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set-off they relied on? With respect to the first question the defendants con-
tended that they were accountable to Demestre & Co. alone; that there was
Do privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and that the
plaintiffs had no right to sue, unless in the name of Demestre & Co. In
support of this contention reliance was placed on the Spanish law prevailing at
Havannah, on the judgment of Lord Blackburn in Armstrong v. Stokes (L. R.
7 Q. B. 598), and on the decisions in The Elbinger Actien Gesellschaft v. Claye
(L. R. 8 Q. B. 13), and The New Zealand Land Company v. Watson (29
W. R. 694, L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 374). The Spanish Code authorized an agent
to act in his own name, relieved him from all obligation to disclose
his principal, bound him as if he were the principal, and precluded
the principal from enforcing the contract made by the agent, unless the
These
agent had first transferred his right of action to his principal.
rules, moreover, applied to cases in which the agent was known by
the person dealing with him to have a principal, if the name of that prin-
cipal was not disclosed. The defendants were aware of the Spanish law on
this subject, and contended that they were entitled to treat Demestre & Co.
as principals and owners of the cargo, and to ignore the plaintiffs altogether.
The Spanish law appeared to the court to be a circumstance to be taken into
account in considering the nature and extent of the authority given by the
plaintiffs to Demestre & Co. ; but the Spanish law was not, in the opinion
of the court, material for any other purpose. The contract between
Demestre & Co. and the defendants was governed by English law, not
Spanish, and the persons who could sue and be sued on that contract in
England must also be determined by our law, and not by the law of Spain.
The question to be considered was the nature and extent of Demestre &
Co.'s authority, and the knowledge which the defendants had on that
subject. The plaintiffs certainly authorized Demestre & Co. to ship the
tobacco in question in their own names, and to consign it to the defendants
for sale. The tobacco was unquestionably the plaintiffs' property, and was
to be sold on their account, and was to be insured for them as owners.
Demestre & Co., were, in the opinion of the court, authorized to receive the
proceeds of the sale of the goods from the defendants in the event of a
sale; but the court could not adopt the defendants' contention that Demestre
& Co. had authority to deal with the goods as their own, nor did they in
fact so deal with them. When the defendants received the telegrams from
Demestre & Co., and effected a provisional insurance, they did not know to
whom the cargo belonged, nor for whom it was to be insured. But, before
the 18th of September, when the policy was really effected, the defendants
knew that Demestre & Co. were acting for some third person, alluded to
as the "interesado," both in shipping the goods and in ordering the
insurance; and with this knowledge the defendants effected the insur-
ance in their own names, for the benefit of all persons interested.
The provisional insurances were effected by unsigned slips in the usual way;
they were in law not binding on the underwriters, and it was impossible to
treat the defendants as having effected the policies for their own benefit, or
for the benefit of themselves and Demestre & Co., to the exclusion of the
"interesado." The jury were quite right in finding that the defendants
effected the insurances for the benefit of all concerned-i.e., as it turned out,
for the benefit of the plaintiffs and of Demestre & Co. and of the defendants,
according to their respective interests in the cargo. The plaintiffs being the
owners of the cargo, the insurance was, consequently, for their benefit, sub-
ject to the liens, if any, of Demestre & Co. and of the defendants respec-
tively. The question then arose whether, by English law, the plaintiffs were
entitled, as undisclosed principals, to sue the defendants for the money they
had received in respect of the insurance thus effected? The English law
respecting undisclosed principals was well known to differ from the law of
many other, if not most other, countries. Their law was similar to that of
Spain. But that by our law the plaintiffs were entitled to sue the defendants
under the circumstances had been long settled. That the plaintiffs could
sue, if they were not foreigners carrying on business abroad, was plain from
the cases collected in the notes to Thompson v. Davenport (2 S. L. C. 390, &c.,
8th ed.), and from Irvine v. Watson (28 W. R. 353, 5 Q. B. D. 102, 414).
But it was contended that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs were foreigners carry
ing on business abroad, the case was different. The court was, however,
unable to come to this conclusion. In the first place, Lanyon v. Blanchard
(2 Camp. 596), Mann. Forrester (4 Camp. 60), and Manns v. Henderson (1
East. 335), were direct authorities in support of such an action as this. In
the second place, it was to be observed that this was not a case in which the
defendants dealt with an English house acting for a foreign principal.
Demestre & Co. were themselves a foreign house, and, although the defendants
relied upon a custom or usage of trade which, it proved, would have shown
that there was no contract between the plaintiffs and the defendante, the
alleged custom or usage was not proved. Thirdly, the defendants were
neither buying from nor selling to Demestre & Co.; they were simply con-
signees for sale, acting for Demestre & Co., who, as the defendants knew,
were themselves acting for some third person. In these respects the case
differed from The Elbinger Actien Gesellschaft v. Cluye and Hutton v. Bullock
(21 W. R. 809, L. R. 8 Q. B. 331). As regards foreigners who bought and
sold goods through English commission merchants, the law was stated by
Lord Blackburn in Armstrong v. Stokes (L. R. 7 Q. B. 505) thus:
"The great inconvenience that would result if there were privity of contract
established between the foreign constituents of a commission merchant and the
home suppliers of the goods has led to a course of business, in consequence of
which it has long been settled that a foreign constituent does not give the
commission merchant any authority to pledge his credit to those from whom
the commissioner buys them by his order and on his account. It is true that
this was originally (and in strictness perhaps still is) a question of fact; but
the inconvenience of holding that privity of contract was established
between a Liverpool merchant and the grower of every bale of cotton which is
forwarded to him in consequence of his order given to a commission merchant
at New Orleans, or between a New York merchant and the supplier of every

bale of goods purchased in consequence of an order to a London commission merchant, is so obvious and so well known, that we are justified in treating it as a matter of law, and saying that, in the absence of evidence of an express authority to that effect, the commission agent cannot pledge his foreign constituent's credit." This view of the law was acted upon in the two cases in L. R. 8 Q. B. already referred to. But their lordships were not aware of any authority extending this exception to the general rule to such a case as this. The New Zealand Land Company v. Watson was strongly relied upon by the defendants as an authority against the plaintiffs' right to maintain this action. That case seemed at first sight very like the present in many respects. But the differences were as important as the resemblances. The authority and course of dealing in that case were different from those in the present case. In The New Zealand Land Company v. Watson, the plaintiffs had consigned their goods to an English house by whom the defendants were employed, and the English house were the plaintiffs' del credere agents. Both these circumstances were wanting in the present case. If the present plaintiffs were suing persons employed by the defendants, the decision in question would more The truth seemed to be that in The New closely resemble this than it does. Zealand Land Company v. Watson, the doctrine laid down in Armstrong v. Stokes was carried one step further than it had been before, and the present defendants contended that it ought to be carried a step further still, and to be extended to cases in which an English house was employed by a foreign agent for a foreign principal, who afterwards sued the English house. Where an English merchant acted as a middle-man for a foreign undisclosed principal, buying or selling through him, the person dealing with the English merchant did not, prima facie, contract with the undisclosed principal, and to this extent the ordinary English doctrines relating to undisclosed principals had been gradually modified with reference to mercantile usage and convenience. But their lordships were not aware that any decision went further than this, and they did not feel warranted in further encroaching on those doctrines. Their lordships adopted the view of Lord Blackburn in L. R. 7 Q. B. 704, that it was too late now to question the propriety of the English law on this subject. If the English law was to be made to conform with foreign law in this respect it must be by legislative enactment rather than by judicial decision. The second contention of the defendants was that, even if the plaintiffs were entitled to sue the defendants, the defendants were entitled to a lien or right of set-off against the plaintiffs in respect of the amount due to the defendants from Demestre & Co. on the general balance of their accounts. This question, whether regarded as a question of lien or as a question of set-off, must again be determined by English law, and, according to our law, the right of the defendants to a lien or set-off depended on a question of fact-viz., whether the defendants did or did not know that Demestre & Co. were acting for an undisclosed principal before the defendants' alleged lien or right of set-off accrued. It was admitted that the defendants knew the plaintiffs' real position before the defendants received the proceeds of the policy, but it was contended that they had no notice of any agency when they effected the insurance, and that, consequently, they acquired a lien on the policy for the balance due to them by Demestre & Co., and that this lien entitled the defendants to retain the proceeds of the policy. It had, however, already been shown that when the defendants obtained the policy on the 18th of September they knew of the interesado, and that the insurance was for his benefit. It had also been shown that the provisional insurance made by the defendants before they had this notice could not avail them so as to put them in a better position than the policy itself. It followed, therefore, that the lien or set-off contended for could not be maintained. The rule which allowed a person who dealt with an agent not known to be such to setoff against his principal any debt due from the agent to the person so dealing with him was well settled (George v. Glagett, 2 S. L. C. 118), but it was equally well settled that this rule did not apply where the person dealing with the agent knew him to have a principal, although the name of the principal might not be disclosed. Whether the undisclosed principal carried on business in this country or abroad was immaterial. Upon this point, as well as the first, the defendants relied on The New Zealand Land Company v. Watson; but the main difference between that case and the present had been already pointed out. As regarded the money sought to be set off in that case, the set off was made before the plaintiff's had made any claim against the defendants; while here the plaintiff's made their claim before the defendants received the proceeds of the policy. In The New Zealand Land Company v. Watson the plaintiffs sought to follow their goods and the proceeds thereof into the hands of the defendants, and the court appeared to have thought that, although they might have followed the goods, they could not have followed the proceeds after The obIt was difficult to follow this reasoning. they had been set off. servations of Lord Blackburn about following goods (L. R. 7 Q. B. 606) ought to be constantly borne in mind in cases of this description. He said: "It is right, in order to avoid misapprehension, to say that the phrase, repeatedly used by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the vendor has a right to follow the goods, is, in our opinion, calculated to mislead. There are cases, such as that of Wilson v. Hart (7 Tannt. 295), to which such a phrase would be applicable; but those, as is pointed out in 2 Smith's Leading Cases, proceed on the ground of fraud. In the absence of fraud, unless the person receiving the goods is a party to the contract under which the goods were sold, the vendor has no right to follow them. If the goods were bricks sold to a contractor he could not charge the owner of the house into which they were built, though he might do so if the person supposed to be the contractor turned out to be really agent for the owner of the house; and the principle is the same in such a case as the present." Applying these observations to The New Zealand Land Company's case, the inability of the plaintiffs to follow their goods into the hands of the defendants and to recover them, without satisfying the defendants' lien, would seem to have followed as soon as it was decided that there was no contract on which the plaintiffs could sue the defendants. In the present case there was such a contract, and, having regard to it and to the knowledge the defendants had when they effected the insurance, The New Zealand Land Company's case could not be regarded as an authority

His lordship said that the contention of the liquidator was not well foundel. There was no doubt but that, under the article in question, which was, in substance, identical with the corresponding clause in table A., of the Com. panies Act, 1862, the directors had the power to dispose of shares at a discount. The conclusion which he had arrived at was fortified by a consideration of the Companies Act, 1867, s. 27, and the Companies Act, 1869, ss. 5, 6. But, assuming that the contract was ultrà vires, even then it must be set aside in toto; the result of which would be that the respondents would be relieved of their shares and receive back the sums paid by them in respect of such shares. That this must be so was shown by the observations of the Master of the Rolls in Anderson's case (L. R. 7 Ch. D. p. 75). It had been argued on behalf of the liquidator that the creditors had right apart from the company, but this contention could not be maintained, for the creditors could obtain nothing except through the company. His lordship was also of opinion that the agree ment in the present case was to the benefit of the creditors, and that the company had acted within its powers. The summons must, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.-SOLICITORS, Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard, & Sharpe; Wynne j Son.

in their favour. If in this case the goods had not been lost, but had been sold by the defendants, and they had paid Demestre & Co. before the plaintiffs re voked their authority to receive payment, such payment would have discharged the defendants, for the plaintiffs clearly authorized Demestre & Co. to receive payment. But it was equally clear that the plaintiffs did nɔt authorize Demestre & Co. to apply the proceeds of the plaintiffs' goods in pay-provisions contained in the Companies Clauses Act, 1863, s. 21, the Railway ing a debt of their own. Having regard to the authority conferred on Demestre & Co. the defendants could not have asserted as against the plaintiffs a lien on the goods or their proceeds for the general balance due from Demestre & Co. Nor, in the circumstances of this case, would the defendants establish a better title to the policy or its proceeds than they would have had to the goods if they had arrived. If, when the defendants effected the insurance they had effected it for their own benefit, without notice that the goods were not Demestre & Co.'s, the defendants might have acquired a better title to the policy and its proceeds than they would have had to the goods; but, as matters stood, their lordships were unable to see any distinction between the two. Looking at the case broadly, there was some inconvenience, not to say injustice, whichever way this case was decided. On the one hand, it was not right to pay one man's debts out of another man's money, which was what the defendants were seeking to do. On the other hand, it was not right to avail one's-self of another man's credit and connection, and not comply with the conditions on which that credit and connection rested, and this was what the plaintiffs were seeking to do. The plaintiff, however, never led the defendants to believe that the goods were Demestre & Co.'s, for, although the bills of lading were in their name, the letter which accompanied the bills of lading informed the defendants that the goods were not Demestre & Co.'s, and were to be insured for the interesado. For the reasons above given, the plaintiffs appeared to their lordships to be entitled to recover the £11,000, subject to the deductions which they themselves conceded ought to be made. It is expected that the defendants will appeal to the House of Lords.SOLICITORS, Walton, Bubb, & Walton; Freshfields & Williams.

LIMITED COMPANY-RECTIFICATION OF REGISTER-MISREPRESENTATIONACQUIESCENCE-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 35.-In the case of In re The Globe Accidental Assurance Company (Limited), a motion was made by a holder of 200 shares in the company for rectification of the register of the company's shareholders by striking out his name therefrom, and for repayment to him, with interest, of sums paid on allotment of the shares. It appeared that the applicant, in January, 1881, received a prospectus of the company stating the capital of the company to be £1,000,000, in £1 shares, with a present issue of 500,000 shares at par. It was also stated by the prospectus that all future issues would be at a premium, and that the issue of the 500,000 shares was made at par in order to comply with the Rules of the Stock Exchange. By a circular issued by the directors in December, 1881, the applicant learned that the whole of the capital subscribed amounted to some £12,500, of which, at the date of the circular, only £5,800 had been received, and that after deducting the preliminary expenses the whole amount available for conducting the business of the company was some £1,200 or £1,300. On the 22nd of May the company was wound up. The applicant contended that he was induced to apply for the shares in the belief that the prospectus set forth that the conditions required by the Stock Exchange for the purposes of obtaining a settling day and quotation would be complied with by the company, and it was also submitted that it was the duty of the directors before commencing business to bave informed the shareholders of the inadequacy of the capital subscribed (Sharpley v. Louth and East Coast Railway Company, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 663; Elder v. New Zealand Land Company, W. N., 1874, p. 85; English, &c., Rolling Stock Company, Lym's case, 14 W. R. 720, 35 Beav. 616). It appeared that the applicant on the 10th of January complained to the directors and asked for the removal of his name and the return of his money, but they, on the 13th, wrote absolutely declining to entertain the proposal. Three months afterwards the present proceedings were commenced. CHITTY, J., said that the only tenable ground of the application was that the company had commenced business with an insufficient capital. The applicant was, however, at least after the allotment of the shares, bound to peruse the articles of association of the company, which would have given him notice of the power of the directors to commence business at any time after the incorporation of the company, not. withstanding that the whole capital proposed by the prospectus had not been subscribed. The prospectus had not deceived the applicant, and the motion failed so far as it was grounded on misrepresentation. The delay of the plaintiff in commencing these proceedings was also fatal to its 8ccess. The motion must be refused with costs.-SOLICITORS, Johnsons, Upton, Budd, & Atkey; Galmoy & Co.

LIMITED COMPANY-INCREASE OF CAPITAL-SHARES ISSUED AT DISCOUNT -COMPANIES ACT, 1862, SCHED. 1, TABLE A., ART. 27.-In the case of In re The Ince Hall Rolling Mills Company (Limited), also before Chitty, J., on the 11th inst., an adjourned summons was heard, asking that certain shareholders who had applied for and been allotted shares issued by the directors at a discount of £1 per share, might be ordered to pay that sum on each such share, on the ground that the contract to issue shares at a discount was ultrà vires. It appeared that one of the articles of association of the company provided that, subject to any direction to the contrary that might be given by the me-ting sancti ning an increase of capital of the company, all new shares should be offered to the members in proportion to the existing shares held by them, and, in the event of any such shares having been offered and declined, the directors might dispose of the same in such manner as they thought most beneficial to the company. In pur-uance of this article, the directors issued the shares in question to the respondents at a discount of £1 per £10 share.

COSTS-PETITION-SERVICE ON PERSON WHO HAS NO INTEREST-TENDER OF SUM FOR COSTS.-In a case of Somes v. Martin, before Kay, J., on the 11th inst., a question arose as to the allowance of costs to some respondents had no interest in the subject-matter. By the will of a testator he gave a who had been served with a petition, but who, in the opinion of the court, fund to trustees on trust to pay the income to his daughter for her life, and after her death the property was to be divided amongst her children after they arrived at the age of twenty-two years. The children mortgaged their interests under the will. The petition was presented by the tenant for life, asking (inter alia) for a declaration whether the gift to her children was or was not void for remoteness. The children's mortgagees had obtained stop orders on the fund, which was in court, and they were served with the petition, which asked that the costs of the petitioner and all other proper parties to the petition might be taxed and paid out of the fund. No tender of any sum for costs was made to the mortgagees when they were served with the petition. They appeared at the hearing, and admitted that the gift to the children was void for remoteness, but they asked for the r costs. KAY, J., said that, under the circumstances, he would not deprive them of costs alto gether, but he would allow each of them the sum of two guineas out of their share of the fund which the petitioner would, subject to her own life estate, take by reason of the intestacy of the testator as to that fund. - SOLICITORS, Church, Prior, & Co.; Gush & Phillips; W. Tunner.

The defendants

TRAMWAYS COMPANY - LEASE BY LOCAL AUTHORITY AGREEMENT ΤΟ SHARE BENEFITS OF LEASE-STATUTORY DISCHARGE- TRAMWAYS ACT, 1870 (33 & 34 VICT. c. 78) s. 19-LOCAL ACT-LIVERPOOL TRAMWAYS ACT, 1880 (43 & 44 Vicr. c. 126).—In the case of The Omnibus Conveyance Company (Limited) v. The Liverpool United Tramways and Omnibus Company, before Caitty, J., on the 3rd inst., the plain iffs claimed in effect the specific performance and damages for non-performance of an agreement entered into in the year 1873 between the plaint ffs and the defendaut,' pr-de essors in title, by which, in the event of the concession to either party of a lease or running powers of or over any or all of certain tranways about to be constructed by the Liverpool Corporation between Liverpool, Wavertree, and West Derby, it was mutua ly agreed by the paties the one to allow to the other the benefit of such concession, and to divide the profits in the proportion therem mentioned. The pla nt ffs charged that the defen fauts had, notwithstanding he agreement, entered into an agreement for the purchase by the corporation of all tramways belonging to the defendants, and for the leasing by the corporation to the defendan's of the tramways to be construct-d by the ormer in the city of Live pool, and that the terms of such agreement had been carried out by means of the Liverpool Tramways Act, 1880, in which was inserted a clause (section 46) providing that as soon as the tramways authorized to be constructed by the local board of West Derby should be completed the local board should lease the same to the defendants for twenty-one years to be worked in conjunction with the tramways in the city of Liverpool. demurred to the plaintiffs' s'atement of claim, principally on the ground that the Act of 1880, and the Tramways Act of 1870, rendered the agreement of 1878 incapable of being carried into effect. CHITTY, J., said that the question turned on the true construction and effect of the special Act-viz., the Liverpool Tramways Act, 1880, and the general public Act-viz., the Tramways Act, 1870. The principle that a contracting party was discharged from his agreement and the consequences of non-performance by a subsequent Act of put performance out of his power established by the judgments of the Court of Queen's Bench in Bayley v. De Crespigny (17 W. R. 494, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180), and of the Courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer Chambers in Brown Mayor of London (9 C. B. N. S. 726, and 13 C. B. N. S. 831), and it had been laid down that when powers and duties were conferred by Act of Parliament affecting the rights and interests of the public, these powers and duties could be exercised only by the persons or bodies on whom they were specially conferred. They could not be delegated (Gardner v. London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, 15 W. R. 325, L. It 2 Cb. 201, per Cairns, L.J., W. R. p. 328, and L. R. p. 212). That this was 60 was not denied on the part of the plaintiffs, but they contended that the effect of the Acts of 1880 and 1870 was to vest in the defendants a property which was capable of being assigned and dealt with by them according to the provisions of the agreement of 1878. In dealing with this proposition, regard must be had to the decision of the present Master of the Rolls in Mulliner v. The Midland Railway Company (29 W. R. 330, L. R.

Parliament which

had been

V.

The

nor transferred

11 Ch. D. 611), in which be held that a railway company had no power to alienate any portion of land actually used for the purposes of the undertaking, there staring a principle applicable not merely to railways, but to undertakings of a similar nature. The analogy between railways and tramways, which were both parliamentary undertakings, was obvious, although there was a distinction between railways and tramways, which was perhaps in favour of the defendants' contention-namely, that tramways were for the most part constructed on public highways. The Act of 1880 not reciting the agreement of 1878 (which was stipulated by the agreement itself should be kept secret), it was useless to consider how the agreement would have been dealt with by the Legislature if it had been disclosed. The Act itself contemplated the working of the tramways by the defendants, and section 46 especially provided that the corporation should lease the tramways to the defendants' company. Moreover, various provisions of the general Act of 1870 were incorporated in the special Act of 1880, including the powers of the local authority under section 19 of the general Act to lease a tramway completed or acquired by them to a person, corporation, or company, with the consent and approval of the Board of Trade, and subject to the provisions of the Act. The only powers of leasing contained in the general Act were conferred by section 19, but the conclusion his lordship had come to, after considering the terms of the Act and its policy as derived from its provisions, and particularly from the special and limited powers which the Act conferred, and the duties which it imposed for the protection of the public, was that no power of alienation was conferred on the promoters except those special powers of leasing which, however, were vested, not in the promoters generally, but in the local authorities, and therefore that it was ultrà vires on the part of such lessees, on whom various statutory duties and liabilities were imposed, to part with or delegate their statutory rights and powers. Nor could any distinction material to the question before the court be drawn between the leases under the 19th section of the general Act and the leases to be granted under the special Act, His lordship therefore held that the defendants were incapacitated by Act of Parliament from performing the agreement of 1878, and, consequently, excused in law from all liability in respect of the agreement. The demurrer must therefore be allowed with the usual consequences.-SOLICITORS, Layton & Jaques, for Radcliffe, Layton, & Steel, Liverpool; G. L. P. Eyre & Co., for Garrett & Tarber, Liverpool.

the individual defendants, without costs.-SOLICITORS, Wilkinson & Drew; R. Chapman ; J. Harrison.

-

SURETY DISCHARGE BY CREDITOR-OMISSION OF CREDITOR TO CALL ON PRINCIPAL DEBTOR TO ACCOUNT-COLLECTOR OF PARISH RATES-REFEREEREFERENCE FOR TRIAL-POWER OF COURT TO GO BEHIND FINDING-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, ss. 57, 58.-In a case of The Guardians of the Mansfield Union v. Wright, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., the question arose whether a surety for a collector of poor rates had been discharged by the negligence of the guardians by whom the collector had been appointed, or of the overseers of the parish. And there was the further question whether the Judicature Act of 1873, issues of fact in an action have been referred for trial. court can go behind the finding of a referee to whom, under section 57 of the the poor in a parish within their union. Carter, with the defendant and one The plaintiffs appointed one Carter to be a collector of rates for the relief of Radford as his sureties, executed a joint and several bond for £100 to the guardians, the condition of the bond being that, if Carter should duly, faithfully, and honestly perform the duties of his office of collector, should diligently collect the rates, and duly, punctually, and correctly account to the person or persons lawfully entitled to require him so to account for all moneys from time to time collected or received by him in virtue of his office on behalf of the parish, and should from time to time pay to the person or persons lawfully entitled to receive the same all moneys so collected or received by him, and should otherwise duly perform certain duties in connection with his office, the bond should be void, but otherwise should remain in full force. The plaintiffs alleged that Carter did not properly account for the moneys which he received as collector, but that he appropriated £84 9s. 6d., and that he ultimately absconded, and had failed to perform the to his own use and failed to account for sums amounting to not less than duties of his office in accordance with the conditions of the bond. The plaintiff's claimed £100. The defendant admitted his liability to the extent of £84 9s. 6d., the amount embezzled by the collector, and paid that sum into court, but denied any further liability. The plaintiffs afterwards amended their statement of claim, and alleged that Carter did not diligently collect rates which it was his duty to collect, and that the plaintiffs had thereby suffered damage, in addition to the loss of the £84 93. 6d., to the extent of at least £15 108. 6d., poor rates to that amount, at least, which ought to have been collected, not having been received by the plaintiffs, and having become irreCoverable. The defendant, by his amended state nent of defence, said that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches in allowing the rates to remain uncollected, and that he was consequently discharged from bis suretyship beyond the sum paid into court. The action came on for trial before Watkin Williams, J., when an order was made, with the consent of the parties, that the jury should be discharged, and that the issues of fact in the action should be referred to a special referee to take evidence and report thereon to Watkin Williams, J. The referee, by his report, found that Carter did not diligently collect the rates, and that by reason of this damage was occasioned to the extent of at least £15 10s. 6d. in addition to the £84 9s. 6d., and that, in consequence of Carter's neglect diligently to collect the rates, poor rates, amounting to not less than £15 10s. 6., which Carter ought to have collected, had not been received and could not be recovered, and so were lost to the parish. The referee further found that, previously to the resignation of Carter, the overseers left the collection of the rates to him, and did not see from time to time that he got in the arrears. But the referee also found that there was not any negligence or laches on the part of the plaintiffs in respect of the collection of the rates or otherwise. Upon this report Watkin Williams, J., held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and that the verdict and judgment must be entered for them. The defendant appealed as to the £15 10s. 61. On the appeal it was urged that the guardians could only sue as trustees for the overseers of the parish, and that they stood in the same position as the overseers would stand if the action was brought by them. If the overseers had done their duty in seeing that the collector took steps to compel the payment of the outstanding arrears, the loss would not have occurred, and this default had discharged the surety. It was also urged that on such an order of reference the court had power to go bebind the finding of the referee on the facts, and to investigate the evidence. The court (JESSEL, M. R., Sir JAMES HANNEN, and LINDLEY, L.J.) affirmed the decision. JESSEL, M.R., said that the first answer to the appellant's case was that the referee's report had found the facts against him. It found that the loss had been occasioned by the default of the collector, and the court could not go behind that finding. The reference was made, under section 57 of the Judicature Act of 1873, to the referee for trial of the issues, and his report had the effect of the verdict of a jury. The suggestion that the guardians stood in the same position as the overseers was not sound in law. Of course the persons who would really lose the money would be the ratepayers, and it was well understood by persons who entered into bonds of this kind that the measure of damages was, not the loss to the guardians, but the loss to the ratepayers. The guardians were not suing for the benefit of the overseers. If this point failed, the appeal failed. But his lordship thought that, even if the overseers had been the plaintiffs, the result would have been the same, for the authorities showed that the mere neglect or omission of an employer to call on his servant to account would not discharge the servant's surety. Sir JAMES HANNEN was of opinion that the guardians were not responsible for the acts of the overseers. In order to discharge the surety some default of the plaintiffs themselves must be shown, and the referee had found that they had not been guilty of any laches. That finding could not now be discus-ed, for it stood on the same footing as the finding of a jury, and was binding on the court. Whether, if the action had been brought by the overseer, their laches would have been an answer, his lordship would not say, for the fac's were not before the court, and he desired not to prejudice that question. ties plainly showed that the mere passive inactivity of the employer would not discharge the surety of the servant, but that a neglect of duty by the

METROPOLITAN VESTRY-IMPROPER EXPENDITURE OF RATES-INJUNCTION -PARTIES TO ACTION FOR COSTS ONLY-METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT, 1855 (18 & 19 VICT. c. 120).-In a case of The Attorney-General v. The Vestry of Bermondsey, before Fry, J., on the 1st inst., a question arose as to the making parties to an action persons against whom no relief could be obtained, merely for the purpose of obtaining costs from them. The action was brought by the Attorney-General, at the relation of a ratepayer of the parish of Bermondsey, the relator being also a co-plaintiff, against the vestry (which was a corporate body under the Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120) and six individuals who were members of the vestry. The plaintiffs alleged that the vestry intended to pay out of the parish rates the expenses of a dinner and a ball, which had been given to celebrate the opening of a new vestry hall, and that this expenditure would be illegal. Resolutions authorizing this expenditure had been proposed and seconded by some, and supported by others of the individual defendants at meetings of the vestry. The plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from applying any portion of the rates in paying these expenses, and that the defendants, other than the vestry, might pay the costs of the action. On a motion for an injunction against the vestry they submitted to a perpetual injunction, without costs, which were not asked against them. The other defendants delivered no statement of defence, and the action afterwards came on as against them on a motion for judgment in default of pleading. It was contended that they ought to be ordered to pay the costs of the action, as they had induced the vestry to resolve on the improper expenditure, and, if they did not pay the costs, the plaintiff, being a ratepayer, would have to bear his proportion of them. Reliance was placed on the case of Attorney-General v. Compton (1 Y. & C. Ch. 417). FRY, J., said that there was no allegation of any intention on the part of the individual defendants to do anything wrong. That allegation was con. fined to the vestry, and this was quite proper, for, except as forming part of the majority, the individual vestrymen would have no control over the funds of the vestry. There was, therefore, no allegation which could support an injunction as against the individual defendants. Could then any relief be granted against them in the shape of payment of costs? They were not brought before the court as sureties for the payment of costs by the principal defendants, but as primarily liable to pay costs, and no other relief was asked against them. As a general rule, persons could not be made parties to an action simply for the purpose of making them pay costs. Could this be done because the plaintiff might say that, as a ratepayer, he would be injured if the vestry had to pay costs out of the rates? It might be that if the vestry had been ordered to pay any costs they could have recovered them from the individual defendants who had led them astray. But there could be no such right of indemnity when the vestry had not been ordered to pay any costs. And, if there was any such right of indemnity, it would be in the vestry, not in the plaintiff. In the absence of any collusion, no individual ratepayer would have such a right. There was no ground for granting any relief against the individual defendants by way either of injunction or costs. Attorney-General v. Compton was distinguishable, because there the individual corporators had so far led the corporation astray that they had paid money improperly out of their coffers, and this money had to be recouped by somebody, and the individual defendants were ordered to repay it. But that was in no way parallel to the present case, in which no money had been paid away by the corporation, and no money, therefore, had to be paid back. But the plaintiffs could not be ordered to pay the costs of the defendants, who were the authors of the mischief, and the action must be dismissed as against

The authori

employer might be set up as a defence by the surety. And, if it could be shown that the overseers had neglected some duty which was imposed on them by stature, his lordship thought that, if they had been plaintiffs, the case might have been brought within the authority of Watts v. Shuttleworth (5 H. & N. 235). But there was no evidence on this point, and his lordship rested his judgment on this, that the guardians were not responsible for any neglect of duty by the overseers. LINDLEY, L.J., thought it was a mistake to treat the guardians as trustees for the overseers. They were, in substance, suing on behalf of the parish. On the other point his lordship would say nothing, because he was not sufficiently acquainted with the facts.—SOLICITORS, Stevens & Co.; Hardisty & Rhodes.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The annual general meeting of the Incorporated Law Society was held at their ball, Chancery-lane, on Friday, the 7th inst., Mr. C. C. Druce, the president, occupying the chair.

Mr. Thomas Paine was elected president, Mr. E. J. Bristow vice-president, and Mr. S. Whitehead, Mr. A. G. Parson, and Mr. J. H. Schröder auditors of the society's accounts for the ensuing year.

The following gentlemen, who had already been nominated as candidates for the vacancies on the council caused by the death of Mr. F. C. Ouvry and the retirement of ten members who, under the bye-laws, went out of office in rotation, but were eligible for re-election, were formally proposed and seconded:Mr. J. Hunter, Mr. N. T. Lawrence, Mr. A. S. Munn, Mr. R. R. Dees, Mr. T. Paine, Mr. R. Cunliffe, Mr. W. Melmoth Walters, Mr. J. Dodds, M.P., Mr. J. V. Longbourne, Mr. J. Addison, Mr. C. C. Druce, Mr. E. J. Bristow, and Mr. E. Kimber. Mr. Paterson, who was one of the retiring members, did not offer himself for re-election. As there were thirteen candidates for the eleven vacancies, it became necessary, under the bye-laws, that a ballot should be taken, and the chairman appointed the 3rd of August for the scrutineers to bring up their report. Mr. Day, Mr. Hewlett, Mr. Osbaldeston, Mr. A. J. Finch, and Mr. Gribble consented to act as scrutineers.

The accounts of receipts and disbursements for the past year, which was taken as read, was approved and adopted. The CHAIRMAN: We have now reached the serious business of the meeting, and it is my duty, in the usual course, to move that the annual report be received, approved, and entered on the minutes. It has already been circulated amongst you, and the usual course at these meetings is to take it as read. But I should wish, before that course is adopted, to refer for a moment to the part of it which relates to the remuneration of solicitors. The statement which there appears was as complete as we could make it up to the time of going to press but within the last few days-that is to say, on Tuesday lastwe received from the Lord Chancellor a draft of the proposed order. It was sent to us, as members of the council, under the provisions of the Act of Parliament, without any special reservation or secrecy. But I have had a telegram from the Leeds Law Society, which stated that my colleague, Mr. Harvey, had received an intimation that he was not to circulate it. I believe that that to some extent originated in a mistake, but, however that may be, I wish to give all effect to any wish of the Lord Chancellor, however expressed. Therefore we are rather abstaining from dealing with it at this meeting. I cannot tell you that it is satisfactory. I think it probable that the council, who will meet early next week to consider the subject, may consider it right to draw up and send in some observations on the subject, but at present the matter is undecided. I cannot think that any useful purpose can be answered by discussing it now, and I think I must ask the meeting to leave it in the hands of those who have for so long done their best to serve them well and faithfully.

Mr. J. M. CLABON observed, with regard to the portion of the report refering to the new Law Courts, that he had, within the last fortnight, inspected such of the courts as were completed, and might state generally that the result was very satisfactory. The objectionable "well" had absolutely disappeared, and there was, in all the courts, a very comfortable table for solicitors, which extended the whole length of the seats set apart for the accommodation of the bar. A comfortable seat was also provided, and the space between the registrars' table and the Queen's Counsels benches had been considerably increased at the suggestion of the council. In the common law courts the table was so placed that the solicitors sat with their backs to the Queen's Counsel, but in the chancery courts they sat with their backs to the judge. He had been told that that was done designedly, but, in his opinion, in all cases the seat ought to be placed under the Queen's Counsel. The arrangements could not, however, be altered at present, but if, by-and-bye, the solicitors found they did not like their seats under the registrar, the council could make their representations in the proper quarter, and there could be but little difficulty in making the change.

Mr. RUBENSTEIN observed that no provision was made for the accommoda. tion of solicitors outside the court.

Mr. CLABON replied that the subject had not escaped him. He had bad a conversation with Mr. Pennington on the subject, and he entirely believed that Mr. Pennington would obtain for the solicitors accommodation apart from that provided in the room in which the clerks meet.

The CHAIRMAN remarked, with regard to the hour of meeting, that this subject had been referred to the council to consider, and they still thought two o'clock the most convenient time. He moved that the annnal report be received and entered on the minutes.

Mr. E. KIMBER, after an allusion ta the value of the time of those present at that particular hour of the day, expressed his surprise that the council, in their report, had made no allusion to the important Bill which was before the House of Lords, and upon which there had been a discussion the previous night in committee. He had spoken to many members of the profession on the subject, who had expressed but one opinion as to judges of courts of first instance being permitted to sit in courts of appeal. He protested against any legislation on such a subject without the great body of solicitors being first consulted. He believed the majority of the solicitors were distinctly of opinion that no judge of first instance should be allowed to sit upon an appeal. If the society was not of that opinion, he was satisfied the legal press was, and, so far as he could gather, the public. That was one measure the council might very well have represented to the Lord Chancellor and Lord Cairns. Then there was not the slightest reference in the report as to keeping more taxing masters at work during the vacation. Under the present state of things there was no certainty whatever-however diligent a solicitor might have been in getting up his case—that, when he went to the taxing master's office with his bill, he could get an appointment before November. With regard to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1881, the council told them that "the amendments introduced into the Bill were designed for the purpose of providing for this contingency." He thought the members might have been informed what those amendments were. Then they stated that they had requested Mr. Gregory to move amendments to the Conveyancing Bill in committee of the House of Commons. He thought it would be of more advantage to the society if Mr. Gregory were to attend their general meetings now and then, and to enlighten them as to what went on in Parliament, and ask their opinion upon the questions of the day affecting the legal profession. Again, the 12th bye-law provided that a list of the council, showing the number of their attendances at the council and committee meetings, should be left in the secretary's office for the inspection of members, in order that they might see with what diligence they had conducted their affairs. He hoped that in the next report there would appear a list of the attendances at full length. Then, with regard to the Copy hold Enfranchisement Bill, he thought the council had taken rather a partial view of the measure. They stated that the Bill contained a clause confiscating the lords' rights of chase and warren, piscaries, and other rights of hunting, shooting, and fishing, without compensation. He would like to know how the Bill dealt with copyholders' rights, and the opinion of the council on that question. They simply said, "The council agree that these rights, except those relating to fisheries and fishing, should be included in all enfranchisements, but they think that the lord should be entitled to compensation." But there were other persons with those rights, besides the lords, who might be entitled to compensation. Then, with regard to the Parliamentary Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Bill, they told the members that "under the existing law a person can be reported without previous notice or without being heard." This was rather too sweeping an observation. So far as he had been able to look into the reports of the commissioners, he had been unable to find the name of a single person who had been reported guilty of bribery or corrupt practices unless he had been heard in some way or another. Many of the witnesses had been heard at great length, and with exemplary patience, throughout the commission, and he scarcely coincided with the council when they said, "On the ground of public policy this privilege should also be accorded, because, when the client has found that his seat is gone, he cares but little about the constituency, and may be willing to tell the commissioners, through his solicitor, all he knows. The solicitor, having once obtained information under the pledge of confidence, should not be compelled to disclose it." Let them think under what circumstances the solicitor was employed by the candidate. He doubted very much whether the solicitor was under the pledge of confidence. The relation was vastly different from the ordinary relation of solicitor and client. There were no secrets that had to be kept. [Laughter.] The laughter convinced him that there were some secrets which, in the opinion of some, ought to be kept, or were generally kept; but, in his humble opinion, they never ought to be kept. There ought to be no secrets, whatever, about the candidature of an individual for parliamentary honours. It was not as if he were a party to litigation, or were being attacked with regard to his character or property. He put himself before his constituency, and said, "Here am I; I am ready to tell you the whole of my life. Judge of me what I am!" If there was anything to conceal, it must be something against the man, and, if anything of that kind was divulged to a solicitor under a pledge of confidence, it was an unjust, immoral, and unrighteous act. The pledge ought not to be kept. He had never found the commissioners put this measure of privilege in the way of answering questions. He thought, therefore, the council were wrong in coming to the conclusion that a solicitor, in such a position, had obtained information under the pledge of confidence. But this was vastly different from the conclusion the council had rightly come to with regard to the paragraph which stated that "some of the commissioners stringently examined solicitors concerned in election petitions as to their acts up to the moment of their entering the barristers' consultation room." There the council were quite right in protesting against the examination of a solicitor, because, from the moment he was employed by a candidate, either to prosecute or defend, he was entitled to plead privilege, but not before, and from that moment he ought to be protected.

Mr. F. K. MUNTON thought that as the subject of legal procedure was under discussion it would be convenient for him to at once make his observa. tions. He had given notice of a motion, as follows:-"That, having regard to the frequent and sometimes inconvenient changes of practice in the courts and offices, it is desirable that the council should nominate, from the body of the society, under proper regulations, a permanent committee of fifteen members actively engaged in contentious work, such committee to be empowered to watch these and kindred matters, and take and receive evidence from the profession, with the view of reporting from time to time modifications

or improvements in practice to be submitted by the council (should they think fit) to the Lord Chancellor or other controlling official." This motion materially affected the question of legal procedure. It would be admitted that the giving to a committee of the members the consideration of the legal procedure had worked well, and he thought it would also be agreed that there were several measures in connection with legal procedure which still required attention. He would first allude to the scandal-for it was nothing else of the condition of the cause lists, both at Westminster and at Lincoln'sinn. It was impossible to ascertain whether there would be one court or six courts sitting, or one judge or six judges ready to hear nisi prius causes. They heard judges state from the bench that, in consequence of the ignorance of somebody-he (Mr. Munton) presumed the solicitors-it was erroneously assumed that there were difficulties in the way of getting trials carried out. He ventured to appeal to anyone engaged in common law and contentious business as to what was the present state of things at Westminster Hall. It was almost impossible to arrive at any kind of satisfactory conclusion as to when they could get a cause heard after it was entered, and that was one of the reasons why, comparatively speaking, so few causes were entered there. He would appeal especially to solicitors dealing with commercial cases to bear him out when he said that they were prepared to adopt almost any course and to sacrifice almost anything in order that they might avoid going into Westminster Hall for trying a cause. They could scarcely ever reckon upon finding the counsel, and if they found the counsel there was a difficulty in finding the court. He saw that within the last three days an announcement had appeared in the newspapers, in the official list of causes to be heard, which ought at once to be taken up by the council on behalf of the society. They had been accustomed to the farce for several days of the announcement that Mr. Justice A. would take certain cases from Mr. Justice B. in the court of Mr. Justice C. That was confusing in itself, but that had been entirely capped by the statement in the official notice of Monday morning-Mr. Justice Field will try the following causes with witnesses (naming five or six causes) to-day or tomorrow! Just let them imagine the state of things when a solicitor has a number of witnesses. It was an absolute disgrace, and ought to be remedied. And yet when solicitors went before the taxing masters constant remarks were made about the great expense of trials. Anyone who would take the trouble to look at the list in the Times newspaper, and see the extraordinary number of times in which cases appeared day after day, with occasional sudden jumps of perhaps a week without being heard, would see that they had arrived at a state of things which never ought to have occurred. Another measure which seemed to require grave consideration was the condition of affairs with sheriffs and their officers. This might not be an important question to every member present, but he ventured to say that there existed no more disgraceful state of things in the legal profession than the way in which, as a whole, executions were levied by the under-sheriffs and their officers, and the mode in which they assessed their fees, and the delays there were in executing the writs, and, worse still, the delays in getting the money after they were executed. He had expressed his views of it by recently bringing an action against a prominent sheriff of a home county, and he had recovered damages from that sheriff for his having detained his (Mr. Munton's) client's money for six or seven weeks after he or his officer had obtained it. These observations would apply to the bailiffs of the county courts, and he had resolved, so far as it lay in his power, to put his foot upon this state of things, and he would bring an action in every case where he had reason to believe the officer of the county court or the sheriff had obtained the money and was retaining it from his client, even if he (Mr. Munton) had to pay the costs himself. He had a case in which he had written to the baliff of a county court, who had replied that, inasmuch as the defendant was in such and such a position, he had thought it not advisable to press him. He (Mr. Munton) at once wrote to the judge to the effect that it was new to him for any bailiff to sit as judge and give time to the defendant. That had very soon brought him the bailiff's levy and costs. It might be that when the members had a complete statement for those who were dealing with the legal procedure rules some of these measures might be dealt with, and therefore he had put his motion upon the paper. He did not, however, propose to press his motion, and for the following reasons: whilst he thought that all would agree with him, and these measures required consideration, and that they would perhaps be better considered in the first instance by a committee of the members who were engaged in contentious business, and whose opinion, if expressed with due consideration, would be listened to by the members of the council, yet he did not press the motion, because he hoped to be able to enlist the attention of at least fourteen or fifteen members who were engaged in contentious business who would take up the measure and report to the council; and if it should turn out that the work thrown upon such a committee is shown to be of such a character that it might very reasonably be in some way formally adopted by the council, he would ask the council to give their opinion thereon at the next annual meeting.

Mr. F. R. PARKER expressed his great disappointment that the council had not been able in their report to make some better statement with regard to the library. It contained merely a record of the independent exertions of independent members, and there was no contribution by the council towards that important part of their institution. In his opinion, the library was unworthy of the society, and, if it were made more what it should be, it would doubtless be the means of attracting to the society a large number of members. The Law Courts would shortly be opened, and they ought to look to the large number of solicitors who would be brought to the courts for an increase in their members. The library was becoming more and more a class-room for the students who went there to learn their lessons which were to be said to their coaches on the next day. They not only read the books to be found in the library, but brought their own for

the purpose of studying them. He did not wish to turn them out of the institution, but he thought the members should have the paramount right of accommodation. He had visited the library of Lincoln's-inn, which would compare favourably with their own in many respects.

He did

Mr. PHILLIMORE regretted that the council should find it necessary to the year for two days and upwards at a time. close the library for the purpose of the examinations eight or ten times in He submitted that they of money in hand, and received upwards of £10,000 a year from the articled were acting in excess of their powers in so doing. The society had plenty not see why a small room should not be appropriated as a separate library clerks, and they might hire a proper place for the examinations. for the use of the articled clerks. He moved an amendment to the report to the effect that the council expressed regret that they were compelled to they hoped to make arrangements which would obviate the necessity of close the library on so many occasions during the previous year, and that such a course in the future.

bye-laws, the council were compelled to keep the library open on every day Mr. J. E. Fox seconded the amendment. He contended that, under the except the public holidays, and spoke of the great inconvenience caused to members by its being so frequently closed.

Mr. R. P. MACARTHUR suggested that the suite of apartments which were granted to the club free of cost should be used for the examinations, and thus the inconvenience caused by the closing of the library would be avoided.

Mr. W. MELMOTH WALTERS considered the club as an institution which joined the society simply that they might become members of the club had conduced materially to the welfare of the society. Many members had The closing of the library was a measure of necessity, and was done in accordance with the power given to the council under the bye-laws. They could not send the students out to be examined at taverns or other places. The subject had been considered from time to time seriously by the co uncil, and plans had been prepared for making very substantial im prove m ents, but they had recently had news of the death of their architect and he was afraid there were circumstances which would interfere with the carrying out of the plans at present, except at a very serious cost. Still, if the council thought they saw a way of spending the money remuneratively they would do so, and they would necessarily consult the members before taking a step which would involve so large an expenditure. If the plans could be carried out, there would be ample accommodation both for the members and the students. If they would look at the balance-sheets they would find that considerable sums of money were spent by the council in providing books for the library. The present balance-sheet showed £417 for the purchase of books, and, as a law library, he thought it compared favourably with most other libraries in London. They were limited in space, and the great difficulty they had to contend with was the arrangement of accommodation for the students; but this was dealt with in the plans to which he had referred, and if the members said the council were to spend the money they were willing to do so. At the present moment,} however, they had a good library, and a librarian well fitted for his post, and who had given every satisfaction to the library committee. The amendment was put, and negatived by a large majority. Mr. DALTON J. MILLER moved a resolution of which he had given notice, having for its object the amendment of the bye-law governing the election by ballot of members of the council, so as to make it necessary for the secretary to forward to each member with the voting-paper a printed list of the attendances of the various members of the council during the past list in the hall of the society, was quite useless, as scarcely any of the year. He observed that the present practice, which was to post such a

members saw it.

Mr. HARGREAVES seconded the motion.

number of members on the council. It was their practice to make the first The CHAIRMAN remarked, on behalf of the council, that there were a large meeting in each month a special meeting, at which a larger attendance than usual was expected, both of town and country members, but they did not find that they got through more business on those days when they had a large attendance than at the other meeting when, perhaps, only half the number were present. If they had any measure before them of special interest they always took care to secure the attendance of the members who would be the more useful in dealing with that particular subject. He thought it would be highly invidious to print the names as suggested.

Mr. WALTERS contended that it was not fair to contrast the attendance of members who, like himself, had offices close to the institution with the on-Tees, or of Mr. Gregory, who had his duties to perform at the House of attendance of gentlemen like Mr. Dodds for instance, who resided at StocktonCommons, or of Mr. Druce, who had to come from the City. It would be most misleading to the country members, who would know nothing of this. There were a great many members they were most anxious to retain on the services of their past presidents, whose experience, judgment, and advice they council who could only attend once a month. They wanted to retain the would be extremely sorry to lose, and the value of their services could not be calculated by the number of their attendances.

Mr. A. E. FINCH thought the information given by such a list would be in the highest degree misleading. He knew some of the members of the council who did the greater part of the work, and their attendances were by no means the most numerous. Many of the older members had gained so much experience that a single attendance on their part was worth a dozen of some of the other members.

The motion was negativel.

Mr. D. T. MILLER then brought forward a motion, of which he had given notice, altering the bye-law which provided that the ten members of the council who had been longest in office should go out of office on the day of th

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