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the bargain between the parties, and this was a mere collateral agreement. As the wrongdoers, including the solicitor, and his lordship could not see why he to the alleged misdescription, the son was not the liquidating debtor. Sections should also have a remedy against the innocent execution creditor. The soli8 and 10 of the Act must be construed together, and the residence and occu- citor was not the agent of the execution creditor to tell the sheriff how he was to pation which the Act required to be stated were those of the bankrupt or discharge his duty. There was no reason in principle for thus extending execution debtor against whose trustee or execution creditor the bill of sale Jarmain v. Hooper, and it would be pernicious to do 80.-SOLICITORS, R, G. was to be void, and not of someone else. Here the residence and occupation Lawson, Manchester; Hare & Co. of the father were truly stated. The additional statement that he was carrying on business in partnership with the son did not make the prior description incorrect. It was mere surplusage which was not shown to be misleading or to CONTRACT– INSOLVENCY_REPUDIATION- ACTION BY COMPANY IN LIQUI. have misled. Of course it was possible that tbere might be surplus words DATION- SET-OFF — "MUTUAL CREDIT"-RULE IN BANKRUPTCY - BANK. which would be misleading. BOWEN, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, F. Venn RUPICY Act, 1869, s. 39-JUDICATURE Act, 1875, s. 10.-In a case of The & Co.; D. Warde.
Mersey Steel and Iron Company v. Naylor, before the Court of Appeal on the
13th inst., a question arose as to the right of one party to a contract to repudiata EXECUTION-WRONGFUL SEIZURE-DIRECTION BY SOLICITOR OF EXECUTION
it in the event of the insolvency of the other, and there was the farther ques. CREDITOR TO SHERIFF-EXTENT OF SOLICITOR'S AUTHORITY-LIABILITY OF
tion whether, by virtue of section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, tbe“ mutual EXECUTION CREDITOR.-In a case of Smith v. Keal, before the Court of
credit” clause (section 39) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, upplies where an
action is brought by a company in liquidation. The plaintiff company was in Appeal on the 14th inst., a question arose as to the extent of the authority
liquidation when the action was brought by leave of the court to recover money of the solicitor of an execution creditor in directing the sheriff as to the goizure under the writ. The action was brought to recover damages for a
for steel supplied to the defendants. The defendants claimed to set off damages wrongful seizure of goods. The plaintiff was not the execution debtor, but
for non-deliveries. The contract was dated in December, 1880, and was for had been in partnership with him. The partnership had been dissolved
5,000 tons of Bessemer steel blooms, at £5 108. per ton f.o.b. at Liverpool, before the issue of the writ. After the writ had been indorsed by the
delivery 1,000 tons montbly, commencing January, 1881; payment net cash creditor's solicitors, and delivered to the sheriff, the sheriff's officer had
within three days after receipt of shipping documents. On the 31st of some doubt whether the goods which he was about to seize at the former
January, and on each of the first five days of February, certain quantities of place of business of the partnership were partnership goods, and he con
blooms were shipped, but the exact amount was disputed. The defendants had sulted the creditor's solicitors. Their managing clerk informed the officer
paid £881 138, 20., and admitted that more was due, but said that they had & that they had reason to believe that the debtor had an interest in the
right to set off as mucb. The plaintiffs claimed £1,713 Os. 9d. The debusiness, and that he had better seize the goods. The officer accordingly
fendants alleged that the plaintiffs had first broken the contract by failing to seized the goods. It turned out that they belonged solely to the con.
deliver 1,000 tops in January, and they counter-claimed for £2,500 damages. tinuing partner, and he brought an action against the execution creditor,
The winding-up petition against the company was presented on the 4th of claiming damages for the wrongful seizure. The question was whether the
February, and a compulsory winding-op order was made on the 15th. In direction given to the sheriff's officer by the solicitors' clerk was within the
answer to the defendants' counter.claim, the plaintiffs pleaded that the matters scope of the authority of the solicitors, so that the execution creditor was
upon which the counter-claim rested arose after the presentation of the windingresponsible for the seizure which resulted from it. Pollock, B., held that
up petition, and that the defendants had not obtained leave, as they ought to the direction was not within the scope of the solicitors' authority, so that
have done, to entitle them to make their claim. To this the defendants dethe execution creditor was not liable, and this decision was upheld by a
murred. At the trial the jury were disc barged by consent, and the case was divisional court, consisting of Pollock, B., Manisty, J., and Stephen, J.,
reserved for further consideration before Lord Coleridge, C.J., who decided in the latter learned judge dissenting from the other two. The decision was
favour of the plaintiffs, being of opinion that the defendants bad themselves affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.)
repudiated the contract and had justified the plaintiffs in refusing further JESSEL, M.R., sald that he thought the doctrine respondeat superior had
deliveries. The defendants appealed and it was contended on their been carried quite far enough in our law, and it ought not to be
behalf that under section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, they were entitled, extended. It was no part of the duty of the solicitor of an
although the plaintiffs were in liquidation, to set off their claim for damages. execntion creditor to interfere with the duty of the sheriff in levying
For the respondents it was urged that this would be making the appellants under the writ. The duty of the sheriff was to levy on the
preferred creditors, and that such a result was not intended by the Legislature. goods of the execution debtor, and he was responsible for finding out these
The court (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY and BOWEN, L.JJ.) allowed the appeal, goods. If the solicitor directed him to seize the goods of another person he
JESSEL, M.R., said that the first question was, what rule was to prevail as to was apswerable like anyone else who directed a trespass to be committed.
getting rid of a liability to further performance of a contract in regard to the The sheriff bimself was liable if he committed a trespass, and anyone who
acts or defaults of one party to it ? If one party broke the contract, was the joined in the trespass was equally liable. In the absence of authority his
other bound to perform it on his part ? Tbere was no absolute rule that could lordship was of opinion that it was no part of the solicitor's duty to interfere
be laid down in so many words as to when a breach by one party exonerated with the sheriff's duty in levying under the writ by giving him directions as
the other. The rule of law was properly stated by Lord Coleridge in Freeth v. to the particular goods wbich he was to seize, and his lordsbip was aware of no
Burr (22 W. R. 370, L. R.9 C. P. 208) thus: “The true question is whether anthority to the contrary. Tbe case of Jarmain v. Hooper (6 Man, & G. 827)
the acts and conduct of the party evince an intention no longer to be bound by had been relied on. It was a decision of the Court of Common Pleas in Banc
the contract." The nature of the breach must be considered and the circum. and was not technically binding on the Court of Appeal. But it was decided
stances. In some cases there might be an express declaration, but more so long ago as 1843; it had been frequently acted on, had never been
commonly the intention had to be inferred. The notion which Lord Bram. questioned since, and bad found its way into all the text-books, and the Court
well seemed to have expressed in Honck v. Muller (29 W. R. 830, L. R. 7 of Appeal would not now review it, even if it thought that it had been
Q. B, D. 92), that there was a distinction between the case wrongly decided. The mere fact of the age of a decision would not protect it
where there bad been part performance of the contract and from review if it was contrary to a general principle of law. But the ques.
where there had not, was not correct. In the present case, was there tion of the scope of a solicitor's authority did not depend on general law, but
anything to show that the buyers were not ready to pay, or had any depended, to a great extent, on usage, and the solema decision of a court estab
intention to repudiate the contrast? The evidence pointed the other way. lished the scope of the authority if it bad not boen previously established by
hecho A payment was due on the 5th of February, but the buyers had heard of usage, and the Court of Appeal would not distarb such a decision when it had
the winding-up petition, and their solicitor advised them that they could been acted on for many years. But in Jarmain v. Hooper the solicitor of an
not, under the circumstances, safely pay the company. That advice was execution creditor had indorsed the writ with a wrong address of the execu
communicated to the company. It was wrong, but even the most skilled tion debtor, and the court held that this amounted to a direction to the sheriff
advisers might sometimes make a mistake. Then terms were proposed to to seize the goods of another person. The sheriff was misled by the direction
the liquidator which showed that there was no desire on the part of the and acted in obedience to it, and seized the goods of a wrong person The buyers to break the contract. Subject, therefore, to the question as to the direction to the sheriff was indorsed by the solicitor on the writ, and the ques
winding up, the defendants ought to succeed. The second point was, tion was whether the client was bound by it. And the court held that the
having regard to the fact that the plaintiff company was in liquidadirection was within the scope of the solicitor's authority, and therefore bound
tion, whether the defendants were entitled to the set-off. The his principal. They said that the solicitor in giving the direction was taking
court was bound to put a meaning upon the words of the Legislature a step essential for the benefit of the client in obtaining the fruits of bis judg
and to attach a rational and beneficial meaning rather than an irrational ment, and, therefore, he could not be said to have acted beyond the
and injurious one. Irrespective of the winding up, there could be po scope of his authority, though he bad miscarried. It would be wrong
question bat that the right to set-off onght to be supported. But had the to extend that decision to the case of a solicitor who either
company a right by reason of the winding up to claim payment in full, and himself or by his clerk gave a verbal direction to the sheriff sabse
to leave the bayers to prove for damages ? Under the Companies Act, 1862, quently to the filling up and indorsing of the writ. Such a direction was
it could not be said that the right of set-off was given. The Legislatore had not a step essential for the benefit of the client, and was not within the scope
not inserted in that Act the "mutual credit" section of the Bankraptoy of the solicitor's authority. The person whose goods were wrongly seized by
Act; bat by section 25 of the Jadicatore Act of 1873, and section 10 of the reason of such a verbal direction had his remedy by action against the sheriff
Act of 1875, the Legislature had intended to alter and improve the law. and the solicitor, and that was a sufficient remedy without making another Originally it was intended to unite the Court of Bankraptoy with the unfortunate person liable. LINDLEY, L.J., said that it was the duty of the Supreme Court, and his lordship bad still hopes of seeing that union carried execution creditor's solicitor to fill up the iadorsement on the writ properly, out by the Legislature. However, by the Act of 1875 it was not done. and if he make a mistake in doing that, his client was liable. That was the But an alteration was made as to the liabilities which could be effect of Jarmain v. Hooper, and his lordship was prepared to stand by that proved in a winding up, and as to the manner of doing so. The decision and to act on it. The court was now asked to extend it, and to say rule as to the mode of proof was to be the same as in bankruptcy. that the client was responsible for what the sheriff did, in consequence of verbal | An account, in fact, was to be taken on both sides, and if anything was doe directions or advice given to him by the solicitor, or his clerk, as to the way after the proper deductions had been made from the claimant's claim, the in which he was to execute the writ. That was beyond the scope of the soli. balance was to be proved for, so that the rule was to be the same in a citor's authority. The person who was wronged had his remedy against all winding up as in administration and in bankruptcy. If the claim in this case had been made in the winding up, there would have been a deduction estate into money ; their only duty was to convert it to the extent only which from the claim for damages. It would have been difficult to say what was might be necessary to provide for the annuity, but not further.-SOLICITORS, the effect of ord. 19, r. 3, if it had not been for section 10, because in those James, Son, f. James ; Cookson, Wainwright, f. Pennington. rules one did not expect to find any alteration of the law, but only alterations in the mode of asserting rights. The meaning of section 10 was that the same mode of taking the accounts should apply in every LOCAL BOARD-INCORPORATION OF DISTRICT-VESTING OF PROPERTY kind of procedure. The same equity was to prevail. Therefore, fairly GOVERNMENT STOCK-TRANSFER—BANK OF ENGLAND-PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, applying the Acts and Rules, and allowing justice to be done, judgment 1875, s. 310.-In a case of The Corporation of Hyde v. The Bank of England, must be given for the appellants. LINDLEY and BOWEN, LJJ., con. before fry, J., on the 12th inst., a question arose upon the construction of curred.-SOLICITORS, G. M. Clements ; W. W. Wynne,
section 310 of the Pablic Health Act, 1875, which provides that where, after the passing of the Act, a district under the jurisdiction of a local board is
constituted or included in a borough," all the powers, rights, duties, capacities, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT—BOND PAYABLE TO BEARER-THEFT-HOLDER liabilities, obligations, and property exercisable by, attaching to, or vested in FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE-PRIOR ADVANCE-GENERAL CHARGE-Con- such local board under this Act, or under any local Act for purposes the same STRUCTIOX.-1o a case of Symons v. Mulkern, before Fry, J., on the 13th as, or similar to, those of this Act, or under any general Act of Parliament inst., the question arose whether where & negotiable instrument (a foreign within, or for the benefit of, such district, shall pass to, and be exercisable by, bond payable to bearer) has been stolen, and has been deposited by a and vested in the council of such borough." In February, 1881, a local holder with his bankers, who have received it bona fide without any notice board (purchased a sum of Consols, which was registered in their corporate of the theft, they can retain it as against the true owner, claiming a lien name in the books of the Bank of England. The purchase was made by the upon it for advances previously made by them to their customer, they board in pursuance of section 234 (sub-section 4) of the Public Health Act, having made no advance to him at the time of the deposit. The action was 1875, for the purpose of providing a fund to pay off money which they had brought by the owner of a bond of the French Government, payable to previously borrowed for the purpose of private improvements which they were bearer against a bank with whom the bond had been deposited by al authorized to execute. After this purchase had been made the district of the customer (who had, in fact, obtained the bond dishonestly, though the bank board was incorporated under an order of the Queen in Council. After the were not aware of this) in order that they might sell it on his account. incorporation the new corporation called on the Bank of England to register They attempted to sell it, but, before it could be sold, the theft was dig the sum of Consols in their corporate name, and to pay the dividends to them, covered. The customer was at the time of the deposit indebted to the
and treat them in other respects as the owners of the stock. The bank declined bank in respect of advances which they had made to him, some of which
to do this, and insisted that there must be a transfer of the stock, and that an were secured by promissory notes signed by him. On the back of each | order vesting the right to transfer must be obtained under the Trustee Act. promissory note was a charge signed by the customer in the following
This action was then brought by the corporation, claiming a declaration that terms :-"I bereby charge all my property now mortgaged to the B.
they were entitled to the sum of stock, and to all the rights of registered stock. Building Society, and all and every other property, shares, or secorities
holders in respect of it, and an order on the bank to register the plaintiffs in which now are, or which may be at any time prior to the payment of this
their books as entitled to the stock, and to pay them the dividends thereon. note, in the possession or power of the holder thereof for the time being,
The bank demurred. FRY, J., held, on the construction of section 310, with the payment of this promissory note." The bank claimed ander this
coupled with other sections of the Act, that the words, “the council of the charge to retain the bond as security for what was due to them on the pro
borougb," must be taken to mean the corporate body, which acted by means missory notes, and they also claimed to retain it under their general
of their council, and that, upon the incorporation, the stock vested in the bankers' lien. Fry, J., held that the bond must be delivered up to the
plaintiffs, without tbe nécessity of any transfer, and that the bank were trae owner. He said that, as no advance was made by the bank at the
bound to register them as the owners.--SOLICITORS, Sharpe, Parkers, & Co.; time when the bond was deposited with them, they were not holders of it
Freshfields of Williams. for valge. Nor was it within the words of the written charge. The cbarge was on the customer's property, and this bond was not his property. PRACTICE-SOLICITOR — DELIVERY OF BILL OF Costs—PEREMPTO RY The language, though very general, must be limited to securities belonging ORDER-FURTHER TIME-ATTACHMENT.-In the case of Re Tucker, before to the oustomer which were in the possession or power of the bank. This Chitty, J., on the 8th inst., a motion was made to commit a solicitor for con. bond was received by the bank for the particular purpose of selling it; they tempt of court for breach of an order to deliver his bill of costs. The order in had a special mandate to sell it, for which they gave no consideration. The question was obtained on the 22nd of February, 1882, and une application for mandate might have been recalled at any moment by the customer. Again, farther time having already been acceded to, on the 5th of April, 1882, a perempthe possession of or power over the bond given to the bank was inconsistent tory order was made on a second application, giving time until the 18th of April. with the assertion by them of any lien on the bond itself. The mandate The solicitor, on the 19th of April, applied a third time for further time, and was to sell the bond; if the bank had a lien on the bond itself, they could this application having been adjourned to the judge a second peremptory order bave intercepted the sale. The possession or power referred to by the was made by Mr. Justice Nortb, giving a fortnight's further time. On the charge must be one not inconsistent with the assertion of a charge by the 16th of May, 1882, a fourth application by the solicitor came before Mr. bank, and the possession which they had in this case was for a limited Justice Chitty, who declined to make any order except that the applicant purpose only, and did not come within the ambit of the charge.-SOLICITORS, sbould pay the costs of the application, an undertaking being given on behalf Lewis & Lewis ; Poncione & Leggatt.
of the parties who had obtained the order not to move for an attachment until the 26th of May. CHITTY, J., said it was not the usual practice to extend a
peremptory order. The course adopted by the Master of tbe Rolls in these cases, MARRIED WOMAN-BEQUEST TO SEPARATE USE-RESTRAINT ON ANTICI- and followed by his lordship, was that when a peremptory order had been once PATION-PAYMENT ON SEPARATE RECEIPT-INCOME-BEARING FUND.-In a made, and further time was desired, an order was made against the solicitor case of In re Clarke's Trusts, before Fry, J., on the 15th inst., a question applying, who paid the costs of the application. In the present instance an arose as to the payment or transfer to a married woman, on her separate order for attachment must issue, but the writ of attachment would, by the receipt, of a share of residue of personal estate bequeathed to her for her desire of the parties, lie in the office for three weeks.-SOLICITORS, Bell, separate use, without power of anticipation. A testator bequeathed to his Brodrick, 8. Gray, for Bewes, Boger, & Hillard, Stonehouse ; N. Bennett. wife an annuity of $40, and he directed his trustees and execators to pro. vide for the game, either by setting apart a sufficient portion of the produce of his residuary personal estate for the purpose, or by parchasing an annuity
Costs -MOTION TO DISMISS FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION_ORDER TO from Government or an insurance company. The testator bequeatbed
DELIVER STATEMENT OF CLAIM-EXPIRATION OF TIME-ORD. 29, R. 1.some pecuniary legacies, and then be bequeathed the remainder of his
In a case before Chitty, J., on the 8th inst., a motion was made by the personal estate to his two daughters, their execators and administrators, as
defendant, under ord. 29, r. 1, to dismiss the action with costs for want of tenants in common, so that the same might be enjoyed by the two daughters
prosecution. It appeared that the plaintiff's statement of claim had been during any and every coverture as separate property, free from marital
struck out by the judge in chambers, liberty at the same time being given to control and without power of anticipation. And the testator appointed three
him to deliver a new statement within fourteen days. The plaintiff, shortly persons as trustees and executors of his will. After his death the executors
after the expiration of that time, delivered his statement, but was thereupon paid his debts, fuperal, and testamentary expenses, and the pecuniary
served with notice of the present motion. CHITTY, J., said tbat the
defendant seemed to have shown sharp practice. This was not to be encourlegacies, and purchased an annuity of $40 for the widow. The residue of
aged. There would be no order on the motion except as to costs. He would the personal estate then consisted of a sum in Consols, a sum of railway
give the defendant the option of either baving no costs or of baving the costs stock, and a sum of cash. One of the daughters was married, and the
made costs in the action. The defendant chose the latter alternative, and question aroge whether her moiety of the residue could be paid and trans.
the plaintiff's statement of claim was directed to be treated as having been ferred to her on her separate receipt. The trustees transferred into court a
duly delivered upon an order for extension of time. moiety of the Consols, and they sold the railway stock and paid into court a moiety of the proceeds of sale, and a moiety of the cash. The daughter petitioned for the transfer of the Consols to her, and the payment of the LIMITED COMPANY-PETITION FOR REDUCTION OF CAPITAL-CANCELLAtwo gums of cash to her on her separate receipt. The husband aagented to TION OF PAID-UP CAPITAL-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, GENERAL ORDERS, R. the application. FRY, J., beld that the petitioner was entitled to have the 20—COMPANIES ACT, 1877, s. 4.-In the case of The North Mills Spinning original som of cash paid out to her on her separate receipt. But as to the Company (Limited), before Chitty, J., on the 9th inst., an order wbich was made sum of Consols and the proceeds of the sale of the railway stook, he held upon petition for the reduction of the capital of the company by cancelling
ey were income-producing funds, the principle of In re Ellis 8 | paid up ca pital, which had been lost or was unrepresented by available assets, Trusts (22 W. R. 448, L. R. 17 Eq. 409) applied, and the petitioner was contained, as drawn up, a direction that notice of the registration of the order only entitled to the income for ber life, subject to the restraint on anticipa- and minute of the schedule thereto should be advertised once in the London tion. His lordsbip was of opinion, on the construction of the will, that Gazette and once in a local paper. This was mentioned to the court, and it there was no obligation on the executors to convert the whole personal was submitted that the order should have omitted the direction as to notice
by advertisement, as tbe reduction of the capital of the company did not, Whether we were rightly advised or not is hardly for me to say. The within the Companies Act, 1877, s. 4, involve either the diminution of any judge of the first court, Mr. Justice Grove, decided in our favour, and the liability in respect of unpaid capital or the payment to any sharebolder of matter then went up to the Court of Appeal, and the Lords Justices decided any paid-up capital. Caitty, J., after consulting with the registrar, stated the other way. Before carrying these proceedings to the House of Lords, as the that it was not the custom to omit the direction unless the court had assented council feel that they themselves, following the example of the judges, were not to do so when the matter was at the bar. The direction would be dispensed entirely unanimous in the matter, we thought we ought to take the feeling with in the present instance.-SOLICITOR, Greaves.
of our constituents as to the expediency and wisdom of bringing these
appeals before the highest tribunal. In this case, as in all others, if we were PRACTICE-Costs—TAXATION_Costs of REFERENCE - SOLICITORS Act,
assured of success we would undoubtedly go on-not only that we might 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), s. 37.-In a case of In re Upperton, before Chitty,
succeed, but also for the purpose of vindicating a principle of great importJ., on the 8th inst., a motion was made for special directions as to the ta xation
ance and weight. On the other hand, we might fail. I do not wish myself,
in the position I occupy, to influence the meeting at all, and I think the most and payment of the costs of a reference to taxation of a bill of costs due from one E. Brailsford, directed to be taxed under an order taken out by the soli.
convenient mode of starting the discussion will be that some member should tors themselves. The order in question was the usual one under 6 & 7 Vict. c.
make a motion on the subject. Mr. Keen will probably move that the appeals 73, s. 37, containing (inter alia) the direction, “ In case the said E. Brailsford
be proceeded with. shall attend upon such taxation, that if such bill, when taxed, be less by a
Mr. GRINHAM KEEN.-It will simplify matters if I at once make the motion sixth part than the said bill as delivered, the said master do tax the said' E.
that we proceed with our appeal. Brailskord his costs of such reference, and if such bill, when taxed, shall not
Mr. BROMLEY.-Would it not be desirable that we should have some explao. be less by a sixth part than the said bill as delivered, the said master do tax
ation more in detail as to the present proceedings in this litigation ? the petitioner his costs of such reference.” E. Brailsford, although served Mr. KEEN.—The case has been fully reported. The action is against law with notice, did not attend the taxation, either in person or by his solicitor, but stationers for applying for grants at the Probate Office-in fact, acting as wrote several long letters to the taxing master. The sum taxed off did not exceed proctors and solicitors, and action has been taken by the council, as the cir. one-sixth part, but the taxing master declined to tax the costs of the reference, cular shows. The names of the counsel are Sir Hardinge Giffard, Mr. Reid, on the ground that E. Brailsford had not attended personally. The 37th section and Mr. Fitzgerald. of the Act enacts that, “in case any such reference shall be made upon the
Mr. BROMLEY.-Is the opinion in writing ? application of the party chargeable with such bill, or upon the application of
Mr. KEEN.—Yes. It is quoted in your circular. such solicitor," &c., "and the party chargeable sball attend upon such
Mr. FINCH. —Is the case before the meeting ? taxation,” the costs of such reference shall be paid according to the event of Mr. Keen said it had been before the members in three annual reports. Those such taxation, “that is to say, if such bill when taxed shall be less by a sixth members who had taken an interest in the proceedings of the council had watched part,” &c.," then the solicitor shall pay such costs, and if such bill when taxed it for the last three years. The council had reported it most fully. He proposed shall not be less by a sixth part, &c., then the party chargeable with such bill that the society should go on with the appeal for the following reasons : - The making such application, or so attending, shall pay such costs,” Chitty, J., first reason was that the Probate Office was an office of the High Court of said that there had not been an attendance within the statute and the order Justice as well as the Queen's Bench Office or Chancery Offices. It was an based on the statute, and the sole question was upon the construction of an office of the High Court of Justice. The work to be done there in applying order which bis lordship was not in a position to alter. The condition in the for grants and letters of administration was not a messenger's work. It was a order appeared to govern both the alternatives which followed, and the taxing clerk's work, or a proctor's work. They all knew in their practice that in master would, therefore, have been wrong had be allowed the costs of the going to Somerset House and applying for grant and letters of administration reference when the condition of attendance of the person chargeable had not they must be able to answer the objections of the clerk of the seat, and satisfy been fulfilled. The result was that solicitors proceeding under such an order his queries, and it depended upon the way in which this was done as to (which was quite in accordance with the Act) must, if the party chargeable did whether the business in hand was put forward or retarded. Therefore it was not not attend, bo content to have their bills taxed, and themselves pay the costs messenger's work, but that of a principal or a clerk. If the decision wbich had of the reference.-SOLICITORS, Baker; Folder of Upperton.
been given held good, then a messenger could practise in chambers in the High Court, and could argue a summons before the judge at chambers. They might even send a commissionaire out of the streets to argue & summons in chambers. He had always understood that a solicitor had the sole right to practise in the
High Court, and that barristers bad the sole right of audience, but if that was SOCIETIES.
not the case the alter ego of the solicitor might be anybody ; ergo, the solicitor
had no longer the right to practise. Lord Justice Brett, of whose judgment INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
he wished to speak with the greatest respect, was not quite consequent in the
remarks be made. He said, in the first instance, that it was a messenger's A special general meeting of the members of this society was held at their work, but in the latter part of his judgment he said that if this messenger did hall, Chancery-lane, on Friday, the 9th inst. Mr. C. c. Druce, president, the business to the satisfaction of the authorities, that seemed to be everything, took the cbair, and upwards of 200 gentlemen were present.
and nobody could complain. But the Somerset House people complained to The meeting was convened for the purpose of considering whether any the council. The council had beaps of letters. They, so to speak, had put further action should be taken by the society in the cases of the Law Society the council in motion. Therefore, it was either a messenger, or a clerk, or a v. Waterlow Brothers & Layton and The Law Society v. Shaw & Blake, principal that ought to go. If a messenger, bow could it be a question of which, as our readers will remember, were actions brought against the firms whether he did the business properly or improperly? That, he (Mr. Keen) referred to to recover penalties on the ground that they had acted as solicitors, ventured to say, was the inconsequent part of the decision. It was no contrary to section 26 of the Solicitors Act, 1860. These actions were tried in messenger's work, it was a clerk's work or a principal's. It is the solicitor's May, 1881, before Mr. Justice Grove, the jary being discharged in each case part to practise in the High Court, and take the proceediogs, and it is the by consent; judgment was entered for the society, and execution stayed, it barrister's part to speak. If this state of things were altered, it would be a having been arranged that, in view of an appeal, a statement of facts should most dangerous result for the profession, and for the public. The be handed to the judge to be appended to his notes. The appeals were heard matter seemed to bim in a nutshell. If it was a proceeding in the in February last, the court holding that the defendants did act with respect High Court of Justice, then it was a solicitor's business to take that to a proceeding in the Court of Probate, but that they did not contravene the proceeding. Could his alter ego be the servant of a thousand masters! He provisions of the statute, for that they did not act as proctors in their own (Mr. Keen) said most emphatically, “ No." This question of law stationers names, or in the name of any other person ; this judgment being based upon was a most serious one. He had received a letter from a gentleman, not long the view taken by the court, that the law stationers charged the solicitors a since, asking him to give an appointment to his law stationer, in order that he messenger's fee only for the time occupied in attending at the Probate Registry, might attend at bis iMr. Keen's) office, and compare an abstract of title with the and that, therefore, what bad been done did not come within the restrictions deeds. He ventured to bring before them the extreme danger of shilly-shallyof the Act. The council had since taken counsel's opinion as to the advisa ing as to whether they should go on with the appeale. He hoped they would, bility of carrying the case to the House of Lords, from which the following is and therefore moved that the society do prosecute this appeal to the House of an extract :
Lords. “We consider that the judgment of the Court of Appeal reduces the question Mr. OSBALDESTON seconded the motion. to one point-viz., whether, in doing what they did, the defendants acted as Mr. Paine (vice-president) thought it right to state to the meetiog that there proctors. If they did not act as proctors, we consider that it might, on the | were two sides to the question, especially as it did not touch a very large prosame principle, be held that in attending summonses at chambers, they would portion of the profession at all. He was not a London agent or a country not act as solicitors. We are still of opinion that the relation of master and solicitor, but it touched a London agent one way, and a country solicitor, who servant must subsist between a clerk and a solicitor in order to enable the chose to resort to the practice complained of, another, and if there were any former to be the alter ego of the latter for the purpose of the solicitor's acts, culpability it was on the part of the country solicitor, and not the law stationer and, having regard to the importance of the principle at issue, we advise an against whom they were proceeding. He wished the members of the society appeal, and think there is a very fair prospect of success."
to be aware that there were serious difficulties. They had the unanimous *The circular conyening the meeting stated that the council, acting on this opinion of the Court of Appeal, composed of three learned judges, which was opinion, had taken the necessary steps towards appealing to the House of given right off. It seemed to bim, by the admissions which their counsel bad, Lords, but before proceeding further they thought it right to take the opinion no dou bt, properly made, that the judges could not come to any other conof the general body of the members on the subject.
clusion. They rightly held that the stationer was a clerk to the solicitor. The PRESIDENT said : Gentlemen, this is the second special general meet. All the proceedings were taken in the solicitor's name, and with the ing we have had this year, being the commencement of a new régime. The greatest possible deference to the very eminent counsel they bad consulted, the present meeting is convened, as you will have learned from the circular, to chances were very much against their succeeding on the appeal. If they did consider the course we are to pursue in the actions we have brought against not succeed, twelve months hence they would have spent $1,500, and be just Messrs. Waterlow and Messrs. Shaw & Blake, by reason of their transacting, where they were at present. As one of the trustees of the members' interests, through their clerks, that which we have been advised is solicitors' business. he thought it his duty to bring this before them,
Mr. FINCH entirely agreed with the general observations of Mr. Keen. They Court of Appeal. Mr. Keen had spoken of law stationers attending summonses. were met to consider a proceeding which involved the outlay of a consider. Such cases would have strengthened the matter very much, but here, un. able sum of money, and he thought they should consider whether they were fortunately, it was confined to the action of certain law stationers who were, likely to succeed in the appeal. They had the unanimous opinion of the in the first instance, set in motion by the country solicitors, and it was, at Court of Appeal, and he thought it was a good decision, and had not heard least, a debateable question whether the acts complained of were not merely anything to bring him to the conclusion that it was not. Tbe two cases pre- ministerial acts that could be done by any messenger or agent. He thought sented to the Court of Appeal involved very distinct propositions. First, they they would lose ground morally if they failed in these actions, and they had embraced the action of country solicitors employing London law stationers to better follow counsel's advice and carry them to the House of Lords. do certain work ; and, secondly, they involved the action of London solicitors Mr. H. H. RICHARDSON suggested that they should accept the decision of employing law stationers to do work, which were very distinct questions. A the Court of Appeal and go to Parliament and obtain an Act for preventing further point was whether the work done was or was not a proceeding under the injury complained of. As the society's balance-sheet, recently put into the Act. The judges were unanimous in saying it was a proceeding in a court. the bands of the members, showed that the balance at the bankers was reduced That being so, the inference was-and the judges referred to t—that the from what it was last year, he thought they should have a special fund for country solicitors were dearred from employing any but London solicitors to the purpose of proceeding, should the meeting arrive at the determination to do that which their London agents could do. That seemed a fair decision, carry on the appeal. It would not be fair that the general body of the mem. The other point was as to whether or not the law stationers employed were bers should be taxed for the special behoof of the proctors. He thought acting as proctors. He could not see how anyone, looking at it in the light those gentlemen had brought it upon themselves by their own misconduct. of common sense, could for a moment doubt that the law stationer employed They charged country solicitors for work which they did not do, and wanted by a solicitor, the solicitor's name being upon the papers, was acting simply to share in the fees for affidavits which they never drew. as an agent or clerk, and would go back to the solioitor for further information.
Mr. OsBALDESTON observed that if the society went to the Legislature as The law stationer so acting in the mere administration of mechanical func.
suggested, for an Act of Parliament, they would be met with the inquiry, tions
" Why haven't you been to the House of Lords ?". Mr. KEEN.-Not mecbánical.
Mr. PRITCHARD, as a member of an old proctorial firm, denied that the Mr. FINCH.—They are so stated in the decision ; I am merely
proctors acted as had been stated. He had never, in all his experience, quoting.
known a proctor to charge for work which had not been done by him. It Mr. Keen,-The decision is wrong.
appeared to him that none of the speakers had touched upon the main subject, Mr. Finch could not see wbat the solicitors had to complain of in that if they permitted the judgment to stand as it was at present, they would be respect. He was not a London agent and, therefore, perhaps, did not take letting in the thin end of the wedge, and they would be having the unquali. that degree of interest or exhibit that degree of prejudice which might other-fied persons trying how far they could go, and thus bringing upon them an wise be the case ; but if he had been he did not see what they had to complain amount of litigation which they would not be able to prevent. If Mr. Finch of. The country solicitors, with this decision before them, surely would no had proved his case that a solicitor, if he pleased, could say to a law stationer, longer go on employing law stationers in this way. The judges had hinted " Do this and do that," and the law stationer would become his clerk for the at ihe fact that a country solicitor may be liable to a penalty if he does; and purpose of doing it, why could not be send up a law stationer to issue & writ ? after such a rule had been laid down for their guidance would they set it at He would be his clerk for the time being. It was of the greatest importance naught ? He did not believe it, and, until they did, he would not believe to the profession at large that any attempt to interfere with the privilege it; and if they did, instead of going against the law stationer, the society solicitors poggessed of practising in the courts should be stamped out. should go against the country solicitor. He thought it a gerious thing for Mr. E. LONGMORE (Hertford) thought there should be no question between the society to take a case from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. the London and country solicitors. He very much regretted that there He had not seen anything to induce bim to think that the decision would be shoold be any solicitors so regardless of the interests of their profession as to reversed. Here was an opinion quoted in the circular:-“We consider that put law stationers in a position to act in these matters. Country solicitors the judgment of the Court of Appeal reduces the question to one point-viz., bad a slight excuse that they saved their pockets, but that any London soli. whether in doing what they did the defendants acted as proctors." He citor should act in this way was to him extraordinary. The great difficulty asked bow any of them, after reading that, thought they could persuade the of the country solicitor at a great distance from the office was to obtain a knowHouse of Lords to declare that the law stationers were acting as prootors in ledge of the correct form of practice, and a law stationer on the spot was doing this work? Then the opinion continued—“If they did not act as better able to ascertain the proper form of affidavit and so on than a country proctors, we consider that it migbt, on the same principle, be held that in solicitor many miles away. He believed that affidavits were frequently preattending summonses at chambers they would not act as solicitors." Apy.
pared by the law stationers and sent to the country solicitor to be sworn. The thing more far-fetched and fallacious than an allusion to the attendance at cham cases brought forward were not so strong as might have been procured, and bers he did not know. Attendances at chambers were for the purpose of doing he was inclined to think law stationers did much more than they admitted in only that which a skilled person could do. They did not send a commission. their defence that they had done. It seemed to him perfectly clear that the aire to argue the summonses at chambers, but if they wanted to send one to relationship of master and servant must exist in order to enable an unquali. Somerset House with their papers why should they be debarred from doing it?fied person to do the acts of the only person entitled to perform them under Then the opinion said :-"We are still of opinion that the relation of master this Act. There was one argument of Sir Hardinge Giffard's that had not and servant must subsist between a clerk and a solicitor in order to enable the been adequately dealt with in the judgments, and that was that the country former to be the alter ego of the latter for the purpose of the solicitor's acts,” solicitor was not qualified at all to go into the Court of Probate, and surely He felt quite sure that overybody in the room, when his business was pressing, if a law stationer acted in the Court of Probate for the country solicitors ho must have seat out to a law stationer, and have said, “Send me an extra acted in the names of persons not duly qualified to appear there. If this hand or two," and was not be, for the time, a clerk to the solicitor? The decision is law, there will be nothing to prevent country solicitors employing stationer charges the time of the man, and the solicitor made out his bill to their law stationers to do all their London agents at present do for them. bis client and charged for his time as a clerk. He had been a little misled! Mr. TAYLOR remarked tbat if it was the opinion of the council that nothing in the matter. He had read the statements in the annual reports, which he whatever could be done by a solicitor except through his clerk, that was had no doubt were conscientiously and fairly given, and no doubt his want of entirely opposed to the opinion he had always entertained, and if that was tbe intelligence had misled him. In the report for 1880 he found this statement :- only ground for the opinion they had formed it was one that could not meet “ In the last annual report, the council adverted to the irregular practice of with the approval of the meeting. If these solicitors were liable, whether emploging law stationers to transact non-contentious business in the Probate country or not, the council should proceed against them; if they were not Division of the High Court, for and in the name of solicitors, on terms of re- liable, then they could, by legislative enactment, be made liable, but it seemed muneration or agency." Of course, if the law stationer was remunerated as an to him they would be uselessly throwing away money to prosecute the appeal. agent that was a serions matter ; but they had it on the case before the Court Let them consider what the result would be when the decision of the Court of of Appeal that there was nothing of the kind. The law stationer did not | Appeal was confirmed, as undoubtedly it would be. Would not their position charge agency, but merely a small fee in remuneration for the time that he be then much worse? They had already gone a very expensive way to work had been employed. But they were not there to discuss the morale of the in employing an outside solicitor instead of doing the work through their thing or the general conduct of law stationers. They must keep their minds secretary close to the case before them, and reading the judgment and the case, and Mr. Å. H. BURNE, speaking as a country solicitor, could say for bimself seeing that tbe facts were not in dispute, he had a very strong impression that that he had never employed a law stationer to go to Somerset House for the the House of Lords would not reverse the judgment, and what were the society purpose in question, or for residuary accounts, or for anytbing else. Country going to get for it? He, for one, did not wish to be debarred from sending a solicitors had every facility for sending such accounts as could be posted law stationer to Somerset House, or even a commissionaire, and if the country through the post. Their own clerks wrote the letters, and if the judge of the solicitors were doing that which was a just matter of complaint according to Probate Court, with the assistance of the Treasury, would give them the samo the decision, they were probably liable to a penalty, and, if that was so, let facility for proving wills by correspondence as they possessed in the district them be proceeded against. The law stationer was not the proper party to be registries, all this which was complained of would be at an end. Of course, in attacked.
the cases referred to by Mr. Keen, where explanations were necessary, the clerk Mr. BROMLEY could not help wishing that the council had kindly taken the or the principal or the London agent must attend, but these cases were members into their confidence before commencing this action, which was a extremely rare. He believed it would be a perfectly foregone conclusion that grave step to take. They ought to have set out carefully the strongest cases the council would be beaten. that could be instanced, or waited for stronger cases, if necessary, before they Mr. H. E. GRIBBLE thought that two questions were being mixed up. It instituted proceedings. He was sure, however, that the council had not acted was open to them individually to discuss whether they would be beaten or without consideration. They had instituted the proceedings, and they had successful, but as a body they must rely upon the opinions of the eminent been prosecuted to a certain point, and it was now a distinct question whether counsel they had consulted. It was certainly as much for the interest of tho they should not follow the proceedings to the House of Lords. The council country as the London solicitors that this thin end of the wedge should be were asking the members for an indemnity for the past and for their sanction kept out, therefore he would decidedly vote for the council being guided by the for the steps to be taken in the future. He thought it wise that the proceed- opinion of their counsel. ings should not be abandoned, but that they should be carried to the highest Mr. WOODWARD supported the resolution. He thought they ought to do
their utmost to stamp out the encroachments of law stationers. A proposal the present House of Commons, or any other House of Commons, would be had been made to him a few weeks since by a well-known West of England in favour of extending the monopoly of the solicitor profession ? Every firm of solioitors that an equally well-known firm of law stationers should single committee that had sat in the Houses of Parliament upon any legal attend at his office to settle the transfer of a mortgage.
question at all had given most undoubted proof that they were of opinion that
tben Mr. T. CLARKSON argued that if the solicitors could go and get this adven. titious aid of law stationers, why not then that of accountants and the number
Mr. Keen, in reply, observed that the council had taken the members fully of other people who were always anxious to do the work of solicitors without
into their confidence in 1879, and told them they were going to try the being properly qualified. There never was a time when there were so many question, and the members all agreed to it. Everything was laid before attacks on the solicitors as the present, and it beloved the members to do all counsel ; the cases were most carefully selected, and everything done in the they could to put a stop to them. He had observed an advertisement in the most careful manner possible. Since these actions had taken place the Times of that day as follows :-"Lawyers' costs. A qualified gentleman of
council had received a letter from Mr. Freshfield to the effect that a large large experience is prepared, without payment, to investigate solicitors' bills of
business was being done in distringas by law stationers. That was what was costs, whether paid or not, and to recover overcharges possibly given up by
coming, and therefore what he wished to say was that if they did not take town or country clients as lost.” It had been suggested that they would not actions in matters of this kind a blow would be struck at the usefulness of succeed in their appeal. They should not allow themselves to be debarred
the society wbich could not be exaggerated. from carrying it on for that reason. There were grounds for appealing, as they
The motion was then put and carried by an overwhelming majority, only had been advised by their eminent counsel, and he thought it would be but | six hands being held up against it. the proper course, out of respect to that opinion, to proceed.
Mr. F. R. PARKER said this was not the time to discuss whether the council were right in entering upon the course they had adopted ; the proper time for
SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIA TION. so doing was when the council had reported it year by year. He very much
The twenty-second anniversary festival of the Solicitors’ Benevolent Assodoubted whether it was wise to start it originally, but, having arrived at its
ciation was held at the Star and Garter Hotel, Richmond, on Wednesday, Mr. present stage, he thought they would be both cowardly and foolish if they did
FRANCIS THOMAS BIRCHAM presiding. About 100 guests sat down to dinner, not take the matter to the highest court. He agreed that they might be
amongst whom were the President of the Incorporated Law Society, U.K. (Mr. beaten, but that would not be any misfortune, for it would pave the way to C. C. Druce), the President of the Hull Law Society, the President of the Camfurther legislation if it be needed. This was about the most important litiga- bridgeshire Law Society, the President of the Bury Law Society, Mr. John tion the society had ever started, and it ought never to be left as it was. It | Pearson. Mr. Gordon Whitbread. Mr. Joseph Dodds, M. P.. Mr. E. Waugh, was of even greater importance to the country than to the London solicitors. | M.P., Rev. J. G. Lloyd, M.A., Chairman of Board (Mr. P. Rickman), DeputyHe did not know if all those present were aware of the manner in which Chairman of Board (Mr. H. T. Sankey), Mr. Arnold W. White, Mr. Samuel these stationers obtained their work. Certainly the country solicitors did Bircham, Mr. H. Roscoe, Mr. Major Bircham, Mr. N. T. Lawrence, Mr. employ them, but they did so at the instance of a very pressing messenger or W.J. Farrer, Mr. E. J. Bristow, Mr. J. Mackrell, Mr. W. M. Walters, Mr. traveller sent round by tbe law stationers, and he knew of a firm who actually P. B. Brown, Mr. W. W. Woolnough, Mr. W. F. Blandy, Mr. G. Keen, employed a solicitor to travel in the country to obtain orders. Could a solici. Mr. F. T. Veley, Mr. T. W. Budd, Mr. T. H. Budd, Mr. S. Harris, Mr. tor descend to a lower stage? He did not think he could, and he thought E. W. Holt, Mr. E. Wason, Mr. H. Sowton, Mr. T. Skewes-Cox, Mr. C. Burt, that he, as well as the law stationer, should be put down. If the deoision of Mr. H.J. Francis, Mr. H. C. J. Groves, Mr. G. E. Steward, Mr. F. W. Steward, the Court of Appeal was right it amounted to this, that it was a licence to Mr. R. Pennington, Mr. J. W. Russell, Mr. W. E. Shirley, Mr. J. C. Barnard, poachers to intrude upon the preserves of solicitors.
Mr. D. C. Taylor, Mr. N. Hanhart, Mr. A. R. Gillman, Mr. E. Low, Mr. H. Mr. J. W. Budd remarked that they were all agreed in one object, and Briggs, Mr. G. R. Dodd, Mr. H. F. Lawes, Mr. H. S. Styan, Mr. J. A. that was by every reasonable means to put an end to the aggression of unau-Rose. Mr. J. H. Kayes, Mr. W. B. Brook, Mr. E. Hedger, Mr. S. Smith, thorized persons upon the privileges of their profession. The sole question was Mr. Í. Lewis, Mr. R. E. Mellersh, Mr. W. H. Roberts, Mr. W. Elgood, Mr. whether it was desirable to prosecute this appeal as one of these means, and R. B. Jones. Mr. R. M. Bower, Mr. J. Tarry, Mr. F. E. Sawyer, Mr. J. he was strongly of opinion that it was undesirable to do so. He was afraid Lidiard, Mr. R. Jones, Mr. A. Windus, Mr. R. Prall, Mr. H. B randon, Mr. that by their own admissions in the action they had put themselves out of R. Pidcock, Mr. H. W. Trinder, &c. court. The case had been very carefully considered by three able judges of " The Queen, the Prince and Princess of Wales, and the other Members of appeal, who had given an unanimous and unhesitating opinion against them upon the Royal Family," having been proposed by the Chairman, and duly the particular point upon which they were asked to appeal. He thought it a honoured, very strong measure to appeal against an unanimous decision of that kind. The CHAIRMAN gave, “The Army, Navy, and Auxiliary Forces,” coupling It must also be borne in mind that the council were the guardians of the money with it the names of Mr. Arnold W. White for the Navy, and Major Bircham of other people, and they had to consider whether the end justified the expen- for the Army, remarking, en passant, that the former gentleman at an early diture which would have to be incurred. He did not hesitate to say that there period of his life had the honour of serving in that branch of the forces for were a great many present who would never advise a client under similar cir- | which he would respond. cumstances to appeal, and he could not help thinking that they would be Mr. White and Major BIRCHAM having acknowledged the toast, acting more wisely to wait until they found some more suitable occasion for Mr. W. MELMOTH WALTERS, in submitting “ The Bench and the Bar," prosecuting the end which they all had in view-namely, the prevention of observed that if the Chairman had claimed their loyalty, as lawyers, for a Aggression upon the profession and this he did not think would be secured toast to Her Majesty the Queen, he (Mr. Walters) could do no less than by prosecuting this appeal.
claim their suffrages, as being loyal to the bench and the bar, for a toast which Mr. J. Moxon CLABON remarked that the simple result of the action would was always received with enthusiasm amongst solicitors. It was true that be that if they were beaten they would not be able next year to pay so much the bench and the bar monopolised the prizes of the profession. The off their mortgage as would otherwise have been the case. The word solicitors were not entitled to those prizes, and therefore they had no feeling "shame” had been mentioned ; he thought it would be a shame if they stopped of envy towards those who were, and when their friends at the bar were in the middle of this action. It would be no shame to be beaten.
raised to the bench there was no feeling amongst the solicitors that they had Mr. JOSEPH DODDS, M.P., said that the council were by no means been wronged thereby, but they were able to rejoice in the promotion and to unanimous on this question, and therefore thought it desirable to take the encourage those who were promoted. The solicitors also felt that, to a certain opinion of the members. Mr. Parker had answered many of the observa extent, these promotions were a recognition of their foresight in discovering tions which had been made with regard to the course adopted by the council, the powers that existed in the individuals who had been raised to the bench, and especially the suggestion that they had come there for an act of and had put them into the positions which had brought them into the foreindemnity. They had done nothing as a council that required an indemnity. | most ranks of the bar, and had thus enabled them to receive promotion. As a country solicitor he might venture to express his own opinion. There The solicitor must be content with a more modest ambition; and he might were cases in the country where it was almost necessary that they should employ well see before him, on entering upon his career, the inscription, “ All hope law stationers. (No, no.) He mast adhere to his opinion. It was a practice abandon ye who enter here.” If he wanted to attain to higher ends he must which ought to be avoided in every case where it was possible, but there were go next door—to the bar. He (Mr. Walters) was not one of those who cases in which the country solicitor should be allowed to exercise bis discre- / would wish that the bar and the solicitor branch of the profession should be tion. But it was not a question whether they should attack the law stationer amalgamated. Each had his own work to do in his own place, and the or the country solicitor, it was simply a question whether, as business men interests of the client, and of the different branches of the profession, and having entered upon a matter of this kind and taken the opinion of the Court of the public generally, were better served by a division of labour than by an of Appeal, they should rest content without having it finally settled as amalgamation, which, in his opinion, would only result in confusion. At a question of law. He did not think there was one among them who would the same time, the solicitors could look calmly on, and, without any feeling not say to a client in similar circumstances, “ You may be beaten, the chances of envy, congratulate their friends who obtained the glittering prizes of the are that you will; but there is a very large stake in it, and you must bave profession. But if the solicitor had not the showy rewards which fell to the the matter settled by the final Court of Appeal.” He ventured strongly to lot of some, he had oftentimes the satisfaction of having won the confidence recommend that they should not stop where they were, but that they should of his client and the esteem of his brethren-no small object of ambition. obtain the decision of the final Court of Appeal, and then consider what These were times of change for the bench and for the bar. They had been course they should pursue.
let alone till 1852 when the Common Law Procedure Act was passed ; but Mr. SALAMAN contended that the issue was whether the solicitors, as a since then there had been the Judicature Acts, New Rules, Acts of Parliament, respectable body, should give way to the law stationers and touters of London. and Amended Acts of Parliament, and all things piled one on top of the If so, let them relinquish the proceedings.
other, till the clearest head had been in a state of confusion; but their Mr. E. KIMBER said that it appeared to him that the question was one friends on the bench had suited themselves to the various circumstances, and between monopolists and the outside public. The solicitors were the found themselves equal to the work which came before them. And he monopolists, and whilst they were so were entitled by every means in might be permitted to say of the bench, that it fully maintained the lustre their power to prevent others from infringing that monopoly. He was not of which had marked it in; previous ages. No age would compare with the opinion that they would succeed in their appeal, but he was of opinion that present in respect to the purity of the administration of justice. Such a thing they ought to fight it. He should like to ask Mr. Dodds whether he thought as corruption was unknown now-a-days. Now-a-days such a thing as the