tion, use, or other restriction, is, in fact, the thing which makes ever, that the question whether the proceedings of the Salvation such a restriction an offence against the rule. Army do or do not amount to an unlawful assembly does not exThe Master of the Rolls said of the covenant in Tulk v. Mox-haust the legal questions that may arise with regard to the legality hay, that it was affirmative in its terms, but was held by the court to imply a negative. But a part of that covenant was in reality, and not merely by implication, negative so far as the covenantor was to keep the garden "uncovered with buildings." It is remarkable that the judgment seems only to have dealt with this negative part of the covenant: a fact which, as we pointed out on a former occasion (supra, p. 309), lends the strongest possible support to the view taken by the Court of Appeal in Haywood v. Brunswick, &c., Building Society. ASSEMBLY WHEN UNLAWFUL. of their mode of procedure. We cannot help doubting, for instance, whether, if the Salvation Army so conduct their processions as substantially to interfere with the ordinary traffic of the streets, they would not be liable for obstructing the highway. The highways are not intended for religious demonstrations, however praiseworthy; and although, practically speaking, in the case of similar processions and demonstrations the obstruction is not generally sufficient to induce any one to take proceedings, we are not clear that when sufficient inconvenience was occasioned such proceedings would not lie. It would seem, for instance, that the exhibition of anything attracting a crowd may be an unlawful obstruction of a highway. There is, however, without doubt, considerable practical difficulty in the way of proceeding in such cases for obstructing the highway. PERSONAL NAMES. THE recent case of Beatty v. Gillbanks (L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 308) raised a question of considerable public interest, though we cannot say that the law on the subject admits of much doubt when the matter comes to be considered. The question arose with regard to the proceedings of the Salvation Army. Briefly the facts THE question has lately been raised in the pages of a contem were these. It appeared that the Salvation Army at Weston-porary whether a man can change his Christian name. Strictly superr-Mare were in the habit of forming themselves into proces- speaking, of course, the fact that a particular name was given to sions and parading the streets singing and shouting. A sort of anybody at his baptism is, like any other past fact, unalterable. counter-organization had been formed, which called itself the Even in the case of a person christened twice by different names, Skeleton Army, and, as might easily be imagined, the proceedings if we speak with severe accuracy, we must not say that he has of the two armies caused considerable uproar and disturbance, changed his baptismal name, but that he has got two baptismal and were calculated to lead to breaches of the peace. But it names. Thus, if a member of the Church of England, christened appeared that the breaches of the peace and tumult were caused, Martin Luther, joins the Church of Rome and is there christened not by the proceedings of the Salvation Army directly, but by the Ignatius Loyola, a pedantic propriety would require us to say that opposition of the rival organization. The magistrates treated the he has got a Protestant Christian name and a Roman Catholic leaders of the Salvation Army as having taken part in an unlawful Christian name as well. However, what people mean when they and tumultuous assembly, and ordered them to be bound over, ask the question, "Can a man change his Christian name?" is with two sureties, to keep the peace for twelve months, and in really this, "Can a man disuse the name given him at baptism, default to be imprisoned for three months, or until they should and adopt some other name in its place?" And there is a popucomply with the order. Against this decision they appealed. lar notion, not without warrant from expressions in books of The court reversed the decision of the magistrates. The summary authority, that this is impossible. The cause of the distinction of the grounds of the judgment contained in the head-note to the thus drawn between the Christian name and the surname is easy report in the Law Reports is as follows-viz., that the appellants to detect. The Christian name is imposed with a solemn rite of having assembled with others for a lawful purpose, and with no in- religion, as old as the Christian Church, and, indeed, so far as the tention of carrying it out unlawfully, but with the knowledge that imposition of the name is concerned, of an antiquity far greater their assembly would be opposed, and with good reason to suppose than that of the Christian Church. The surname, on the other that a breach of the peace would be committed by those who hand, is the product of a habit which has only grown up, though opposed it, the appellants could not be rightly convicted of an genealogists are apt to forget it, since the Norman Conquest. Thus unlawful assembly. This result seems to be in conformity with the Christian name may naturally claim to be in some sort a person's the justice of the case and the undoubted principles of the law real name in a sense superior to his surname. In early times a on the subject of unlawful assemblies. Everyone must feel, as a custom existed by which a person could adopt a new name at his matter of justice, that proceedings should rather have been taken confirmation. It was the duty of a priest when christening infants against the leaders of the Skeleton Army than against those of the to "refuse to pronounce the same, if the parents or godfathers do imSalvation Army. Binding over the leaders of the Salvation Army pose and give them ludicrous, filthy, or ill-sounding names" (Ayliffe, to keep the peace was rather like binding the lamb over to keep the 105). It was, perhaps, to this duty being neglected that was due peace towards the wolf. Archbishop Peccham's Constitution which directs such names to be altered on confirmation (Gibson, 363). But this custom of taking a new name at confirmation was not confined to cases where the baptismal name was an unseemly one; even so innocent a name as Thomas could be abandoned; and the name taken at confirmation was regarded as the true name. "If a man be baptized by the name of Thomas, and after, at his confirmation by the bishop, he is named John, he may purchase by the name of his confirmation. And this was the case of Sir Francis Gawdie, late Chiefe Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, whose name of baptism was Thomas, and his name of confirmation Francis; and that name of Francis, by the advice of all the judges in anno 36 Hen. 8 he did beare and after used in all his purchases and grants. And this doth agree with our antient books, wherein it is holden that a man may have divers names at divers times, but not divers Christian names" (Co. Litt. 3a). It is needless to remark that the custom of taking a new name at confirmation has long since died out, and the form of the Confirmation Service in the Prayer Book affords no opportunity for the bishop to pronounce a new name. In the present day there can be, we think, no doubt that the designation by which a person has for a length of time called himself, and been known and recognized by others, constitutes his real name, whether given to him at baptism In common fairness it seems obvious that the people to be bound over are not those who assemble for a lawful purpose which they know is likely to be opposed, but those who unlawfully oppose them. It is almost equivalent to saying that the criminal is not the person who has a purse which incites another to steal, but the person who steals it. So far as the law on the subject is concerned, it seems quite clear that a tumultuous and unlawful assembly must be accompanied with circumstances of actual violence or tendency thereto on the part of those assembling themselves together, and that an assembly of persons not accompanied with such circumstances as these can never be a riot, however unlawful their intent. It therefore seems clear that the appellants were not guilty of the particular offence with which they were charged, for all the circumstances of violence arose from the opposite party, not from theirs. The magistrates seem to have thought that it was sufficient to constitute an assembly unlawful if those taking part in it knew that their proceedings would give rise to tumult and violence on the part of their opponents. This is obviously untenable. Such a doctrine would render illegal all meetings, however laudable their object, or however essential to the public interest, if only there was reason to expect violence in opposition to them. It would seem, how or not. During the eighteenth century the custom grew of imposing two or more Christian names. The inconvenience of using them all makes people in general drop all except one, and this practice is recognized by the law. Thus, in the case of a devise to William Marshall, there being two persons, one named William Marshall and the other William John Robert Blandford Marshall, parol evidence was held admissible to show which was the devisee intended, though had none been forthcoming the testator would have been presumed to mean the one called William Marshall simpliciter (Bennett v. Marshall, 2 K. & J. 740). Again, when the name is altogether different from the baptismal name, a legatee can take if he can show he is the person intended. So, in Delmare v. Robello (1 Ves. Jun. 415), a gift by a Jew to his daughter Reyne was held good, though before the date of the will she had become a Christian and been baptized by the name of Maria Hieronyma. The same has long been held in the case of a deed. "The name of the persons in grants is set down only to distinguish persons, and to make the person intended certain: and, therefore, howsoever it be best and most safe to describe the person by his true and proper name of baptism, and also by his surname, yet mistakes in this case, unless they be very gross, will not make void the grant. Nihil facit error nominis cum de corpore constat. And, therefore, if one that is a bastard hath gotten a name by reputation in the place where he doth live, or another man hath gotten another by common esteem than his own right name, or is usually called by another name than his true name in the place where he lives, in these cases they may grant by this name and the grant is good. And if John at Stile grant by the name of William at Stile, this grant is good. Et sic de similibus (Sheppard's Touchstone, 233). So with a grantee: "If a grant is made to Alfred Fitzjames by the name of Ethelred Fitzjames," the grant is good (Ibid. 236). The same principle, that "the name is only to distinguish persons, and to make the person intended certain," operates in the publication of banns of marriage. Thus, where one Abraham Langley had been known for three years as George Smith, it was held that the banns of marriage had been duly published in the name of George Smith, the court remarking that had he used the name of Abraham Langley, by which he was not known, the object of the publication of banns would have been defeated (R. v. Billinghurst, 3 Man. & Sel. 250). Lord Selborne, in Charter v. Charter (L. R. 7 E. & I. App., at p. 385), says with reference to the material importance of name as compared with description: "When a court has to choose between the name, which is only one part of an entire description, and other parts of the description more applicable to a person who does not bear the name, there is certainly no general rule that the name should bear a preponderating weight; nor even that in re dubia it should always turn the scale so as to save the devise from being void for uncertainty." An instance in point occurred in Patching v. Barnett (51 L. J. Ch. 77). The general conclusion to which we come is that a person's name is a matter of fact rather than a matter of law; and that while there is a strong presumption that his name is that by which he was christened, followed by that of his father, any other names by which he is, in fact, known and distinguished will be recognized in law. Accordingly, any one who is dissatisfied with the appellation bestowed on him by his godfathers and godmother can, if he likes, disuse it, and adopt some other more to his taste; and if he can persuade the rest of the world so to call him, he may be said, to all intents and purposes, to have changed his Christian name. At the same time any prudent person would take care so to describe himself in any legal or other important document that no question could hereafter be raised about his identity. The law, so long unequal in favour of the husband, has now swung round towards inequality in favour of the wife. The married woman who is tied to a worthless bust and can take refuge in an hotel, or in lodgings, or with friends, and defy him to touch her property; the married man tied to a worth ss wife, if burdened with children, can hardly take the same course, especially if he is in a situation which he is unwilling to leave.--Echo. At the Stock and Share Auction Company's sale on the 7th inst. the following were among the prices obtained:-United Horse Nail, 9s.; Roman Gravels, 81; Coregum Gold Mining, 6.; Indian Kings on and Sandhurst, 5s. 6d.; Taunts Silver Lead Eight per Cent. Prefs., 15s.; Walkham United Mines, 68.; io Grande do Sul, B. Warrants, 258. REVIEWS. GREAT SPEECHES BY GREAT LAWYERS. GREAT SPEECHES BY GREAT LAWYERS. BY WILLIAM L. SNYDER, of the New York Bar. New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Co. 1881. With the This is the first volume of an intended collection of arguments and speeches by eminent lawyers in America and Great Britain. It was originally meant to divide the work into subjects corresponding with the main divisions of jurisprudence, and to illustrate each by selected speeches. But this plan was found to be impracticable, and the various specimens of oratory have been allowed to succeed one another apparently On the whole we think the without any principle of arrangement. book has gained more than it has lost by this being the case. aid of the table of contents and the index the student can peruse the arguments in the order he prefers, while the general reader will probably think that the absence of system is fully compensated by the increased variety. In some instances the arguments on both sides are given; and all cases Mr. Snyder has prefixed a brief but sufficient account of the circumstances. The book contains a wide range of topics, from questions of international and constitutional law to trials for murder and criminal conversation. The field of international law has been cultivated by to find a considerable portion of the work devoted to this class of subjects. American jurists with such assiduity and success that we are not surprised Thus, Mr. Snyder opens with Patrick Henry's argument in favour of the right of Virginia, during the Revolution, to confiscate British debts. The speech is spirited, but perhaps a little too rhetorical for a question of law. A severer style, but one more befitting a jurist, prevails in Mr. O'Connor's cogent argument in the case of the brig General Armstrong. This vessel was an American privateer, which was destroyed in 1814 by a British squadron, after a severe contest in the port of Fayal, in the dominions of Portugal, a neutral power. Portugal demanded redress from England, which she failed to obtain. On the other hand, the United States made a demand on Portugal for the loss. The latter claim was submitted to the arbitration of Napoleon III.; and he, in 1852, rendered an award in favour of Portugal, which was accepted by the Government of the United States. Upon this the owners and crew of the privateer presented a claim against the United States for 131,600dols., and their case was argued with learning and with success by Mr. O'Connor, whose speech is here given. In the trial of the officers and crew of the Confederate privateer Savannah the arguments on both sides are presented. Mr. Snyder has rightly adopted this course, as we thus get a remarkably full discussion of the right of revolution within the law of nations, and the rights of revolutionists under the laws of war. A striking contrast to these grave topics is offered by Mr. Serjeant S. Prentiss's defence of Judge Wilkinson. Judge Wilkinson being about to marry visited Louisville, in Kentucky, to make preparations for the event, in company with his brother Dr. Wilkinson, and Mr. Murtaugh, who like himself were residents of Mississippi. Dr. Wilkinson had "ordered a suit of clothes of Mr. Redding, who followed the very respectable occupation of a tailor, occasionally relieved and interspersed by the more agreeable pursuits of a coffee-house keeper." The coat did not fit; an altercation ensued; and Judge Wilkinson struck the tailor with a poker. After this encounter the parties separated, and Judge Wilkinson retired with his friends to a bar-room, where he dismissed the affair from his mind:-"With buoyant feelings and pulse-quickening anticipations, he had come more than a thousand miles, upon a pilgrim and not of strife. He came to transplant one of Kentucky's fairest age to the shrine of beauty, and not of blood; upon an errand of love, flowers to the warm gardens of the sunny South. The marriage feast was spread; the bridal wreath was woven; and many bounding hearts and sparkling eyes chided the lagging hours. The thoughts of the bridegroom dwelt not upon the ignoble controversy, which, for an unguarded moment, had occupied his attention, but upon the bright and glorious future whose rapturous visions were about to become enchanting pleasant meditations, the angry tailor suddenly appeared in the bar-room, realities." Unfortunately, while Judge Wilkinson was indulging in these followed by "a right smart crowd" of his friends. The Mississippians were attacked, knives and pistols were freely used, and two of Redding's companions were killed in the affray. Subsequently Judge Wilkinson and his friends were indicted for murder, and successfully defended by Mr. Prentiss. A great deal of local feeling had been excited by the affair, and not the least remarkable feature in the speech is the adroit flattery of Kentucky with which Mr. Prentiss indulged the jury. Another argument for the defence in a trial for murder is that of Mr. Seward on behalf of William Freeman, in which the difficult question of insanity is ably discussed. Of a different kind is the speech of Mr. Rufus Choate on behalf of Helen Maria Dalton in the Dalton divorce case. Mr. Choate's argument was not only successful with the jury, but convinced the husband of his wife's innocence. Soon after the trial Mrs. Dalton received a bouquet from her husband, and, in a short time, the pair were happily re-united. Another striking speech for the prisoner is that of Mr. David Paul Brown at the trial of Holmes for manslaughter on the high seas Holmes was a sailor on board an emigrant ship which was wrecked. He was the last of the crew to leave the ship, and was conspicuous for his courage and humanity during the wreck. But afterwards, the long-boat boat being overcrowded and in imminent danger of sinking, Holmes and others, in order to save it, threw sixteen passengers into the Mr. Brown defended Holmes in a powerful address, remarkable for the skill with which he kept the circumstances vividly before the jury:"This case, in order to embrace all its horrible relations, ought to be sea. decided in a long-boat, hundreds of leagues from the shore, loaded to the very gunwale with forty-two half-naked victims; with provisions only sufficient to prolong the agonies of famine and of thirst; with all the elements combined against her: leaking from below, filling also from above; surrounded by ice, unmanageable from her condition, and subject to destruction from the least change of the wind and the waves-the most variable and most terrible of all the elements. Decided at such a tribunal, nature-intuition-would at once pronounce a verdict, not only of acquittal, but of commendation." Besides the American examples, Mr. Snyder gives the opposing speeches of Plunket and North in the case of R. v. Forbes; and the arguments and charge to the jury in the case of Massy v. The Marquis of Headfort. He also reproduces the speech of Thomas Erskine in the prosecution of Williams for publishing Paine's "Age of Reason." We do not think this a happy selection from Erskine's speeches. It was as counsel for the defence that Erskine displayed his great powers of advocacy. On the other hand, Mr. Snyder has done well in giving the speech of Sir James Mackintosh in defence of Jean Peltier, which is well worth attention. In conclusion, we gladly recommend this book to English readers. Those who are studying forensic speaking will find the time they spend with such examples of brilliant advocacy well repaid; and all who care for eloquence will meet with much in these pages to attract and to interest. CORRESPONDENCE. SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ACT, 1881.—GENERAL ORDER. somewhat curious. I once heard a judge solemnly lay down that it is [We print the above as the opinion of a member of the profession whose position entitles his views to consideration, but we must not be S. J.] supposed to concur unreservedly in all the opinions expressed.-ED. "MORTGAGOR OF LAND." [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I should be glad to be allowed a further and final word on the question, Are leaseholds within section 18 of the Conveyancing Act ?" with especial reference to your requirement that an affirmative solution must be such as to commend itself to "men of sense and discretion." The discussion that has taken place in your columns hardly leaves the subject in a very satisfactory state; and if there be anything in the point you have raised, its practical importance may excuse a little elaboration. Now, it should not be lost sight of that the question at issue is not as to the exact meaning of the words "land of any tenure"; it is not precisely, even, as to the meaning of the term "land" in section 18; but I submit that the problem to be solved is, What is the true interpretation of the expression "mortgagor of land" in that section f I have no objection to admit that the strict, though not the modern and popular, meaning of "land of any tenure" excludes leaseholds for years. I grant that it might have been better to have added some such words as 66 or any estate or interest therein," as in the case of Lord Cranworth's Act; but I maintain that, taking a large and comprehensive view of the Act as a whole, and assuming, as we are entitled and bound to do, that the Act as a whole shall be consistent with itself, we can only collect a uniform and consistent meaning by construing the word "land" in section 18 as including leaseholds. 8 Take, then, the 5th salient division, headed Statutory Mortgage," which immediately follows the similar division headed "Mortgages," under which section 18 is found. Division "V. Statutory Mortgage' speaks of "a mortgage of freehold or leasehold land." Now let us go to section 7, which sets out the covenants for title to be implied in conveyance by way of mortgage of leasehold property." The phrase expression "mortgagor of land" in section 18 applicable to the statutory mortgage of freehold land only, and would deny that it is applicable at all to the mortgage of leasehold land mentioned in section 7; and the ground of your contention is that "land, unless a contrary intention appears, means "land of any tenure," and that the words "of any tenure are words of restriction and not of amplification. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-As the General Order made in pursuance of the above Act affects so materially the interests of the profession, it is a matter of vital import-"the land conveyed" is there used. Your contention would make the ance to both solicitor and client that it should be free from any ambiguity or liability to misconstruction. I would, consequently, point out that in the case in which a solicitor acts for both vendor and purchaser in an ordinary sale and purchase transaction, he is entitled under the order, if strictly construed, to charge the full commission (according to Part I. of Schedule I.) as vendor's solicitor, and also the full commission (according to Part I. of Schedule I.) as purchaser's solicitor; inasmuch as rule 2 of the rules intituled "Rules applicable to Part II. of Schedule I." does not affect transactions of the description mentioned. It is questionable whether such a result was intended, but the order seems capable of no other construction. Solicitors are constantly acting for both vendor and purchaser in the same transaction, especially in sales by private contract, and it is most desirable that their remuneration in such cases should be definitely fixed. A. ST. B. HOLLAND. 92, London-wall, E.C., Aug. 23. SOLICITORS' CASES: RE W. E. TATTERSHALL. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, It must be gratifying to the whole profession that the Incorporated Law Society did not appear as prosecutors in this case, which is evidently one of great hardship. I know nothing of Mr. Tattershall, except what appears from your report. Judging from it, he seems to have been a respectable, but unfortunate, practitioner, who, under the pressure of "heavy losses from forgery and embezzlement," had used the money lying to his credit with his bankers, which, prima facie, every man has a right to do. He was not wrong in having paid the trust income to his own account, for the Master of the Rolls said he "did not call that an offence." His offence seems to have been, not the having made use of the money, but the having failed to restore it; for it cannot but be inferred from the judgment that, if the money had been repaid before the application was heard, there would have been no punishment at all, or only a nominal one. Everyone conversant with the details of business (which barristersand therefore judges-as a rule, are not) knows that a solicitor in large practice cannot keep a separate banking account for every trust he has to do with, nor do his clients ever dream of his doing so—until, indeed, they sustain a loss which ordinary care on their own part might have prevented, and then they invoke the aid of counsel and judges to punish the doing of that which, if things had not gone wrong, would never have been found fault with at all. The comments of judges on the duties of solicitors are occasionally Therefore, when the context classifies lands as if they were of different tenures, or when it shows that leasehold land is intended, this amounts to a declaration that leasehold land is not of any tenure! I doubt very much whether such a principle of interpretation will commend itself to "men of sense and discretion." The interpretation clause must itself to some extent be interpreted by the manner in which the interpreted term is used throughout the Act as a whole; and when we find that many parts of the Act would be devoid of rational meaning unless we conclude that "land of any tenure" was intended to embrace the derivative tenure leasehold, I think we are justified in drawing that conclusion. When the Act speaks of mortgages of all sorts of land, why should you stop short at section 18 and apply your feudal microscope? 66 I must respectfully demur to your explanation that Mr. Joshua Williams, at the commencement of a chapter on Tenure, wrote tenure instead of "tenancy," in reference to a lease, by a slip of the pen. If so, it was a slip of the pen that has had fourteen editions, and the pens of our standard text-writers must have been slipping for generations. I said that the controversy does not turn on the meaning of the word "land" alone, but I have left myself no space to draw out the meaning of the word "mortgagor," except to say that that term is defined absolutely-without any liability to qualification from a contrary intentionas including a mortgagor of leasehold land. "There were ninety and nine that safely lay And I have given my reasons for thinking it is so here. will, in default in trust for others. There was no issue of the marriage. The husband by will gave whatever he had to his wife, who sold the mortgaged estate for a price which discharged £300 only of the £1,000. It would be very desirable that the trustees should be released and indemnified, but it cannot be done. H. September 5. [We think that the remarks of our correspondent (who, if he will allow ns to say so, has changed his ground) are well worthy of attention, and that it is, at all events, more probable that the sheep will be dragged into the fold by some such method as that which he now indicates, than by his former proposal to give an impossible meaning to the phrase, "land of any tenure." With regard to Mr. Joshua Williams' use of the word "tenure," we can only say, with a modest confidence in the strength of our position upon this point, that if the learned writer did not make a slip of the pen he made a mistake. This is really one of those things which are not matters of opinion, as our correspondent seems himself to be aware.-ED. S. J.] SALE OF SOLICITOR'S PRACTICE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-In the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL of the 29th of July last, a solicitor's practice is offered for sale at two and three quarter years' purchase. Can you or some of your readers inform me the usual price for the share of a deceased or retiring solicitor? I have found that one year's purchase is generally paid in commercial firms, and was surprised to find two and three quarter years' purchase asked for the practice of a solicitor. September 4. OBITUARY. MR. THOMAS FALCONER. PALL MALL. Mr. Thomas Falconer, many years a judge of county courts, died at Bath on the 28th ult. at the age of seventy-seven. Mr. Falconer was the son of the Rev. Thomas Falconer, of Bath, and was born in 1805. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1830, and he practised for several years in the Court of Chancery. Soon after the passing of the Reform Act he was appointed by Lord Denman to be revising barrister for the metropolitan boroughs, and he acted for several years in that capacity. In 1851 he acted as an arbitrator upon the Commission to determine the boundaries of the provinces of Canada and New Brunswick, and in the following year he became Colonial Secretary for Western Australia. Shortly afterwards he received from Lord Truro the appointment of county court judge for Circuit No. 30, comprising Swansea, Merthyr Tydvil, and other important towns in South Wales. Mr. Falconer was an industrious and successful judge, and was very highly esteemed by the legal profession and the mercantile community in his district. He will long be remembered for his successful opposition to the truck system. fle discharged his ouerous judicial duties for nearly thirty years, but in the autumn of last year he was attacked with severe illness while sitting in court at Pontypridd, and he soon afterwards retired on a pension. He had since resided at Bath, and his health had greatly improved, but a few weeks ago he sustained a fall when at a flower show, and from the effects of which he never recovered, Mr. Falconer was unmarried. He was a magistrate for Monmouthshire, Glamorganshire, and Breconshire. His politics were Liberal. He was one of the few surviving members of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and he bad made some liberal gifts to the public libraries at Cardiff and Merthyr Tydvil. THE RIGHT HON. MONTAGUE BERNARD, D.C.L. The Right Hon. Montague Bernard, D.C.L., who died at Overroes, Ross, Herefordshire, on the 2nd inst., at the age of sixty-two, was the son of Mr. Charles Bernard, of Eden, Jamaica, and wae born in 1820. He was educated at Sherborne School, and he was successively scholar and fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, where he graduated first class in classics and second class in mathematics. He obtained the Vinerian Law Fellowship, and he ultimately proceeded to the degree of D.C.L. He became a pupil in the chambers of the present Lord Chancellor, and he was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1846. He practised for several years as an equity draftsman and conveyancer, and in 1859 he returned to Ox'ord on his election as the first Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, to which a fellowship at All Souls' College was attached. About the same time he was appointed assessor of the Vice-Chancellor's Court, in which capacity he rendered most valuable services by establishing an improved system of procedure. He also adjudicated in the proceedings which were unsuccessfully taken in that court against Professor Jowett. He held both appointments till 1874, and he acted on several occasions as public examiner in the School of Law and Modern History and for degrees in civil law. He proceeded to Washington as a member of the Commission to carry out the negotiations which resulted in the Alabama Treaty. Shortly after his return to England he was sworn in as member of the Privy Council, and was also appointed a member of the Judicial Committee, in which capacity he took part in the hearing of several ecclesiastical appeals, including the case of Sheppard v. Bennett. In 1872 he was engaged at Geneva as an assistant to the present Lord Selborne, who represented this country in the Alabama arbitration. Dr. Bernard also served on several other commissions, including the Naturalization Commission, the Fugitive Slaves' Commission, and the Oxford University Commission of 1877. Oa that occasion he rendered valuable services in the framing of the new college statutes, many of them having been drafted by him personally. He was one of the original promoters of the Guardian, and he was for several years editor of that newspaper. He was author of several works on international law, the best known among which were "Four Lectures on Subjects Connected with Diplomacy," and "The Neutrality of England daring the American Civil War." MR. CHARLES GARDNER THOMSON. Mr. Charles Gardner Thomson, solicitor (of the firm of Thomson & Wilson), of Kendal, one of the coroners for the county of Westmoreland, died suddenly on the 28th ult. at the early age of forty-six. Mr. Thomson was born in 1836. He was admitted a solicitor in 1857, and he had practised for about twenty-five years at Kendal, where he had a large and important private practice. For several years Mr. John Bolton Wilson had been associated in partnership with him. He was elected coroner for the Kendal and Lonsdale Wards of Westmoreland in 1861, and he held that office till his death, and be was also clerk to the Kendal Board of Guardians, Assessment Committ e, Rural Sanitary Authority, and School Attendance Committee, and superintendent registrar for the district. His premature death has caused general sorrow at Kendal. Mr. Thomson leaves a widow and eleven children. He was buried on the 31st ult. NEW ORDERS, &c. NEW RULES UNDER TRADE-MARKS REGISTRATION ACTS, 1875-77. Rule 5 of the Rules made in August, 1876, shall be altered so as to read thus "5. A person, whether a British subject or an alien, desiring to register a trade-mark, shall apply to the registrar by sending to him a statement prepared in accordance with Rules 6, 7, and 8, and the prescribed fee, with the addition in the case of a trade-mark which has been used before the 13th of August, 1875, but not otherwise, of a declaration prepared in accordance with Rules 9, 10, 11, 64, 65, 66, and 67." Rule 11 of the Rules made in August, 1876, shall be altered so as to read thus "11. Where an application for the registry of a trade-mark is made by or on behalf of any firm or partnership, the statement and declaration shall be made by one member only of such firm or partnership, or by any person duly authorized by such firm or partnership; and the registrar may require such proof as be thinks fit that the application made is duly authorized by such firm or partnership." Selborne, C. June 24, 1882. Rules 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27, made in August, 1876, shall be abolished, and the following rules substituted therefor : 23, 24. Registration of assignments or transmissions.] The person to whom any registered trade-mark has been assigned or has been transmitted by death, marriage, bankruptcy, or otherwise by operation of law may apply to be registered as proprietor thereof by sending to the registrar a statement and declaration in the prescribed form, and accompanied by the prescribed fee. 25. Assignee or transmittee may assign his interest although not registered.] Any assignee or transmittee may assign his interest in any mark, notwithstanding that he has not been registered as proprietor thereof. 26, 27. Declaration by assignee or transmittee.] Every declaration made by an assignee or transmittee shall state his name, address, and calling, and that the mark has been lawfully assigned or transmitted to him with the goodwill of the business concerned in the goods with respect to which the trade-mark is registered or with some part of such goodwill; and the registrar may, if he think tit, require proof of the assignment or transmission. Whereas it is desirable to alter the amounts of the fees in the second schedule charged respectively upon application for, and registration of, trade. marks, it is hereby ordered that the fee upon application shall be 5s. instead of £1 as at present, and that the fee upon registration shall be £1 15s, instead of £1 as at present, but that where application is made for the registration of more than one trade-mark at the same time and in the same class, the fees for each mark after the first shall be 5s. upon application and 15s. upon registra tion, as set forth in the accompanying amended schedule of fees. It is also necessary that an alteration should be made in the second schedule to the Rules, with respect to the fees to be charged on applications for the registration of subsequent proprietors in cases of assignment or transmission of trade-marks. According to the existing definition, the fee or fees can only be charged in cases where the subsequent registration has been actusliy effected, although the whole work of examination, &c., except the clerical act of entering upon the register, has been performed. In future, therefore, the fee for subsequent registration shall be charged on the application for such registration. As regards the rule made the 4th of February, 1878, to enable the registered proprietor of a trade-mark to obtain the cancellation of the entry of such trade-mark upon the register, it is found to be desirable to provide also for the Thet day of 18 This is the statement marked "B" referred to in the me this day of 18 cancellation of any part of an entry. In future, therefore, the registered proprietor of a trade-mark may at any time send to the registrar an application to cancel part of an entry upon the register, leaving the registration still in force for the remaining portion of such entry, such application to be accom. panied by the prescribed fee and by a declaration made by the applicant, stating his name, address, and calling, and that he is the person whose name appears upon the register as the proprietor of the said trade-mark; and thereupon the registrar may, if satisfied of the truth of the statement made by the applicant, cancel part of the entry of such trade-mark, as before mentioned. Moreover, as the Schedule of Fees has been several times amended by New Form of Declaration to accompany Statement on Application for Registra additions thereto, the whole has been recast and consolidated in the form which accompanies these rules. It is furthermore ordered that the revised Schedule of Fees shall come into operation on the second day of October, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two. July 29, 1882. SELBORNE, C. We being two of the Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury do hereby assent to the above Rules so far as they relate to fees. *Here insert name, address, and calling of applicant. If on behalf of a firm or company fill in accordingly. + Here insert date. Here insert signature. I,* tion by Assignment or Transmission. of (2.) The trade-mark therein mentioned, together with the good will of the business concerned in the goods with respect to which registered t (3.) I hereby declare that lawfully entitled to be registered as subsequent proprietor of the said trade-mark referred to in such statement, and that lawfully entitled to the goodwill of the business concerned in the goods with respect to which the said trade-mark registered. And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of the Statutory Declarations Act, 1835. § 050 - 0 5 0 020 1 15 0 5. Where the same person is registered at the same time for more than one trade-mark, for registration of each additional mark after the first - 0 15 0 *Here insert name, address, and calling of applicant. Here insert whether assigned or transmitted and how. This is not required when the declaration is made out of the United Kingdom. § Here insert signature. LEGAL APPOINTMENTS. Mr. GEORGE Maw, jun., of Bishop Auckland, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner to take Acknowledgments of Married Women. Mr. FRANCIS FREDERICK PINKETT, barrister, who has been appointed Chief Justice of the West Africa Settlements, was called to the bar at Gray'sinn in Michaelmas Term, 1863. He was formerly a member of the Western Circuit, and he was for several years Crown Solicitor, Registrar-General, and Master of the Supreme Court at Sierra Leone. He has for several months acted as Chief Justice of the West Africa Settlements. Mr. JAMES CHAPMAN, solicitor, of 1, Gresham-buildings, Basinghall-street, 0 100 has been appointed a Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women for the Counties of Middlesex and Essex, and the Cities of London and Westminster. 01 5 0 0 5 0 16. For certificate of refusal to register a trade-mark under section 2 of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 33 0 2 0 1 17. For certificate of refusal, at the same time, for more than one trade-mark, for each additional mark after the first 18. Settling a special case by registrar 19. For continuance of mark at expiration of fourteen years 20. Additional fee where fee is paid within three months after expiration of fourteen years DISSOLUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS. EDWARD WESTLAND BERNARD and WILLIAM HENRY KING, solicitors, Stourbridge, Worcester (Bernard & King), June 30. The said practice will henceforth be continued and carried on by the said William Henry King alone, who will receive and pay all debts;dus and owing to and from the said partnership. [Gazette, Sept. 1.] ROBERT EDWARD JOSHUA MATTHEWS and ROBERT WELLS, solicitors, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane (Matthews & Wells). 0 0 Sept. 1. Robert Edward Joshua Matthews will pay and discharge all debts and liabilities, and receive all moneys payable to the said late firm. 0 10 0 2 1 0 0 21. Additional fee for restoration of trade-mark when removed for non-payment of fee 22. For inspecting register, for every quarter of an hour 23. For making a search amongst the classified representations of 24. For office copy of documents, 2d. per folio, but never less than 0 1 0 July 29, 1882. 0 26 SELBORNE, C. [Gazette, Sept. 5.] August 12, 1882. HERBERT J. GLADSTONE, Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's COMPANIES. WINDING-UP NOTICES. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. LIMITED IN CHANCERY. NORTH WINGFIELD COLLIERY COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented UNITED SHEPHERDS' WHEAL ROSE, LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J., dated EAST LONDON AND SUBURBAN DAIRY COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or |