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solidated Gold Mining Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 7th inst.,
a question arose as to the right of a person who has filed an affidavit in a
matter afterwards to withdraw it, so as to prevent the witness from being cross-
examined. An application was made by one Young, by motion under section
35 of the Companies Act, 1862, to rectify the register of members of the
company by omitting his name. Affidavits were filed on both sides, among
which were an affidavit by the applicant in support of his case and an affidavit
by one Roebuck on behalf of the company. An order was then made on the
application of Young for the appointment of a special examiner "for the
purpose of taking the examination, cross-examination, and re-examination
of witnesses who have made affidavits for the purposes of the motion." And
it was also ordered that the applicant and the company should be at liberty
to issue subpanas for the evidence in chief of any witness for the purposes of
the motion. Young attended before the examiner and was cross-examined on
his affidavit. Roebuck afterwards attended, and, after he had been sworn,
the company's counsel objected to his being cross-examined, on the ground
that they had withdrawn his affidavit and that he was no longer a witness for
them, and could, therefore, only be examined by the other side in chief.
The question was referred to the court, and KAY, J., held that the witness
must attend and be cross-examined, and this decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.). The ques-
tion turned partly upon the construction of section 40 of the Act
15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, which provides that "any party in any cause
or matter may require the attendance of any witness before an
examiner of the court, and examine such witness orally... and any
party having made an affidavit to be used, or which shall be used, on any
claim, motion, petition, or other proceedings before the court shall be bound,
on being served with such writ, to attend before an examiner, for the
purpose of being cross-examined." And rules 7 and 11 of the order of the
Court of Chancery of the 5th of February, 1861, speak of the cross-examina-
tion of "any deponent or witness, or of any party," and of "any witness,
whether a party or not." JESSEL, M.R., said that considering the date of
the decision of Wood, V.C., in Clarke v. Law (4 W. R. 35, 2 K. & J. 28),
that a party having filed or given notice to read an affidavit is not at liberty
to withdraw it, the practice must be considered settled. The Vice-Chancellor
there said, "He has propounded himself as a witness, and cannot be allowed
if not cross-examined to use his affidavit, but if threatened with cross-
examination to withdraw it; having tendered himself as a witness, he is
bound to submit to cross-examination." After that decision the practice
must be considered settled, notwithstanding the observation of Lord
Selborne in Pike v. Dickinson (21 W. R. 862), that he was wholly unable to
understand the reasoning upon which Clarke v. Law was founded, though he
followed the decision. If the observation was correctly reported, the Master
of the Rolls said he could not understand it. He thought the case was
perfectly intelligible. A man having given notice of his intention to use an
affidavit was not at liberty to withdraw the witness in order to avoid his
cross-examination. Of course he need not use the evidence if he did not
wish to do so, bat the opposite party could use it. It appeared to his lord-
ship to be a sound principle in the administration of justice that a man
having called a witness should not be at liberty to withdraw him after he had
been sworn, whether he was put into the box or whether he made an affidavit.
As to section 40 of the Act of 1852, no doubt it was open to criticism. The
word "party" seemed to be used in it in one sense at the beginning, and in
another afterwards. But if the argument was right that the word "party
in the latter part of section 40 meant only one of the parties to the proceedings,
there would be no means of examining a witness (not a party) who had made
an affidavit in a matter. There was a mode of doing this in a cause. In
practice it had always been considered that the word "party" meant
"person," and the rules of 1861 confirmed this construction. This having
been the settled practice for thirty years, it was too late now to discuss
whether it was right in the first instance. BRETT, L.J., thought that the
principle laid down in Clarke v. Law was one common to the administration
of justice in every tribunal. It was a most important rule, in order to
serve the administration of justice pure and undefiled, that no party should
be allowed to take a step in the proceedings for the purpose of winning, and
then when he found that it was turning against him to withdraw it. It
would be most disastrous to countenance anything of the kind. A party
could not be allowed to take a step in proposing to use evidence if it should
not be questioned by his adversary, but the moment it was questioned, feel-
ing the weakness of what he had proposed to do, to withdraw it. His lord.
ship could not conceive anything more calculated to bring the administration
of justice into contempt and ignominy. COTTON, L.J., was not at all
satisfied that the point was not concluded by the language of section 40, inde.
pendently of any authority. But, at any rate, he thought the rule laid down
in Clarke v. Law was a good rule, and one which ought to be considered as
established. The question was whether the rule applied to a witness who
was not a party to the proceedings. Whatever might be the right view of
the construction of section 40, the practice was settled that it applied to a
witness who was not a party to the proceedings as well as to one who was. It
applied to an affidavit made by any person for the purpose of any motion.
SOLICITORS, Snell, Son, & Greenip; Ĥ. Sydney.

At

of the debts due to the partnership, or the names of the persons who owed them. He stated as one of his assets, "Property as per list G. £1,936,” and in the list G. there was the following statement:-"I am a partner in the firm of Leigh & Amor, and it appears, upon balancing the accounts, that there is a surplus, after paying the trade creditors, of £1,936, which sum stands to the credit of my capital account in that business. I am informed that Mr. Leigh claims the entire amount, under a penal clause in the partnership agreement, should the business be wound up through any act of mine." The creditors at their first meeting resolved to adjourn the meeting for fourteen days, in order that an accountant named in the resolution might investigate the debtor's affairs, and report to the adjourned meeting. He was to be assisted by a committee, consisting of three creditors and the receiver. the adjourned meeting a report by the accountant was presented. It was not signed by the debtor, or in any other way adopted by him. It confirmed the debtor's statement as to the amount of his share in the capital in the partnership, and set forth an account, though not in full detail, showing how this amount was arrived at, and it mentioned that the whole of the £1,936 was claimed by Leigh under the terms of his arrangement with the debtor. At the adjourned meeting the creditors resolved by the proper statutory majority to accept a composition of 1s. 61. in the pound, payable in two instalments, and the resolutions were confirmed at the second meeting. One of the dissentient creditors opposed the registration of the resolutions, on the ground that the statement of affairs was insufficient. Mr. Registrar Murray, on the authority of Ex parte Solomon (L. R. 20 Ch. D. 281, ante, p. 311), allowed the objection, and refused the registration. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. JESSEL, M. R., said that the Act required the debtor to make a statement of affaire. The statement must be in writing, and must pledge the debtor to the amount of his assets. In the present case the debtor had made a statement of his own separate assets, and the creditors had before them the means of ascertaining what means he had of meeting his liabilities. A debtor who was a partner in business with some one else must make a similar statement of the assets of the firm. He must state the names of the creditors of the firm and the amount due to each, and the names of the debtors to the firm with the amount due from each. The creditors could then see for themselves the position of the firm. But that was not enough. He must also make a statement of the account between himself and his partner. The creditors could then see exactly what the share coming to him would be. In his lordship's opinion that was the proper mode of making the statement of his affairs, and there was no difficulty as a rule in doing it. Of course there might be exceptional cases-if, for instance, the partner refused the debtor access to the books of the firm. But, if for any reason it was impossible for the debtor to make a proper statement of his affairs, he could not have the benefit of the provisions of the Act as to liquidation or composition, but he must submit to be made a bankrupt. In the present case the statement was that it appeared, on balancing the accounts of the partnership, that there was a surplus of £1,936 standing to the debtor's credit. That told his creditors nothing. It did not say whether the balance was correct, nor how it was arrived at. Then he said he was informed that the whole of the £1,936 was claimed by Leigh under a penal clause in the partnership agreement. He was bound to set out what the claim of Leigh was, and what the penal clause was. titled to anything from the partnership assets or not. The statement was The creditors could not really tell whether the debtor was enwholly insufficient. BRETT, L.J., thought that the rule which the court was his affairs would be disclosed, but still be thought that the rule ought to be laying down would be a hardship to the solvent partner, because the state of laid down. The argument of the appellant came to this, that, whenever a tion with his creditors had a business of his own and also another business in man who was desirous of having a liquidation by arrangement or a composiwhich he had a partner, he might, in the statement which he had to make for the purpose of guiding his own creditors, if the partnership was solvent, set down in a lump sum his share in the business. It was admitted that, if he were carrying on two different businesses, each of which was his own pre-exclusively, such a statement of his interest in each would not be sufficient. Bat how could the fact that some one else was interested in one of the busistatement with regard to the affairs of the partnership business, which was his nesses make any difference? Was he to be excused from making a proper although it was also some one else's, because he had a partner in it? His lordship could see no rule which absolved the debtor from making a Proper statement of the affairs of the business because he had a solvent partner in it. In the present case the debtor had pledged himself nothing about the partnership business. His lordship was not prepared to say that, if the accountant's report had contained all the necessary information, and the debtor under his own hand had referred to that report in such a way as to incorporate it into his statement of affairs, that might not have been suffiinsufficient for the purpose of guiding his creditors. COTTON, L.J., said that, But he had done nothing of the kind, and his statement was clearly statement by holding this insufficient, some difficulty might be in the placed way desired of persons who to avail themselves of the liquidation and composition clauses Act. of the But the court could only consider what was required by the Act in order that dissentient creditors should be bound by the resolutions of the majority. The Act said that the debtor should produce a statement showing the whole of his assets and debts; it did not say a statement of the aggregate of his assets or debts. One object was that the creditors might be able to form an opinion what dividend he was able to pay. Another object was that there should be a statement of the debtor himself; and though the report of an accountant, if properly adopted by the debtor himself, might be a sufficient statement, yet the debtor must give all the information which he himself possessed, and it was not enough to say that by subsequent investigation everything could be discovered. The debtor must make the statement himself, and must pledge himself to its

"

LIQUIDATION PETITION-STATEMENT OF AFFAIRS-SUFFICIENCY-DEBTOR IN PARTNERSHIP-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 125, 126.-In a case of Ex parte Amor, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., a question arose as to the sufficiency of the statement of affairs of a debtor who had filed a liquidation petition. The debtor had carried on two businesses-one alone, the other in partnership with one Leigh. Leigh remained solvent. The debtor, in the statement of his affairs which he produced at the first meeting of his creditors, gave the names of the creditors of the partnership, with the amount of the debt due to each. He did not, however, state the amount

cient.

accuracy. In the present case the debtor had pledged himself to nothing; no information was given which could enable the creditors properly to judge whether they should accept the composition which was offered. The debtor asked that he might be allowed to summon a fresh first meeting of his creditors. The court refused to allow this, saying that the jurisdiction to do this was purely discretionary.-SOLICITORS, Beyfus & Beyfus; H. A. Lovett & Co.

TRUSTEE-DISCRETIONARY POWER-JURISDICTION OF COURT.-In a case of Tempest v. Camoys, before the Court of Appeal on the 1st inst., the question arose whether the court should interfere to compel trustees to exercise discretionary power of investing trust funds in the purchase of real estate, there being a difference of opinion between the trustees as to the propriety of making a particular purchase. By the will of a testator the trustees were empowered, at their or his discretion, to sell the devised estates and to reinvest the proceeds of sale in the purchase of other lands, and also, in the exercise of their or his absolute discretion, to raise any money which they might think proper for the purpose of effecting any purchase which they might, in the exercise of their absolute discretion, think proper, of any lands in the West Riding of Yorkshire, by mortgage of all or any part of the devised estates. There being in court a sum of about £13,000 consols, representing the proceeds of the sale of the testator's Lancashire estates, which had been sold by direction of the court, and also accumulations exceeding £21,000, it was proposed, with the consent of one of the trustees, to apply these sums towards the purchase for £60,000 of the Bracewell Hall estate, in the West Riding, and to raise the balance of about £30,000 by mortgage. A petition was presented to obtain the direction of the court that the proposed purchase should be carried out. The other trustee of the will objected to the proposed purchase on several grounds-1. That it was not a prudent exercise of their discretion for the trustees, who had only some £30,000 in hand, to purchase an estate which would cost £60,000, and might not be worth that amount; 2. That a purchase of such magnitude was never contemplated or intended by the testator; and 3. That the purchase with borrowed money of property with a large mansion upon it, involving great expense in keeping it up, was neither necessary nor desirable in the interests of the trust. The Bracewell Hall estate had been in the possession of the elder branch of the testator's family from the time of Henry I. down to 1657, when it was alienated by the then owner, and it was said to be very desirable to take advantage of this opportunity of recovering, at what was a moderate price, an estate which had been the cradle and for so many centuries the home of the family. On the other hand, it was admitted that Bracewell Hall was not intended as an immediate family residence, but that, if the purchase should be effected, it was proposed to grant a twenty-one years' lease of the hall for the purposes of a lunatic asylum. CHITTY, J. declined to sanction the proposed purchase, being of opinion that when the two trustees in whom the discretionary power of purchasing was vested differed in opinion the court could not interfere to control that discretion by compelling them to exercise the power. This decision was Court affirmed by the of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) JESSEL, M.R., said it was very important that the law of the court on this subject should be understood. It was settled law that, when a testator had given a pure discretion to trustees, the court could not exercise it for them, although it could prevent them from exercising it improperly, as in the case when persons had a power to appoint new trustees, the court could not interfere with their exercising that power, but it could see that they did not appoint improper persons. But if there was a duty coupled with the exercise of the trust the court could then compel the trustees to carry it out. In the present case there was a power which amounted to a trust to reinvest the proceeds of the sale of real estate in land, and, if the objecting trustee had refused to invest the money in land at all, the court might have interfered. But he had not not done this; he was only exercising his discretion as to the time when this should be dore, and as to the particular investment which was proposed. The court could not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. In addition to this, it appeared that about half the purchase-money would have to be raised by mortgage of the purchased estate; and this must be done under a power to raise money by mortgage, which was purely discretionary in the trustees. This also was a discretion which the court could not interfere with. Therefore, in his opinion, Chitty, J., was right, and the appeal must be dismissed. BRETT and COTTON, LJJ., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Cole & Jackson; Ward, Mills, & Co.

PETITION-APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEES-ANNUITANTS-SERVICE OF PETITION. In the case of In re Marshall, before Chitty, J., on the 5th inst., a petition was presented for the appointment of new trustees of a will, the petitioners being residuary legatees absolutely entitled. A question arose whether two annuitants of £100 each should have been served with the petition. It appeared that the whole estate of the testator was of the value of some £25,000, subject, however, as to the realty to a mortgage of £14,000. CHITTY, J., said that annuitants were not necessarily made respondents to such petitions, but the question whether they should be served was one in the dis cretion of the court. Service might, in the present instance, be dispensed with.-SOLICITORS, Clutton & Harris; Farmer.

LIMITED COMPANY-WINDING UP-SHAKEHOLDERS' PETITION-CONSENSUS OF SHAREHOLDERS-FRAUD.—In the case of In the Matter of the New Callao Co. (Limited) before Chitty, J., on the 3rd inst., a petition was presented by the holder of eighty-five shares in the company praying that it might be wound up, on the ground that it was a bubble and a sham. It appeared that the company was incorporated in April, 1881, with a nominal capital of £750,000 in £1 shares, for the purpose of purchasing and working gold mines in

Venezuela. The petitioner alleged that the prospectus issued by the company set forth false representations, and that the mining property contained no gold at all, and that the company was carried on only for the purpose of paying remuneration and salaries to its directors and other officers. The petition was supported by the holders of some 3,000 or 4,000 shares, and was opposed by some 180 persons holding between them 17,000 or 18,000 shares and by others who held vendors' shares to the number of 15,000. CHITTY, J., said that even where a petition for winding up a company was presented by a contributory who held a large number of shares, the court required a very strong case to be made out before it would substitute its own opinion for the wishes of the majority of the shareholders. Here was a petition by the holder of a small number of shares, supported by a comparatively small section of shareholders, but opposed by a large proportion. It appeared that no less than three meetings of shareholders had been called, all of which it was open to any shareholder to attend. At these meetings there had been a fair attendance, and the result was a unanimous vote of opposition to the company being wound up; in other words, a unanimous desire that it should be continued to be carried on. Another meeting had also been called in the interest of the petitioner, and the result of that meeting was that a majority of those present opposed the wind. ing up. The shareholders, therefore, might be said to have generally shown a substantial opposition to a winding up. The prospectus issued by the company had been carefully travelled through by the petitioner for the purpose of showing that it set forth fraudulent and untrue statements, but the only evidence in support of these statements was the statutory affidavit filed in support of the allegations in the petition. This was no doubt prima facie evidence, but it was no more; and the affidavit was met by the evidence to a contrary effect produced by those who opposed the winding up. Amongst such evidence was an affidavit by a person who swore that he had found gold on the property in question. The case was, therefore, a very different one from that of the Wala Wynaad Indian Gold Mining Company recently before him, and the petitioner here had not made out a case that entitled him to have an order similar to the one there made. It had been objected that the evidence produced by the company was not such as could be strictly received by the court. The evidence was, however, good in this respect that it was good enough to satisfy the shareholders. His lordship wished to repeat what he had already said—namely, that in the case of a shareholder's petition for a winding up, the court would decline to accede to a request to substitute the the judgment of the court for that of the general body of shareholders unless a very strong case were made out by the petitioner. No such case was made out here, and the result was that the petition must be dismissed, with costs. Such costs would, of course, not include the costs of the shareholders who supported the petition, but would include the usual one set of costs to those shareholders who opposed the petition.-SOLICITORS, Greenfield & Abbott ; Walter Ellis; Lewis Davis; G. Davis, Son, & Co.; Beall.

SOLICITORS' CASES.

COURT OF APPEAL, LINCOLN'S INN. (Before JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON, L.J.)

Aug. 8.-In re W. E. Tattershall.

This was an appeal from an order of a divisional court consisting of Field and Stephen, L.JJ., suspending from practice as a solicitor for the period of five years (ante, p. 600). The appellant, who was in practice as a solicitor in Sheffield, was one of the trustees of a marriage settlement, and in this capacity he bad received the rents of the trust property which were in the first instance paid in by him to his own account, and then paid out by cheque to the cestui que trust. The appellant had recently suffered heavy losses from forgery and embezzlement by a dishonest clerk, whom he had since prosecuted. Under of his trust money which was lying mingled with his own money at his pecuniary pressure occasioned by his losses he had appropriated about £200 that he had been forced under some pressure to dip into the trust fund, and bankers. The loss was discovered in September last, when he wrote admitting offering, when he was able, to replace what he had taken, at the same time enclosing a cheque for a small amount of rent recently received. One of his clients, who was a near relative of the cestui que trust, owed him a sum of about £200, and it was in February, 1882, suggested that the client should pay this amount to the cestui que trust so as to make good the loss sustained. The appellant at once consented to this proposal and gave an authority to the client to pay over the money to the cestui que trust. The payment not having been made, proceedings in April last were taken for the purpose of getting the appellant suspended from practice. The whole amount of the money taken had, in the course of April and May, been replaced. On July 6 the divisional court made an order suspending the appellant from practice for five years as the least punishment that in their opinion could meet the justice of the case.

Waddy, Q. C., and Wilberforce, for the appellant, submitted that the divisional court had passed a sentence of extreme and undue harshness, being apparently under the impression, which was erroneous, that the money had only been replaced in consequence of the proceedings taken against him, whereas sometime before these proceedings were either taken or threatened he had consented that money owing to him by one of his clients should be applied in making good the loss occasioned by his admitted misconduct, and it was entirely due to the failure of the client to perform his promise that there had been the delay between February and May in replacing the money taken. Stuart Wortley, for the cestui que trust.

JESSEL, M.R.-You do not, I suppose, press for punishment. Stuart Wortley.-No, but at the same time we do not wish to have it said that it is an application that never ought to have been made. JESSEL, M.R.-You will not be told that.

JESSEL, M.R., said that he had very great hesitation in interfering at all with the order of the divisional court, and he could not conceal from himself that that order was right in substance. There could be no doubt that the appellant had received the income of the trust property and had mixed it with his own money at his bankers. His lordship did not call that an offence, as the amounts from time to time received were small, and it was a very difficult matter to open a separate account with a banker for such small amounts, and, moreover, the sums were income, not capital. But then, when the amount exceeded £200, the appellant made use of it for his own purposes, knowing that it did not belong to him. His lordship could not call this anything but a dishonest act. He could not differ from the view of the divisional court; it was a very wrong and dishonest act. That being so, the only thing the court had to consider was the amount of punishment to be awarded. The divisional court had suspended the appellant for a period of five years, and, if that court had been aware of all the facts which now appeared he would not have interfered with the exercise of their discretion, however severe their sentence might have been. But there were two facts now before the court which were not apparently before the divisional court, and which, if they had been brought to their notice, would, he thought, have induced them to modify their sentence. In the first place, the appellant was over sixty years old, and in his case suspension for a period of five years would be equivalent to striking him off the rolls altogether, a punishment which was not intended by the divisional court. Then, in the second place, the judges of that court were under the impression that it was these proceedings which had occasioned the transfer of the debt, and restitution of the trust fund, but this turned out to be erroneous. It now turned out that this arrangement was made in February, before any hostile proceedings were either taken or threatened. The appellant bad done his utmost to make restitution before this application was made, though the payment of the transferred debt had not in fact been made, and this was a circumstance favourable to him which was not before the divisional court. Taking these two circumstances together, and protesting against any idea that offences of this nature were not to be punished with wholesome severity, their lordships, although they might be erring on the side of leniency, would reduce the sentence to suspension from practice for the period of one

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per annum.

It appeared by a master's report that, on the 17th of December, 1880, Mr. Grueber received from one Charles Laurence a cheque for £276 1s. 4d., and that a few days later Laurence was repaid a sum of £26 1s. 4d., the balance in Mr. Grueber's hands being then £250. On the same day the following agreement was drawn up:-"Received of you, Mr. C. G. Grueber, the sum of £26 1s. 4d., part of the sum of £276 18. 4d., being the legacy payable to me under the will of George Read, deceased. And I hereby authorize and empower you to retain the balance thereof, and employ the same in your business or otherwise until such time as I may require the same, you paying me therefor interest thereon in the meantime at the rate of eight per cent. Dated this 21st day of December, 1880. One month's notice to be given to you of my intention to withdraw all or any of the abovementioned moneys.-Signed, Charles Laurence." The master reported that Mr. Grueber did not explain the agreement to Laurence, who is an uneducated man, nor did he give him a copy of the agreement. The master reported further that Laurence gave his evidence before him in a very unsatisfactory way, and was greatly influenced by a settlement that had been come to between himself and Mr. Grueber, whereby a Mr. Nicholson became surety to Laurence for the money due to him from Mr. Grueber. The settlement was that Mr. Nicholson was to pay down a deposit of £50 to Laurence, and the balance of the debt within two years, but that if proceedings were to be pressed against Grueber, and he were struck off the rolls, the guarantee was to be void.

W. G. Harrison, Q.C, and Glyn, for Mr. Grueber.-The money was lent to Mr. Grueber by Laurence under the terms of the agreement, and justice will be satisfied by the court enforcing the re-payment of the money. As to the clause providing for the agreement becoming void in the event of proceedings being taken, I am given to understand that Nicholson is a moneylender, and was only willing to become security for Mr. Grueber if he could see his way to getting the money back again with interest. That he would hardly do if Mr. Grueber were struck off the rolls; and hence the proviso. F. Hollams for the Incorporated Law Society was not desirous of unduly pressing the matter.

FIELD, J.-Ia this matter a rule had been granted calling upon the solicitor to answer the matters in certain affidavits, or, in the alternative, to show cause why he should not be struck off the rolls.

The facts under which the application arises, and upon which we are called upon to award punishment, appear to be these: Mr. Grueber was engaged in a chancery suit for Laurence, and in December, 1880, Laurence was entitled to a legacy of £276 18. 4d. This sum he daly received from the Accountant-General and, according to the ordinary practice of solicitors, Mr. Grueber went down and took possession of the cheque. It is said that Laurence having no banker suggested that Mr. Graeber should take the money and take care of it for him. Had Mr. Grueber taken the cheque,

Reported by W. BLEW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

and given another on his own bank, it would have been well enough, bat he did not do so. Laurence seems to have been a man of some intelligence, and by no means disinclined to make eight per cent. out of his money, bat Mr. Grueber should not have mixed himself up in a money lending transac tion with his own client; it is a bad thing to join transactions of that sort with the work of a solicitor at all. The duty of a solicitor when he enters into personal relations with his client is to throw off his duty as solicitor altogether, and say to his client, "I cannot deal with you in this matter myself, but I wish you to lend me the £250, and I wish to have a proper agreement drawn up, and you had better go to some professional man and have it done." But what course did this solicitor adopt? He prepared the agreement for his client without giving him the chance of learning whether the agreement was fair or not. Now, his position was that of a borrower, and we find him unable to pay back the money borrowed. Can that position be explained? What happens then? £26 is paid back to Laurence, and then a document is drawn up which, as Mr. Hollams says, begins fairly enough, but which is calculated to deceive a man like Laurence. Its beginning is in form an ordinary receipt (his lordship read the document given above). Then the next step is bad, Mr. Grueber inducing Laurence to sign that document; that carries the matter further, and is, I think, a most improper transaction. A man who had made a fair agreement with his client would give him a copy of it to refer to. In acting as he did, Mr. Grueber was guilty of an offence, first against Laurence, and then against the highly respectable body to which he belongs, his duty being to see that no act of his should do harm to that roll on which his name appears. That being the state of things, Laurence appeals to this court as the guardian of public morality, and the court must take notice of it as the matter has been brought before it. An affidavit was made upon which the court thought that proper grounds existed for proceeding, and then came a circumstance which nearly always happens. Having invoked the corrective and punitive powers of this court an arrangement is tried between the parties.

Now comes the most unpleasant task of considering what punishment we must award. It seems to have occurred to some one that striking off the rolls would be the proper punishment. At the same time, I do not say that, serious as this offence is, it is serious enough to force us to proceed to extreme measures. The only alternative is suspension, and how long must that be for? I admit that it is an unsatisfactory punishment, as it stops a man from earning his living, but there is no other punishment of a less degree for us to infliot, there is nothing else for us to do. The agreement represented that the money was to be paid within two years, but it has not been done. We do not desire to be harder than we need be, but, taking all matters into consideration, we must pronounce a sentence of suspension for three years, at the end of which time, if he should have conducted himself in the meantime as he should, an application may be made to this court. CAVE, J., Concurred.

Aug. 3.-Re Thomas Whitwell, a Solicitor.*

In this case it appeared from the Master's report that on the 6th of Jane, 1879, a Mr. Taylor had agreed to purchase five cottages for the sum of £785, and he employed Mr. Whitwell as his solicitor. Mr. Taylor gave him £70 as deposit. The purchase was to be completed on the 13th of June, but the date of completion was subsequently postponed to the 27th of June. On that day Mr. Taylor paid to Mr. Whitwell, as his solicitor, the balance of the purchase-money (£715), to complete the purchase. Mr. Whitwell neglected to complete the purchase, and misapplied the money to his own use, and never repaid the money to Mr. Taylor. In June, 1880, Mr. Whitwell filed a petition for liquidation, and scheduled Mr. Taylor, who lost his money, as creditor for the whole amount.

Murray appeared for the Incorpora'ed Law Society.

The COURT (FIELD and CAVE, JJ.) ordered Mr. Whitwell to be s'ruck off the rolls.

(Before LORD COLERIDGE, C.J., sitting as a Divisional Court.)
August 7.-Re Wilkins, Blyth, and Fanshawe.

This case was referred to the court by Stephen, J., before whom it had involved in it were of considerable interest to the legal profession, and the come on an appeal from the decision of Master Bennett. The questions arguments lasted several hours. Mr. Wells had brought an action against of £1,596 was due to him for work done by him for the defendants in the conthe Mitcham Gas Company, in which he had made a claim that a balance struction of a gas retort, &c. The company had set up a large counter-claim amounting to over £5,600, as damages for bad work, delay, &c. The action had been referred to a barrister, and had been heard before him on thirtytwo days. In the result he had found in March, 1878, for the plaintiff on both claim and counter-claim, and had awarded him £518. The costs had had disallowed a very large number of items, among others the charges for been taxed in the usual way as between party and party, and the master shorthand-writer's notes, amounting to £524, also counsel's fees for attendance in chambers in each case where the master had not certified that the summons was fit for counsel. Four years afterwards an application on behalf of Mr. Wells had been made to tax the costs as between his solicitors, Mesers. Wilkins, Blythe, & Fanshawe, and himself. In this taxation again the master had disallowed the whole of the cost of the shorthand notes, and substantially the question for his lordship, who by consent took the case sitting as a divisional court, was whether the principles upon which a master should from those upon which he was bound to act in taxing as between party and tax costs as between solicitor and client were or were not wholly different

Reported by G. W. BLEW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,

party. The learned counsel for the solicitors did not shrink from pushing his contention so far as to say that a master had no discretion at all where the solicitor was able to satisfy him that the item claimed represented moneys actually disbursed. It is true that, as to some of the items, and more especially the cost of the shorthand notes, it was shown that Mr. Wells had himself used them, and had been fully aware that they had been taken from day to day; but the contention on his behalf was that he had been always led by the solicitors to believe that if successful in his action against the gas company, as, indeed, he had been, the defendants would have to bear the expense of the shorthand notes. Oddly enough, one of the items disallowed by the master in his taxation of the costs as between the solicitors and the client had been the fee paid to a second counsel who had appeared for Mr. Wells in the case of Wells v. Mitcham Gas Company (L. R. 4 Ex. D. 1), a case which was an appeal upon the very question as to whether or not the costs of the shorthand writer's notes ought to be borne by the unsuccessful litigants.

Edward Clarke, Q.C., appeared for the solicitors, the appellants. Holl, Q.C., and Attenborough, were for the client, the respondent. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., in giving judgment, refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the master in all the various cases, with the exception of the item disallowed by him for the second counsel in the appeal of Wells v. Mitcham Gas Company. Having substantially decided the case in favour of the client, he held that the respondent was entitled to the costs.-Times.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The following is the report of the scrutineers certifying the result of the

election of ten members of the council:

Pursuant to the appointment made by the president at the meeting of the society held on the 7th of July, 1882, in compliance of the 5th section of by. law 15, we, the undersigned, the scrutineers so appointed, beg to present to the members of the society our report, certifying the result of the election, which has been conducted in accordance with the charter and bye-laws of the society. The secretary handed to us on Tuesday, the 31st of July, a box containing the voting papers, which had been placed in it as soon as they were delivered. The first schedule hereto annexed contains the total number of voting papers received, amounting in all to 1,410. The same schedule sets forth the number of voting papers rejected and the grounds of rejection. Four have been rejected on the ground that they were not received by midnight on the 29th of July, four because the voting papers were not signed, and one because one name only was struck out. The total number of votes in favour of each candidate is set forth in the second schedule hereto annexed. The third schedule contains the names of those candidates whom we find and certify to be duly elected. The voting papers have been duly closed up under our seals, and will be retained in our care for the period of one month, which will expire on the 4th of September next, when we shall destroy them, as provided by section 2 of bye-law 18.-M. D. Osbaldeston (chairman), Samuel Day, A. J. Finch, W. O. Hewlett, H. E. Gribble.-August 1, 1882.

The first schedule referred to in the annexed report :-Total number of voting papers received, 1,410; A. Received after the prescribed date, 4; B. Unsigned, 4; C. Name struck out, 1.

Second schedule:-Joseph Addison, 1,162 votes; E. J. Bristow, 1,348; R. Cunliffe, 1,347; R. R. Dees, 1,320; J. Dodds, M.P., 1,025; C. C. Druce, 1,344; John Hunter, 1,164; E. Kimber, 258; N. T. Lawrence, 1,348; J. V. Longbourne, 1,302; A. S. Munns, 577; Thomas Paine, 1,341; W. M. Walters, 1,343.

Third schedule:-E. J. Bristow, 1,348; N. T. Lawrence, 1,348; R. Cunliffe, 1,347; C. C. Druce, 1,344; W. M. Walters, 1,343; T. Paine, 1,541; R. R. Dees, 1,320; J. V. Longbourne, 1,302; J. Hunter, 1,164 ; J. Addison, 1,162; J. Dodds, M.P., 1,025. A vote of thanks to the chairman terminated the proceedings.

THE GLOUCESTERSHIRE LAW SOCIETY.

The annual meeting of this society was recently held at Cirencester, when there was a large attendance of members, being solicitors, practising in Gloucestershire and Wiltshire, Mr. R. Ellett, president of the society, in the chair. The report of the committee was received and adopted, and Mr. E. W. Coren, of Gloucester, was elected honorary secretary and treasurer. An adjourned general meeting, made special for alteration of rules, was held on the 8th of July at Gloucester, when Mr. Ellett was re-elected president for five years, and Mr. R. T. Helps, of Gloucester, was elected vice-president. The committee for the ensuing year was elected and certain alterations made in the rules of the society. On the motion of Mr. L. W. Winterbotham, of Stroud, seconded by Mr. T. Taynton, of Gloucester, it was referred to the committee to consider the adoption of a scale of fees to be paid to auctioneers for conducting auction sales of real property.

The following are extracts from the report of the managing committee :Members.-The present number of members is eighty.

Solicitors' Remuneration.-This important subject has engaged the earnest attention of the committee. "The Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881," came into operation in August last, and empowers the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the president of the Incorporated Law Society, and the president of one of the provincial law societies (the Liverpool Society having been selected) to make general orders

r'gulating the remuneration of solicitors in matters of conveyancing, and in o her non-contentious business; and one month before any such order is made the draft must be submitted to the Incorporated Law Society for their observations and suggestions, which are to be taken into consideration by the Lord Chancellor and his colleagues before making the order. In anticipation of action being taken under this statute, the council of the Incorporated Law Society communicated with the committee of this society and with the other provincial law societies, and invited an expression of opinion as to the scale of conveyancing charges, which it would be expedient to get authorized by general order under the Act. Your committee, acting in accordance with the repeatedly-expressed opinion of the society in general meeting, recommended an ad valorem scale of remuneration for conveyancing business, so far as practicable. Subsequently, a draft order was confidentially submitted to the committee, and by them to the members in special general meeting, and, with slight modification, approved. This draft was afterwards further modified by the council of the Incorporated Law Society, after consideration of the opinions expressed by the several provincial law societies, and then submitted to the Lord Chancellor. The main items of the proposed scale are as follows:

"In respect of sales, purchases, and mortgagees, £2 per cent. up to £1,000, with a minimum fee of £4; £1 per cent. on any further amount up to £5,000; and a half per cent. on any further amount beyond £5,000, exclusivo of disbursements.

"In respect of leases, £7 per cent. on the rent up to £100, with a minimnm fee of £5; £5 per cent. on any further amount of rent up to £200; and £2 per cent. beyond £200.

"In respect of settlements of personal estate, the same remuneration as on a purchase, at a price equal to the value of the property settled.

"For other conveyancing business :-Ordinary attendances, 10s. ; journies in ordinary cases, at the rate of £5 5s. per day of seven hours; and, generally, remuneration regulated by the nature and importance of the transaction, and the service performed, and the knowledge, skill, and labour employed

thereon."

The operation of the "Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881," and the further projected legislation affecting the laws relating to land and the practice of conveyancing, render it, in the opinion of the committee, most important in the interests of the profession, as well as desirable in the public interest, that an ad valorem scale of remuneration for conveyancing business should be legally established without farther delay.

Contract Fees to Vendors' Solicitors and Auctioneers' Fees on Auctio the effect that the continuance in some quarters of the practice of charging Sales.-In furtherance of the views expressed at the last annual meeting, to contract fees, whilst in others it had been discontinued, as recommended by the resolution of the annual meeting of this society in 1879, is unjust and objectionable, the committee in November last issued a circular to all the members, calling attention to that resolution, and urging that its recommendation should be adopted. They also opened a communication with the Bristol Law Society on the subject, and have the satisfaction to report that, on the 21st of December last, a meeting of solicitors practising in that city resolved that, in future, the practice in Bristol and its neighbourhood of charging purchasers with solicitors' contract fees should be abandoned; and on the 23rd of December a similar resolution was passed at a meeting of the solicitors practising in Gloucester. The resolution of this society in 1879 applied only to the contract fees of vendors' solicitors, but the solicitors practising in the cities of Gloucester and Bristol have also condemned the practice of charging auctioneers' fees to purchasers. This practice, although, in the opinion of the committee, more a matter for the public than the profession has also been objected to by the council of the Incorporated Law Society, and is confined to a few counties in the West of England and parts of Wales. committee invite an expression of opinion on the part of the members of this society as to the advisability of taking steps to bring about, also, the general discontinuance of this practice.

The

also under discussion at the last annual meeting, and the committee have given Stringent Conditions of Sale.-Common form Conditions.-This subject was it their consideration. The adoption by many members of the common form conditions, settled some years since by this society, has had the desired eff ct of establishing, to a large extent, a reasonable practice in regard to the con ditions used at sales by auction in this county. The committee, however, find that this desirable result is still not universally attained, and they have had before them instances (some from the city and neighbourhood of Bristol) in which conditions are imposed much more stringent than the common form conditions of this or of the other provincial law societies which have prothemselves in communication with the Bristol Law Society on the subject; mulgated common form conditions. The committee have, therefore, put and the council of that society, although not admitting that more stringent conditions are usual there than in other districts, have promised that tho matter shall receive consideration. The conditions particularly referred to by the committee as objectionable are the following:

1. That which makes recitals in any abstracted deed conclusive, without restriction as to the date of the deed.

2. That which throws upon the purchaser the expense of stamping any unstamped or insufficiently-stamped document of title, without restriction as to the age of the document, or any information as to its nature or import

ance.

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rents or income of the property, and in some cases actually requires him to pay to the vendor the amount of back rents, which may never be reDovered.

6. That which makes the purchaser accept from a vendor, notwithstanding that he is absolute owner, the qualified covenant for title which ordinarily is only used or implied in the case of fiduciary vendors.

7. That which casts upon purchasers the expense of anything necessary for perfecting or completing the vendor's title, a condition which may involve the Costs of an application to the court for a vesting order.

The committee have had under their consideration the question whether it is necessary or desirable to re-settle the common form conditions, having regard to The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881," and have communicated with other provincial law societies on the subject. They find, however, that the general feeling is, that until further experience has been had of the working of that Act no material change in the conditions of sale is necessary; but the Birmingham Society is being advised by counsel on the question, and it will continue to receive the attention of your committee. Legal Procedure.-Since the last annual meeting the report of the committee on legal procedure, appointed by the Lord Chancellor, has been issued. That report proposed important changes in legal procedure, and, at the instance of the council of the Incorporated Law Society, your committee expressed their opinion upon those proposals. The subject came before a special meeting of the Incorporated Law Society in November last, and was then referred to a committee of members of that society. Representatives of the provincial law societies were invited to act upon the committee, and this society was represented upon it by the president and Mr. W. S. Jones. The report of the Law Society's committee was presented to an adjourned special meeting of that society in February last, and adopted and ordered to be sent to the Lord Chancellor and the judges. On some important points the Law Society's committeo differed from the Lord Chancellor's committee; as, for instance, with reference to the necessity for pleadings, which the Lord Chancellor's committee recommended should be abolished, but which the Law Society's committee considered it necessary to retain to some extent, or in some form, with the object of defining the real point at issue. Your committee, however, observe that new rules are about to be issued by the rule committee of the judges, which it is understood will be based substantially on the report of the Lord Chancellor's committee. The members of this society will no doubt share the regret of their committee that this should be the case, but at the same time they may feel assured that the valuable report of the Law Society's committee will yet bear fruit.

Settled Land Bill.-This important Bill, which, notwithstanding the adverse conditions of its Parliamentary career, is making progrees, has for its main object to enable a tenant for life (which term is used to include generally the class of limited owners) to dispose by sale, lease, or otherwise, of any part of the settled land, or even of the whole of it, provision being made for securing the purchase-money on a sale and otherwise, for protecting the interests of the remainderman and of others entitled to come in under the settlement. The Bill is not confined to future settlements.

The committee have expressed to the Incorporated Law Society and the associated provincial law societies their general approval of the Bill, and solicited for it the support of local members of Parliament. Upon one or two points of detail, however, your committee have suggested amendments. Conveyancing Act Amendment Bill.-This Bill, which is proceeding simul. taneously with the Settled Land Bill, has for its object to amend and supplement the "Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881." Its more material provisions are: the establishment of official searches for judgments, Crown debts, &c., the restriction of the doctrine of constructive notice, and the abolition of acknowledgment of deeds by married women. The committee have also expressed their general approval of this Bill, but bave pointed out the objections which they entertain to the proposal which the Bill contains to the effect that when the solicitor of a purchaser finds that the title has been previously investigated and accepted on behalf of a purchaser through whom the title is deduced," such solicitor may dispense with further investigation even when acting for trustees. It seems to your committee that this provision is objectionable, both in the interests of the public and the profession; of the public, because it will tend to the acceptance of bad titles from motives of false economy, or the carelessness of practitioners; and of the profession, because it will tend to introduce the practice of purchasers electing not to have the titles investigated, and expecting to have a corresponding reduction in the solicitors' charges.

District Registrars.-A Bill was before Parliament last session which proposed to make barristers eligible for the office of district registrars. The committee felt that, having regard to the many offices and appointments to which members of the bar are at present alone eligible, and to the fact that the appointment of district registrar is one of the very few open to solicitors, this proposal is unfair to our branch of the profession, and wholly uncalled for in the public interest. The committee, therefore, sought the aid of the mem. bers of Parliament for the district in opposing the proposal, and are glad to report that it was abandoned.

Bankruptcy Law.-Another Bankruptcy Bill has been introduced, but the probability of its being proceeded with this session is at present so small that it seems unnecessary to discuss its provisions in this report. The Bill, with others, will continue to receive the attention of the committee, and they will be glad to receive suggestions from members thereon.

Associated Provincial Law Societies.-This society has continued in association, and has been represented by the president at meetings of the associated societies for the consideration of the Bankruptcy Bill, Legal Procedure, and Solicitors' Remuneration,

OBITUARY.

MR. CHARLES CARNE LEWIS.

Mr. Charles Carne Lewis, solicitor, of Brentwood and Ingatestone, died at his He was the son residence, the Mansion House, Brentwood, on the 26th ult. of the Rev. John Lewis, rector of Ingatestone, and was born in 1807. He served his articles with Mr. Charles Parker, of Chelmsford, and was admitted a solicitor in 1828. In the following year he settled at Brentwood, where he practised until his death. He had also an office at Ingatestone, and for several years he had a London office in Mark-lane. Mr. Lewis was a perpetual commissioner for the county of Essex, and had a large business at Brentwood and the neighbourhood. He had been for fifty years coroner for South Essex, and his duties had become very laborious, as his district was very extensive, and the population was constantly increasing. On the occasion of the loss of The Princess Alice, he held an inquest on many bodies which were washed ashore on the Essex side of the Thames. He was also registrar of the Brentwood County Court (Circuit No. 38), and olerk to the county magistrates; to the Commissioners of Land Tax for the Hundreds of Chafford and Bastable, and to the Governors of the Brentwood Grammar School. Mr. Lewis leaves a large family. He had, for several months, suffered from disease of the heart, but his death was rather sudden.

MR. JOHN CUTTS,

Mr. John Cutts, solicitor, died at Little Bardfield Hall, Essex, on the 21st ult., at the age of eighty-six. Mr. Cutts, who was almost the oldest solicitor in Essex, was born in 1796. He was admitted a soliitor about the year 1825, and for fifty years he carried on a large practice at Great Bardfield. le himself to farming operations on a very extensive scale. Notwithstanding retired from business four or five years ago, and he had since entirely devoted his great age Mr. Cutts retained all his faculties unimpaired.

MR. THOMAS GIBSON CANT.

Mr. Thomas Gibson Cant, solicitor (of the firm of Cant & Fairer), of Penrith, was drowned in the river Lowther on the 7th inst. He left home in the morning for a day's fishing, and afterwards seems to have bathed, and to have been carried by the current into a deep hole. His death has caused great sorrow in Penrith, where he was very highly respected. He was admitted a solicitor in 1852. He was a perpetual commissioner for the counties of Cumberland and Westmoreland, and had been for many years clerk to the lieutenancy for both counties. Mr. Cant was in partnership with Mr. Chris topher Fairer.

MR. ARTHUR EVANS.

Mr. Arthur Evans, solicitor, died on the 4th inst. at his residence, Crom

well House, Maldon, Essex, at the early age of thirty-nine. Commencing his career as a junior clerk in the office of Digby & Son, Maldon, he earned his articles, and, notwithstanding heavy claims upon his time as their managing examination in 1871, to the gold medal of the Incorporated Law Society, his clerk, studied so successfully as to entitle himself, on his passing the final age, however, precluding him from receiving it. His firm soon afterwards added his name, and he worked up the business to one of the best in the county of Essex. In 1877 he was unanimously elected town clerk, clerk to the borough justices, the urban sanitary authority, the school attendance committee, the Maldon Harbour Commission, and the income and land tax commissioners. He was also solicitor to, and a large shareholder in, most of the local companies. Three months ago be was appointed a perpetual commissioner. He was a widower with two children.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. GILBERT GEORGE KENNEDY has been appointed Revising Barrister for Leicestershire and Rutlandshire. Mr. Kennedy was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Easter Term, 1870, and he practises on the Midland Circuit, and at the Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire Sessions.

Mr. EDWARD BAGNALL THORNEYCROFT, solicitor (of the firm of Phillips, Osborne, & Thorneycroft), of Shifnal and Wolverhampton, has been appointed Clerk to the County Magistrates at Wolverhampton, in succession to Mr. Horatio Brevitt, the new town clerk of Wolverhampton. Mr. Thorneycroft was admitted a solicitor in 1877.

Mr. CLEMENT HIGGINS, barrister, has been appointed to be arst Recorder of the Borough of Birkenhead. Mr. Higgins was educated at Downing College, Cambridge, where he graduated in the second class of the Natural Science Tripos in 1869. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1871, and he practises on the North Wales and Chester Circuit.

Mr. WILLIAM RIBTON has been appointed one of the Revising Barristers for the county of Surrey. Mr. Ribton is a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1849, and he practises on the South-Eastern Circuit, and at the Central Criminal Court and Middlesex Sessions.

Mr. ERNEST AUGUSTUS NORTHCOTE, barrister, has been appointed a The Settled Land and Conveyancing Bills received the Royal Stipendiary Magistrate for the Colony of British Guiana. Mr. Northcote assent on Thursday.

is the son of Mr. Stafford Henry Northcote. He was educated at West

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