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they have considered the representations contained in the appeal from the justices of the county of Leicester to which you refer. The Board had, prior to its receipt, communicated with the auditor on the subject to which it relates, and they direct me to forward herewith, for the information of the justices, an extract from the auditor's reply. With regard to the view expressed in the justices' appeal, that the effect of the Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act, 1878, is to place the ultimate responsibility for the due maintenance of highways and main roads on the county authority, the Board must point out that ssction 13 of that Act merely requires the county authority to repay half the cost of the maintenance of the main roads, if they are maintained to the satisfaction of the county surveyor, or of such other person as the county authority may appoint; but it does not impose any responsibility on the authority with respect to the proper maintenance of the roads. It is true that section 10 empowers the county authority to enforce the duty of highway authorities in regard to repairs, but this only applies where specific complaint is made of the default.

The Board admit that some general regulations might usefully be laid down for the guidance of highway authorities in determining what should be done to obtain a certificate that the main roads had been properly maintained. Any such regulations, however, could not require anything to be done which the highway authorities could not legally do apart from them, and it appears that the auditor contends that the highway authorities are not empowered to defray the cost of painting milestones marking the distances on disturnpiked roads, which was one of the things prescribed by the rules issued by the county authority in 1879. The Board will not, at this moment, express any opinion as to whether the auditor is right or wrong in this contention. The question has now come before them on an appeal from one of the disallowances made by Mr. Chamberlin, and it will be incumbent upon them to decide the point in dealing with this appeal, but they may state that, assuming Mr. Chamberlin's view to be correct, it was clearly his duty to disallow the expenditure. With regard to the removal of obstructions caused by snow, there can be no doubt that highway authorities are empowered to incur a reasonable expense for this purpose, and Mr. Chamberlin states that he has not disallowed any such expenditure. It would seem, too, that he did not strike out the item in the claims on the county authority in respect of main roads; but that he appended a note to them, drawing the attention of the county authority to the question whether the removal of obstruction caused by snow could be deemed to be repairs within the meaning of section 13 of the Act of 1878.

Section 18 of the Act makes it the duty of the district auditor to audit the claims, and if he thought that any items inserted in them were not properly included, he would have been justified in striking them out. At the same time, the county authority are not bound by the auditor's decision in this matter, and if they consider that half the cost of removing snow from main roads ought to be repaid by them, they would not be precluded from making the repayment, even although the auditor had disallowed the items in the claim. The Board believe, however, that in some other cases county authorities have declined to recognize the cost of removing snow as part of the expense of repairing the main roads for the purpose of obtaining repayment. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, HUGH OWEN, Assistant Secretary.

W. N. Reeve, Esq., Clerk of the Peace for the County of Leicester.]

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CASES OF THE WEEK.

LESSOR AND LESSEE-RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE-BREACH OF COVENANT TO INSURE CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881, s. 14 RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT-ACTION PENDING AT DATE OF PASSING OF ACTPOWER OF COURT OF APPEAL-ORD. 58, RR. 2, 5.-In a case of Quilter v. Mapleson, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., an important question arose as to the retrospective effect of section 14 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, which provides (inter alia) that, “(1) A right of reentry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation of the lease, for a breach of any covenant or condition in the lease, shall not be enforceable, by action or otherwise, unless and until the lessor serves on the lessee a notice specifying the particular breach complained of, and, if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach, and, in any case, requiring the lessee to make compensation in money for the breach, and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time thereafter, to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy, and to make reasonable compensation in money, to the satisfaction of the lessor, for the breach. (2) Where a lessor is proceeding, by action or otherwise, to enforce such a right of re-entry or forfeiture, the lessee may, in the lessor's action, if any, or in any action brought by himself, apply to the court for relief; and the court may grant or refuse relief, as the court, having regard to the proceedings and conduct of the parties under the foregoing provisions of this section, and to all the other circumstances, thinks fit; and in case of relief may grant it on such terms, if any, as to costs, expenses, damages, compensation, penalty, or otherwise, including the granting of an injunction to restrain any like breach in the future, as the court, in the circumstances of each case, thinks fit." (7) repeals (inter alia) seotions 4-9 of Lord St. Leonards' Act (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35.) "(8) This section shall not

affect the law relating to re-entry or forfeiture, or relief in case of non-payment of rent. (9) This section applies to leases made either before or after the commencement of this Act, and shall have effect, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary." The Act was passed on the 22nd of August, 1881. The action was brought by a lessor against his lessee to enforce a forfeiture of the lease, on the ground of breach of a £14,000. The defendant, under the Act 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, set up the condition to keep the premises insured from loss by fire for the sum of defence that there were two policies of insurance, each for £7,500, and that he had arranged with the insurance companies that the policies should not lapse by reason of the non-payment of the premiums due on the 25th of March, 1880, and that on the 14th of May, while the arrangement was, as he believed, in full force, he effected new insurances upon the property for the full amount, and up to and inclusive of the 24th of June, 1880, and daly paid the premiums on these new insurances; but that before the 14th of May he could not (having been abroad up to the end of April) procure sufficient funds to pay the premiums on the old policies or to effect new insurances. He did not deny the non-payment of the March premiums nor that there had been an interval of time between the lapsing of the old policies, if they did lapse, and the 14th of May (when the new policies were have lapsed, have been left uninsured; and it was not denied that this would effected), daring which the premises would, assuming the old policies to have been a breach of the condition "to keep the premises insured at all times," but for the alleged arrangement with the companies that the policies should not lapse by reason of the non-payment of the March premiums. The action was tried before Lord Coleridge, C.J., and he on the 4th of July, 1881, gave judgment upon further consideration in favour of the plaintiff. His lordship, however, stayed execution in order to allow the defendant to appeal. The question was raised whether section 14 applied to a forfeiture in respect of which an action had been brought and judgment given before the passing of the Act. And the further question was raised whether the Court of Appeal could give any other judgment than that which the court below ought to have given at the time when it did give judgment. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY and BOWEN, L.JJ.) held that section 14 applied to the case, and also that the Court of Appeal had power to give the judgment which the court below ought to have given if the action had been tried at the date of the hearing of the appeal. JESSEL, M.R., said that Act itself. The rule of construction was well settled that the court would not the question whether the Act was retrospective must be determined from the interpret an Act so as to alter existing rights unless it found that the Legislature intended that to be done. But when it was plain that there was such an intention, the Act must be applied accordingly. The Act was passed to give lessees a right to relief from forfeiture which they did not possess before. Sub-section 9 of section 14 clearly enacted that the section should apply to leases made either before or after the commencement of the Act; and, therefore, sub-section 1 deprived landlords of a right which they had before the passing of the Act. It was plain beyond question that the section was intended to be retrospective as to the main point with regard to forfeiture. The question was whether it applied to a pending action. But, first, did it apply to a breach before the passing of the Act? Was there any reason against its so applying? It would be extraordinary if breaches in future were to be relieved against, but breaches already committed should be left. By sub-section 7 of section 14 the enactment relating to relief from forfeiture for non-insurance contained in section 4 of the Act, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, was repealed, and section 71 only retained the rights of a lessee to the benefit of that Act so far as regarded a pending action. If the court were to say that the Conveyancing Act did not apply to breaches committed before it-the Act being intended for the benefit of lessees-those lessees who had committed breaches against which there could have been relief before the Act would now be left without relief. Then, did the Act apply to an action brought before it was passed? Why should the bringing of an action make any difference, the object being to give relief against forfeiture? Sub-section 2 of section 14 only applied before re-entry. The case was different from that of relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent, which was excepted by sub-section 8, because it was fully provided for by the Common Law Procedure Act, which limited the tenant by giving him six months after execution. No such limit had been fixed in the case provided for by the Conveyancing Act, because, by sub-section 2, the tenant must come for relief before actual re-entry. That was itself the limit. In his lordship's opinion, unless something was found in the wording of the Act to prevent its application, it must apply. It had been urged that it could not apply because the previous subsection could not; but the words "so far as applicable" must be understood in sub-section 2 so that it should only refer back to sub-section 1, so far as applicable. The words "where a lessor is proceeding" might be read as referring to a state of things, and not to a period of time; they might mean when a lessor shall proceed, or they might refer to actions pending at the passing or commencement of the Act. But too much stress must not be put upon them, and sub-section 2 must be taken to apply to pending as well as future actions. As to the question whether the Court of Appeal could apply the Act, which had been passed after the pronouncing of the judgment appealed against, it must be borne in mind that every appeal was now a re-bearing, as appeals in chancery always were. It had often happened in chancery that an appeal was successful, though the judgment appealed from was quite right. The case might have been one upon the construction of a will, and the plaintiff's title might not have been good before the ViceChancellor, but afterwards a death or some other event might have happened which made the plaintiff's title plain, and the Lord Chancellor on appeal would have given relief at once, though the Vice-Chancellor's decision had been perfectly correct. But ord. 58, r. 5, made the case still clearer. It provided that, "the Court of Appeal shall have all the powers and duties as to amendment and otherwise of the court of first instance, .. and shall

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have power to give any judgment and make any order which ought to have been made, and to make such further or other order as the case may require." It was intended that the Court of Appeal should exercise this jurisdiction so as to make that order which ought to be made at the time when the case was before it. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the words of section 14 were sufficient to include the present case. It was clearly retrospective as regarded the rights of the parties; it was not going too far to hold that it was retrospective also as to procedure. It was not an unimportant circumstance that Lord St. Leonards' Act was repealed. His lordship was of opinion that section 14 applied to any case in which the lessor had not recovered actual possession of the property before the Act passed. And he could not see any difficulty in the construction of the rules relating to the Court of Appeal. BOWEN, L.J., concurred. And the court gave relief from the forfeiture on the terms of the defendant's effecting an insurance in accordance with the covenant and paying to the plaintiff the amount which he had paid for premiums, with interest at four per cent. The defendant must also pay the rent with interest at the same rate, and he must pay the costs of the action and of the appeal.-SOLICITORS, J. & R. Gole; Last & Son.

SOLICITOR-COSTS-TAXATION-ORDER OF COURSE-OMISSION TO STATE PRIOR ORDERS FOR TAXATION AND SUMMONS FOR DELIVERY OF PAPERSNON-STATEMENT OF PETITIONER'S ADDRESS.-In a case of In re Covert, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., an application was made to discharge an order of course for the delivery and taxation of a solicitor's bills of costs, and an order committing the solicitor for disobedience, on the ground that the petition for the order did not state that two orders for taxation and payment of costs in an action in which the solicitor had been employed for the petitioner, or that a summons was pending in that action for the delivery up to the petition of documents relating to that action, which were in the solicitor's possession, without prejudice to the solicitor's lien. It was urged that the non-statement of these facts in the petition amounted to a concealment of material facts, and made the ex parte order of course irregular. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.) overruled the objections. JESSEL, M.R., said that, even if an order was irregular, the court was not bound to discharge it. It might amend the order. This was shown by In re Ingle (21 Beav. 275), and this was in accordance with the view taken by the framers of order 59 of the Rules under the Judicature Act. The rules did not apply to these orders of course, but the principle did apply. But his lordship thought that the order was not irregular. The objection as to the non-statement of the orders in the action for the taxation of costs was answered by the decision of Lord Romilly in In re Fluker (20 Beav. 143). The client was entitled to an order compelling the solicitor to deliver his bill of costs, and to deliver up his papers on payment, and this could not be done under an order to tax the costs in an action. Under such an order the solicitor could not be compelled to carry in his bill for taxation. Therefore, the orders in the action, if stated, would have been no objection to the making of the order of course. As for the pending summons, it was for delivery up of the papers in the suit, subject to the solicitor's lien; the order of course was for the delivery up of all papers on taxation and payment. There was nothing in that objection. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the first point was decided in In re Fluker, and, as to the pending summons, no doubt, as was held in In re Gedye (15 Beav. 254), if an ex parte order for taxation was obtained by a suppression of material facts it ought to be discharged. But here the object of the summons was to obtain the papers without paying for them; the object of the petition of course was to obtain them on payment. If an order had been made on the summons it might have been proper to state it, but how the pendency of the summons could be material his lordship was at a loss to conceive.

Another objection taken was that the address of the petitioner was not stated in the petition of course, and it was said that this would make it impossible for the solicitor to obey the order for delivery of his bill or the papers to the petitioner. The petitioner was the owner of a large landed estate, and he was described as of that place, though he did not, in fact, reside there. The court overruled this objection too. JESSEL, M. R., said that the description might not be strictly accurate according to the practice, but there was no irregularity. A decree or an order on a petition would not have been irregular because the address of the plaintiff had not been properly stated in the bill or petition. The defendant or respondent would only have been entitled to security for costs. This applied equally o an order on a petition of course. The omission did not vitiate the order or prevent the solicitor from obeying it. The practice was to deliver the bill to the solicitor who had obtained the order of course, and, if it was so delivered, no application to commit the solicitor for disobedience to the order could be made. Indeed, if the solicitor did not know the petitioner's address, he could not deliver the bill to him personally. LINDLEY, L.J., said there was no sugges. tion of any trick, of any attempt to mislead, or any want of good faith. It was said that the solicitor would be embarrassed, because he would not be able to find the petitioner. But the order did not require the delivery to be made at an address given in the petition. If there was any irregularity it could not affect the validity of the order.-SOLICITORS, J. R. Covert; Bell, Brodrick,

& Co.

questior, the former distinctly swearing that the moneys were paid by way of
loan, while the son, though not quite so positively, said that they were gifts
to him. The books of both father and son were also in evidence. It was
urged on behalf of the son's trustee that, in the case of payments made by a
father on behalf of a son, there is a legal presumption that they are intended
by way of gift. The court (JESSEL, M. R., and LINDLEY and Bowen, L.JJ.)
held that the moneys had been advanced by the father by way of loan, and
admitted the proof. JESSEL, M.R., thought that the equitable doctrine that
there was a presumption that property purchased by a father in the name of
his son was intended as a gift had no application to the present case. At
law, in the absence of evidence, property so purchased would be the property
of the son.
When, however, one man advanced money to buy property in the
name of another, equity implied a trust in favour of the person who advanced
the money. But, in the case of a father, or a person who had assumed the
duty of a father, equity engrafted an exception on this implied trust. It
would not, from the mere fact that money was advanced by a father, assume
the existence of a trust for him, and so the child could, in equity, keep that
which, at law, would be his. But the present question was not of that nature.
The payment was made by the father, and at law, if you proved payment
and nothing more, there was no obligation on the payee to repay the money.
On the contrary, the payment was supposed to have been made in fulfilment
of a prior obligation, or in extinguishment of a pre-existing liability. The
law assumed that a man would not throw away his money or give it away
without any consideration. If nothing more than payment was proved, there
was no occasion to resort to any presumption arising out of the relation of
father and son. The onus was on the person who claimed repayment to show
that there was some contract rendering the payee liable to refund, and if that
was shown, he was liable to refund at law as well as in equity. So that the
only question was really one of evidence. And here the weight of evidence
was in favour of the father's story, that the money had been advanced by way
of loan. LINDLEY, L.J., sail that, there being evidence, there was no pre-
sumption at all, and the legal inference from the evidence was that the money
was advanced as a loan, and not as a gift.-SOLICITORS, J. B. Looker;
Torr & Co.

RIGHT OF APPEAL-ORDER on SpeciaAL CASE STATED BY ARBITRATORJUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 19-FINAL OR INTERLOCUTORY ORDER-In a case of Shubrook v. Tufnell, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., the question arose whether an order made by the Queen's Bench Division upon a special case stated by an arbitrator could be appealed from. At the trial, an order was made by Lord Coleridge, C.J., referring the whole question to arbitration. The arbitrator afterwards stated a special case for the opinion of the court, the case being signed by him and by the solicitors of the parties. The question stated for the opinion of the court was whether, upon the facts stated, there was any cause of action. If the court should be of opinion in the affirmative, then the case was to be referred back to the arbitrator; if the court should be of opinion in the negative, then judgment was to be entered up for the defendant, with his costs of suit. The Queen's Bench Division (Manisty and Watkin-Williams, JJ.) beld that the plaintiff had a cause of action, and ordered judgment on the special case to be entered for the plaintiff, and that the case should be referred back to the arbitrator. The defendant appealed, and it was objected, on behalf of the plaintiff, that this decision was not a "judgment or order" of the court within section 19 of the Judicature Act, 1873, but only an expression of the opinion of the court for the guidance of the arbitrator, and, therefore, not apppealable. The court (JESSEL, M.R.. and LINDLEY, L. J.) held that an appeal would lie. JESSEL, M. R., said that this view was in accordance with the ratio decidendi of the House of Lords in The Overseers of Walsall v. The London and North-Western Railway Com pany (27 W. R. 189, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 30), which was that the expression of opinion was a judicial act.

The question was also raised whether the order was a final or an interlocutory one, and whether, therefore, it ought to go into the final or the interlocutory list of appeals. The court held that it was a final order. JESSEL, M. R., said that it was clearly a final order. In one alternative the order on the special case would have finally disposed of the action. Collins v. The Vestry of Paddington (28 W. R. 588, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 368) was dist nguishable. The court did not there, as appeared by the Law Reports heal note, intend to decide that, in all cases, a decision of the court on a special case stated by an arbitrator for its opinion was an interlocutory order, but only that, under the special circumstances of that case, it was so.-SoLICITOR, Torr & Co.; Frederick Taylor.

APPEAL-STAY OF EXECUTION-COMMON LAW ACTION-SECURITY BY RESPONDENT-ORD. 58, R. 16.-In the case of Williams v. Mercier (noted ante, p. 479) an application was made to the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.), on the 21st inst., on behalf of the plaintiff for a stay of execution pending an appeal to the House of Lords. The action was an interpleader issue to determine the right to certain jewels of a wife which had been taken in execution by creditors under a judgment in respect of a debt contracted by her before her marriage. The husband (the plaintiff in the issue) claimed the jewels, which were presents to the wife on her marriage, by virtue of his marital right; the defendant, a milliner, alleged that they were separate property of the wife. The Court of Appeal held, upon the con LOAN-struction of the settlement, that the jewels were separate property of the wife, and, therefore, liable to be taken in execution by the defendant. There was no evidence of the insolvency or probable insolvency of the defendant. The court refused to grant a simple stay of execution. JESSEL, M.R., said that the principle on which execution was stayed pending an appeal was that there was danger of the appellant, if successful, losing the fruits of his appeal. In an ordinary common law action a stay of execution was never granted except under very special circumstances, such as the insolvency of the respondent.

FATHER AND SON-PAYMENT OF MONEY TO SON-GIFT OR PRESUMPTION.In a case of Ex parte Cooper, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose whther money, which had been paid by a father to, or on account of, his son, had been paid by way of gift or loan. Both the father and the son bad filed liquidation petitions, and the trustee of the father claimed to prove in the liquidation of the son for moneys which the father had paid on the son's account, on the ground that they were loans by Both the father and the son gave evidence on the

the father to the son.

If ever there was a case for adhering to this rule, the present was one. Execution would be stayed only on the terms of the amount of the judgment being paid to the defendant. But, the defendant being engaged in business, though there was no evidence or suggestion of her insolvency, it would be right in the exercise of the judicial discretion of the court, to order her to give security for the repayment of the money in case the appeal should be successful. following the decision in Merry v. Nickalls (21 W. R. 305, L. R. 8 Ch. 205). The costs of the action would be paid to the defendant's solicitor on his personal undertaking to return them in the event of the appeal being successful. The plaintiff must pay the costs of this application and of the security. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the rule laid down in Merry v. Nickalls was a very sensible one. It was not a hard and fast rule, but it was right in nine cases out of ten.-SOLICITORS, Lewis & Lewis; Pawle & Fearon.

METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACTS-18 & 19 VICT. c. 120, s. 10525 & 26 VICT. c. 102, s. 96-RATE FOR PAVING NEW STREET-COVENANT BY TENANT TO PAY RATES "IMPOSED ON DEMISED PREMISES "-PRACTICESPECIAL CASE-JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT-APPEAL.-In a case of Allum v. Dickinson, before the Court of Appeal on the 20th inst., a question arose as to the liability of the tenant of a house in a street within the metropolitan district to pay to his landlord the share of the expenses of paving the street apportioned by the vestry of the parish to the particular honse and paid by the landlord in pursuance of notice from the vestry clerk. The lease contained a covenant by the tenant that he would pay the yearly rent, "and also will pay the sewers and main drainage rates, tithe-rent charges, Board of Health, metropolitan, and other district rates and assessments whatsoever, whether parliamentary, parochial, or otherwise, which now are or which at any time during the said term shall be taxed, rated, charged, assessed, or imposed upon the demised premises or any part thereof, or upon or payable by the occupier or tenant in respect thereof (except the property or income tax)." The action was brought by the landlord to recover from the tenant the amount which he had thus paid. A special case was stated for the opinion of the court. A divisional court, consisting of Mathew and Cave, JJ., gave judgment for the defendant, upon the ground that the amount sued for was not a 66 66 sewers or main drainage rate," &c., or assessment parliamentary, &c., charged either upon the premises, or upon the tenant or occupier in respect thereof," within the terms of the lessee's covenant. The court said that the charge in question was one which was made once for all, and was clearly for works for the permanent improvement of the property, and, therefore, for the interest of the landlord, as distinguished from a rate made for temporary or current expenditure for the interest of the tenant or occupier. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY and BOWEN, L.JJ.) affirmed this decision. They said that the charge, being for the expenses of permanently improving the property, was naturally payable by the owner rather than by the occupier. This, however, was not in itself conclusive. But the covenant by the lessee to pay was for the payment of annual charges, which were taken into consideration in fixing the rest of the house, while this was a charge payable once for all, and not of yearly recurrence. Looking at the Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 96), it was quite plain that costs and expenses incurred under the Metropolis Local Management Act were not charged or imposed upon the premises, but were imposed upon the owner in respect of the premises. A remedy, no doubt, was given against the occupier for the recovery of the amount, but the amount 80 recovered from him was limited to the amount of rent for the time being due, and was to be deducted by him from the rent which he paid to the landlord. The decision was right upon both grounds.

A point of practice also arose. On the hearing of the special case the plaintiff did not appear, and, after argament, judgment was given for the defendant in the absence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not move in the divisional court to set aside the judgment on terme, but appealed. In the Court of Appeal the question was raised whether this was the right course. There did not appear to be any settled practice applicable, and it was stated that no instance of nonappearance on the hearing of a special case was known to have occurred before. The appeal was allowed to proceed, the respondent not objecting, but JESSEL, M.R., said that the case must not be taken as a precedent.SOLICITORS, W. F. Nokes; Billing & Kent.

BY

LEASE-PROPRIETARY CHAPEL-RESTRICTIVE COVENANT-SERVICE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CLERGyman-ClergYMAN DULY ORDAINED, BUT UNLICENSED AND INHIBITED.-In the case of The Foundling Hospital v. Garrett and others, before Chitty, J., on the 16th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendant, the Rev. C. G. C. Dunbar, a Church of England clergyman and colonial archdeacon, from officiating or performing Divine service in St. Andrew's Church or Chapel, Tavistock-place. It appeared that the chapel was held under a lease for ninety-nine years, granted by the Foundling Hospital in the year 1802, and containing a covenant on the part of the lessees that they should not, at any time during the term, permit any clergyman or person to officiate in the chapel, or perform public Divine service therein, but such as should be regular clergyman of the Church of England." Services and sermons had, in accordance with previous advertisements, been recently conducted and preached in the chapel by the defendant, Archdeacon Dunbar, although the Bishop of London had, in January, 1880, revoked a licence given by him to Archdeacon Dunbar in December, 1877, on his first becoming tenant of the chapel, and had also inhibited him from performing service in the diocese, and although no application had been made by Archdeacon Dunbar to the vicar of the parish in which the chapel was situated for leave to preach and perform public Divine service in the chapel, It was submitted by the plaintiffs that Archdeacon Dunbar could

not, after the bishop's revocation of his licence and inhibition, be said to be a regular clergyman entitled to officiate or perform public Divine service within the terms of the covenant, for the words in the covenant, "officiate" and "Divine service," had been decided by Lord Hardwicke, so far back as 1742, to refer, when used in connection with the duties of a clergyman, to the public performance of the service of the Established Church, in accordance with the laws regulating it (Trebec v. Keith, 2 Atk. 498). Not only was it within the absolute discretion of a bishop tɔ at any time revoke, even without assigning any reason, a licence given to a clergyman to officiate in a proprietary chapel (Hodgson v. Dillon, 2 Curt. 388), but the licence itself was useless without the consent of the vicar. It was contended, on behalf of Archdeacon Dunbar, that the true meaning of the words in the covenant, "regular clergyman," was "clergyman duly ordained,” and the validity of Archdeacon Dunbar's ordination not being in dispute, the covenant was satisfied, and that, so far as the plaintiffs, who were merely lessors, were concerned, no question arose. CHITTY, J., said that the only question for his decision was one of construction; all that was necessary to be thought of was, what was the meaning of the parties to the lease? He was not aware that the term "regular" had any technical sense in the ecclesiastical law, unless when used in connection with priests living in accordance with a monas. tic rule in contrast with those who, being parochial clergy, or living in the world, were called secular. Of course, this was not the meaning of the term here. Looking at the covenant as a whole, he was of opinion that the term "regular" was used as a qualification of the previous word " person." As he be duly ordained and also licensed by the bishop before he was at understood the law to be, a clergyman of the Church of England must liberty to perform Divine service or preach. This was the ecclesiastical law, inhibited, and there was, therefore, in his case an absence of the qualifications Archdeacon Dunbar was not licensed, and had been legally requisite. The circumstance, therefore, of ordination was not enough by itself to satisfy the words of the covenant. His lordship was, therefore, of opinion that the injunction sought for must be granted with costs. The injunction was, upon the application of Archdeacon Dunbar's counsel, and the plaintiffs raising no objection, ordered to be suspended for a month, with a view of enabling the defendant to appeal.-SOLICITORS, Simpson, Hammond, Richards, & Simpson; A. D. Smith & Wood; Hume, Bird, & Eldridge.

and the law of the land.

PETITION BY TENANT FOR LIFE FOR RE-INVESTMENT-SERVICE OF REMAINDERMEN-LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845, ss. 69, 70.-In a case of In re Chambers, before Chitty, J., on the 17th inst., a petition was presented by the tenant for life of real estates settled by the will of a deceased testator for re-investment in real estate of £500 Consols, part of a sum of £510 Consols, representing the purchase-money paid into court by a railway company in respect of real estate comprised in the will taken by the company in pursuance of the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. It was objected that those entitled in remainder after the petitioner's death had not been served with the petition, and the rule was stated to be that service on the remaindermen would only be dispensed with where the petition was for interim investment. It was stated that the intended investment consisted of a messuage and land of the estimated annual value of £36, and it was asked that the residue of the fund in court should be paid to the petitioner. CHITTY, J., after referring to Ex parte Staples (1 D. M. & G. 294), said that remainder. men, in his opinion, were not necessarily respondents in petitions of this kind and in the present instance he would not order them to be served, but if, when the order was being drawn up, the registrar should raise any objection, the matter must be mentioned to the court again. His lordship also, taking into consideration the small amount of the residue to be left uninvested, made an order for its payment to the petitioner upon his giving an undertaking to expend it for the benefit of all parties interested.-SOLICITORS, Ullithorne, Currey, & Villiers; Capel A. Curwood.

PETITION-VESTING ORDER-TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, ss. 2, 24.-In the case of In re Hyatt's Trusts, before Chitty, J., on the 19th inst., a petition was presented under the Trustee Act, 1850, s. 24, for an order vesting a sum of into the names of two trustees who refused to act and disclaimed; whereupon consols, in new trustees. It appeared that the consols had been transferred the beneficiaries duly appointed new trustees, into whose names they requested the original trustees to transfer the consols. Upon their refusal the present petition was presented and an order was made as prayed; but the Bank of England declined to act upon the order, on the ground that the 24th section of the Act, which enacts that a vesting order, may be made where "any one of the trustees of stock refuses to transfer it, did not apply to the case of two or more trustees refusing. The petition being again put in the paper, it was submitted by the petitioner that the interpretation clause of the Act (section 2) provided that, unless the contrary should appear from the context, every word importing the singular number should extend to several persons or things, and that the words of the 24th section of the Act were therefore enlarged by the interpretation clause. CHITTY, J., held that the court had jurisdiction to make the order.-SOLICITORS, S. Johnson; Freshfields & Williams.

19

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT-AGREEMENT TO SHOW GOOD MARKETABLE TITLE-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS -NOTICE.-ln a case of Cato v. Thompson, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., the question arose whether a purchaser of land was entitled to repudiate his contract under the following circumstances. The contract was for the sale of some freehold houses, and the vendor thereby agreed to make a good marketable title to the property. He, in fact, held the property subject to a restrictive covenant, which prevented him from using the houses as shops, and the purchaser had notice of this covenant. chaser refused to complete the purchase, on the ground that this covenant

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could not be released, and he brought an action for the return of his deposit. The vendor counter-claimed for specific performance of the contract. Lopes, J., gave judgment in the plaintiff's favour, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY and BOWEN, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M. R., said that it was not a case for compelling the purchaser to perform the covenant with compensation. He thought that the cases as to compensation ought not to be extended; indeed some of them had almost gone the length of making a new contract for the parties. The present case was also distinguishable from such cases as Farebrother v. Gibson (1 D & J. 602) and Leyland v. Illingworth (2 D. F. & J. 248), the principle of which was that, where there was a statement in a contract which was capable of two meanings, and it would naturally be understood by a purchaser in one of them, he would be entitled to be relieved from his contract if the statement was true only in the sense in which he would not naturally have understood it, provided that he had no notice; but he would not be entitled to be relieved if he had notice of the sense in which the statement was made. But, in the present case, the contract was an express one to show a good marketable title, and it was possible, though not very probable, that the restrictive covenant might be released. It was not like an open contract, in which case there was a presumption of law that a marketable title was to be shown, but the presumption might be rebutted by evidence that the purchaser knew of some defect in the vendor's title. An express contract could not be contradicted in that way. LINDLEY, L.J., thought that evidence that the purchaser knew of the covenant was not admissible to contradict the written contract. BOWEN, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, W. Easton; A. H. Crowther.

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the colonial Legislature and included in the annual appropriation ordinance
of the colony. The pensioner may draw his pension either from the colonial
Treasurer in the colony or from the Crown agents of the colony in England.
The trustee, on the hearing of the application, offered to consent to the bank.
rupt's receiving for his maintenance £350 a year out of the pension, and on
the appeal be still adhered to this offer. It was contended on behalf of the
bankrupt that, having regard to the fact that no action could be brought to
recover the pension, and that it was the subject of an annual vote of the
colonial Legislature, it was not "property" within the meaning of the Act,
and did not vest in the trustee. It was rather a payment in the nature of
bounty. Property' must be something which there was a legal or equit
uble right to recover, or something which was expressly declared by statute
to be property. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and LINDLEY and
BOWEN, L.JJ.) in substance affirmed the registrar's order. JESSEL, M.R.,
said that on the bankrupt's retirement from his office he received a super-
annuation allowance for his past services. What did that mean? When a
man was appointed to such an office he was told that he would receive such a
salary and such a pension when he retired, and he accepted the office on those
terms. Possibly the exact amount of the pension might not be named. But
he accepted the office partly in consideration of the salary and partly in con-
sideration of the pension. The appellant having become a bankrupt, the
only question was whether the creditors of his business were entitled to take
the pension which he had so hardly earned to pay their debts. It was a case
for great sympathy, and if the trustee had come to the court and said, "I
will have all that pension, whether you like it or not," the court would have
known how to deal with it. But the trustee had very properly offered the
bankrupt £350 a year for his maintenance. That was an offer which ought
to be accepted, assuming that the appellant was not right in his contention
that the trustee took no interest in the pension. It was argued, in the first
place, that the pension was not " property." His lordship thought it was.
enforceable in the courts of this country or of the colony. His lordship
thought that was so. But that did not make the pension not property.
There were many cases of what would be called property arising out of a
contract which no judicial tribunal could enforce. Take the case of the
bonds of a foreign Government. There was a contract by the foreign
Government to pay a sum of money, but it was not enforceable in the courts
of this country, and, probably, not in any court. Still no one would say
that a foreign bond was not property. If a man died possessing French or
Italian bonds, no one would say he had died without property. Such bonds
were not choses in action in the ordinary sense, and that could not be the
definition of "property." The mere fact that you could not sue for the
thing did not make it the less property. His lordship would not attempt to
define "property" exactly; that would be too dangerous; but, no doubt,
foreign bonds, in common language and in lawyer's language, were
66 prop.
erty." It could not be doubted that a man who had a pension of £10,000
from the British Government would have "property." A pension for past
services was certainly assignable in equity, if not at law. Then it was said
that the pension could not be got till it was voted by the colonial Legislature.
That was no answer. The vote was the mere form or mode of securing the
payment. It was not as if the appellant had been told he should have a
pension just as it was or was not voted by the Legislature. In that case he
would not have accepted the office. The vote was only the mode of ascer
taining what the colony had to pay. The same thing happened in the case
of salaries and pensions in this country; they could not be paid till they had
been voted by the House of Commons; but still no one would say that they
were not property. No doubt some pensions and salaries were not assignable,
on the ground of public policy, such as the half-pay of officers in the Army
and Navy, or their salaries for actual services, and others, like the retiring
allowance of a beneficed clergyman, which were made not assignable by Act
of Parliament. But his lordship thought that all these things were property.
His view of the Bankruptcy Act was this: section 15 vested all the bank-
rupt's property in the trustee, subject to the special exceptions made by sub-
sequent sections. There was an exception made by section 23 of property
which the trustee was empowered to disclaim. The produce of executions
dealt with by section 87 would vest in the trustee by virtue of section 15, but
for the provisions of section 87. The benefice of a beneficed clergyman was
by our law not alienable, but by section 15 all the property of the clergyman in
the profits of the benefice would have vested in the trustee in his bankruptcy but
for section 88, and section 15 must be read, so far as a beneficed clergyman was
concerned, subject to, and as qualified by, section 88. Again, section 15 was
controlled by section 89 with regard to the persons mentioned in it. A
person occupying such a position was not necessarily to be left to starve, how
ever improvident he might have been, but a discretion was given to the court.
Why should not the same principle apply to section 90 ? The appellant's
pension was not a "salary," but it was "income." That was as large a
word as you could have. It was not the less income because it was voted
every year. The court had, by section 90, power to make such order as it
should think just. That meant that the income vested in the trustee under
section 15, subject to the power of the court to set aside a part of it for the
bankrupt. The specific provision of section 90 controlled to that extent
section 15.
order-viz., a declaration that the pension vested in him, and then an order
His lordship thought that the trustee had applied for the right
as to the proportion which should be paid to him. It was not necessary to
consider what the proportion should be, the trustee having made a fair and
liberal offer. LINDLEY, L. J., said that the appellant's contention was that
his pension was not in any way available for his creditors. It was suggested
that the pension was not within section 90, because it was payable at the will
of the colonial Legislature. But all money to which the bankrupt might
become entitled during the continuance of the bankruptcy was within section
15. The property vested in the trustee absolutely by sections 15 and 17, but
15. Sections 87 to 95 introduced modifications and qualifications of section
subject to the modifications and qualifications contained in that group of

"PROPERTY" OF BANKRUPT-VESTING IN TRUSTEE "INCOME" OF BANKRUPT-PENSION OF RETIRED CIVIL SERVANT OF CROWN-RETIRED JUDGE OF CROWN COLONY-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 4, 15, 17, 90.-The contract under which the appellant accepted the office might not be In a case of Ex parte Huggins, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose what is the extent of the " property " of a bankrupt, which, by section 15 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, is divisible among creditors, and by section 17, vests in the trustee in the bankruptcy on his appointment; the question being whether the retiring pension of an ex-Chief Justice of a Crown colony, granted to him on his retirement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and voted annually by the Legislature of the colony, vested in the trustee in his subsequent bankruptcy. Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the term "property," if not inconsistent with the context, "shall mean and include money, goods, things in action, land, and every description of property, whether real or personal; also, obligations, easements, and every description of estate, interest, and profit, present or future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incident to property as above defined." Section 15 provides that "the property of the bankrupt divisible amongst his creditors, and in this Act referred to as the property of the bankrupt, shall comprise (inter alia) all such property as may belong to or be vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, or may be acquired by, or devolve on, him during its continuance." By section 17, the property of the bankrupt vests in the trustee on his appointment. Sections 87-95 are headed, "As to property devolving on the trustee." Section 87 makes special provisions as to executions for 'judgment debts above £50 levied on the goods of a trader. Section 88 provides that "where the bankrupt is a beneficed clergyman, the trustee may apply for a sequestration of the profits of the benefice, but the sequestrator shall allow out of the profits of the benefice to the bankrupt, while he performs the duties of the parish or place, such an annual sum as the bishop directs. Section 89 provides that "where a bankrupt is or has been an officer of the army or navy, or an officer or clerk or otherwise employed or engaged in the Civil Service of the Crown, or is in the enjoyment of any pension or compensation granted by the Treasury, the trustee during the bankruptcy, and the registrar after the close of the bank. ruptcy, shall receive, for distribution amongst the creditors, so much of the bankrupt's pay, half-pay, salary, emolument, or pension as the court, upon the application of the trustee, thinks just and reasonable, to be paid in such manner and at such times as the court, with the consent in writing of the chief officer of the department under which the pay, half-pay, salary, emolument, pension, or compensation is enjoyed, directs." Section 90 provides that "where a bankrupt is in the receipt of a salary or income other than as aforesaid, the court, upon the application of the trustee, shall from time to time make such order as it thinks just for the payment of such salary or income, or of any part thereof, to the trustee during the bankruptcy, and to the registrar (if necessary) after the close of the bankruptcy, to be applied by him in such manner as the court may direct." The bankrupt in the present case had been for some years Chief Justice of a Crown colony. He retired from his office in the year 1879, and thereupon a pension of 875 per annum was granted to him by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He returned to this country, and afterwards entered into partnership in a business. This business proved unsuccessful, and in the result he was adjudicated a bankrupt. The trustee applied to the Court of Bankruptcy for an order declaring that the bankrupt's pension vested in the trustee as forming part of the bankrupt's property, or, in the alternative, for an order for payment of part of the pension to the trustee for the benefit of the bankrupt's creditors, and that the trustee should receive from the Treasury or the Crown agents for the colony, or any person having the money in his hands, the quarterly instalments of the pension, or such part thereof as to the court should seem just and reasonable. The bank ruptcy had not been closed, nor had the bankrupt obtained an order of discharge. The registrar made an order giving the trustee the right to receive the whole of the pension, and restraining the bankrupt from receiving it. The evidence showed that in a Crown colony, retiring pensions of servants of the Crown, as in the present case, not being regulated by any local statute, are awarded by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and are payable out of the revenue of the colony. The pensions so awarded are placed the annual estimates of the colony, and are voted annually by

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sections. This pension was surely "income" of the bankrupt in every sense of the word. It was not like a purely arbitrary allowance which could be stopped at any moment at the will of the person who paid it. In his lordship's opinion it was "income" within the true meaning of section 90. The only fault of the registrar's order was that its language was a little too general. Literally construed it meant that the trustee was entitled to take the whole pension without any qualification. But that would be put right by inserting a declaration that the pension vested in the trustee subject to the provisions of section 90. BOWEN, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Pattison, Wigg, & Co.; Scott & Barham.

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ADMINISTRATION ACTION EXECUTOR - ADDING WILFUL DEFAULT ACCOUNTS AND INQUIRIES AFter Judgment-ORD. 33.—In a case of Luke v. Tonkin, before Fry, J., on the 17th inst., the question arose whether, after an ordinary administration judgment had been given, the plaintiff could, on further consideration, obtain a direction for the taking of further accounts and the making of further inquiries on the footing of wilful default by the execu tor. The statement of claim alleged wilful default, but at the trial no relief was asked for on that footing, and only the ordinary administration judgment was pronounced. But the action was not dismissed so far as it sought relief on the ground of wilful default. In taking the accounts in chambers under the judgment the plaintiff sought to surcharge the executor on the footing of wilful default, but the chief clerk held that, under the judgment as it stood, he had no power to entertain the question of wilful default. On the bearing on further consideration the plaintiff asked to have accounts and inquiries on the footing of wilful default directed, and he proved some instances of wilful default. It was objected by the defendant that the question of wilful default could not be raised after judgment in the ordinary form had been given. FRY, J., held that he had power to direct the additional accounts and inquiries. He said that he adhered to the opinion which he had expressed in Barber v. Mackrell (27 W. R. 794, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 534), that the effect of what was said by Jessel, M.R., in Job v. Job (26 W. R. 206, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 562), as subsequently explained by him in Mayer v. Murray (26 W. R. 690, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 424), was that, if wilful default was alleged in an administration action, relief on that footing could be given at any stage of the proceedings, even after judgment, if wilful default was proved. His lordship considered himself bound by this expression of opinion. He thought it was very important that, when a certain line of procedure had been laid down by one judge, other judges should follow it. There was no surprise on the defendant, for notice had been given to him that the question would be raised on the hearing on further consideration. His lordship accordingly added the accounts and inquiries which were asked for.-SOLICITORS, Coode, Kingdon, & Cotton; Dangerfield & Blythe.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-JUDICIAL SEPARATIONORDER FOR ALIMONY EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE-MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, 1878 (41 & 42 VICT. c. 19), s. 4.-In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on the 20th inst., the case of Howarth v. Smith (otherwise Howarth) came before the court by way of an appeal against an order of two justices of Cheshire, made under section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Aor, 1878. The appellant had been summoned for an aggravated assault upon his wife. On the hearing of the summons he denied that he had ever been married to the complainant, who asserted that the marriage bad been celebrated at Manchester Cathedral on the 15th of February, 1869. No certificate of the marriage was produced, but the magistrates convicted the appellant, and also made an order for a judicial separation under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878, and ordered him to pay to the complainant a sum of fifteen shillings per week by way of permanent alimony. The appellant had since undergone a term of imprisonment for default in paying this sum, and his counsel now read an affidavit, which stated that a search had been made in the marriage registers at Manchester Cathedral for a period of four years (including the month of February, 1869), and that no entry of a marriage between the parties had been found. HANNEN, P., said that, if the facts stated by the appellant's counsel were correct, the order of the justices must be set aside; and he granted a rule nisi, returnable on Tuesday next, calling upon the respondent to show cause why the order should not be quashed.-SOLICITOR, M. Abrahams.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS. (Before Mr. REGistrar Murray, acting as Chief Judge.) June 7.-Ex parte Andrews and another, Re Cowland. Where the sheriff has seized under an elegit issued at the suit of A., and remains in possession of the defendant's goods under that writ, the mere delivery of a fi. fa. for the sum of £30, with costs of execution and sheriff's fees, by B., before any act of bankruptcy committed by the defendant, will be sufficient to constitute B. a secured creditor as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the defendant.

This was an application on behalf of Joseph Andrews and John Folland Lovering, the trustees under the liquidation of J. W. Cowland, for an order that the injunction granted by the court on the 16th of May, restraining Messrs. Walter Cosser & Co. from taking any further proceedings in the action brought by them against the debtor, or upon the judgment recovered or execution issued therein, might be continued until the further order of the court.

On the 14th of March, 1882, Messrs. Cosser & Co. brought an action against the debtor, J. W. Cowland, to recover the sum of £46 128. in respect of a bill of exchange, dated September 1, 1881, drawn by Cosser & Co. upon, and accepted by, the debtor.

Messrs. Cosser & Co. subsequently agreed to give the debtor time for pay. ment, but the debtor failing to carry out his arrangement, Messrs. Cosser & Co., on the 5th of April, 1882, signed judgment against him, and issued execution for the sum of £30 78. 7d., with costs of execution, and sheriff's fees. The writ of fi. fa. was at once lodged with Messrs. Nathan, the sheriff's officers, and a warrant was obtained by them from the sheriff on the same day, the 5th of April, but possession of the debtor's goods was not formally taken under this warrant until about half-past one o'clock on the following day, the 6th of April, 1882.

It appeared, however, that some days previously Messrs. Nathan had seized the debtors' goods under a writ of elegit issued at the instance of Messrs. Braby & Co., and that, at the time Messrs. Cosser's fi. fa. was lodged with them, on the 5th of April, they were so in possession on behalf of Braby & Co. On the 6th of April, 1882, at forty-five minutes past twelve o'clock, as appeared by the debtor's affidavit, the debtor filed his petition for liquidation, about one hour previously to possession being formally taken under Messrs. Cosser's fi. fa.

On the 12th of April the debtor obtained an order restraining Messrs. Cosser from taking any further proceedings under their execution until after the 19th of April, and the injunction was subsequently continued until after the first meeting of creditors. At that meeting trustees were appointed, by whom notice of the present application was given. Warmington, for the trustee.

in

Nicholl, for Messrs. Cosser & Co.

The arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment of the court. Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY.-Ever since the decision of the Court of Appeal the case of Ex parte Williams, Re Davies (20 W. R. 430, L. R. 7 Ch. 314), the law is well settled that in an ordinary case, as between an execution creditor and a trustee in bankruptcy, the mere delivery of the writ to the sheriff without seizure, though, by the Statute of Frauds, it binds the goods, does not make the execution creditor a creditor holding security." "That case decided that, in order to constitute him a secured creditor, seizure by the sheriff prior to the act of bankruptcy to which the title of the trustee relates is requisite, a mere right to seize not being sufficient. The sheriff has no property in the goods until seizure, but after he has seized he has, to use the words of Lord Justice Mellish, "acquired a qualified property in the goods like that of a factor who is under advances, ani from whom the goods may be claimed back on payment of those advances." The question which the court has now to decide is whether, where the sheriff has seized, not under the writ issued at the suit of the particular execution creditor (B.), but under a prior writ issued at the suit of A., and the sheriff remains in possession under that seizure, the mere delivery of the writ to the sheriff by B. under such circumstances, before any act of bankruptcy, will be sufficient to constitute B. a secured creditor as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the defendant? Now, before referring how does the law seem to stand in regard to the duty and position of to the only authority which has been relied on by the trustee in this case, the sheriff where several writs are delivered to him against the same ed., p. 578, and the case of Jones v. Atherton, referred to in the note]. In person? [His Honour then cited, upon this point, Archbold's Practice, 13th the case of Bachurst v. Clinkard (in Shower's Reports, referred to by Best arguendo), Brown being indebted on a judgment, a fi. fa. was issued against him, and thereon the goods were all seized and in the sheriff's custody, and it was argued that consequently they were not liable to the plaintiff's execution. Chief Justice Holt held that being once seized, and in the custody of the law, they could not be seized again by the same or any other sheriff. Then there is a case of Chambers v. Coleman (9 Dowling), which, with other cases, go to show that the seizure by the sheriff under one writ enures to the benefit of all the execution creditors under subsequeat writs, according to the priority in which they are delivered, without any farther action on the part of the sheriff. But the trustee urges that some such action is necessary to perfect the title of the execution creditors against him, and his counsel relies on some observations of Lord Justice Mellish in Ex parte Villars, Re Rogers (22 W. R. 397, 603, L. R. 9 Ch. 432). [His Honour read them.] Now to adduce these observations as an authority in favour of the trustee's contention in this case seems to me to be quite unreasonable. They amount to nothing more than a short statement of some of the facts of that case, and his lordship's short comment on those facts. But to contend that from those observations there may be extracted an expression of opinion, much less a decision that there could be no seizure under the second writ until notice of it had been given to the officer in possession, and a copy served, seems to me to be out of the question. I certainly do not regard the case as any authority against the right of the execution creditor, and I am of opinion that upon the delivery of the writ by the execution creditor to the sheriff then being in posse sion of the goods, the creditor acquired, through the sheriff, a lien on The application must, therefore, be refused, with costs. the goods within the meaning of section 16, overriding the title of the trustee.

Solicitors for the execution creditor, Bolton & Co.
Solicitors for the trustee, Seagrove & Co.

SOLICITORS' CASES.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. (Before DENMAN, J., and POLLOCK, B.)

June 8.-Re Joel Emmanuel & Co.*

Joel Emmanuel & Co., a firm of solicitors, had delivered a bill of costs to their clients Isaac, Druiff, & Co., a business firm, for charges incurred in various matters, among others, for their costs and charges in a number of

Reported by M, W. BROWNE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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