of £5,000, and one-half per cent. on any further amount beyond £5,000, but subject to the regulations contained in Part I. of the first schedule to this Order.

(b) In respect of business connected with leases, or grants in the nature of leases, of the kinds mentioned in Part II. of the first schedule to this Order, completed, the remuneration of the solicitor having the conduct of the business is to be that prescribed in Part II. of such first schedule.

(c) In respect of business connected with settlements, completed, of personal estate, the remuneration of the solicitor having the conduct of the business is to be that prescribed in Part III. of the first schedule to this Order.

(d) In respect of business connected with any transaction, the remuneration for which, if completed, is herein before or in the first schedule hereto, prescribed, but which is not, in fact, completed, and in respect of all other business the remuneration for which is not herein before, or in the first schedule hereto, prescribed, the remuneration is to be regulated by the terms contained in this Order and in the schedule hereto, if and so far as applicable.

3. The remuneration in this Òrder or in the schedules hereto prescribed is not to include

(a) Disbursements properly and reasonably made.

(6) Costs or charges in reference to any contentious business, order of court, or other proceeding in any court, required to be conducted, obtained, or instituted in the course of the transaction.

4. In respect of any business not completed before the time when this Order takes effect, and in respect of all business subsequent to that time, the remuneration of a solicitor shall be regulated, not according to length of documents, number of conferences, or letters, or other distinct parts of the whole transaction, but by the nature and importance of the transaction, the service performed, and the knowledge, skill, and labour employed therein; and in respect of any business which is required to be, and is, by special exertion, carried through in an exceptionally short space of time, a soli citor shall be entitled to a proper additional remuneration for the special exertion, according to the circumstances.

5. A solicitor may accept from his client, and a client may give to his solicitor, security for the amount of remuneration to become due to the solicitor for business to be transacted by him, and for interest on such amount, but so that interest is not to commence till the amount due is ascertained, either by agreement or taxation.

6. In this Order, and the schedules hereto, the following words and expressions shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the 3rd section of the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881-viz, :—

Solicitor, Client, Person.

THE FIRST SCHEDULE.
PART I.

SALES, PURCHASES, AND MORTGAGES. (a) Fractions of £100 to be reckoned as £100.

(b) Where the prescribed remuneration would, but for the present provision, amount to less that £5, the prescribed remuneration is to be £5. (c) Where property is sold subject to incumbrances, the amount of the incumbrances is to be deemed part of the purchase-money. (d) On a sale in lots, each lot sold to a separate purchaser is to be taken as a separate sale.

(e) The prescribed remuneration is to include the preparation or perusal and approval of the contract (if any), and the completion thereof.

£5,000 and not exceeding £50,000, instead of the rates allowed up to the amounts mentioned in those columns respectively.

PART II.

LEASES, OR AGREEMENTS FOR LEASES, AT RACK RENT (OTHER THAN A MINING LEASE, OR A LEASE FOR BUILDING PURPOSES, OR AGREEMENT FOR THE SAME).

Lessor's solicitor for preparing, settling, and completing lease and counterpart :

30s.

20s.

20s.

20s.

10s. 5s.

5s.

Where the rent does not exceed £100

2s. 6d.,,

Do., do., for investigating title to freehold, copyhold, or leasehold property, and preparing and completing mortgage.... 30s. Vendor's or mortgagor's solicitor for procuring execution and acknowledgment of deed by a married woman

£2 10s. extra.

* Every transaction exceeding £100,000 to be charged for as if it were for £100,000. 1. The commission for deducing title and perusing and completing convey. ance on a sale by auction is to be chargeable on each lot of property held wholly or partially under a distinct title as on a separate sale, whether purchased by the same or by different buyers, but where a property held under the same title is divided into lots for convenience of sale, and the same purchaser buys several such lots and takes one conveyance, and only one abstract is delivered, the commission is to be chargeable upon the aggregate prices or reserved prices of the lots.

2. The commission on a sale or attempted sale by auction in lots is to be chargeable on the aggregate of the prices or reserved prices. When property offered for sale by auction is tought in and terms of sale are afterwards Legotiated and arranged by the sclicitor, he is to be entitled to charge commission according to the above scales on the reserved price where the property is not sold, and also one-half of the commission for negotiating the sale. When property is bought in and afterwards offered by auction by the same solicitor, he is only to be entitled to the scale for the first attempted sale; and for each subsequent sale ineffectually attempted he is to charge according to the present system, as altered by the second schedule hereto. In case of a subsequent effectual sale by auction, the full commission for an effectual sale is to be chargeable in addition, less one-half of the commission previously allowed on the first attempted sale. The provisions of this rule as to commission on sales or attempted sales by auction are to be subject to rule eleven.

3. Where a solicitor is concerned for both mortgagor and mortgagee, he is to be entitled to charge the mortgagee's solicitor's charges and one-half of those which would be allowed to the mortgagor's solicitor up to £5,000, and on ang excess above £5,000, one-fourth thereof; but only one commission is to be allowed for negotiating the loan-viz., that of the mortgagee's solicitor.

4. If a solicitor peruses a draft on behalf of several parties having distinct interests, proper to be separately represented, he is to be entitled to charge £2 additional for each such party after the first.

5. Where a party, other than the vendor or mortgagor, joins in a conveyance or mortgage, and is represented by a separate solicitor, the charges of such separate solicitor are to be dealt with under the old system as altered by the

second schedule hereto.

6. Where a conveyance and mortgage of the same property are completed at the same time, and are prepared by the same solicitor, he is to be entitled to charge only half the above fees for investigating title and preparing the mortgage deed up to £5,000, and on any excess above £5,000 one-fourth thereof, in addition to his full charges upon the purchase-money and his commissions for negotiating (if any).

7. Fractions of £100, under £50, are to be reckoned as £50. Fractions of £100, above £50, are to be reckoned as £100.

8. Where the prescribed remuneration would, but for this provision, amount to less than £5, the prescribed remuneration shall be £5, except on transactions under £100, in which cases the remuneration of the solicitor for the vendor, purchaser, mortgagor, or mortgagee is to be £3.

9. Where a property is sold subject to incumbrances the amount of the incumbrances is to be deemed a part of the purchase-money, except where the mortgagee purchases, in which case the charge of his solicitor shall be calculated upon the price of the equity of redemption.

10. The above scale as to mortgages is to apply to transfers of mortgages where the title is investigated, but not to transfers where the title was investigated by the same solicitor on the original mortgage or on any previous transfer; and it is not to apply to further charges where the title has been so As to such transfers and further charges the previously investigated. remuneration is to be regulated according to the second schedule hereto. But the scale for negotiating the loan shall be chargeable on such transfers, and further charges where it is applicable.

11. The scale for conducting a sale by auction shall apply only in cases where no commission is paid by the client to an auctioneer. The scale for negotiating shall apply to cases where the solicitor of a vendor or purchaser arranges the sale or purchase and the price and terms and conditions thereof, and no commission is paid by the client to an auctioneer, or estate or other agent. As to a mortgagee's solicitor it shall only apply to cases where he arranges and obtains the loan from a person for whom he acts. In case of sales under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, or any other private or public Act under which the vendor's charges are paid by the purchaser, the scale charge for negotiation shall not apply.

12. In cases where, under the previous portion of the schedule, a solicitor would be entitled to charge a commission for negotiating a sale or mortgage, or for conducting a sale by auction, and he shall not charge such commission, then he shall be entitled to charge the rates allowed by the first column on all transactions up to £2,000, and to charge in addition those allowed by the second column on all amounts above £2,000 and not exceeding £5,000, and further to charge those allowed by the third column on all amounts above

Where the rent exceeds £100 and does not exceed £500.......

Where the rent exceeds £500

Lessee's solicitor for perusing draft and completing

£7 10s. per cent. on the rental, but not less in any case than £5.

£7 10s. in respect of the first £100 of rent, and £2 10s. in respect of each subsequent £100 of rent.

£7 10s. in respect of the first £100 of rent, £2 10s. in respect of each £100 of rent up to £500, and £1 in respect of every subsequent £100. One-half of the amount payable to the lessor's solicitor.

The same payment as on a rent of £5, and also
20 per cent. on the excess beyond £5.
The same payment as on a rent of £50, and 10
per cent. on the excess beyond £50.
The same payment as on a rent of £150, and 5
per cent. on the excess beyond £150.

Where a varying rent is payable, the amount of annual rent is to mean the largest amount of annual rent. Purchaser's or lessee's solicitor for perusing One-half of the amount payable to the vendor's or lessor's solicitor. draft and completing

AS TO ALL LEASES, OR CONVEYANCES AT A RENT, OR AGREEMENTS FOR THE SAME, OTHER THAN MINING LEASES AND AGREEMENTS THEREFOR.

1. Where the vendor or lessor furnishes an abstract of title, it is to be charged for according to the present system as altered by the second schedule. 2. Where a solicitor is concerned for both vendor and purchaser, or lessor and lessee, he is to charge the vendor's or lessor's solicitor's charges and one-half of that of the purchaser's or lessee's solicitor.

3. Where a mortgagee or mortgagor joins in a conveyance or lease, the vendor's or lessor's solicitor is to charge £1 18. extra.

4. Where a party other than a vendor or lessor joins in a conveyance or lease, and is represented by a separate solicitor, the charges of such separate solicitor are to be dealt with under the old system as altered by the second schedule.

5. Where a conveyance or lease is partly in consideration of a money pay. ment or premium, and partly of a rent, the premium shall be divided into the number of years included in the term and treated as an annual rent, in addition to the rent reserved, and the commission shall be charged on the aggregate amount.

6. Fractions of £5 are to be reckoned as £5.