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Falconer, William Graham, Middlesborough, Lithographer. Nov 25 at 3 at offices of Lewis, Zetland rd, Middlesborough

Fielding, John, Crimble, Huddersfield, Joiner. Nov 28 at 10.30 at offices of Ainley and Hall, New st, Huddersfield

Francis, Robert, King's Lynn, Norfolk, Outfitter. Nov 26 at 10.12 at offices of Hill, St Nicholas st, Ipswich

Franks, George Henry, Guisborough, York, Cabinet Maker. Nov 26 at 11 at offices of Draper, Finkle st, Stockton-on-Tees

Fryer, Peter, Mount Pleasant, Hastings, Builder. Nov 24 at 3 at offices of Miller and Miller, Sherborne lane

Fulford, Fanny, Thomas Fulford, and Edwin Fulford, West Dean, Wilts, Farmers. Nov 28 at 2 at offices of Nodder and Gater, City chmbrs, High st, Salisbury

Garratt, Samuel, Lincoln, Licensed Victualler. Nov 28 at 11 at offices of Swan and Bourne, Silver st, Lincoln

Gething, Henry, Tirpenry, Swansea, Chemical Manufacturer. Nov 24 at 3 at offices of
Evans and Davies, Wind st, Swansea

Gibbons, John Thomas, Great Marlow, Bucks, Baker.
Maidenhead. Spender, Maidenhead

Gill, Charles, Coates, Isle of Ely, Cambridge, Cordwainer.
Reeve, High causeway, Whittlesey

Ginger, Thomas, Mill Hill, Hendon, Carpenter.
Rogers

Nov 30 at 3 at Bear Hotel,

Dec 2 at 12 at offices of

Nov 28 at 2 at 17, Essex st, Strand.

Gough, Edward, Clifton, Bristol, out of business. Nov 29 at 12 at offices of Anstey, John st, Bristol. Evans

Gough, John Samson, Accrington, Lancaster, Confectioner. Nov 28 at 3 at Mechanics Institute, Willow st, Accrington. Haworth and Broughton, Accrington

Hargreaves, William Henry, Bradford, York, Plasterer. Nov 28 at 3 at offices of Berry and Robinson, Charles st, Bradford

Hart, Samuel, Wootton Bassett, Wilts, Ale Merchant.
Swindon. Cooke, Gloucester

Heath, Richard, Brighton, Commercial Traveller.
North st, Brighton

Nov 29 at 1 at Queen's Hotel,

Dec

2 at 3 at offices of Goodman,

Nov 23 at 12 at 40, Bishops.

Hedges, Joseph, Virginia row, Bethnal Green, Manager. gate Without. Archer, Brayard rd, Peckham

Hill, George, Breadsall, Derby, Brickmaker. Dec 1 at 3 at offices of Davenport Norton, St James's st, Derby

Hothersall, Richard, Preston, Lancaster, Butcher. Nov 28 at 3 at office of Clarke, Lune st, Preston

Houston, Andrew, Newport, Isle of Wight, Travelling Draper. Nov 28 at 2 at offices of Edmonds and Co, Cheapside. Eldridge, Jun, Newport

Howe, William Best, Torquay, Devon, Milliner. Nov 28 at 3 at the Castle Hotel, Castle st, Exeter. Orchard, Exeter

Hughes, Albert. Northwich, Chester, Publican.
Son, Northwich

Hurst, Thomas, Denton, Lancaster, Clothier.

st, Manchester. Drinkwater, Hyde

Dec 1 at 3 at offices of Cheshire and

Dec 1 at 3 at Merchants' Hotel, Oldham

James, William Henry, and Sydney Orford, Birmingham, Wholesale Warehousemen.
Nov 28 at 1 at offices of Wright and Marshall, New st, Birmingham
Johnson, James, Sonning, Corn Merchant. Nov 25 at 11 at Wheatsheaf Hotel, Reading.
Creed

Jones, Mary, David Owen Jones, William Edward Jones, Towyn, Merioneth, General
Furniture Dealers. Nov 21 at 10 at offices of Howell and Evans, Maengwyn st,
Machynlleth

Keep, Henry, Newington causeway, Hosier. Dec 1 at 3 at offices of Dear, Gresham st Key, Charles, Corely, Salop, Collier. Nov 23 at 3 at offices of Thursfield, Swan st, Kidderminster

Lamb, Sam, Bradford, Potato Salesman. Nov 26 at 12 at offices of Watson and Dickons, Cheapside, Bradford

Lawson, Anthony, Leeds, Furnishing Salesman. Dec 1 at 3 at offices of Shaw, Commercial st, Leeds

Lloyd, David, Carmarthen, Draper. Nov 28 at 10 30 at offices of White, King st, Carmarthen

Locke, James, Exeter, Tea Dealer. Nov 25 at 12 at offices of Southcott, Post Office st, Exeter. Brown, Exeter

Lyon, Joseph, Stockton, Durham, Boot Maker. Nov 25 at 2 at Drapers' Society, Cheapside. Thompson, Stockton-on-Tees

Mapleston, Charles, and Charles Frederick Mapleston, Coningsby, Lincoln. Nov 25 at 11 at office of Harrison, Bank st, Lincoln

Marsh, William, Bentley, nr Doncaster, Land Agent. Dec 5 at 3 at office of Gill and Hall, Wakefield

Marshall, Stephen, St Albans, Grocer. Nov 28 at 3 at George Hotel, St Albans. Wells, St Albans

Middleton, William James, Barnard Castle, Durham. Schoolmaster. Nov 25 at 3 at office of Richardson, Barnard Castle. Draper, Stockton-on-Tees

Morse, George, Begelly, Pembroke, Builder. Nov 21 at 2 at Rutzen Arms Hotel, Narberth. Griffiths, Carmarthen

Morsman, Walter George, Gosport, Grocer. Nov 28 at 2:10 at office of Edmonds and Co, Cheapside. King, Portsea

Moss, George, Norton-in-the-Moors, Stafford, Joiner. Nov 25 at 11 at offices of James, Nelson sq, Newcastle-under-Lyne

Nicklin, Francis, Stone, Stafford, Innkeeper. Nov 28 at 11 at offices of Ashmall, Albion st, Hanley

Palmer, Henry, Landel's rd, East Dulwich, Mason. Dec 1 at 3 at office of Peckham and Co, Knight Rider st. Doctors' Commons

Parker, William, Middleton-by-Youlgreave, Derby, Farmer. Dec 5 at 2 at Castle Hotel, Bakewell, Calder, Derby

Pearsall, John, Birmingham, Brassfounder. Nov 28 at 12 at offices of Haigh, Waterloo st, Birmingham

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Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietors, H. SCHWEITZER & CO, 10, Adam-street, London, W.C.

Pick, Henry, Southwick, Northampton, Farmer. Nov 25 at 10 at offices of Law, St Mary's pl, Stamford

Pooley, Alfred, Liverpool, out of business. Nov 25 at 3 at offices of Gibson and Bolland, South John st, Liverpool. Copeman

Pratt, Francis John, Cheltenham, Colliery Agent. Nov 28 at 11 at offices of Clark,
Regent st, Cheltenham
at 3 at offices of Llewellyn and

Quayle, Alfred, Hanley, Stafford, Clogger. Nov 25
Ackrill, Picadilly st, Tunstall

Rendell, Joseph, John st, Shacklewell, Contractor. Nov 29 at 3 at offices of Andrews
and Mason, Ironmonger lane, Cheapside. Barratt, John st, Bedford row
Ruggles, John, Brentwood, Essex, Beer Retailer. Nov 25 at 3 at offices of Noton,
Lombard st

Saunders, John, Tillington, Sussex, Farmer. Nov 21 at 11 at Half Moon Inn, Petworth.
Albery and Lucas, Midhurst

Shayler, David, Oxford, Dairyman. Nov 30 at 11 at offices of Whitfield, Michael's chmbrs, Oxford

Simpson, Edward, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Licensed Victualler. Nov 24 at 11 at offices of Alcock and Routledge, Frederick Lodge, St Thoma2 st, Sunderland 1 Smith, Joseph, Camerton, Cumberland, Blacksmith. Nov 29 at 11.30 at offices of Hayton and Simpson, Cockermouth. Hayton and Simpson, Cockermouth Smith, Timothy, South Normanton, Derby, Grocer. Nov 28 at 3 at offices of Jones and Middleton, Gluman gate, Chesterfield

Smith, William, Idle, York, Draper's Assistant. Nov 28 at 4 at offices of Atkinson and Wilson, Tyrrell st, Bradford

Smith, William Charles, jun, Old Kent rd, Provision Merchant. Nov 23 at 4 at Victorla House, Trinity st, Southwark. Bordman and Co

Smith, William Fawcett, Weldon Wansford, Northampton, Physician. at offices of Baylis and Pearce, Church et chmbrs, Old Jewry

Nov 29 at 12

Southwell, John Albert, Wisbech St Peter, Crmbridge, Tailor. Nov 25 at 1 at offices of
Fraser and Wright, Old Market st, Wisbech

Stephens, Albert Arthur, Stanley rd, Ball's pond rd, Cab Driver. Nov 24 at 2 at Mason's
Hall Tavern, Mason's avenue. Bassett, Fenwick rd, East Dulwich
Nov 25 at 12 at Guildhall Coffeehouse.

Stevens, William, Hythe, Kent, Boot Maker.
Carder, Dover

Nov 25 at 12 at

Swatman, Emily Norton, St Leonard's-on-Sea, School Proprietress. offices of Phillips and Cheeseman, Havelock rd, Hastings Thompson, John, and Nicholas Thompson, Hayton, Lancaster, Joiners. Nov 28 at 2.30 at offlces of Artindale and Artindale, Hargreaves st, Burnley

Tinson, Henry, St John's st, West Smithfield, Packing Case Maker. Dec 5 at 2 at office of Scott, College bill, Cannon st

Todd, Thomas, Howdon-on-Tyne, Northumberland, out of business. Nov 30 at 2at offices of Moody, Claydon st, Newcastle-on-Tyne

Tunnard, Esau, Kirton, nr Boston, Lincoln, Plumber. Nov 26 at 12-30 at offices of
Bailes, Church lane, Boston

Wade, William, Crewe, Chester, Builder. Dec 2 at 1.30 at Brunswick Hotel, Nantwich
rd, Crewe. Warburton, Crewe
Wainwright, John, Birmingham, Coal Dealer. Nov 29 at 11 at offices of Jackson and
Sharpe, High st, West Bromwich

Wakmaen, Joseph John, Wolverhampton, Stafford, Licensed Victualler. Nov 30 at 11
at offices of Rhodes, Queen st, Wolverhampton
Wall, James, Lincoln, Cigar Merchant.
Temperance bldgs, Silver st, Lincoln
Watson, Pilfold Fletcher, Leeds, Dealer in Fine Arts. Nov 25 at 3 at offices of Austin,
Victoria bldgs, Park lane, Leeds

Dec 1 at 11 at offices of Andrew, Midland

Weaver, George, Farmborough, Somerset, Farmer. Nov 26 at 12 at offices of Wilton and Sons, Westgate bldgs, Bath

Whipps, William John, Princes sq, St George's-in-the-East, Soap Manufacturer. Dec
Youens, James, High Wycombe, Buckingham, Grocer. Dec 5 at 1 at offices of Clarke,
7 at 3 at offices of Macarthur and Son, John st, Bedford row
Easton st, High Wycombe

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BY SPECIAL APPOINTMENT,

To Her Majesty, the Lord Chancellor, the Whole of the Judicial Bench, Corporation of London, &c. SOLICITORS' AND REGISTRARS' GOWNS. BARRISTERS' AND QUEEN'S COUNSEL'S DITTO, CORPORATION ROBES, UNIVERSITY & CLERGY GOWNS, ESTABLISHED 1689.

94 CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.

HAMPTON & SONS make NO CHARGE

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H. PROSSER & Barrel to enllations for Probate an

and Shell Fish Warehouse, late of Temple Bar, REMOVED to 34, Chancery-lane.

Valuations for Probate and Transfer. Surveys.
Estate and Auction Offices, 8, Pall Mall East, S.W.

PARTRIDGE & COOPER,

LAW AND GENERAL STATIONERS,

1 & 2, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON, E.C.

Law Copying and Engrossing.

Deeds and Writings engrossed and copied on the Premises, with punctuality and dispatch, at the lowest scale of charges. A good Discount allowed on agreed accounts. LAW PRINTING.

STATEMENTS OF CLAIM AND DEFENCE, AFFI-
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DEEDS, CONVEYANCES, MORTGAGES, &c., Printed
in form for Registration.

Discount allowed for cash on agreed accounts.
LITHOGRAPHY.

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CURRENT TOPICS.

LONDON, NOVEMBER 26, 1881.

WE HAVE AUTHORITY to state that no date has yet been fixed for the meeting of the Rule Committee of Judges to consider the proposed changes in legal procedure. The meeting is not likely to take place for at least a fortnight, or to precede the annual Council of Judges, the date of which is not yet settled.

IT IS THE INTENTION of the President of the Board of Trade to introduce next session a Bill to consolidate the enactments on the bankruptcy law.

sets of the papers specified to be delivered for the use of the court one week before an appeal is likely to appear in the daily court paper.

THE MEETING of the Incorporated Law Society, last Friday, arrived at the conclusion indicated by us last week. A committee of members of the society was appointed to consider the recommendations of the Legal Procedure Committee, and to report to the council with the view of further considering the subject at an adjourned meeting of the society. The names of the members of the committee will certainly enlist the confidence of the profession, and the addition of some members of the council will enable the committee to learn the grounds on which the suggestions already circulated were adopted. Some objection was raised to the course taken by the council in printing these suggestions, and we cannot help thinking that it would have been wiser to have kept them in

MR. JUSTICE CHITTY will commence the hearing of witness petto until the result of the deliberations of the committee appointed actions on Tuesday next.

IT WAS ANNOUNCED on Wednesday in the Court of Appeal at Lincoln's-inn that in future all admiralty appeals will be heard by the Westminster branch of the court.

THE ARRANGEMENT announced in the daily papers that appeals from the Master of the Rolls would be taken at Lincoln's-inn on Monday and Tuesday next week has been altered. His lordship will preside in the Court of Appeal at Lincoln's-inn on those days as usual.

THE ORDER which has been issued under the Courts of Justice (Salaries and Funds) Act, 1869, affects the position of certain clerks in the several offices and departments of the Chancery Division. Under the order, certain clerks, specified by name in the schedule, will, in future, be classified, as therein shown, as first, second, and third class clerks, in accordance with the practice now in vogue. The principal provision is that which makes all existing and future clerks in the Chancery Division interchangeable and liable to be transferred to any office or department in the same Division.

WE UNDERSTAND that at a meeting of the solicitors practising in Bristol, held on the 21st inst., it was resolved, by a large majority, that in future sales the present practice in Bristol and its neighbourhood of charging purchasers at sales of property by auction with solicitors' contract fees be abandoned, and that, in the opinion of the meeting, auctioneers should be paid by the persons employing them. This is a step in the right direction, and will, we hope, be generally followed throughout the West of England, wherever the present objectionable practice of charging purchasers at auctions with solicitors' or auctioneers' fees prevails.

SOME TIME AGO we drew attention to the inconvenience caused in the Court of Appeal by the non-delivery of the requisite papers for the use of the judges on the hearing of an appeal, and we pointed out the propriety of solicitors delivering in all cases three sets of papers for the use of the judges. We believe that the late Lord Justice JAMES considered that, as the Court of Appeal had no power to make rules, that court could not properly lay down any regulation on this subject. The result of the absence of any such regulations has been constant inconvenience. The Master of the Rolls has now taken the matter in hand, and a notice has been issued (which will be found in another column) requiring three

by the meeting had been ascertained. Notwithstanding the explanations of the president it still remains matter of doubt whether the council have pledged themselves to the red letter opinions, or whether they are merely suggestions to be re-considered after the report of the committee appointed last Friday has been received. It is very much to be hoped that the latter is the intention.

THE MAIN SUGGESTION of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society on the Procedure Committee's report relates to the question of appeal, which has been fully treated in the articles which have appeared in these columns. We need only say upon this that the alterations which the council propose carry out the views which we have advocated. Among the most important of the other suggestions of the council are those relating to shorthand notes and the summary procedure on bills of exchange. As to the former, we concur with the council in thinking that the recommendation of the Procedure Committee goes beyond what is reasonable in burdening the parties in all events and in all cases with the cost of note and transcript. What the court needs for its guidance should be paid for by the public; what the parties think necessary for themselves they should themselves pay for; and the ultimate incidents of that burden should be determined like other questions of costs. As to the summary procedure on bills of exchange, it seems to have been abolished under the notion that the same remedy was afforded by order 14, but in fact the new remedy is worse than the ment cannot, in any event, be obtained without an application, and old in respect both of delay and of cost-in cost because judgin delay because the application will frequently extend the period beyond the twelve days allowed under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67. There seems, therefore, to be good reason for the suggestion of the committee do not bear the marks of any very mature consideration. council. For the rest, their observations on the proposals of the Had the observations, and the implied adoption of the proposals where not altered, been the result of a careful examination by a committee appointed for that purpose, it would have added weight to those proposals as they stand. As it is, we cannot consider that the examination we propose to make of the suggestions of the Procedure Committee will be burdened by any greater presumption in their favour than arises from their adoption by the committee itself.

IT IS VERY DIFFICULT to resist the plaintive appeal made in another column by, or on behalf of, a highly respectable ghost. WALTER DE ALDEHAM wants to know, now that the Court of Exchequer is abolished, where his successor in the holding of certain lands in Salop is to render the service by which he holds the lands-viz., the payment to the King yearly at his Exchequer of two knives? It is conceivable that the Order in Council for the abolition

case of

of the Common Pleas and Exchequer, of December 16 last-which extent we think the writer exaggerates the contrast between the provides that" all proceedings which have heretofore, by any law qualifications of a common lawyer and an equity man as a judge or custom other than such Acts of Parliament, rules, and orders as in criminal cases. It does not necessarily happen that the common aforesaid [ie, the Judicature Acts and Orders], been taken or lawyer appointed to the bench has any but a slight familiarity had respectively in the . . . . Exchequer Division of the said with the practice in criminal courts. He generally has been long High Court of Justice, be from and after the time when this order withdrawn from the Crown court, and, indeed, in some cases he But it is nevertheless shall take effect, taken and had in the Queen's Bench Division may never have practised in that court. of the said High Court of Justice "-may not have come to the true that the nature of his business under the old system of proknowledge of our ghostly correspondent. But even if it it has, it is cedure formed a much better education for the work of a criminal certainly open to him to say that since it was thought necessary, court than that of an equity counsel. The work of an equity counsel, notwithstanding this order, to provide in the Judicature Act of under the old system, could hardly, indeed, be said to form any the last session for the the presentation of the education for the functions of a criminal judge. Even now that Lord Mayor and the proceedings with regard to the nomination the practice of the Chancery Division with regard to evidence has of the sheriffs, it must be equally necessary to provide by express been considerably altered, and viva voce evidence is more common legislation for the case of the successor of our correspondent, and there, the character of the cases and of the transactions involved that of the many other persons who hold by similar tenures. in them is not so well calculated to prepare a man for dealing There certainly seems to have been an oversight, but we think our with criminal cases as that of many of the transactions with correspondent's successor need not be very anxious about the which the Common Law Division usually deals. Then, again, of results. Let him pay his knives to the proper officer at the course, in most cases the common lawyer has, at any rate at the Central Office, who will, doubtless, gladly accept them. Then we beginning of his career, some experience of the criminal courts, apprehend that the successor will be safe from fear of forfeiture, and even after the lapse of a good many years the knowledge so on the principle expounded by Lord COKE, who says (Co. Lit. acquired is speedily revivified. Agreeing, as we do, with the 212b), "the place is but a circumstance, and, therefore, if the author of the article in question to a very great extent, and thinkobligee receiveth [the money] at any other place, it is sufficient, ing it somewhat of a scandal that a judge entirely unversed in though he be not bound to receive it at any other place." See criminal procedure should be sent to deal with the lives and also, per POWELL, B., in Bath and Montague's case (3 Ch. liberties of prisoners—just as we think it somewhat of a scandal Cas. 68). that common law judges, wholly unversed in the procedure of equity, should be pitchforked into the position of judges in the Chancery Division to deal with questions of trusts and winding up of companies, with which they are wholly unfamiliar-we nevertheless feel considerable doubt whether complaints on the The dual system of common law and equity, does practically, to a large extent and for many purposes. subject are of any use. continue to exist, and must for long do so, and nobody seems very clear whether it is, or ought ever to be, entirely done away with, but tentative efforts are made in the direction of fusion, the scope of which is probably not very clear even to the authorities who make them, one of these being the practice of appointing equity men to the common law bench. This necessarily involves, to some extent, the evils of which our contemporary complains, although it is true that an equity man so appointed must speedily acquire a familiarity both with criminal practice itself and other experience cognate therewith. The precedent for these appointments having once been created, we cannot doubt that it will be from time to time followed.

THE QUESTION has frequently been mooted, how far counsel defending a prisoner is at liberty to make, as the mouthpiece of the prisoner, statements of facts of which there is no evidence. After some divergence of opinion, we believe that the practice (pace Lord COLERIDGE) is at present settled in favour of his being allowed to do so. The objections to this practice have been discussed in connection with the recent trial of LEFROY, and there is no doubt that there are some serious objections in principle to it, but it seems to us that under our present system, by which the prisoner can neither be compelled or permitted to give evidence himself, the admission of this practice is inevitable. The sterner and more technical minds of the judges of former days may have seen no difficulty in repressing any such statement on the part of counsel, but at the present day there is more compunction with regard to prisoners upon their defence. If a prisoner is defending himself, practically he cannot be prevented from stating facts in his address to the jury. The question therefore is, whether, because he has counsel to represent him, he is to be deprived of the advantage of having his statement before the jury. It seems to us that the feeling of the present day would be all against making a prisoner take his choice of the two advantages, and either have counsel but no opportunity of stating his version of the facts, or state his version of the facts with the penalty of losing all the advantages of being defended by counsel. The difficulties inherent in the present mode of procedure in this respect naturally suggest the alternative of making the prisoner capable of giving evidence, and so of making his statement regular evidence, subject to the due safeguard of cross-examination. If this were done, a true statement, it is suggested, would have much more weight, and so the innocent would profit, whereas a false statement would generally be broken down. There is no doubt a strong argument to be derived in favour of allowing prisoners to give evidence on their own trial from the obvious defects of the present practice, but there are many other considerations involved. The general question of the advisability or otherwise of admitting this sort of evidence was largely discussed some time ago in connection with the Criminal Code prepared by Mr. Justice STEPHEN, and pretty nearly all that could be said on one side or the other was put forward in that discussion, in which we ourselves took part. Unfortunately the Legislature has for a long time been so exclusively occupied with subjects of a more burning nature that matters of this sort have been wholly in abeyance.

AN EVENING CONTEMPORARY has recently called attention to the objections attendant upon the practice of sending judges from the equity courts into the Crown courts at assizes. To some

THE ORDINARY 66 LIBERTY TO APPLY," reserved in a chancery order, became last week the subject of discussion in an action of Huntley v. Link, before Mr. Justice CHITTY. The claim of one KAY, a defendant in the action, had been satisfied, and an order had been made dismissing the action as against him. KAY then gave notice of motion for an order that certain securities in the hands of the plaintiff should be delivered up to him. This motion was met by the preliminary objection that KAY, being no longer a party to the action, could not apply in the action except on liberty reserved by the order under which he ceased to be a party; and that, as a matter of fact, liberty to apply was not reserved by that order. In answer to this it was contended that liberty to apply is impliedly reserved by every order, whether the words are there or not, as has been recently decided by Mr. Justice FRY. Ultimately Mr. Justice CHITTY held that a defendant against whom an action has been dismissed cannot afterwards move in that action for substantial relief, following the principle of the case of Kendall v. Marsters (2 De G. F. & J. 200), where it was laid down that the usual direction for liberty to apply does not extend to an application for costs as to which no express direction is given in the decree. It is clear that very little reliance can be placed on the implied liberty to apply for any purpose beyond that of carrying out the order into which the liberty is to be imported by implication.

Da ing a recent trial in New London, says the Virginia Law Journal, a rural juror appealed to the court to know" if the lawyers could not be stopped purpose to bother and confuse us jurors; don't they, judge?" "I suppose from bothering the jury." "Them lawyers," he remarked, come here on they do, my friend," wearily answered his honour.

of the High Court of Justice is likely to occupy this position? THE PROCEDURE COMMITTEE'S REPORT. This can hardly be suggested without casting a strange and most

IV.

IN former articles we have referred to those parts of the report which deal with the question of appeal, but the subject is not yet exhausted. The committee, in enforcing their arguments in favour of a court in Banc, say that "for certain purposes a court in Banc must continue," the reason being as follows:

:

"Not merely has it to discharge appellate business, but, as regards inferior courts, matters are now assigned to it by statute, in some of which its decision is final. Such are all Crown matters (with exceptions not practically worth notice), election, municipal, parliamentary [i.e., we suppose election matters both municipal and parliamentary,] and some other matters. There are also a certain number of motions of public importance, such as habeas corpus, quo warranto, mandamus, criminal information, &c., in which the subjects of the realm from time immemorial have had the advantage of resorting in the first instance to the judgment of a court in Banc, composed of more than one judge, and whose decision is, therefore, more readily acquiesced in."

Putting aside the question of appeals in actions, which we have already dealt with, it remains to consider how the case stands as to the other matters here referred to. We must venture to inquire on what ground these matters are to be distinguished from others of first instance in requiring more than the rest to be heard by a court of more than one. It is perhaps to be deemed a mere rhetorical exaggeration (although a report is hardly the place where we should look for rhetoric) when the subject is said to have had from "time immemorial" the right of applying for a quo warranto, a mandamus, or a criminal information, all of them originally, and till comparatively recent times, strictly prerogative matters, in which it was only by grace that the subject could be heard to move. So far as the argument from prescription is concerned, it must be admitted that the right of the subject to have points of law raised on demurrer decided by a court of "more than one judge" is of much superior antiquity. Yet that demurrers should be determined by a single judge has now been for some time acquiesced in without complaint. This consideration, therefore, must be set aside, and what remains of the argument is, (1) that the matters enumerated are matters of public importance; (2) that being such, it is desirable that the judgment of the court of first instance should be acquiesced in without appeal; (3) that such a decision will be more likely to be acquiesced in if pronounced by more than one judge.

injurious reflection upon the members of that body. But, if such a suggestion could be made, the assertion might safely be sustained that a court of three such judges would form no impediment to the course of a cause upwards. Nay, more, it may be safely and truly said that the very assumption that three judges are needed at Westminster to do what one judge is competent to do at Lincoln's-inn, or to conduct business at least not more difficult than a single judge conducts there, does itself throw some degree of doubt and suspicion upon the former. For, certainly, these matters of "public importance are in no respect more difficult than other matters, and require no greater amount of judicial ability for their determination. It would be far better to encourage confidence in the competency of the judges by intrusting them with full powers than to suggest a doubt of the units by requiring them to act in groups.

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It may, however, be asked whether it can be seriously contended that a court of first instance may not be so strong as to discourage appeals from its decisions? Certainly it may, but the question exhibits the fallacy on which the proposal in question is based. A court may be exceptionally strong, and that whether it is composed of one judge or of several. Perhaps no court ever enjoyed a higher degree of confidence than that presided over by a single judge, Vice-Chancellor Wood. But it is one thing to say that a court may be so pre-eminent as to discourage appeals from it; it is another thing to say that as between ordinary courts any such distinction will prevail. There are, and always must be, among judges differences which the public will recognize; but what guarantee is there that the court of three will be so constituted as to contain judges, or even one judge, of the highest distinction? They will be listened to with little more respect than is paid singly to the individuals composing them; and certainly with no such additional regard as will materially affect the litigant's disposition to appeal. And, meanwhile, for this slender and doubtful advantage three judges will be employed in doing a duty which one is competent to discharge. The end sought for will not be attained in a degree in any way proportioned to the expenditure of strength employed to attain it.

In examining these propositions, it will be worth while to inquire what are the considerations which tend to increase or diminish appeal. A first place has to be assigned to the nature of the litigation. If the amount at stake, either directly or indirectly, is large; if the resources of the litigants are abundant; if the matter is one which, though the amount at stake is not great, yet the interests and feelings of the parties are deeply engaged, those circumstances exist which makes an appeal probable. A very inferior place must be assigned to the greater or less doubt and difficulty of the question to be decided. If, however, the question is one which, being difficult, is also likely to recur, and to involve further litigation, a motive for appealing is at once supplied. These are the really operative considerations, and no ingenuity will prevent them from having their effect, if, at least, there is a court of appeal to which litigants care to resort. But there is a way of check-court. The case was therefore adjourned, and the Lord Chief ing, though not of preventing, appeals. If the appeal is made cumbrous, costly, and dilatory, instead of being simple, easy, and speedy, then, no doubt, at the cost of injustice to those who still appeal, others who desire to appeal and would have appealed will be deterred from incurring the risk, and appeals will be diminished. This is a consideration often lost sight of when a comparison is made between the number of appeals at common law and in chancery under the old system. In chancery the appeal was simple, easy, and expeditious, and to known judges; at common law it was cumbrous and dilatory, and to a court which was fluctuating and wholly uncertain in its composition, both in numbers and in quality. It will hardly be desired that appeals should be diminished by reducing the efficiency of the Court of Appeal, or obstructing the access to it.

Perhaps, however, there is a way of stimulating appeals. It is possible to constitute so weak a court of first instance that it should come to be regarded as only a necessary ante-chamber to the Court of Appeal. But is it to be suggested that a judge

Next, as to the matters in which appeal is final. As to some of these the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1881, s. 14, has already removed the finality; and, putting these aside, the question may be asked whether in others decisions are not now final where an appeal ought to be allowed? No one, for instance, can think it a very satisfactory criterion of whether a case is suitable for appeal that a penalty is imposed, the imposition of which depends on a difficult point of construction in an important statute; and the consequences of the existing rule may be well illustrated by the recent case of Saunders v. Richardson (L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 388). In that case an important point under the Education Acts had been decided by a divisional court, of which a highly-respected judge, Lindley, J., was the senior member. The case arose on a penalty and there was no appeal. Upon the same point presenting itself to another divisional court, the decision did not commend itself to the judges, but it was difficult to decide in direct opposition to the view acted on in a co-ordinate Justice directed that it should be re-argued before a court of five judges. This was done, and the rule laid down by the previous decision was practically reversed by a court which was not a court of appeal. Now the question may reasonably be asked whether this method of reversing one decision, by re-arguing another before an extraordinary court, is cheaper, speedier, more just, or more convenient than an appeal to the ordinary Court of Appeal, sitting constantly to review the decisions below. It may be a very reasonable thing that, in certain classes of cases, the court which hears the case should have discretion to grant or refuse an appeal and to impose conditions, but it does not seem a reasonable thing that, however difficult and important the point, and however desirous the parties, or the court itself, may be to have the decision of the Court of Appeal, this should not be possible, and that a review should only be obtained by summoning a cloud of judges from their other duties, to create a new and inconvenient tribunal.

In a word, if there is any class of cases fit to be determined by a

judgment of the High Court, it may safely be affirmed that there will be some among them in which it is desirable that an appeal should lie to the Court of Appeal, and that the decision of the High Court should therefore not have the character of absolute finality. While, on the other hand, as to those of the number which are so small and trivial, or so free from doubt, that a further appeal, though desired, ought not to be allowed, it may also be safely affirmed that a decision by a single judge will be as satisfactory to the public, and more proportioned to the matter in question, than the decision of a court of three.

It would, therefore, be much more in accordance with the reason of the thing and with public convenience that an appeal should lie from every decision of the High Court; but that such appeal should, in certain classes of cases, be by leave only. It would probably be right to lay down in general terms the considerations which should guide the exercise of this judicial discretion. The results reached by the judge in the application of those principles would be with difficulty and reluctance interfered with; but the too rigorous exercise of the power of precluding appeal might be guarded against by allowing special leave to appeal to be given by the branch of the appeal court which deals with motions of practice.

Before quitting the subject of appeal we may notice certain proposals of the committee which, though not placed under that heading, have a direct bearing on the question of appeal business. The first relates to new trials, and is contained in the two ing resolutions:

the appeal should lie directly from his decision to the Court of Appeal. The next resolution is so admirable that, though less germane to the present subject, yet being sufficiently allied to it, we will quote it in this place, understanding by "the court "the Court of Appeal.

"19. Neither party shall have a right to a new trial on the ground that some question has not been left to the jury which the judge at the trial bas not been asked to leave to the jury. The court shall have power in such cases either to direct a new trial, or, with the view of saving a further trial, to draw all inferences of fact, or take further evidence, or direct inquiry."

There is, finally, a resolution which, having regard to the course of business in late years, is certain to be more or less fully adopted ; nor can we see any reason for desiring to limit it :

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This again is referred to here from its bearing on the question of appeal business. An argument in favour of a court in Banc is raised by the committee, on the ground that the appeal in new have already examined the force of this argument; but what we trials is from the decision of a judge and twelve other men. follow-have now to observe is, that the effect of the new rule will be to diminish very largely the number of cases to which this argument will apply; and therefore, in a practical sense, the importance and value of the rule grounded upon it. The trial being before a judge alone, the existing rule, which it is not proposed to disturb, will carry the case direct to the Court of Appeal; the judges who would constitute the court of three will be set free to discharge their own independent duties; and the Court of Appeal will not be called upon to disturb its sittings, and to give one of its members a holiday, by summoning an extraordinary court of five.

"18. After the trial of any cause before a judge and jury, the judge may, upon application, certify that he is dissatisfied with the verdict, in which case a new trial shall take place unless the court shall otherwise order."

The reason given for this proposal is that when a judge reports that he is dissatisfied with a verdict "the general rule, acted upon in the vast majority of cases," is to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial. That this statement truly represents the fact, however inconsistent with the respect which the committee elsewhere express for the judgment of the "twelve men," no one will doubt; and it is with reason contended that the power now exercised in fact, but not directly, should be in future exercised openly, and without the delay and cost incurred in an argument before a court which will end by adopting the view of the presiding judge. But it is important to observe that the effect of this rule will be to relieve the court of business which at present occupies a considerable portion of its time, and to relieve the Court of Appeal, if courts in Banc should no longer be deemed necessary, of a considerable portion of the business which would otherwise be transferred to them. So far as concerns new trials on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence, those cases only will go to the appeal court in which the judge either concurs with the jury, or does not express himself dissatisfied with their verdict, or in which the successful party is prepared to sustain the verdict against the opinion of the judge. At the same time it must be pointed out that the course proposed is not without its perils. If the application is to be made on the spot, and decided as it must in that case be, without argument, and on the impression prevailing in the mind of the judge at the close of the trial, the result (apart from the somewhat too open disregard of the opinion of the "twelve men ") may not always be satisfactory. A judge is apt to take a view strongly, which further reflection modifies; and it cannot, we think, be denied that many cases have occurred where the judge would, on the spur of the moment, have ordered a new trial, but where, on further reflection, he has perceived that the case fairly admitted of a view different from that which he has entertained, and has, in the end, refused to certify his dissatisfaction with the verdict. If, on the other hand, the "application" is to be a substantive motion or argument, the saving in time and money will not be what is anticipated. Nay, if the case is first to go to the judge, and then to the court in Banc, with a liability to further appeal, both delay and expense will be increased. Yet there can be no doubt there is great force in what the committee urge. And perhaps, when it is duly considered, it forms an argument against the existence of the intermediate appeal to a court in Banc. The argument of the committee may therefore so far be adopted. It seems reasonable that the first application for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against evidence, should be before the judge who tried the case; and that

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X.-LEASES. WE propose in this article to examine very briefly sections 10-14, of which the first three are surpassed in the difficulty of their subject-matter by no other part of the Act. We may add that no other part of the Act seems to have offered a fairer opportunity of permanent and valuable legislation. To have laid down plain and equitable rules for deciding under all circumstances what persons are entitled respectively to claim the benefit and to enforce the burden of covenants "having reference" to lands comprised in a lease, and also for deciding what covenants come properly under that designation, would have merited the profound gratitude of the profession. Other very useful information might also be given by rules for deciding under all circumstances what persons are entitled to take advantage of a condition of re-entry or (if the subject needs to be treated) any "other condition" contained in a lease. Since the severe simplicity of the common law, which narrowed the inquiry by closely restricting the respective rights and liabilities of the parties, was invaded by the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, the questions here involved have been constantly growing in complexity, and their answers in bulk. After that the aid of equity had been successfully invoked, in the famous case of Tulk v. Moxhay, to effect, for most purposes of practice, a great enlargement of the list of relevant covenants, the total mass of the learning bearing upon the subject became so vast that even a superficial examination of it would far transcend the space at our disposal for dealing with the above-mentioned sections of the Act. These deal only with covenants between lessor and lessee. The first of them, section 10, refers to covenants by the lessee" having reference to the subject-matter " of the lease, and also with conditions contained in a lease. It is noteworthy that the conditions in question are mentioned in general terms, without the addition (or rather, with the ostentatious exclusion) of any such restriction as

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