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they have considered the representations contained in the appeal from a ffect the law relating to re-entry or forfeiture, or relief in case of non-payment the justices of the county of Leicester to which you refer. The Board of rent. (9) This section applies to leases made either before or after the had, prior to its receipt, communicated with the auditor on the subject commencement of this Act, and shall have effect, notwithstanding any to which it relates, and they direct me to forward herewith, for the stipulation to the contrary." The Act was passed on the 22nd of information of the justices, an extract from the auditor's reply.

August, 1881. The action was brought by a lessor against his With regard to the view expressed in the justices' appeal, that the lesson to enforce a forfeituro of the lease, on the ground of breach of a effect of the Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act, 1878, is to £14,000. The defendant, ander the Act 22 & 23 Viot. o. 35, set op the

condition to keep the premises insured from logs by fire for the som of place the ultimate responsibility for the due maintenance of highways defence that there were two policies of insuranoe, each for £7,500, and that and main roads on the county authority, the Board must point out that he had arranged with the insurance companies that the policies should not section 13 of that Act merely requires the county authority to repay half lapse by reason of the non-payment of the premiums due on the 25th of the cost of the maintenance of the main roads, if they are maintained March, 1880, and that on the 14th of May, while the arrangement was, as to the satisfaction of the county surveyor, or of such other person as the he believed, in full force, he effeoted new ingrances upon the property for county authority may appoint; but it does not impose any responsibility the foll amount, and up to and ipolusive of the 24th of June, 1880, and duly on the authority with respect to the proper maintenance of the roads. paid the premiams on these new iogurances ; but that before the 14th of It is true that section 10 empowers the county authority to enforce the May he could not (baving been abroad ap to the end of April) procure duty of highway authorities in regard to repairs, but this only applies sufficient funds to pay the premiums on the old policies or to effeot now where specific complaint is made of the default.

ipsurances. He did not deny the non-payment of the Maroh premiums nor The Board admit that some general regulations might usefully be laid that there had been an interval of time between the lapsing of the old down for the guidance of highway authorities in determining what should policies, if they did lapse, and the 14th of May (when the new policies were be done to obtain a certificate that the main roads had been properly have lapsed, have been left uninsored ; and it was not denied that this would

effected), daring whioh the premises world, assuming the old policies to maintained. Any such regulations, however, could not require anything have been a breach of the condition as to keep the premises ingared at all to be done which the highway authorities could not legally do apart

from times," bat for the alleged arrangement with the companies that the them, and it appears that the auditor contends that the highway policies should not lapse by reason of the non-payment of the March authorities are not empowered to defray the cost of painting milestones premiums. The action was tried before Lord Coleridge, C.J., and he marking the distances on disturnpiked roads, which was one of the on the 4th of Jaly, 1881, gave judgment opon further consideration in things prescribed by the rules issued by the county authority in favour of the plaintiff. His lordship, however, stayed execution in 1879. The Board will not, at this moment, express any opinion as to order to allow the defendant to appeal. The question was raised whether the auditor is right or wrong in this contention. The question whether section 14 applied to a forfeitore in respect of which an has now come before them on an appeal from one of the disallowances action had been brought and judgment given before the passing of made by Mr. Chamberlin, and it will be incumbent upon them to decide the Act. And the farther question was raised whether the Court of Appeal the point in dealing with this appeal, but they may state that, assuming could give any other judgment than that which the court below ought Mr. Chamberlin's view to be correct, it was clearly his duty to disallow to have given at the time when it did give judgment. The Court of the expenditure.

Appeal (Jessel, M. R., and LINDLEY and Bowen, L.JJ.) held that section 14 With regard to the removal of obstructions caused by snow, there can applied to the case, and also that the Court of Appeal had power to give be no doubt that highway authorities are empowered to incur a reasonable the judgment which the court below ought to have given if the action had expense for this purpose, and Mr. Chamberlin states that he has not been tried at the date of the hearing of the appeal. Jess EL, M.R., said that disallowed any such expenditure. It would seem, too, that he did not Act itself. The rule of construction was well settled that the court would not

the question whether the Act was retrospective must be determined from the strike out the item in the claims on the county authority in respect of interpret an Act 80 as to alter existing rights unless it found that the Legis. main roads ; but that he appended a note to them, drawing the attention lature intended that to be done. Bat when it was plain that there was such an of the county authority to the question whether the removal of obstruc- intention, the Act must be applied accordingly. The Act was passed to give lessees tion caused by snow could be deemed to be repairs within the meaning a right to relief from forfeiture which they did not possess before. Sub-section 9 of section 13 of the Act of 1878.

of section 14 clearly enacted that the section should apply to leases made either Section 18 of the Act makes it the duty of the district auditor to before or after the commencement of the Act; and, therefore, sub-section 1 audit the claims, and if he thought that any items inserted in them were deprived landlords of a right which they had before the passing of the Act. It not properly included, he would have been justified in striking them out. was plain beyond question that the section was intended to be retrospective as to At the same time, the county authority are not bound by the auditor's the main point with regard to forfeiture. The question was whether it applied to decision in this matter, and if they consider that half the cost of a pending action. Bat, first, did it apply to a breach beföre the passing of removing snow from main roads ought to be repaid by them, they extraordinary if breaches in future were to be relieved against

, but breaches

the Act ? Was there any reason against its so applying? It would be would not be precluded from making the repayment, even although already committed should be left. By sub-section 7 of seotion 14 the enactment the auditor had disallowed the items in the claim. The Board believe, relating to relief from forfeiture for non-insurance contained in section 4 of the however, that in some other cases county authorities have declined to Act, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, was repealed, and section 71 only rerecognize the cost of removing snow as part of the expense of repairing tained the rights of lessee to the benefit of that Act 80 the main roads for the purpose of obtaining repayment.--I am, Sir, your far as regarded a pending action. If the court were to say that the obedient servant,

Hugh Owen, Assistant Secretary. Conveyancing Act did not apply to breaches committed before it—the Act W. N. Reeve, Esq., Clerk of the Peace for the County of Leicester.] being intended for the benefit of lessees—those lessees who had committed

breaches against which there could have been relief before the Act would now be left without relief. Then, did the Act apply to an action brought before it was passed ? Why should the bringing of an action make any difference,

the object being to give relief against forfeiture ? Sub-section 2 of section 14 CASES OF THE WEEK.

only applied before re-entry. The case was different from that of relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent, which was excepted by sub-sec

tion 8, because it was fully provided for by the Common Law Procedure Act, LESSOR AND LESSEE—RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE-BREACH or Covenant which limited the tenant by giving him six months after execution. No such TO INSURE — CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY Act, 1881, s. 14 — limit had been fixed in the case provided for by the Conveyancing Act, RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT_ACTION PENDING AT Date of PassiNG OF Act – because, by sub-section 2, the tenant must come for relief before actual POWER OF COURT OF APPEAL-ORD. 58, RR. 2, 5.-In a case of Quilter F. re-entry. That was itself the limit. In his lordship's opinion, unless someMapleson, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., an important question thing was found in the wording of the Act to prevent its application, it must arose as to the retrospective effect of section 14 of the Conveyancing and Law apply. It had been urged that it could not apply because the previous subof Property Act, 1881, which provides (inter alia) that, " (1) A right of re- section could not; but the words “so far as applicable" must be understood entry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation of the lease, for å breach of in sub-section 2 so that it should only refer back to sub-section 1, so far as any covenant or condition in the lease, sball not be enforceable, by action or applicable. The words "where a lessor is proceeding” might be read as otherwise, unless and until the lessor serves on the lessee a notice specifying referring to a state of things, and not to a period of time; they might mean the particular breach complained of, and, if the breach is capable of remedy, when a lessor sball proceed, or they might refer to actions pending at the requiring the lessee to remedy the breach, and, in any case, requiring the passing or commencement of the Act. But too much stress must not be pat lessee to make compensation in money for the breach, and the lessee fails, upon them, and sub-section 2 must be taken to apply to pending as well as within a reasonable time thereafter, to remedy the breacb, if it is capable of future actions. As to the question whether the Court of Appeal could apply remedy, and to make reasonable compensation in money, to the satisfaction the Aot, which had been passed after the pronouncing of the judgment of the lessor, for the breach. (2) Where a lessor is proceeding, by action or appealed against, it must bò borne in mind that every appeal was now. a otherwise, to enforce such a right of re-entry or forfeiture, the lessee may, in re-bearing, as appeals in chancery always were. It had often happened in the lessor's action, if any, or in any action brought by himself, apply to the chancery that an appeal was successful, though the judgment appealed from court for relief ; and the court may grant or refuse relief, as the court, baving was quite right. The case might have been one upon the construction of a regard to the proceedings and conduct of the parties under the foregoing pro will, and the plaintiff's title might not have been good before the Vicevisions of this section, and to all the other circumstances, thinks fit; and in Chancellor, but afterwards a death or some other event might have happened case of relief may grant it on such terms, if any, as to costs, expenses, which made the plaintiff's title plain, and the Lord Chancellor on appeal damages, compensation, penalty, or otherwise, includiog the granting of an would have given relief at once, though the Vice-Chancellor's decision had injunction to restrain any like breach in the future, as the court, in the cir. been perfectly correct. But ord. 58, r. 5, made the case still clearer. It procumstances of each case, thinks fit.” (7) repeals (inter alia) seotions 4-9 of vided that, the Court of Appeal shall bave all the powers and duties as to Lord St. Leonards' Act (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35.) “(8) This section shall not amendment and otherwise of the court of first instance, .. and shall




have power to give any judgment and make any order which ought to hevo questior, the former distinctly swearing that the moneys were paid by way of been made, and to make such farther or other order as the case may require.” loan, while the son, though not quite so positively, said that they were gifs It was intended that the Court of Appeal should exercise this jurisdiction so as to bim. The books of both father and son were also in evidence. It was to make that order which ought to be made at the time when the cose was urged on behalf of the son's trustee that, in the case of payments made by a before it. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the words of section 14 were sufficient to father on behalf of a son, there is a legal presumption that ihey are intended include the present case. 'It was clearly retrospective as regarded the rights by way of gift. The court (Jessel, M. R., and LINDLEY and Bowen, L.JJ.) of the parties ; it was not going too far to hold that it was retrospective also as beld that the moneys had been advanced by the father by way of loan, and to procedure. It was not an unimportant circumstance that Lord St. Leonards' admitted the proof. JESSBL, M.R., thought that the equitable doctrine that Act was repealed. His lordship was of opinion that section 14 applied to any there was a presumption that property purchased by a father in the name of case in which the lessor had not recovered actual possession of the property bis son was intended as a gift had no application to the present case. At before the Act passed. And he could not see any difficulty in the construc- law, in the absence of evidence, property so purchased would be the property tion of the rules relating to the Court of Appeal. Bowen, L.J., concurred. of the son. When, however, one man advanced money to bny property in the And the court gave relief from the forfeiture on the terms of the defendant's name of another, equity implied a trust in favour of the person who advanced effecting an insurance in accordance with the covenant and paying to the the money; But, in the case of a father, or a person who had assumed the plaintiff the amount which he had paid for premiums, with interest at four duty of a father, equity engrafted an exception on this implied trust. It per cent. The defendant must also pay the rent with interest at the same would pot, from the mere fact that money was advanced by a father, assume rate, and he must pay the costs of the action and of the appeal.-SOLICITORS, the existence of a trust for him, and so the child could, in equity, keep that J. & R. Gole ; Last & Son.

which, at law, would be his. But the present question was not of that nature,

The payment was made by the father, and at law, if you proved 4 payment SOLICITOR-Costs_TAXATION-ORDER OF COURSE-OMISSION TO State

and nothing more, there was no obligation on the payee to repay the money, PRIOR ORDERS POR TAXATION AND SUmmons for DELIVERY OF PAPERS- of a prior obligation, or in extinguishment of a pre-existing liability. The

On the contrary, the payment was supposed to have been made in fulfilment NON-STATEMENT OF PETITIONER'S ADDRESS.—In a case of In re Covert, before law assumed that a man would not throw away big money or give it away the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., an application was made to discharge without any consideration. If nothing more than payment was proved, there an order of course for the delivery and taxation of a solicitor's bills of costs,

was no occasion to resort to any presumption arising out of the relation of and an order committing the solicitor for disobedience, on the ground that the father and son. petition for the order did not state that two orders for taxation and payment that there was some contract rendering the payee liable to refund, and if that

The onus was on the person who claimed repayment to show of costs in an action in which the solicitor bad been employed for the petitioner,

was shown, he was liable to refund at law as well as in equity. So that the or that a summons was pending in that action for the delivery, up to the only question was really one of evidence. And here the weight of evidence petition of documents relating to that action, which were in the solicitor's possession, without prejudice to the solicitor's lien. It was urged that the of loan. LINDLEY, L.J., Bail that, there being evidence, there was no pre

was in favour of the father's story, that the money had been advanced by way non-statement of these facts in the petition amounted to a concealment of sumption at all, and the legal inference from the evidence was that the money material facts, and made the ex parte order of course irregular. The

was advanced as a loan, and not as a gift.-SOLICITORS, J. B. Looker ; court (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.) overruled the objections. Jessel,

Torr & Co. M.R., said that, even if an order was irregular, the court was not bound to discharge it. It might amend the order. This was showa by In re Ingle (21 Beav. 275), and this was in accordance with the view taken by the framers of RIGHT OF APPEAL-ORDER ON SPECIAL CASE STATED BY ARBITRATOR order 59 of the Rules under the Judicature Act. The rules did not apply JUDICATURE Act, 1873, s. 19-Final or INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.-In : to these orders of eourse, but the principle did apply. But his lordship thought case of Shubrook v. Tufnell

, before the Court of Appeal on the 21:: inst., that the order was not irregular. "The objection as to the non-statement of the question aryse whether an order made by the Queen's Bench Division upon the orders in the action for the taxation of costs was answered by the decision of a special case stated by an arbitrator could 'te appealed fron. At the trial, Lord Romilly in In re Fluker (20 Beav. 143). The client was entitled to an an order was made by Lord Coleridge, C.J., referring the whole question to order compelling the solicitor to deliver his bill of costs, and to deliver arbitration. The arbitrator afterwards stated a special case for the opinion of up his papers payment, and this could not be done under the court, the case being signed by him and by the solicitors of the parties, an order to tax the costs in action. Under such an order The question stated for the opinion of the court was wbether, upon the fac's the solicitor could not be compelled to carry in

his bill for stated, there was any cause of action. If the court should be of opinion in the taxation. Therefore, the orders in the action, if stated, would affirmative, then the case was to be referred back to the arbitrator ; if the have been no objection to the making of the order of course. As for the court should be of opinion in the negative, then judgment was to be entered pending summons, it was for delivery up of the papers in the suit, subject to up for the defendant, with his costs of suit. The Queen's Bench Division the solicitor's lien; the order of course was for the delivery up of all papers on (Maoisty and Watkin-Williams, JJ.) beld that the plaintiff had a cause of taxation and payment. There was nothing in that objection.' Lindley, L.J., action, and ordered judgment on the special case to be entered for the plaintiff, said that the first point was decided in in re Fluker, and, as to the pending and that the case should be referred back to the arbi' rator. The defendant summons, no doubt, as was held in In re Gedye (15 Beav. 254), if an ex parte appealed, and it was objected, on behalf of the plaintiff, that this decision was .order for taxation was obtained by a suppression of material facts it ought to not a" judgment or order" of the court within section 19 of the Judicatore be discharged. But here the object of the summons was to obtain the papers Act, 1873, but only an expression of the opinion of the court for the guidanca without paying for them; the object of the petition of of the arbitrator, and, therefore, not apppealable. The court (Jesset, M. R., was to obtain them on payment. If an order had been made and LINDLEY, L.J.) held that an appeal would lie. Jessel, À, R., said that on the summons it might have been proper to state it, but how the this view was in accordance with the ratio decidendi of the House of Lords in pendency of the summons could be material bis lordship was at a loss to The Overseers of Walsall v. The London and North-Western Railway Com. conceive.

pany (27 W. R. 189, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 30), which was that the expression of Another objection taken was that the address of the petitioner opinion was a judicial act. was not stated in the petition of course, and it was said that this The question was also raised whether the order was a final or an ioterwould make it impossible for the solicitor to obey the order for delivery locutory one, and whether, therefore, it oaght to go into the final or the of his bill or the papers to the petitioner. The petitioner was the interlocutory list of appeals. The court held that it was a final order. JESSEL, owner of a large landed estate, and he was described as of that place, M.R., said that it was clearly a final order. In one alternative the order og though he did not, in fact, reside there. The court overruled this objection the special case would have finally disposed of the action. Collins v. The too. "JESSET, M.K., said that the description might not be strictly accurate Vestry of Paddington (28 W. R. 588, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 368) was distin. according to the practice, but there was no irregularity. A decree or an order guishable. The court did not there, as appeared by the Law Reports beat; on a petition would not have been irregular becanse the address of the plain. note, intend to decide that, in all cases, a decisioa of the court on a special tiff bad not been properly stated in the bill or petition. The defendant or respond- case stated by an arbitrator for its opinion was an interlocutory order, but ent would only have been entitled to security for costs. This applied equally only that, under the special circumsances of that case, it was so.—Soo an order on a petition of course. The omission did not vitiate the order or LICITORS, T'orr & Co.; Frederick Taylor. prevent the solicitor from obeying it. The practice was to deliver the bill to the solicitor who had obtained the order of course, and, if it was so delivered, no application to commit the solicitor for disobedience to the order could be made.

APPEAL_STAY OF EXECUTION-COMMON LAW ACTION-SECURITY BY Indeed, if the solicitor did not know the petitioner's address, he could not RESPONDENT_ORD. 58, R. 16.— In the case of Williams v. Mercier (noted deliver the bill to him personally. LINDLEY, L.J., said there was no sugges. ante, p. 479) an application was made to the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., tion of any trick, of any attempt to mislead, or any want of good faith. It and Lindley, L.J.), on the 21st inst., on behalf of the plaintifor a stay of was said that the solicitor wonld be embarrassed, because he would not be able execution pending an appeal to the House of Lords. The action WAS.20 to find the petitioner. But the order did not require the delivery to be made interpleader issue to determine the right to certain jewels of a wife which at an address given in the petition. If there was any irregularity it could not had been taken in execution by creditors under a judgment in respect of $ affect the validity of the order.-SOLICITORS, J. R. Covert ; Bell, Brodriek, debt contracted by her before her marriage. The husband (the plaintiff in the & Co.

issue) claimed the jewels, which were presents to the wife on ber marriaga, by virtue of his marital right; the defendant, a milliner, alleged that they

were separate property of the wife. The Court of Appeal held, upon the con FATHER AND SON - PAYMENT OF MONEY TO SON - Gift or Loan -struction

of the settlement, that the jewels were separate property of the wife, PRESUMPTION.-In a case of Ex parte Cooper, before the Court of Appeal on and, therefore, liable to be taken in execution by the defendant. There was the 15th inst., the question arose whther money, which had been paid by a no evidence of the insolvency or probable insolvency of the defendant. The father to, or on account of, his son, had been paid by way of gift or loan. court refused to grant a simple stay of execution. "JESSEL, M.R., said that Both the father and the son bad filed liquidation

petitions, and the trastee of the principle on which execution was stayed pending an appeal was that there the father claimed to prove in the liquidation of the son for moneys which the was danger of the appellant, if successful, losing the fruits of his father had paid on the son's account, on the ground that they were loans by an ordinary common law action a stay of' execution was never granted except the father to the top. Both the father and

the son gave evidence

on the under very special circumstances, such as the insolvency of the respondent.


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If ever there was a case for adhering to this rule, the present was one. not, after the bishop's revocation of his licence and inhibition, be Execution would be stayed only on the terms of the amount of the judgment said to be a regular clergyman entitled to officiate or perform public being paid to the defendant. But, the defendant being engaged in business, Divine service within the terms of the covenant, for the words in the though there was no evidence or suggestion of her insolvency, it would be covenant, "officiate" and " Divine service," had been decided by Lord Hardright in the exercise of the judicial discretion of the court, to order ber to wicke, so far back as 1742, to refer, when used in connection with the duties give security for the repayment of the money in case the appeal should be of a clergyman, to the public performance of the service of the Established successful. following the decision in Merry v. Nickalls (21 W. R. 305, L. R. Church, in accordance with the laws regulating it (Trebec v. Keith, 2 Atk. 8 Ch. 205). The costs of the action would be paid to the defendant's solicitor 498). Not only was it within the absolute discretion of a bishop tó at any on his personal undertaking to return them in the event of the appeal being time revoke, even without assigning any reason, a licence given to a clergysuccessful. The plaintiff must pay the costs of this application and of the man to officiate in a proprietary chapel (Hodgson v. Dillon, 2 Curt. 388), but security. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the rule laid down in Merry v. Nickalls the licence itself was useless without the consent of the vioar. It was con. was a very sensible one. It was not a hard and fast 'rule, but it was right in tended, on behalf of Archdeacon Danbar, that the true meaning of the words nine cases out of ten.-SOLICITORS, Lewis g. Lewis ; Pawle f Fearon.

in the covenant, "regular clereyman," was "clergyman duly ordained,” and the validity of Archdeacon Dunbar's ordination not being in dispute, the

covenant was satisfied, and that, so far as the plaintiffs, wbo were merely lessors, METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACTS-18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 105– were concerned, no ques: ion arose. CIIITTY, J., said that the only question 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 96-RATE FOR PAVING NEW STREET-COVENANT BY

for his decision was one of construction; all that was necessary to be thought TENANT TO PAY RATES “IMPOSED ON Demised PREMISES "-PRACTICE- of was, what was the meaning of the parties to the leage ? He was not aware SPECIAL CASE-JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT- APPEAL.-I. & caso of Allum v.

that the term "regular" had any technical sense in the ecclesiastical law, Dickinson, before the Court of Appeal on the 20th inst., a question arose as

unless when used in connection with priests living in accordanca with a monas. to the liability of the tenant of a bouse in a street within the metropolitan world, were called secular. Of course, this was not the meaning of the term

tic rule in contrast with those who, being parochial clergy, or living in the district to pay to his landlord the share of the expenses of paving the street apportioned by the vestry of the parish to the particular hoage and paid by here. Looking at the covenant as a whole, he was of opinion that the term the landlord in pursgance of notice from the vestry clerk. The lease con

regular” was used as a qualification of the previous word " person." As he tained a covenant by the tenant that he would pay the yearly rent, "and understood the law to be, a clergyman of the Church of England must also will pay the sewers and main drainage rates, tithe-rent charges, Board liberty to perform Divine service or preach. This was the ecclesiastical law,

be duly ordained and also licensed by the bishop: before he was at of Health, metropolitan, and other district rates and assessments whatsoever, and the law of the land. Archdeacon Dunbar was not licensed, and had been whether parliamentary, parochial, or otherwise, which now at any time during the said term shall be taxed, rated, oharged, assessed, legally requisite. The circumstance, therefore, of ordination was not enough

are or wbich inhibited, and there was, therefore, in bis case an absènce of the qualifications or imposed opon the demised premises or any part thereof, or upon or by itself to satisfy the words of the covenant. His lordship was, therefore, of payable by the occupier or tenant in respect thereof (except the property or income tax).” The action was brought by the landlord to recover from the opinion that the injunction sought for must be granted with costs. The

injunction was, upon the application of Archdeacon Dunbar's counsel, and the tewart the amount wbich he had thus paid. A special case was stated for the opinion of the court. A divisional court, consisting of Mathew and Cave, of enabling the defendant to appeal.--SOLICITORS, Simpson, Hammond,

plaintiffs raising no objection, ordered to be suspended for a month, with a view JJ., gave judgment for the defendant, opon the ground that the amount saed Richards, š Simpson ; A. D. Smith & Wood; Hume, Bird, f Eldridge. for was not a "sewers or main drainage rate,” &c., or assessment parliamentary, &c., charged either upon the premises, or upon the tepantor ocoupier in respect thereof,” within tbe terms of the lessee's covenant. The court said PETITION BY TENANT FOR LIFE FOR RE-INVESTMENT-Service Op Re. that the charge in question was one which was made once for all, and was MAINDERMEN—LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845, ss. 69, 70.-IQ clearly for works for the permanent improvement of the property, and, a case of In re Chambers, before Chitty, J., on the 17th inst., a petition was therefore, for the intereet of the landlord, as distinguished from a rate made presented by the tenant for life of real estates settled by the will of a deceased for temporary or current expenditure for the interest of the tenant or occupior. testator for re-investment in real estate of £500 Consols, part of a sum of $510 The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and Lindley and Bowen, L.JJ.) Consols, representing the purchase-money paid into court by a railway comaffirmed this decision. They said that the charge, being for the expenses pany in respect of real estate comprised in the will taken by the company in of permanently improving the property, was naturally payable by the owner pursuence of the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. It rather than by the occupier. Thie, however, was not in itself covolosive. was objected that those entitled in remainder after the petitioner's death had But the covenant by the lessee to pay was for the payment of annual not been served with the petition, and the rule was stated to be that service charges, which were taken into consideration in fixing the rent of the house, on the remaindermen would only be dispensed with where the petition was for while this was a charge payable ovce for all, and not of yearly recurrence.

interim investment. It was stated that the intended investment consisted of Looking at the Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 96), it was quite plain that

a mossuage and land of the estimated annual value of £36, and it was asked costs and expenses inodrred noder the Metropolis Local Management Act that the residue of the fund in court should be paid to the petitioner. CHITTY, were not charged or imposed opon the premises, but were imposed upon J., after referring to Ex parte Staples (1 D. M. & G. 294), said that remainder. the owner in respect of the premises. A remeds, no doubt, was given men, in his opinion, were not necessarily respondents in petitions of this kind agaicst the occupier for the recovery of the amount, bat the amount bo

and in the present instance he would not order them to be served, but if, when recovered from him was limited to the amount of rent for the time being the order was being drawn up, the registrar should raise any objection, the dae, and was to be deduoted by him from the rent which he paid to the matter must be mentioned to the court again. His lordship, also, taking into landlord. The decision was right upon both grounds.

consideration the small amount of the residue to be left uninvested, made an A point of practice also arose. On the hearing of the special case

order for its payment to the petitioner upon his giving an undertaking to the plaintiff did not appear, and, after argument, judgment was given expend it for the benefit of all parties interested. --SOLICITORS, Ullithorne, for the defendant in the absence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff did Currey, & Villiers ; Capel A. Curwood. not move in the divisional court to set aside the judgment on terme, but appealed. In the Court of Appeal the question was raised wbether this was the right course.

There did not appear to be any

Petition—VESTING ORDER-TRUSTEE Act, 1850, ss. 2, 24. - In the

case of In re Hyatt's Trusts, before Chitiy, J., on the 19th inst., a petition settled practice applicable, and it was stated that no instance of non

was presented under the Trustee Act, 1850, s. 24, for an order vesting a sum of 8ppearance on the bearing of a special one was known to have occurred belore. The appeal was allowed to proceed, the respondent not objectiog, into the names of two trustees who refused to act and disclaimed ; whereapon

consols, in new trustees. It appeared that the consols had been transferred but JESSEL, M.R., said that the case mast not be taken as & precedent.

the beneficiaries duly appointed new trustees, into whose names they requested SOLICITORS, W. F. Nokes ; Billing & Kent.

the original trustees to transfer the consols. Upon their refusal the present petition was presented and an order was made as prayed; but the Bink of

Eogland deelined to act upon the order, on the ground that the 24th section LEASE-PROPRIETARY CHAPEL-RESTRICTIVE COVENANT-SERVICE

of the Act, which enacts that a vesting order, may be made where "any one CHURCH OF ENGLAND CLERGYMAN-CLERGYMAN DULY ORDAINED, BUT of the trustees of stock refuses to transfer it, did not apply to the case of two UNLICENSED AND INHIBITED.-In the case of The Foundling Hospital v.

or more trustees refusing. The petition being again put in the paper, it was Garrett and others, before Chitty, J., on the 16th inst., a motion was made to submitted by the petitioner that the interpretation clause of the Act (section 2) restrain the defendant, the Rev. 6. G. C. Dunbar, a Church of England clergy provided that, unless the contrary should appear from the context, every word man and colonial archdeacon, from officiating or performning Divine service in St. Andrew's Church or Chapel, It appeared that the and that the words of the 24th section of the Act were therefore enlarged by

importing the singular number should extend to several persons or things, chapel was held under a lease for ninety-nine years, granted by the Foundling the interpretation clause. Chitty, J., held that the court had jurisdiction to Hospital in the year 1802, and containing a covenant on the part of the lessees make the order.-SOLICITORS, S. Johnson; Freshfields & Williams. that they should not, at any time during the term, permit any clergyman or person 10 officiate in the chapel, or perform public Divine service therein, but such as should be a regular clergyman of the Church of England." Services and VENDOR AND PURCHASER-REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT -AGREEMENT TO sermons bad, in accordance with previous advertisements, been recently con

GOOD MARKETABLE TITLE-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIVE ducted and preached in the chapel by the defendant, Archdeacon Dunbar, COVENANTS - Norice. - In a case of Calo v. Thompson, before the Court of although the Bishop of London had, in January, 1880, revoked a licence given Appeal on the 19th inst., the question arose whether a purchaser of land was by him to Archdeacon Danbar in December, 1877, on his first becoming tenant entitled to repudiate his contract under the following circumstances. The of tho chapel, and bad also inhibited him from performing service in the contract was for the sale of some freehold houses, and the vendor thereby diocese, and although no application had been made by Archdeacon agreed to make a good marketable title to the property. He, in fact, held the Dunbar to the vicar of the parish in which the chapel was situated property subject to a restrictive covenant, which prevented him from using for leave to preach and perforin public Divine service in the chapel, the houses as shops, and the purchaser had notice of this covenant. The purIt was submitted by the plaintiffs that Archdeacon Dunbar could chaser refused to complete the purchase, on the ground that this covebant




could not be released, and he brought an action for the return of his deposit. the colonial Legislature and included in the annual appropriation ordinance The vendor counter-claimed for specific performance of the contract. Lopes, of the colony. The pensioner may draw his pension either from the colonial J., gavo judgment in the plaintiff's favour, and his decision was affirmed by Treasurer in the colony or from the Crown agents of the colony in Eagland. the Court of Appeal (Jessel, M.R., and Lindley and Bowen, L.JJ.). JESSEL, The trustee, on the hearing of the application, offered to consent to the bank. M. R., said that it was not a case for compelling the purchaser to perform the rupt's receiving for his maintenance £350 a year out of the pension, and on covenant with compensation. He thought that the cases as to compensation the appeal be still adhered to this offer. It was contended on behalf of the ought not to be extended ; indeed some of them bad almost gone the length bankrupt that, baviog regard to the fact that no action could be brought to of making a new contract for the parties. The pregent case was also distin- recover the pension, and that it was the subject of an annual vote of the guishable from such cases as Farebrother v. Gibson (1 D & J. 602) and Ley. colonial Legislature, it was not "property” within the meaning of the Act, land v. Illingworth (2 D. F. & J. 248), the principle of which was that, where and did not vest in the trustee. It was rather a payment in the nature of there was a statement in a contract which was capable of two meanings, and bounty, Property” must be something which there was a legal or equitit would naturally be understood by a purchaser in one of them, he would be uble right to recover, or something which was expressly declared by statute entitled to be relieved from his contract if the statement was true only in the to be property.. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and Lindley and genge in which he would not naturally have understood it, provided that he Bowen, L.JJ.) in substance affirmed the registrar's order. Jessel, M.R., had no notice ; but he would not be entitled to be relieved if he had notice of said that on the bankrupt's retirement from his office be received a sapere the sense in which the statement was made. But, in the present case, the annuation allowance for his past services. What did that mean? When a contract was an express one to show a good marketable title, and it was man was appointed to such an office be was told that he would receive such a possible, though not very probable, that the restrictive covenant might be salary and such a pension when he retired, and he accepted the office on those released. It was not like an open contract, in which case there was a pre- terms. Possibly the exact amount of the pension might not be named. Bat sumption of law that a marketable title was to be shown, but the presumption he accepted the office partly in consideration of the salary and partly in conmight be rebutted by evidence that the purchaser knew of some defect in the sideration of the pension. The appellant having become a bankrupt, the vendor's title. An express contract could not be contradicted in that way. only question was whether the creditors of his business were entitled to take LINDLEY, L.J., thought that evidence that the purchaser knew of the the pension wbich he had so hardly earned to pay their debts. It was a casa covenant was not admissible to contradict the written contract. BOWEN, L.J., for great syyppathy, and if the trustee had come to the court and said, “I concurred.-SOLICITORS, W. Easton ; A. H. Crowther.

will have all that pension, whether you like it or not,” the court would have known how to deal with it. But the trustee had very properly offered the bankrupt £350 a year for his maintenance. That was an offer which ought

to be accepted, assuming that the appellant was not right in his contention " PROPERTY OF BANKRUPT_VESTING IN TRUSTEE-INCOME”

that the trustee took no interest in the pension. It was argued, in the first BANKRUPT-PENSION OF RETIRED CIVIL SERVANT OF CROWN-RETIRED place, that the pension was not "property." His lordship thought it was. JUDGE OF CROWN COLONY-BANKRUPTCY Act, 1869, ss. 4, 15, 17, 90.- The contract under which the appellant accepted the office might not be In a case of Ex parte Huggins, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., enforceable in the courts of this country or of the colony. His lordship the question arose what is the extent of the property of a bankrupt, thought that was so. But that did not make the pension not property. which, by section 15 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, is divisible among his There were many cases of what would be called property arising out of : creditors, and by section 17, vests in the trustee in the bankruptcy on his contract which no judicial tribunal could enforce. Take the case of the appointment; the question being whether the retiring pension of an ex-Chief bonds of a foreign Government.

There was

& contract by the foreign Justice of a Crown colony, granted to bim on his retirement by the Secretary Government to pay a sum of money, but it was not enforceable in the courts of State for the Colonies, and voted annually by the Legislature of the of this country, and, probably, not in any court. Still no one would say colony, vested in the trustee in his subsequent bankruptcy. Section 4 of the that a foreign bond was not property. If a man died possessing French or Bankruptcy Act provides that the term "property," if not inconsistent with Italian bonds, no one would say he had died without property. Such bonds the context, “shall mean and include money, goods, things in action, land, were not choses in action in the ordinary sense, and that could not be the and every description of property, whether real or personal ; also, obligations, definition of “property.” The mere fact that you could not sue for the easements, and every description of estate, interest, and profit, present or thing did not make it the less property. His lordship would not attempt to future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incident to property as above define "property” exactly ; that would be too dangerous ; bat, no doubt, defined.” Section 15 provides that "the property of the bankrupt divisible foreign bonds, in common language and in lawyer's language, were “prop: amongst his creditors, and in this Act referred to as the property of the bank- erty.” It could not be doubted that a man who had a pension of £10,000 rupt, sball comprise (inter alia) all such property as may belong to or be from the British Government would have “properiy." A pension for past Vosted in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, or may be services was certainly assignable in equity, if not at law. Then it was said acquired by, or devolve on, him during its continuance.". By section 17, the that the pension could not be got till it was voted by the colonial Legislatura. property of the bankrupt vests in the trustee on his appointment. Sections That was no answer. The vote was the mere form or mode of securing the 87-95 are headed, " As to property devolving on the trustee.” Section 87 payment. It was not as if the appellant had been told he should have a makes special provisions as to executions for 'judgment debts above £50 levied pension just as it was or was not voted by the Legislature. In that case he on the goods of a trader. Section 88 provides that “where the bankrupt is would not have accepted the office. The vote was only the mode of ascer. a beneficed clergyman, the trustee may apply for a sequestration of the profits taining what the colony had to pay. The same thing happened in the case of the benefice,

but the sequestrator shall allow out of the profits of salaries and pensions in this country; they could not be paid till they bad of the benefice to the bankrupt, while he performs the duties of the parish or been voted by the House of Commons; but still no one would say that they place, such an annual sum" as the bishop directs. Section 89 provides that were not property. No doubt some pensions and salaries were not assignable, " where a bankrupt is or has been an officer of the army or navy, or an officer or on the ground of public policy, such as the half-pay of officers in the Army clerk or otherwise employed or engaged in the Civil Service of the Crown, or is in and Navy, or their salaries for actual services, and others, like the retiring the enjoyment of any pension or compensation granted by the Treasury, the allowance of a beneficed clergyman, which were made not assignable by Act trustee during the bankruptcy, and the registrar after the close of the banks of Parliament. But bis lordship thought that all these things were property. ruptcy, shall receive, for distribution amongst the creditors, so much of the His view of the Bankruptcy Act was this : section 15 vested all the bank. bankrupt's pay, half-pay, salary, emolument, or pension as the court, upon rupt's property in the trustee, subject to the special exceptions made by subthe application of the trustee, tbinks just and reasonable, to be paid in such sequent sections. There was an exception made by section 23 of property manner and at such times as the court, with the consent in writing of the which the trustee was empowered to disclaim. The produce of executions chief officer of the department under which the pay, half-pay, salary, emolu. dealt with by section 87 would rest in the trustee by virtue of section 15, but ment, pension, or compensation is enjoyed, directs.' Section 90 provides that for the provisions of section 87. The benefice of a beneficed clergyman was “where a bankrupt is in the receipt of a salary or income other than as by our law not alieoable, but by section 15 all the property of the clergyman in aforesaid, the court, upon the application of the trustee, shall from time to the profits of the benefice would have rested in the trustee in his bankruptcy but tince make such order as it thinks just for the payment of such salary or in- for section 88, and section 15 must be read, so far as a beneficed clergy man was come, or of any part thereof, to the trustee during the bankroptcy, and to the concerned, subject to, and as qualided by, section 88. Again, section 15 was registrar (if necessary) after the close of the bankruptcy, to be applied by him controlled by section 89 with regard to the pereons mentioned in it. A in such manner as the court may direct.” The bankrupt in the present case person occupying such a position was not necessarily to be left to starve, how had been for some years Chief Justice of a Crown colony. He retired from ever improvident be might have been, but a discretion was given to the court. bis office in the year 1879, and thereupon a pension of 2875 per annum was Why should not the same principle 'apply to section 90 ? The appellant's granted to him by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He returned to this pension was not a “salary," but it was income.” That was as large country, and afterwards entered into partnership in a business. This business word as you could have. It was not the less income because it was voted proved unsuccessful, and in the result he was adjudicated a bankrupt. The every year. The court had, by section 90, power to make such order as it trustee applied to the Court of Bankruptcy for an order declaring that should think just. That meant that the income vested in the trustee under the bankrupt's pension vested in the trustee as forming part of the bankrupt's section 15, subject to the power of the court to set aside a part of it for the property, or, in the alternative, for an order for payment of part of the pension bankrupt.' The specific provision of section 90 controlled to that extent to the trustee for the benefit of the

bankrupt’s creditors, and that the trustee section 15. His lordship thought that the trustee had applied for the right should receive from the Treasury or the Crown agents for the colony, or any order-viz., a declaration that the pension vested in him, and then an order person having the money in his hands, the quarterly instalments of the pension, as to the proportion which should be paid to him. It was not necessary to or such part thereof as to the court should

seem just and reasonable. The bank? | consider what the proportion should be, the trustee having made a sair and ruptcy bad not been closed, nor had the bankrupt obtained an order of dis-liberal offer. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the appellant's contention was that charge. The registrar made an order giving the trustee the right to receive the his pension was not in any way available for his creditors. It was suggested whole of the pension, and restraining the bankrupt from receiving it. The that the pension was not within section 90, because it was payable at the will evidence showed that in u Crown colony, retiring

pensions of servants of the of the colonial Legislature. But all money to which the bankrupt might Crown, as in the present case, not being regulated by any local statute, become entitled during the continuance of the bankruptcy was within section payable out of the revenue of the colony. The pensions so awarded are placed 15. The property vested in the trustee absolutely by sections 15 and 17, but on the annual estimates of the colony, and are voted annually by subject to the modifications and qualifications contained in that group of

sections. This pension was surely "income" of the bankrupt in every sense Messrs. Cosser & Co. subsequently agreed to give the debtor time for pay, of the word. It was not like a purely arbitrary allowance which could be ment, but the debtor failing to carry out his arrangement, Messrs. Cosser & stopped at any moment at the will of the person who paid it. In his lord- Co., on the 5th of April, 1882, signed judgment against him, and issued exesbip's opinion it was "income" within the true meaning of section 90. The cation for the sum of £30 78. 7d., with costs of execution, and sheriff's fees, only fault of the registrar's order was that its language was a little too general. The writ of fi. fa. was at once lodged with Messrs. Nathan, the sheriff's officers, Literally constraed it meant that the trustee was entitled to take the whole and a warrant was obtained by them from the sheriff on the same day, the 5th pension without any qualification. But that would be put right by insertiog of April, but possession of the debtor's goods was not formally taken under a declaration that the pension vested in the trustee subject to the provisions this warrant until about half.past one o'clock on the following day, the 6th of of section 90. Bowen, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Pattison, Wigg, d. Co.; April, 1882. Scotl & Barham.

It appeared, however, that some days previsasly Messrs. Nathan had seized

the debtors' goods under & writ of elegit issued at the instance of Messrs. ADMINISTRATION ACTION — EXECUTOR — WILFUL DEFAULT — ADDING Braby & Co., and that, at the time Messrs. Cosger's fi. fa. was lodged with ACCOUNTS AND INQUIRIES AFTER JUDGMENT_ORD. 33.-In a case of Luke v.

them, on the 5th of April, they were so in possession on behalf of Braby &

Co. Tonkin, before Fry, J., on the 17th inst., the question arose whether, after an ordinary administration judgment had been given, the plaiatiff could, on

On the 6th of April, 1882, at forty-five minutes past twelve o'clock, as further consideration, obtain a direction for the taking of further accounts and appeared by the debtor's affidavit, the debtor filed his petition for liquidation, the making of further inquiries on the footing of wilful default by the execu.

about one hour previously to possession being formally takon under Messrs. tor. The statement of claim alleged wilful default, but at the trial no relief Cosser's fi. fa. was asked for on that footing, and only the ordinary administration judgment

On the 12ch of April the debtor obtained an order rastraining Messrs. Cosser was pronounced. But the action was not dismissed 80 far as it sought relief from taking any further proceedings under their execution until after the 19th on the ground of wilful default. In taking the accounts in chambers under of April, and the iojunction was subsequently continued until after the first the judgment the plaintiff sought to surcharge the executor on the footing of meeting of creditors. At that meeting trustees were appointed, by whom notice wilfol default, but the chief clerk held that, under the judgment as it stood, of the present application was given. he had no power to entertain the question of wilful default. On the

Warmington, for the trustee. bearing on further consideration the plaiatiff asked to bave accounts and

Nicholl, for Messrs. Cosser & Co. inquiries on the footing of wilful default directed, and he proved some instances

The arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment of the court. of wilful default. It was objected by the defendant that the question of

Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY.—Ever since the decision of the Court of Appeal wilful default could not be raised after judgment in the ordinary form bad in the case of Ex parte Williams, Re Davies (20 W. R. 430, L. R. 7 Cb. 314), been given. Fry, J., held that he had power to direct the additional accounts the law is well settled that in an ordinary case, as between an execation and inquiries. He said that he adhered to the opinion which he had ex

creditor and a trustee in bankruptcy, the mere delivery of the writ to the pressed in Barber v. Mackrell (27 W. R. 794, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 534), that the sheriff without seizure, though, by the Statute of Frauds, it binds the goods, effect of what was said by Jessel

, 11. R., in Job v. Job (26 W. R. 207, L. R. 6 does not make the execution creditor a creditor " holding security.' That Cb. D. 562), as subsequently explained by him in Mayer v. Murray (26 W.

case decided that, in order to constitute him a secured creditor, seizure by the R. 690, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 424), was that, if wilfal default was alleged in an ad- sheriff prior to the act of bankruptcy to wbich the title of the trastee relates is ministration action, relief on that footing could be given at any stage of the requisite, a mere rigıt to seize not being sufficient. The sheriff has no propproceedings, even after judgment, if wilful default was proved. His lordship erty in the goods until seizure, but after he has seized he has, to use the words considered himself bound by this expression of opinion. He thought it was

of Lord Justice Mellish, "acquired a qualified property in the goods like that very important that, when a certain line of procedure had been laid down by of a factor who is under advances, ani from whom the goods may be claimed one judge, other judges should follow it. There was no surprise on the de

back on payment of those advances." The question which the court has now fendant, for notice bad been given to him that the question would be raised

to decide is whether, where the sheriff has seized, not under the writ issued at on the hearing on further consideration. His lordship accordingly added the

the suit of the particular execution creditor (B.), but under a prior writ issued accounts and inquiries which were asked for.-SOLICITORS, Coode, King at the suit of A., and

the sheriff remains in possession under that seizure, the don, &: Cotton; Dangerfield & Blythe.

mere delivery of the writ to the sheriff by B. under such circumstances, before

aoy act of bankruptcy, will be sufficient to constitute B. a secured creditor as HUSBAND AND WIFE-AGGRAVATED Assault-JUDICIAL SEPARATION– against the trustee in bankruptcy of the defendant? Now, before referring ORDER FOR ALIMONY-EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE-MATRIMONIAL Causes Act, to the only authority which has been relied on by the trustee In this case, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 19), s. 4.-In

the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty how does the law seem to stand in regard to the duty and position of Division, on the 20th inst, the case of Howarth v. Smith (otherwise Howarth) the sheriff where several writs are delivered to him against the same came before the court by way of an appeal against an order of twojaatices ed., p. 578, and the case of Jones . Atherton, referred to in the note). In

person? [His Honour then cited, upon this point, Archbold's Practice. 13th of Chesbire, made under section 4 of the Matrimonial Canses Aot, 1878. The appellant had been summoped for an aggravated assault upon his the case of Bachurst. v. Clinkard (in Shower's' Reports, referred to by Best wife. On the hearing of the summons he denied that he had over been arguendo), Brown being indebted on a judgment, a fi

. fa. was issued against married to the complainant, who asserted that the marriage bad been him, and thereon the goods were all seized and in the sheriff's custody, and celebrated at Manchester Cathedral on the 15th of February, 1869. No

it was argued that consequently they were not liable to the plaintiff's execu.

tion. Chief Justice Holt held that being oncs seized, and in the custody of certificate of the marriage was produced, but the magistrates convicted the Matrimonial Causes Aot, 1878, and ordered him to pay to the complainant cases, go to show

that the seizure by the sberit under one writ enures to the appellant, and also made an order for a jadicial separation doder the the law, they could not be seized agaia by the same or any other sheriff.

Then there is a case of Chambers v. Coleman (9 Dowling), which, with other a sum of fifteen shillings per week by way of permanent alimody. The benefit

of all the execution creditors under subsequent writs, according to the appellant had since undergone a term of imprisonment for default in paying priority in which they are delivered, without any farther action on the part of tbis sam, and bis counsel now read an affidavit, which stated that a searoh the sheriff. But the trustee urges that some such action is necessary to had been made in the marriage registers at Manchester Cathedral for a perfect the title of the execution creditors against him, and his counsel relie3 period of four years (including the month of February, 1869), and that no entry of a marriage botween the parties bad been found. Hannen, P., said (22 W. R. 397, 603, L. R. 9 Ch. 432). [His Honour read them.] Now to

on some observations of Lord Justice Mellish in Ex parte Villars, Re Rogers that, if the facts stated by the appellant's counsel were correct, the order adduce these observations as an authority in favour of the trustee's contenof the justices must be set aside ; and he granted a role nisi, returnable on

tion in this case seeins to me to be quite unreasonable. They amount to Taesday next, calling upon the respondent to show cause wby the order nothing more than a short statement of some of the facts of that case, and should not be quasbed.--SOLICITOR, M. Abrahams.

his lordsbip's short comment on those facts. But to contend that from those observations there may be extracted an expression of opinion, much less a deci

sion that there could be no seizure under the second writ until notice of it had CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS. been given to the oflicer in possession, and a copy served, seems to me to be (Before Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY, acting as Chief Judge.)

out of the question. I certainly do not regard the case as ang anthority

against the right of the execution creditor, and I am of opinioa that upon the Jane 7.- Er parte Andrews and another, Re Cowland.

delivery of the writ by the execution creditor to the sheriff then being in Where the sheriff has seized under an elegit issued at the suit of A., and posse sion of the goods, the creditor acquired, through the sheriff, a lien on remains in possession of the defendant's goods under that writ, the The application must, therefore, be refused, with costs.

the goods within the meaning of section 16, overriding the title of the trustee. mere delivery of a fi. fa. for the sum of £30, with costs of execution

Solicitors for the execution creditor, Bolton & Co. and sheriff's fees, by B., before any act of bankruptcy committed by the Solici:ors for the trustee, Seagrove & Co. defendant, will be sufficient to conetitute B. a secured creditor as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the defendant.

This was an application on behalf of Joseph Andrews and John Folland Lovering, the trustees under the liquidation of J. W. Cowland, for an order

SOLICITORS' CASES. that the injunction granted by the court on the 16th of May, restraining

Hau COURT OF JUSTICE. -QUEEN's Bencu DivisioN. Messrs. Walter Corser & Co. from taking any further procet divgs in the action brought by them against the debtor, or npon the judgment recovered

(Before DENMAN, J., and Pollock, B.) or execution issued therein, might be continued until the furtăer order of the Joel Emmanuel & Co., a firm of solicitors

, had delivered a bill of costs to

June 8.-- Re Joel Emmanuel & Co. * coart.

On the 14th of March, 1882, Messrs. Cosser & Co. brought an action against their clients Isaac, Druiff, & Co., a business firm, for charges incarred in the debtor, J. W. Cowland, to recover the sum of $46°126. in respect of a various matters, among others, for their costs and charges in a number of bill of exchange, dated September 1, 1881, drawn by Cosser & Co. upon, and accepted by, the debtor,

Reported by M, W. BROWNE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,

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