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into Parliament, it was called a “ Bill for consolidating enactments present to the legal profession. The first experiment in “codifirelating to municipal corporations in England and Wales,” and cation” has been tried in the Bills of Exchange Act ; forty-three was described in the prefatory note or “ breviate " as being, as statutes are completely re-cast by the consolidating and amendfar as practicable, a pure consolidation Bill." We observe that ing Municipal Corporations Act; considerable changes (though the Act bears as its title “ An Act for consolidating, with amend- by no means so great practically as has been supposed) are effected ments, enactments relating,” &c., and we are glad that practitioners by the Married Women's Property Act; a statute of unexampled are thus put upon their guard, for looking to the very frequent crabbedness purports to “ amend” the crabbed Bills of Sale Act; changes of phraseology and arrangement, the numerous slight limited owners receive extensive powers from the Settled Land alterations inserted ex animo in the Bill, and the not unimportant Act; most boroughs in the country will want to get something amendments inserted by both Houses of Parliament, we out of the Electric Lighting Act; and last, though not least, the should not be surprised to find a considerable total of amend County Courts (Fees and Advocates) Act abrogates the limit upon menis. Amongst other instances we notice that Schedule II., the fees of solicitors and counsel which has existed in those courts rule 10, which is substituted for the repealed section 69 of the ever since 1846, under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 91. Municipal Corporation Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76), effects a substantial change-or, at all events, clears up a very doubtful point. Section 69 of the Act of 1835 provided that “all acts

to be done by the council” might be" done by the majority MR. GREEN'S IMPRISONMENT. of the members of the council who should be present at any How is Mr. Green to be got out of gaol ? This is a question meeting held in pursuance of the Act." The new rule runs thus : “ All acts of the council, and all questions coming or arising which of late has been much vexing the minds both of lawyers before the council, may be done and decided by the majority of and laymen, and which we have Mr. Gladstone's authority for such members of the council as are present and vote at a meeting saying the Lord Chancellor himself is “most anxious to carry held in pursuance of this Act, the whole number present at the through,” that is, we presume, satisfactorily to solve. Yet the meeting, whether voting or not, not being less than one-third of answer is not difficult to find. It needs none of that recondite the number of the whole council.” Under the old law it was at ecclesiastical learning asserted by the leading journal to have least doubtful whether, if any members present at a meeting been long since divorced from common sense. It depends entirely abstained from voting, and a resolution was carried by a

on the plain and unambiguous words of two sections of two number less than a majority of those present, it was valid. A statutes which, at the same time as they authorize Mr. Green's correspondent this week' inquires what is the generally received imprisonment, also prescribe the conditions of his release. opinion on this point. We cannot speak to the general opinion, fortunately for him, these conditions are such as neither he on the but the fact that the alteration above mentioned has been made

one hand, nor the promoters of the proceedings against him on the seems to indicate that the contrary rule was generally accepted, other, seem disposed to fulfil; and unless they are fulfilled he will and that before the new rule has come into operation everything have to remain where he is until his case has been met by special must be decided by an actual majority of members present.

legislation. No doubt it does appear hard that he should have ceased to be incumbent of Miles Platting and still be an inmate of Lancaster Gaol. But the avoidance of his living, which unques

tionably took place on the 27th of June last, under the provisions EMINENT PERSONs who amuse their leisure by drafting in- of section 13 of the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, does different Acts of Parliament, may reflect with pride and satisfac- not entitle him to his liberty. For he is in custody for disobeytion that Sir MATTHEW HALE was the author of the Statute of ing Lord Penzance's order inhibiting him from officiating, not only Frauds. Its youth is as perennial as that of Mrs. SKEWTON, and in the parish of Miles Platting, but throughout the diocese of no custom can “stale its infinite variety.” Questions upon it Manchester, until he undertakes to pay obedience to the same will probably continue to emerge at intervals to the end of all judge's “ monition” to him to abstain from certain specified time, if it shall continue for so long to adorn the Statute-book. ritualistic practices. This undertaking he has throughout The last of these, as the reader will see by the recent case of refused to give, and the inhibition, which is not limited to the Webber v. Leo (30 W. R. 866), is whether an agreement that a parish, therefore still stands against him although he has lost his person shall share certain shooting, and shall be entitled to take benefice. From the date of its issue until he was arrested he away one-fourth of the game shot, requires a written memorandum continued to officiate in defiance of the order, and, as will be seen, under section 4 of the statute. It was contended that the agree- there are two ways, and only two, in which he can be freed from ment gave the defendant merely a personal license to join the the consequences of his “contumacy.” plaintiff in shooting, and not an interest or profit à prendre within The law on the subject lies in a very narrow compass. It is the well-known decision of Wickham v. Hawker (7 M. & W. 63). entirely contained in the 1st section of the 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, az But the Court of Appeal held that since the defendant had the amended by the 1st section of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 93. Previous to the right to take away a share of the game shot, the agreement was passing of the earlier statute an ecclesiastical judge enforced his for an interest in land: a decision which our readers should note, orders by means of excommunication, and the excommunicate since agreements relating to such rights are of frequent occurrence person was, by virtue of the writ de excommunicato capiendo, subin practice. The words of the statute are:-“ Any contract or sequently arrested and detained until he was reconciled to the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or Church. But by that Act a new method of coercion was substiconcerning them.” The Court of Queen's Bench, in Hooper v. tuted. A person refusing to obey is pronounced "contumacious," Clark (L. R. 2 Q. B. 200)—a case which was not cited on the and his contumacy“ signified” to the Court of Chancery. From present occasion-seem to have thought that the right to shoot that court a writ de contumace capiendo is issued, and all sheriffs, game in gross or apart from any proprietary interest in the land gaolers, &c., are required to execute it by taking the body of the itself, is an incorporeal hereditament; but the Court of Appeal person against whom it is directed. This is the process which was seem to have gone still further in styling it a profit à prendre. pursued in Mr. Green's case. The section then provides the mode At all events, our readers will do well to remember that, in the in which the prisoner can obtain his release. Upon his obedience, elegant language of the Statute of Frauds, it is a contract

but not otherwise, the judge is directed to pronounce him absolved, of” an “interest in or concerning lands,” and take their meas ures and the sheriff is to discharge him so soon as the costs incurred accordingly,

by reason of the custody and contempt are paid.

This section is obviously of no use to Mr. Green, except in the

unlikely event of his changing his views of the ecclesiastical SHORTLY BEFORE the prorogation of Parliament, Mr. Gladstone character and authority of Lord Penzance. But the amending described the session as a period of ruin for political measures, Act (3 & 4 Vict. c. 93) can be made available in spite of Mr. and so, no doubt, it has been. But it is abundantly clear to any Green, if only the judge and the promoters of the suit concur in lawyer casting his eye over the eighty-two statutes which have the opinion that it is desirable his imprisonment should terminate. already received the Royal Assent, that we must go back at least Section 1 enacts that it shall be lawful for the judge, “if it shall as far as the year 1875 for a session of equal importance with the seem meet to him," to make an order on the gaoler or sheriff in

whose custody any party may be under a writ de contumace capiendo for the discharge of such party out of custody, and such NON-COMPLIANCE WITH DEBTOR'S SUMgaoler or sheriff shall, on receipt of the order, forthwith discharge such party, "provided no such order shall be made without the

MONS AS AN ACT OF BANKRUPTCY. consent of the other parties to the suit.” Now, here is to be found A CONSIDERABLE amount of misapprehension appears to exist as the only key which can from the outside unlock Mr. Green's prison to the effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the recent door. The learned Dean of Arches has no personal desire, it may case of Hood v. Newby (ante, p: 657). The facts of the case be assumed, to prolong Mr. Green's punishment; but will the appear to be that the plaintiff in the action had sued out a promoters consent to or apply for his discharge ? Probably debtor's summons against the defendant on which the latter made they would not be unwilling to do so if they could feel quite sure default, whereupon the plaintiff filed a bankruptcy petition as to what would then happen at Miles Platting. Hence arises against him. Subsequently an agreement of compromise was the importance of appointing a successor to Mr. Green-or, at any entered into between them, whereby the defendant undertook to rate, of licensing a curate who would not permit an intrusion. pay the plaintiff a sum of money, and the bankruptcy petition Until this is done the promoters are not likely to take any step was allowed to drop. But in the meantime the defendant had which would enable Mr. Green to return and repeat his offence. committed another act of bankruptcy. (of which, however, the

But it may be far from easy to secure an incumbent who will plaintiff had no notice when he entered into the agreement with the offer an uncompromising opposition to Mr. Green. The patron is defendant) upon which he was afterwards adjudicated a bankrupt. here master of the situation. He may present any one he chooses, In the action by the plaintiff against the defendant, the trustee except only the deprived person (Public Worship Regulation under the bankruptcy of the latter claimed to set aside the agreeAct, s. 13). Suppose he happens to sympathize with Mr. Green's ment, on the ground that at the time it was entered into the views, it is scarcely likely that he will appoint a sturdy opponent plaintiff, although he had no notice of the act of bankruptcy of Ritualism. At present he does not appear inclined to make upon which the adjudication proceeded, had notice of an act of any appointment at all, though it is clear that he can do so forth- bankruptcy “ available for adjudication” under section 94 of the with and without reference to any notice of the vacancy from the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, committed by the defendant in failing to bishop. Section 13 of the Public Worship Regulation Act enacts comply with the debtor's summons issued by the plaintiff himself ; that, upon avoidance of the living, “ it shall be lawful for the and this contention was upheld by the court. The very important patron to nominate as the incumbent were dead," and the duty fact in the case, which we have printed in italics, is not very of the bishop with reference to giving notice of the vacancy is only fully stated in the report of the case, and it has been supposed in important as far as the question of lapse is concerned. By the i

some quarters that the act of bankruptcy upon which adjudica& 2 Vict. c. 106, s. 58, which is incorporated with section 13 of tion proceeded was not committed until after the agreement imthe Public Worship Regulation Act, the avoidance is to be peached by the trustee had been concluded. If this had been so, reckoned, " for the purposes of lapse,” from the date of the notice. the decision would be in direct conflict with prior decisions of It is expedient, therefore, that the bishop should give the notice, the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Wier, Re Wier (19 W. R. and thus put himself in the position of being able himself to col- 1042, L. R, 6 Ch. 880) and Éx parte Bouchard, Re Moojen (28 late an incumbent in six months' time in case of the patron failing W. R. 129, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 26), but as it is, the decision is reto present. Indeed, the language of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106 is im- concileable with those cases, as we shall endeavour to show, perative, and, in spite of the advice he has received from his although we think it is at the same time open to comment. chancellor, it seems plain that he is neglecting his statutory

Before discussing the precise point raised in the case of Hood duty.

v. Newby let us for a moment glance at some of the differences Meanwhile the services at the church have been permitted by between the present law as to debtors' summonses and the former the bishop to remain in charge of Mr. Green's former curates, law as to the same. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, from whom it would be idle to expect any strenuous resistance to provides that any one of the acts or defaults therein menMr. Green's return. How it happens that the same bishop who tioned shall constitute an act of bankruptcy-viz. inter alia), thought so seriously of the illegality of Mr. Green's practices as “That the creditor presenting the petition has served in the to authorize his prosecution, is at the same time satisfied to allow prescribed manner on the debtor a debtor's summons requiring the same unlawful practices to be continued, as in fact they are the debtor to pay a sum due, of an amount of not less than fifty by the curates in charge, is one of those ecclesiastical mysteries pounds, and the debtor, being a trader, has, for the space of on which we offer no opinion. It is sufficient to point out that, as

seven days, or not being a trader has, for the space of three weeks, long as the benefice is vacant and the services in the church are succeeding the service of such summons, neglected to pay such under the control of clergy who certainly will not lend a hand to sum, or to secure or compound for the same," and such act of “ put down Ritualism,” the obstacles in the way of Mr. Green's bankruptcy is available for adjudication provided a bankruptcy release are formidable, if not insuperable. Mr. Green will not

petition be presented within six months from the committal himself apply to Lord Penzance to be “absolved” from his con- | thereof. Under the Act of 1849 (which was not altered in this tempt, and, under present circumstances, his prosecutors are not respect by the Act of 1861) debtors' summonses (therein called unnaturally reluctant to apply for him. Some Act of the Legis- trader debtor summonses) were issuable against traders only, and lature, similar to that which the Archbishop of Canterbury un

were available for adjudication for two months only after default successfully attempted to carry last session, may prove to be

as therein provided. On the other hand, when once an act of the only way out of the difficulty.

bankruptcy was committed by a debtor under a debtor's summons, any creditor or creditors of the debtor for the requisite amount to constitute a petitioning creditor's debt could present a bankruptcy petition founded thereon. Again, under the present law, as laid

down by the decided cases on the point, the act of bankruptcy The English reports (the Albany Law Journal states) are very little if any becomes complete on the expiration of the time stated in the better than the American, so far as the reporting goes. at least never guilty of introducing every remark of the judges on the summons-viz., seven days, or three weeks as the case may be, argument, which remarks seldom tend to edification, and are merely the after service thereof—and there is no provision for postponing the staggerings of the mind' of the judges, to borrow a phrase of President completion thereof; but by the Act of 1849 provisions were Garfield.”

enacted which enabled the creditor and debtor, by arrangement, The United States Supreme Court, says the Canada Law Journal, have to stave off the actual committal of an act of bankruptcy. These given a decision in the case of Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Foley (11 Fed. R. being the principal differences between the present law and the 766), which at first sight appears a little startling. In taking out a policy Act of 1849, we will now proceed to review the various decided of life insurance, the applicant had answered affirmatively the questions "Are you a man of temperate habits ? “Have you always been so ?” cases which appear to us to have reference to the point raised in The Supreme Court held that this answer was not necessarily untrue, the case of Food v. Newby. although the jury might find that he had had an attack of delirium tremens,

The first case is that of Ex parte Wier, Re Wier, to which we resulting from an exceptional indulgence in drink prior to the issuance of the policy; for that his habits, " in the nsual, ordinary, and have already alluded. In that case the question was as to the routine of life,” might nevertheless be temperate.

time from which the act of bankruptcy would count. The sum



was served on a non-trader on the 21st of July, 1870. be deemed to commence from the completion of the act of bankWithin three weeks from service thereof the debtor applied to ruptcy. That must be from the expiration of the time limited the court to dismiss the summons, on the ground that the debt for compliance with the debtor's summons. It cannot mean the was not owing, and the registrar made an order that if, on or filing of the petition, for the reason stated by the Lord Justice. before the 12th of August, 1870, security were given for The only question then is, whether the case comes within the payment of the debt and costs, all proceedings on the summons protection of the 94th section. There is no distinction made in should-be stayed until after the trial of an action to be brought by that section between an act of bankruptcy under a debtor's the creditor. The debtor made default in finding security, and summons and any other act of bankruptcy. I think it must, within six months from such default, but more than six months therefore, apply to that as well as to others." after the expiration of three weeks succeeding the service of the In E.c parte Bouchard, Re Moojen, to which we have also summons, the creditor presented a bankruptcy petition. The already alluded, the facts were, that in December, 1877, the objection was raised that it was too late, being more than six creditor presented a bankruptcy petition against the debtor, the months after the committal of the act of bankruptcy. On behalf act of bankruptcy being the non-compliance with a debtor's of the creditor it was contended that the act of bankruptcy was summons issued for a disputed debt of £100 odd. On the hearing not concluded until the failure to find security ; but Mellish, of the petition on the 11th of January, 1878, an order was made L.J., in a considered judgment, upheld the objection of the adjourning the further hearing until the 18th, on the debtor debtor, and decided that the act of bankruptcy was complete at undertaking to pay into court, by the 17th, £125 to abide the the expiration of three weeks after service of the summons, result of an action to be brought by the creditor. The amount although the creditor could not proceed upon it until failure to was paid in on the 18th, and the hearing of the petition by confind the security ordered. In the course of the argument sent adjourned sine die. In May following the debtor was for the petitioning creditor section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, adjudicated bankrupt on the petition of another creditor pre1869, which has a most important bearing upon the point sented in February. Under an order made in January, 1879, in

are discussing, was referred to. That section runs : the action which had been commenced by the creditor in the pre“The bankruptcy of a debtor shall be deemed to have rela- ceding January, the debtor withdrew his defence, and the tion back to and to commence at the time of the act of creditor signed judgment for his debt and costs, together exceedbankruptcy being completed on which the order is made adjudg- ing the £125 paid into court. He then applied to the Court of ing him to be bankrupt; or, if the bankrupt is proved to have Bankruptcy and obtained an order for payment out to him of the committed more acts of bankruptcy than one, to have relation £125 paid in by the debtor, and the trustee appealed therefrom. back to and to commence at the time of the first of the acts of On behalf of the appellant, the contention was that the title of bankruptcy that may be proved to have been committed by the the trustee related back to the act of bankruptcy committed by bankrupt within twelve months next preceding the order of the debtor in failing to comply with the debtor's summons issued adjudication."

In the course of his judgment, Mellish, L.J., by the creditor himself, and that, therefore, the subsequent paysaid: “It was also argued that if an act of bankruptcy was ment into court was not protected as a security to the creditor. committed in all cases at the end of the three weeks, The Court of Appeal, following the remarks of Mellish, L.J., in the creditor afterwards could not safely receive payment of the Ex parte Wier, Re Wier, which we have quoted, upheld the debt, because he would receive it with notice that an act of decision of the court below and dismissed the appeal. James, bankruptcy had been committed, and that if the debtor was after- L.J., in the course of his judgment, said: “I am of opinion that wards adjudicated a bankrupt on the petition of another creditor, the equitable title of the petitioning creditor to the money was the title of the trustee would relate back to the act of bankruptcy complete when it was paid into court to abide the event of which was completed at the expiration of twenty-one days. We the action. The only question then was, What was the do not think this consequence would follow. When the debt is event of the action ? The money was to be the creditor's if he paid, the act of bankruptcy committed at the expiration of the time established his title to it, and he did so. Such a provision would mentioned in the debtor's summons ceases to be an act of bank- be idle if the whole thing could be afterwards defeated by the ruptcy on which the debtor can be adjudicated a bankrupt, and relation back of the title of the trustee appointed on another we think it at the same time ceases to be an act of bankruptcy to creditor's petition to the act of bankruptcy committed on the which the title of the trustee can relate back under the 11th debtor's summons. The case is really decided by what Mellish, section."

L.J., said in Ex parte Wier in delivering the considered judg. The next case is the one on which reliance appears to have ment of the court. The act of bankruptcy committed on a been placed by the trustee in the case of Hood v. Newby-viz., debtor's summons is only a qualified act of bankruptcy, and that Ex parte Hankin, Re Buchan (23 W. R. 401, L. R. 10 Ch. 267). is what Mellish, L.J.'s, judgment really amounted to." Baggallay There the facts were precisely similar to those in Hood v. Newby, and Thesiger, L.JJ., who with James, L.J., constituted the Court the first debtor summons

, and afterwards received payment of his of It follows from the cases which we have cited that if the debtor debt, had, at the time he received such payment, express notice in Hood v. Newby had not committed a second act of bankruptey of a second act of bankruptcy committed by the debtor, in failing until after the transaction impeached had been concluded, such to comply with a debtor's summons issued by another creditor, transaction would have been unassailable. The remarks of James upon which act of bankruptcy he was subsequently adjudicated and Mellish, L.JJ., in the case of Ex parte Hankin, Re Buchan, bankrupt. It was contended, on behalf of the creditor who had clearly had reference to the second act of bankruptcy committed received payment of his debt, that the act of bankruptcy upon by the debtor, and of which the creditor had express notice at the which the debtor was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt was not time when he received payment of his debt, and had no reference completed until the creditor who had sued out the summons had whatever to the previous act of bankruptcy committed by him in failfollowed it up by filing a bankruptcy petition, which was not done ing to comply with the first debtor's summons served upon him. The until four weeks after the payment to the other creditor of his real point in the case of Hood v. Newby then, was, that the debtor debt. In delivering judgment, James, L.J., said :-“The act of having, before the transaction impeached by the trustee had been bankruptcy is complete on the expiration of seven days from the completed, committed an act of bankruptcy, to which the trustee's service of the summons. It is impossible to contend that it is not title related back under section 11 of the Act, the transaction was complete till the filing of the petition ; if so, there would be no clearly covered hy that act of bankruptcy, so as to avoid it unless time from which the six months within which the petition must the creditor could bring it within the protection of section 94. be filed would run. That being so, the payment must be void Compelled to argue from that point of view, therefore, reliance unless it came within the 94th section, which protects payments was placed on his behalf upon the decision of the Court of Appeal made in good faith to a creditor without notice of an act of bank-in Ex parte Crosbie, Re Bedell (26 W. R. 119, L. R. 7 Ch. 1. ruptcy, and available against him for adjudication. The Act 123), in which the court interpreted the words “notice of any act does not say “available for all the creditors generally'; if so, of bankruptcy available for adjudication against the bankrupt," in there might have been a difficulty.” Mellish, L.J., also said :- section 31 of the Act, to mean (according to James, L.J.) notice of " The 11th section of the Act provides that the bankruptcy shall“ an act of bankruptcy available for adjudication at the date of


the order—i.e., an act of bankruptcy committed within sis months before"; and (according to Thesiger, L.J.) “ an act available for

LEGISLATION OF THE YEAR. the adjudication in respect of which the bankrupt is adjudicated," the same meaning being given to the similar words in section 94

JUDGMENTS IN INFERIOR COURTS. by the Court of Appeal in the subsequent case of Ex parte Gilbey, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 31.An Act to RENDER JUDGMENTS Re Bedell (26 W. R. 768, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 248). The court, how

OBTAINED IN CERTAIN INFERIOR COURTS IN ENGLAND AND ever, held that those decisions only related to the time at which

IRELAND RESPECTIVELY, EFFECTUAL IN ANY OTHER PART OF the act of bankruptcy had taken place, and did not govern the

THE UNITED KINGDOM. point then before the court, and that the creditor could not bring the transaction within the protection of the section, inasmuch

The object of this Act is well expressed in the preamble to be " to although he had no notice of the act of bankruptcy on which the extend the principle of the Judgments Extension Act, 1868, to the adjudication proceeded, or of any act of bankruptcy to which the judgments of certain inferior courts of Great Britain and Ireland.” trustee's title would relate back, yet he had notice of an act of Those who are well acquainted with that Act need scarcely read bankruptcy “ available for adjudication” within the meaning of any further. For the benefit of those who are not, it may be that section in the failure to comply with the debtor's summons

stated that the main provisions of this Act are as follows :—Where sued out by the creditor himself, notwithstanding (and herein, a judgment is obtained in any of the inferior courts of any of the we think, consists the anomaly of the decision) that such act of three kingdoms, the party recovering judgment may apply to the bankruptcy was not one to which the trustee's title related back. registrar of the court, who, upon proof that the judgment has not

We have quoted from the cases cited by us more copiously than been satisfied, is to grant a certificate of the judgment in a perhaps might appear necessary in order that the point might be scheduled form (section 3). This certificate may be produced to clearly understood, as it appears to have been very much mis- the registrar of any inferior court in either of the two other kingunderstood in some quarters.

The Manchester Guardian con- dums, who is to register it on payment of a fee, but no certificate cludes a short article upon the case, published a few days after the may be registered more than twelve months after judgment decision was given, as follows :-" The practical point to be noted (section 4). It is best to give section 5 at length.' It runs

thus : in this case is that it considerably lessens the value of the procedure by way of debtor's summons, because it shows that any "Where a certificate of a judgment of any of the inferior courts aforesaid bargain made as a result of such a summons- —and it is for this they has been registered under this Act, process of execution may issue thereon out are generally used—would be re-opened and avcided if the debtor of the court in which the same shall have been so registered against any goods

or chattels of the persons against whom soch judgment shall have been became a bankrupt or liquidated within six months afterwards."

obtained, which are within the jurisdiction of such last-mentioned court, in the Now, as we have shown, the practical effect of the decision falls same or the like manner as if the judgment to be executed had been obtained very far short indeed of that statement, and “ any bargain made in the court in which sach certificate shall be so registered as aforesaid.” as the result of such a summons” would not be "re-opened and avoided” merely if the debtor became a bankrupt or liquidated ment, the registration may be cancelled by order of the court

It is also provided that, on proof of the setting aside of a judgwithin six months afterwards. In addition to this it would be (section 7); that no costs are to be allowed in actions on judgnecessary, in order to avoid the transaction, to prove that the debtor ments, except by order of the court (section 8); that the existing bad before the completion of the bargain with the creditor suing limits of local jurisdiction are not to be exceeded (section 9), and out the summons committed another act of bankruptcy to which that the Act shall not apply, unless the whole cause of action the trustees title would relate back under section 11 of the Act, arose and the summons was personally served within the district of though it would not be necessary that the creditor should have the inferior court in which the action was commenced. It remains notice of such act of bankruptcy at the time of the bargain. The to add that the term " inferior court” “ includes county courts, instances where such a further act of bankruptcy could be proved civil bill courts, and all courts in England and Ireland other to have been committed by the bankrupt would be very few, and than the High Courts, and, in Scotland, the sheriffs' courts and the this will account for the point never having been raised before.

courts held under the Small Debts and Debts Recovery Acts,” As to the decision itself, it would appear at first to be rather at and that the certificate may not be granted until after the time for variance with that passage in the judgment of Mellish, L.J., in appealing against the judgment shall have elapsed, and in the event Ex parte Wier, Re Weir, in which he says that “when the debt of the judgment not being reversed on appeal or of execution thereis paid the act of bankruptcy committed at the expiration of the under not being stayed. To discover the time for appealing, time mentioned in the debtor's summons ceases to be an act of recourse must be had to the Acts of the three kingdoms, respecbankruptcy on which the debtor can be adjudicated a bankrupt." tively, under which inferior courts are regulated. We believe we The words in the Lord Justice's judgment which we have printed are right in stating that in England the time for appealing is ten in italics would certainly seem to be equivalent to the words

or eight days according as the appeal is by case or motion (see 13 "available for adjudication” in the section, and if on payment of & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 14, and 38 & 39 Vict. č. 50, s. 6). In Scotland the debt the act of bankruptcy had ceased to be one “ on which the time would seem to be in general twenty days or six months the debtor could be adjudicated a bankrupt,” it had also ceased to if the judgment has not been " extracted ” : see Court of Session be one “ available for adjudication ” within the section. But this Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 100), ss. 67, 68. In Ireland, by the objection is probably met by the fact that at the date of the com- Civil Bill Courts (Ireland) Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 57), s. 127, mencement of the bankruptcy-viz., the committal of the act of appeals may be made to the judge of assize for the county in which bankruptcy to which the trustee's title related back—the failure to the decree appealed against was made, at the assizes next after the pay in compliance with the debtor's summons was subsisting as an decree was made “ and not after." act of bankruptcy"available for adjudication," and that being so, it could not afterwards be annulled by reason of the subsequent

PAUPERS. payment.


DISCHARGE AND REGULATION ACT, 1871. Ex.Judge Dennison, says the Albany Law Journal, formerly Chlef Justice

The Pauper Inmates, &c., Act of 1871, enacted by section 5 that of Washington territory, was arguing a motion in the District Court before Judge Greene, who is credited with being a very scholarly man. Ex-Judge a casual pauper should not be entitled to discharge himself from a Dennison is a lawyer of the old school-tall, clean shaven, with deep-toned casual ward before eleven a.m. of the day following his admission voice and stately manner. Having occasion to refer to “Browne on

into the casual ward of a workhouse. This time is altered by the Medical Jurisprudence," Dennison pronounced it as if in two syllables, Brow-ne. Judge Greene interrupted him with the remark : "I presume present Act to nine a.m. of the second day following such admisyou mean Brown, do you not ?" * Your honour,” replied Dennison, " this sion. The same section of the same Act enacted that where a author's name is spelled B-r-o-won-e, and if that doesn't spell Brow-ne, 1 casual pauper had been admitted on more than one occasion during don't know what does." "But,” said the judge, my name is spelled one month, he should not be entitled to discharge himself before G.r.e-e-n.e, and you wouldn't call it "Greeney,' would you ?”. Without a nine a.m. of the third day after such admission. smile on his sphinx-like face, and in his most sepulchral tone, came the alters “ third" to " fourth.” It also enacts, for the first time, that

The present Act answer, which convulsed the court : “ Your honour, that will depend on how you decide this motion !"

Sunday is to be excluded in the computation of the days of detention. So much for the principal section of this Act, which created considerable excitement in the House of Lords, and which has

REVIEWS. already, probably, caused almost equal excitement in tramping circles. A further section appears to re-enact, with an almost

SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION, unnecessary amendment (for it seems only to express what was CONVEYANCING COSTS UNDER THE SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ACT, 1881, AND implied before), the enactments of section 7, sub-section 5, of the

THE General ORDER MADE IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, BEING A COMPLETE Act of 1871, and of section 44 of the Poor Law Amendment Act, Guide to the New SCALE OF CHARGES. By J. S. RUBENSTEIN, Solicitor. 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61), which impose upon a person who Waterlow Brothers and Layton. obtains poor relief by false statements all the pains and penalties This is a very 1seful handbook of the new Order. It consists, first, of which are imposed upon “idle and disorderly persons by the a summary of the Act and Order and notes thereon. The notes are Vagrant Act (5 Geo. 4, c. 83).

generally careful and shrewd. They bring out many of the points to which we have drawn attention, and notice one or two others which we

have not stated. For instance, on rule 6, which gives the solicitor ARTIZANS AND LABOURERS DWELLINGS.

the option to elect before undertaking the business whether he will 45 & 46 Vict. c. 54.-AN ACT TO AMEND THE ARTIZANS AND be paid by scale or according to the present system, as altered by LABOURERS DWELLINGS Acts.

Schedule II., Mr. Rubenstein points out that its main operation will be

in cases where the solicitor is to be paid by a person for whom he is There are two sets of enactments dealing with labourers' dwellings. in no way concerned, as, for instance, in the preparation of a lease by The principal Act of the first set is “ The Artizans and Labourers the lessor's solicitor. The summary is followed by the Act and Dwellings Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 130)." This deals with Order in full, and then comes, perhaps, the most useful part dwellings owned by individual owners. The principal Act of the of the book, in which the scales are worked out, and elaborate second set is “The Artizans and Labourers Dwellings Improve- different circumstances. We have verified these tables on many items

tables are given of the commission payable ou various amounts under ment Act, 1875" (38 & 39 Vict. c. 36). This deals with dwell- and have found them accurate. There is, however, a misplaced bracket in ings owned by a body of owners by means of a “ scheme” for the heading on page 66 which may mislead, and should be altered in the pulling them down when unhealthy and replacing them by more next edition. There are a few forms of statements of charges appended proper dwellings. Each of these Acts was amended by a separate and extracts from statutes relating to costs. Act in 1879—the Act of 1868 by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 64, and the Act of 1875 by 42 & 43 Vict. c. 63. The present Act, which has quickly followed the recommendations of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, which reported only so recently as (we

CORRESPONDENCE. believe) July last, amends both the Acts of 1868 and 1875 in a separate “ Part” allotted to each. The main object of the Act

AUCTIONEERS' COMMISSIONS. is to cut down the expenses which were found to attend the work

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] ing of the parent Acts, and this is done in two ways. First, it is provided (and this provision is common to both parts”) that, in household furniture, and their cpinions as to the value of any real

Sir,--Most, if not all, of the Liverpool auctioneers are mere sellers of estimating compensation to owners affected by the Acts, an arbitrator is no longer to take into account “all circumstances affect: property which they may be called upon to offer are not asked for, and ing the value” of the premises affected, in addition to the elements The practice of even the leading auctioneers here as regards sales of of compensation particularly specified in the enactments them- real estate at the public auction-rooms is to charge a fee of one guinea selves : such as (see section 19, sub-section 2, of the Act of 1875) for each lot if bought in, or of two guineas if sold; and this no matter “ the fair market value, due regard being had to the nature of how large the purchase-money may be. the property, and the probable duration of the buildings," &c.

If there be many lots it is usual to stipulate that the fees in respect of The second provision, which affects the Act of 1875 only, is a

those bought in shall not exceed four or five guineas.

The auctioneer incurs no trouble except to attend at the auction-room very elaborate one. It will be remembered that section 5 of the for about an hour and read the particulars and special conditions of sale. Act of 1875 required local authorities to provide accommodation The public sale conditions of our local law society are generally used and for persons of the working classes who might be “displaced” by are never read. If the solicitor feels any doubt as to his auctioneer's a "scheme.” Tbis requirement, notwithstanding an amendment ability to read or pronounce such words as “ hereditaments" or " muniby the Act of 1879 to the effect that a provision of dwelling “other ments,” occurring in the manuscript, or considers him “shaky " in the than within the area” inhabited by the displaced ones should be matter of the aspirate, he wisely reads the particulars and conditions

himself. sufficient, was found (as might have been expected) to entail a very

Sometimes, but not often, the auctioneer takes the trouble to visit the great burden upon the rates. The present Act, therefore, further cuts down the new accommodation to be required. This object is ment among the list of those from whom “ further particulars" may be

property ; his name is not, however, usually inserted in the advertise. effected by a very great expenditure of words, which shortly come obtained. to this, that in the metropolis the accommodation is reducible by The solicitor prepares and inserts the advertisements. The printer sees one-half, and elsewhere altogether, if the “confirming authority to the posting of the sale placards on the walls. The solicitor distri-i.e., in the metropolis, the Metropolitan Board of Works, in the butes a portion of them among the members of the profession, and the City of London, a Secretary of State, and elsewhere, the Local estate agent engages the auction-room and, in fact, does all except Government Board—think fit to dispense with the obligations im- should refrain from qualifying himself to do what little remains by taking

actually “ offer” the property ; and why, when he has done so much, he posed by the Act of 1875.

out the necessary license, and should, at the critical moment, hand over the disposal of his client's property to a person whose chief occupation is to “knock down" chairs and tables, is quite incomprehensible to Liverpool, September 26.

A LIVERPOOL SOLICITOR. An amusing definition reaches us, says the Albany Law Journal, from the P.S.-As regards the omission to prescribe the remuneration of a Pacific. In People v. Gray, California Supreme Court (9 Pac. C. L. J. 778), vendor's solicitor when acting for the purchaser, I suppose that the the jury had in their room, on tap and in daily use, three or four kegs of framers of the scale did not like to appear to sanction such a practice beer, and also consumed two demijohns of wine ; and “two bottles of by providing for the case. They were perhaps under the impression whisky, at each meal, including, breakfast; this was held not to be that if a purchaser found he had to pay as much to the rendor's solicitor * suitable and sufficient food," and the consumption thereof was held to be for preparing his conveyance as he would have to pay to his usual improper conduct calling for the setting aside of the conviction, although it solicitor, he would prefer employing the latter. did not appear that any juryman was thereby unfitted for the discharge of his duty.

The London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian says that, with a view to rendering the parcels post perfect, the Postmaster-General is

CONVEYANCING ACT, 1881, s. 3 (4). now considering an important scheme for the general insurance of parcels,

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] which will probably be submitted to Parliament next year, and these in turn will in all probability be followed by the adoption of the proposal for

Sir, In the above sub-section are the words "the receipt for the last pay. the insurance of letters containing valuables, to which Mr. Fawcett gave ment due for rent under the lease before the date of actual completion approval last year, but which he was compelled to postpone for more of the purchase.” Do they mean the receipt for the half or quarter immediately pressiog matters.

year's rent which became due on the rent day immediately preceding

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