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employed the defendant Dyer as his solicitor in a former action against the defendant company, in which the company set up a counter-claim. The result of this action was that, under Dyer's advice, the plaintiff accepted some debentures of the company in discharge of his claim against them. The plaintiff subsequently discharged Dyer as his solicitor, and afterwards brought a second action against the company to enforce his debentures, in which action the company intended to set up their former counter-claim, and employed Dyer as their solicitor. The plaintiff alleged that, in acting for him, Dyer had acquired confidential information, the disclosure of which would seriously prejudice the plaintiff in bis action to enforce his debentures, and he therefore claimed an injunction restraining the employment of Dyer, and the communication to the company of any information acquired by him when acting for the plaintiff. Hall, V.C., granted an injunction (ante, pp. 379, 386), restraining the company from employing Dyer as their solicitor. He held that the power of the court to restrain a solicitor from acting against a former client was not confined to cases where the solicitor had discharged himself, but that it extended to cases in which the solicitor had been discharged by the client. In the Court of Appeal, before the appeal had been heard out, the court (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.) suggested an arrangement between the parties, to which they assented, so that no judgment was delivered. But JESSEL, M.R., during the argument, intimated an opinion that the solicitor could not be restrained from acting against his former client in a case in which the client had discharged him without any misconduct on his part. The client could not deprive the solicitor of the means of earning his livelihood. The jurisdiction was founded on breach of trust, and in no case could the solicitor be allowed to communicate to the client's adversary information which he had acquired while he was acting for the client. And JESSEL, M.R., said that the Vice-Chancellor's order had gone further than any of the previous decisions, even those in the Irish court. His lordship also expressed an opinion that the proper course in granting such an injunction was to restrain the solicitor from acting for the new client, not to restrain the new client from employing him.-SOLICITORS, Torr & Co.; Meredith, Roberts, & Mills.

execution and attestation.

BILL OF SALE-REGISTRATION-AFFIDAVIT OF EXECUTION AND ATTESTATION-BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1878, ss. 8, 10.-Ia a case of Ford v. Kettle, before the Court of Appeal on the 26th ult., a question arose as to the construction of section 10 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878. Section 8 of the Act provides that every bill of sale shall be duly attested and registered under the Act, otherwise it shall be deemed fraudulent and void as against (inter alia) execution creditors of the grantor, and, by section 10, "A bill of sale shall be attested and registered under this Act in the following manner:(1) The execution of every bill of sale shall be attested by a solicitor of the Supreme Court, and the attestation shall state that before the execution of the bill of sale the effect thereof has been explained to the grantor by the attesting solicitor; (2) such bill, ... and also a true copy of such bill, and of every attestation of the execution of such bill of sale, together with an affidavit of the time of such bill of sale being made or given, and of its due shall be presented to, and the said copy and affidavit shall be filed with, the registrar within seven clear days after the making or giving of such bill of sale." In the present case a bill of sale of stock-in-trade and furniture was, on the 19th of December, executed by one Hooper in favour of the plaintiff to secure £500. The execution was attested by two witnesses, one of whom was a solicitor and the other was a solicitor's clerk. As regards the solicitor the attestation clause stated that the deed had been "signed, sealed, and delivered" by Hooper "in my presence, the effect hereof having been first explained to him by me." The bill of sale was taken to the office of the Queen's Bench Division for registration on the 20th of December, the affidavit required by section 10 being made by the clerk. It stated that a paper annexed thereto was a true copy of the bill of sale, and of every attestation of the execution thereof; that the deponent was present and saw Hooper duly execute the bill of sale, and that the same was made originally by him on the 19th of December, 1881; that the names or signatures subscribed as the attesting witnesses to the bill of sale were respectively in the proper hand writings of Burbidge (the solicitor) and the deponent, Burbidge being a solicitor of the Supreme Court; and that before the execution of the bill of sale the effect thereof was explained by Burbidge to Hooper. On the 4th of January, 1882, the goods comprised in the bill of sale was seized under an execution on behalf of the defendants, who were creditors of Hooper. The plaintiff claimed the goods under the bill of sale, and the sheriff took out an interpleader sunmons. An issue was directed to try whether the plaintiff or the defendants were entitled to the goods. It was objected by the defendants that the affidavit was not sufficient within section 10, and that, consequently, the bill of sale had not been duly registered, and was void as against them. The issue was tried before Field, J., and a verdict was found for the defendants. The plaintiff applied for a new trial, on the ground that the judge had misdirected the jury, but the application was refused by a divisional court. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) granted a rule nisi for a new trial, and the rule now came on for argument. JESSEL, M.R., said that he much regretted the decision at which he felt compelled to arrive. He was always exceedingly loth to allow a purely technical objection to prevail. At the same time a judge must not allow hard cases to make bad law. When you had an Act which was intended to be very strict, and you found on the fair interpretation of it that a condition which it required for insuring the validity of a bill of sale had not been complied with, the court was not at liberty to depart from the fair meaning of the Act. The form of attestation required by section 8 was not given in the Act, but its substance was given in section 10, which said that a copy of the bill of sale and of the attestation, tegether with an affidavit of (inter alia) the "due execution and attestation" of the bill of sale, were to

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option in the matt r. He must take the affidavit, which was not a preliminary to the registration, but part of the registration itself. The question was whether the affi iavit in this case was in compliance with the Act. The Act said "due execution and attestation." His lordship did not think it mattered whether the word "dua" was there or not, for no mode of execution was pointed out in the Act. The word "due," therefore, could not affect the meaning of the word "execution," and, consequently, it could not affect the meaning of the word "attestation." The word "due " might, therefore, be thrown out of consideration. What, then, did "attestation mean? It was well understood. The ordinary form of attestation of a deed was "signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of" the attesting witness. That was what 'attestation" meant. The thing must be done in the presence of the man who in future would be able to testify that it was done. There was no attestation unless the thing was done in the presence of the attesting witness. The affidavit in the present case did not satisfy this test; it was consistent with it that the solicitor might have come in half an hour after the execution of the deed. It was not sufficient that the attestation clause should state that the solicitor had attested the execution; the Act required an affidavit of this, and here there was no affidavit that he had attested, or that he was present when the deed was executed, or of anything equivalent to that. His lordship quite agreed that, if this was the trial of an action, the court would say that the evidence that the solicitor had attested could not be objected to, and would infer that no one would have had the courage to make such an affidavit if the solicitor had not been present. But that argument only came to this-that if there were no Act of Parliament, you might infer that that had been done which the affidavit did not say was done. And his lordship did not see the answer to the argument that you could not indict a man for perjury because you chose to draw a wrong inference from what he had said. If the Act required a certain safeguard it could not be dispensed with. It appeared to his lordship, though he came to the conclusion reluctantly, that the affidavit was not sufficient, and the rule must be discharged, with costs. LINDLEY, L.J., said that it was essential to "attesta tion that the attesting witness should be present and have the opportunity of observing what was done. The affidavit must, therefore, show that the attesting witness way present. The affidavit here did not show this. The objection, but the words of the Act must be followed.-SOLICITORS, F. R. court could not strain the words of the Act. This was a wretched technical Wright; Ford & Ford.

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SHERIFF-FI. FA.-WRONGPUL Seizure-ACTION BY OWNER OF GOODSINTERPLEADER-COSTS.-In a case of Hilliard v. Hanson, before the Court of Appeal on the 26th ult., a question arose as to the costs of an action brought against a sheriff by the owner of goods which the sheriff had seized under a writ of fi. fa., issued against another person. The writ was issued against the goods of a son who lived in the house of his father. The son had no goods there, except some wearing apparel. The sheriff's officer seized this, and also the goods of the father. goods seized (other than the wearing apparel) were his property, and not the The father gave a verbal notice to the officer that the son's. The sheriff then took out an interpleader summons, but before this sammons could be heard the father commenced an action against the sheriff alone, and applied to Hall, V.C., for an injunction to restrain the sheriff from remaining in possession of the plaintiff's goods, and from removing or selling them. Hall, V.C., granted the injunction. The sheriff appealed, and the Court of Appeal ordered the sheriff to withdraw, on the terms of £48 being paid into court to answer the execution, and the further hearing of the appeal was adjourned. When the appeal came on again it was stated that, on the hearing of the interpleader summons, the execution creditor had admitted that the goods which had been seized, with the exception of the wearing apparel, were the property of the father. The only question then remaining was as to the costs. JESSEL, M.R., said that the case was of considerable importance with regard to the procedure under executions. The execution creditor had directed the sheriff to seize all the goods in the father's house, and the sheriff seized them accordingly. There was no ground for alleging that there had been any abuse of the powers of the sheriff or any misconduct on his part of that of his officers. There was no reason why, on the interpleader summons, if no action had been brought, the judge should not make the ordinary order that no action should be brought against the sheriff. But, the action having been commenced, the form of the order would be to stay the proceedings in it. That, however, would not dispose of the costs. His lordship thought that the Vice-Chancellor ought not to have turned the sheriff out of possession without hearing the execution creditor, who ought either to have been made a party to the action or to have been served with notice of it. It was he who was really disputing the title to the goods. The order was, however, right in fact, as it turned out that the goods were the goods of the father, and the sheriff costs. If there were no interpleader he would have to pay costs, as having was really a trespasser. His lordship did not see how the sheriff could get any been in the wrong throughout. But as the sheriff had not acted improperly, his lordship did not see why he should be deprived of the protection he would otherwise have had, merely because the owner of the goods had commenced his action before the interpleader summons. The court ought to show its disapproval of the plaintiff's conduct in bringing the action prematurely by giving him no costs. It could not go further than that. The injunction would be dissolved, but no costs of the motion would be given in either court. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the action was vexatious and premature. The right course would have been to wait to see the result of the interpleader.-SOLICI TORS, W. R. A. Kime; W. Maynard.

POWER-CONSTRUCTION-FRAUDULENT EXERCISE PORTIONS FOR CHILD. REN-POWER TO CHARGE ON LAND-VESTING-RAISABILITY-DEATH OF be filed with the registrar. That was the registration. The registrar had no Appeal reversed the decision of Kay, J., in the case of Henty v. Wrey (30 APPOINTEE BEFORE PERIOD FOR RAISING.-On (the 19th ult., the Court of

W. R. 317, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 492). The questions were whether a power given to a tenant for life under a settlement of real estate to charge portions for younger children on the estate had been validly exercised, and, if it had, whether, under the circumstances, some of the portions were raisable. The tenant for life had power, in case he should have three or more children, other than an eldest or only son for the time being entitled under the limit. tions of the settlement to an estate in tail male in remainder expectant on his father's death, to charge the estates, by deed or will, with the sum of £10,000 for the portions of such three or more children. By a deed, dated the 17th of March, 1828, the father charged the estate with the raising and paymeat of £10,000 for the portion or portions of his three infant daughters (the only children he then had) to be a vested interest in them respectively immediately on the execution of the deed, and to be paid and payable at such times and in such proportions as the father should by deed or will appoint, and, in default of appointment, to be paid to such children respectively, share and share alike, at twenty-one, or on marriage, which should first happen, if it should happen after the father's death, but, if it should happen in his lifetime, then the portions should be postponed until after his death, unless he should consent to their being raised in his lifetime. This deed also contained a power for the father to vary or absolutely revoke the appointments therein contained and to make other appointments. By a deed dated the 10th of July, 1832 (indorsed on the last deed) the father charged the estates with the payment of £10,000 for the portions of his three daughters, to be a vested interest in them respectively immediately on the execution of the deed, and to be paid to them as mentioned in the deed of the 17th of March, 1828. The eldest daughter afterwards married. The other two died, one aged fifteen, in the year 1836, the other, aged eighteen, in the year 1845. In consequence of their deaths, their father, as their next-of-kin, became entitled to their interest in the £10,000. He never had any other children. On the 30th of August, 1851, he executed a deed by which he appointed that £5,000, part of the £10,000, should be raised and paid, immediately after his death, to the married daughter for her separate use. On the 22nd of November, 1851, a deed was executed, to which the father and the daughter and her husband were parties, by which in order to remove any doubt whether, by reason of the absence of a botchpot clause from the former deed, she was not entitled to share in the £5,000, the remainder of the £10,000 which was unappointed, she and her husband joined with the father in assigning the unappointed £5,000 to two trustees, on trust absolutely for the father, as part of his personal estate, in case he should survive his wife. This event happened. On the 23rd of August, 1875, the father, in consideration of £3,000 paid to him by the plaintiff, assigned to the plaintiff the moiety of the £10,000 to which he was entitled under the above deeds. And by the deed of assignment he entered into an absolute covenant with the plaintiff for quiet enjoyment. The father died on the 11th of September, 1879. This action was brought by the purchaser, claiming to have the £5,000 which had been assigned to him raised out of the estate, and, in the alternative, if the court should be of opinion that it was not raisable, damages against the estate of the father for breach of covenant. Kay, J., held that on the deaths of the two daughters their interests in the £10,000 fell into the estate and became not raisable, and that, consequently, the plaintiff had no title to any part of the appointed fund. But his lordship held that the plaintiff was entitled to prove against the estate of the father for £3,000, the amount of his purchase-money, with interest thereon. His lordship treated the case of Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour (1 B. C. C. 394) as an authority for the proposition that a portion charged on real estate is not raisable if the child to whom it is appointed dies before the period fixed for raising it, even though the portion has become vested under the terms of the appointment. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ.) reversed the decision. JESSEL, M. R., had, during the argument, sent for the record of Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour, from which it appeared that Brown's report was inaccurate in statement, and his lordship showed, by quoting Lord Eldon's remarks in McQueen v. Farquhar (11 Vesey, 479), and in the case of the Queensberry Leases (1 Bligh, 397), that there were other omissions, and that the ground upon which Lord Thurlow proceeded had probably been misunderstood. The true ground was that the power in that case had, in fact, been fraudulently exercised. The father there had exercised the power by appointing to a daughter who was "at death's door in a consumption," as Lord Eldon said, in order that he might take out administration on her death, and obtain the appointed property for himself. On the whole, his lordship thought there was a balance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that Lord Thurlow had, in fact, based his judgment on the fraudulent exercise of the power. Lord Eldon and Lord St. Leonards favoured that view, while Lord Hatherley, in Lady Wellesley v. Lord Mornington (1 Jur. N. S. 1202), and Sir Anthony Hart, in Edgeworth v. Edgworth (1 Beatty, 334), were against it. Lord Eldon would probably have learnt the facts of the case in his own practice. The case was decided in 1784, at which time there was very few counsel practising in the Court of Chancery. The result was that Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour was not an authority for the supposed rule of law. In his lordship's opinion the power was well exercised in this case. There was no evidence that the father thought his children would die when he appointed to them, and his lordship was shocked at such a suggestion. It was the appointment of 1832, not that of 1828, which must be considered, and it was not difficult to see that the mode of vesting was directed in order to benefit the children. LINDLEY, L.J., was of opinion that, on the true construction of the power, the appointment was warranted by it. The power authorized an appointment by deed, revocable or irrevocable, or will, and it expressly authorized the donee to exercise his own judgment, not only as to the time when the appointed fund should be made to vest, but also as to the time when it should be made payable. It would not be right to construe the power more restrictively than its objects and its words required, especially having regard to the fact that there was no provision for the maintenance of the children in default of appointment. The appointor had the choice whether he would appoint by deed or will, and in the

absence of evidence of fraud the court could not control his choice as to that, or as to the time of vesting of the fand. The next question was whether the appointment was invalid by reason of its being a fraud on the power. By a "fraud" his lordship understood an abuse of the power, or, in other words, an exercise of it for some purpose different from that for which it was conferred. In the present case there was no evidence of any fraud or abuse, apart from the documents and the state of the appointor's family, and from these materials alone his lordship could not come to the conclusion that the power had been exercised otherwise than bona fide for the benefit of the children who were its proper objects. Fraud or improper motives ought not to be presumed; they must be prove d. The third question was whether, assuming the appointment to be valid, the portions of the two children who died under twenty-one ever became raisable. There certainly were many cases in the books, and expressions both in judgments and in writings of authors of celebrity, which tended to show that, where portions for children are charged on real estate, and the children die in infancy (and if daughters unmarried), bafore the time for raising the portions has arrived, the portions not being required are not raisable, and sink into the inheritance for the benefit of the owners of the land on which they were charged. The language of Lord Thurlow in Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour, as reported in 1 B. C. C. 394, was in favone of this view, and other language to the same effect was to be found in other cases collected in Edgeworth Edgeworth. The judgment of Key, J., in the present case was evidently influenced by these decisions and expressions of opinion, and it became important to examine the subject, and to a certain the grounds and the limits of the supposed doctrine. An examination of the authorities would show that the question under consideration was intimately connected with the question of construction, and that there was considerable danger of confusion and error if they were not examined separately. His lordship then referred to a number of the older authorities, in which he said that the reason why a portion charged on land was held not to be raisable was, not that it was not wanted, but that it had not vested before the death of the person entitled to it. In other cases about the same date, in which portions charged on land were held to have vested, the portions were held to be raisable, although in some of them the persons entitled to the portions had died too young to require the money. Having carefully examined all the older anthorities bearing on the subject, his lordship could find nothing, unless it was Lord Hinchinbroke. Seymour, which warranted the notion that a portion, charged on land and vested, was not to be raised if the person entitled to it died before he might want it. His lordship then referred to four cases, which he said were the most important of the modern decisions-viz., Edgeworth v. Edgeworth; Keily v. Keily (2 D. & W. 38); Remnant v. Hood (2 D. F. & J. 396); Davies v. Huguenin (1 H. & M. 730). His lordship said that there was, no doubt, considerable difficulty in reconciling all the authorities on the question when a portion charged on land vested, and when it did not, and the court had often struggled, even against the words of an instrument, in order to avoid coming to the conclusion that a portion charged on land in favour of a child vested before that child attained twenty-one or married. This was the true explanation of the observations in Edgeworth v. Edgeworth, Remnant v. Hood, and Davies v. Huguenin. But, when once the conclusion was arrived at that the portion was vested, there was no conflict of authority with respect to the right to have it raised. In the present case the period of vesting was plainly fixed, and there was no difficulty on that point, if the appointment was authorized by the power, which, for the reasons already stated, his lordship held that it was. With respect to Lord Hinchinbroke v. Seymour, his lordship was unable to reconcile it with the other authorities, except on one of two suppositions-viz, either that the appointment was not authorized by the power, if properly construed, or that the appointment was a distinct fraud on the power. By reason of the well-known illness of the appointee, Lord Eldon, in 11 Ves. 479, and 1 Bligh, 397, understood the case to have proceeded on the latter ground; so apparently did Lord St. Leonards (4 D. & W. 55). Brown, however, did not mention this, nor did he notice the important fact that there was a provision for the daughter and her maintenance in default of appointment, which might materially affect the construction of the power. This fact was surmised by, although not known to, Mr. Chance, who had made some valuable comments on the case in his excellent work on Powers (vol. 1, p. 463, et seq.). The decision in that case was plainly correct, though, owing to the way in which it was reported, its grounds had been misunderstood on some occasions. His lordship said that, from a careful examination of all the authorities which he had examined, he had arrived at the following results (1) That powers to appoint portions charged on land ought, if their language was doubtful, to be construed so as not to authorize appointments vesting those portions in the appointees before they wanted them-i.e., before they attained twenty-one, or (if daughters) married. (2) That when the language of the power was clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to it. (3) That when, upon the true construction of the power and the appointment, the portion had not vested in the lifetime of the appointee, the portion was not raisable, but sank into the inheritance. (4) That when, upon the true construction of both instruments, the portion had vested in the appointee, it was raisable, eveu although the appointee died under twenty-one, or (if a daughter) unmarried. (5) That appointments vesting portions charged on land in children of tender years, who died soon afterwards, were looked on with suspicion, and very little additional evidence of improper motive or object would induce the court to set aside the appointment, or treat it as invalid, but that without some additional evidence the court could not do so. Apply. ing these principles to the present case, his lordship was of opinion that the appointment was valid, and that the decision of Kay, J., must be reversed.SOLICITORS, Hadden, Woodward, & McLeod; Morice & Toller; Warry, Robins, & Co.

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APPEARING AND OPPOSING-CONTINUATION OF PROCEEDINGS.-In the case of In re The Capital Fire Insurance Association (Limited), before Chitty, J., on the 24th ult., a petition for the winding up of the company was presented by a creditor whose debt in support of the petition consisted of a claim for advertising the company, and the question raised was whether the debt was the debt of the company or of its promoters. CHITTY, J., said that a tradesman who desired to deal in a strictly business-like way with a company should only execute orders on the receipt of a communication from the authorized hand of the company-namely, from its board of directors, by its proper officer, such as the secretary to the company. It was, however, no doubt usual for advertisement agents to accept orders from promoters. It often happened that promoters gave orders and pledged their individual credit in the expectation of being relieved from the liability thus incurred when the company was founded, and it was apparent in such a case that the advertisement agent could only enforce payment by proceeding against the promoters individually, and not by proceeding against the company after it was founded. In the present case he was of opinion that the petitioner looked to the promoters and not to the company for payment. A great mistake was often made by tradesmen dealing with promoters, for they thought that they would be entitled to have the benefit of any agreement between the promoters and the company. That was not so. The petition must be dismissed, with costs. His lordship held also, with reference to the costs to be paid by the petitioner, that there must be one set for the company opposing, another set for share holders appearing and opposing, and a third set for creditors appearing and opposing.-SOLICITORS, Brandons; Halse, Trustram, & Co.; Beall; Stoneham & Co.; Greenfield & Abbott.

THE LATE LORD JUSTICE HOLKER. On Friday week, in the Court of Appeal at Westminster, LORD COLERIDGE, on taking his seat, said:-I feel that being present here with you to-day, I am rather here for the purpose of inviting you to express your respect for the character of him whom we have lost-your estimate of his great powers and your sorrow for his loss-than to express my own. Not as I am sure I need hardly say that I do not feel sorrow, deep and true, but that you, especially the Solicitor-General and some others whom I see here, know him much better than I did, and your opportunities of judging of his character and powers were far larger than the chances of the profession brought to my share. Yet, as I am here, perhaps this very circumstance is not without its value, because it enables me to give independent and peculiar testimony to the quickness and the greatness of his professional success. For I myself left the bar late in 1873, and at that time Sir John Holker had hardly had opportunities of being heard in the House, and was little known in the courts in London, though I knew that at that time he was very eminent on his own circuit. But now, after the lapse of scarcely more than eight years, we are met together to lament over the loss of a man who, in the meanwhile, had filled, with universal applause, the offices of Solicitor-General and Attorney-General, and who, at the time of his death, stood, by universal consent, in the very first rank of the profession, both as an advocate and as a lawyer. Looking back over my own recollections, I cannot call to mind another instance of profes sional success at once so rapid and so enduring. And you and I know perfectly well that the fame he won was fairly won, and that he well deserved to win it. For you and I know the profession to which we all belong, and if it judges, as it does judge, generously, it almost always judges justly, and if it agrees, as in the case of Sir J. Holker, unanimously to respect and admire, it is because he was known to be worthy of its admiration and respect. But it is not only-nor, perhaps, chiefly-the great advocate and the sound lawyer whose loss we lament to-day; it is the friend, the com panion, the simple, genial man, whose memory will live as long as any of us live, and who bas left behind him a void which cannot adequately be filled. I myself know some-very likely some of those I address know many moreacts of generous, almost parental kindress, done by him-simply, unpretendingly, with no ostentation, without effort, without display, and, so far as he was concerned, apparently almost as a matter of course. And I do believe that there never beat a kindlier beart in any human breast. I do believe that a truer and manlier nature than Sir John Holker's never existed among men. He is gone from us, and we who are left behind must recollect what he was. No success ever spoilt him, no elevation ever puffed him up; he remained the same quiet, simple, unpretending man, unassuming, without an atom of vanity, or selfishness, or even self-assertion. Let it be forgiven if among the friends, by whom it will be understood, I use the kindly and endearing name by which we all knew him so well-he was the same "Jack Holker" from the beginning to the end. But it is not only in these aspects; it is also as a judge we have to consider him. The short time be spent upon the bench was spent in illness, in sickness, in pain; in the decay, not of his mental, but his physical powers, under infirmities which rendered the effort to use his mental powers sometimes almost greater than he could endure. What he would have been ultimately as a judge it is not possible for any of us to say, and in that regard he must remain one of those "heroes of unfulfilled renown," of whom there are so many in life, and whose fate must fall on any thoughtful man who looks on the destinies of his race, if perhaps with hope, certainly with grave sadness. Mr. Gladstone, who is no bad judge in such matters, is known to have said of him that he considered him one of the very closest and most fearless of legal reasoners he had ever listened to; and I know that it Was to Sir John Holker a singular and peculiar gratification that the just recognition of his great professional eminence came from one who had no peculiar bias to disturb his judgment in his favour. Certainly, if sense and learning; if vigorous understanding and accurate language; if strong grasp of facts and principles; if transparent honesty of purpose; if sweetness of temper, and unwearied courtesy, and

consideration for every human being who came in contact with him; if these things are as they are great qualities of a judge, these great qualities he had in the largest and amplest measure. We may regret; we may grieve that the exercise of these great powers has been cut short by a power which cannot be resisted; but he has left behind him an unstained reputation; he has left behind him a memory which will live and be cherished by us as long as life is spared to us; and, if we mourn, as we all do, his loss-it is at least left to us, as best we may, to strive to imitate his virtues. The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (the Solicitor-General and the whole of the members of the bar present rising with him) said :-My Lord Chief Justice has referred to the position which Sir John Holker occupied on the bench; but he had so recently left us that we feel as if he had fallen out from our ranks and lain himself down and gone to his rest. He had been among us in his familiar presence in the every-day work of our professional life so long and so constantly that we found it difficult to realize the fact that he was no longer one of us. During that time, while on the road to high success, leaving many behind him and passing many by, he had the rare good fortune never to raise one feeling of envy or enmity in any man's breast. He never had, he never could have bad, one man to judge him harshly, one man who grudged him his success. The reason was that in all the progress of that success he never would make use of any factitious, any adventitious means, and by the mere strength of his arm and the truth and temper of his blade, he worked his way towards the high position he attained. What he was, all who were associated with him, whether as opponents or as colleagues, whether as contemporaries or juniors, can well bear witness. He never spoke one hard, one hasty word, but always bore himself with kindness and consideration to every one who came in contact with him. My lord has truly said how great an example he has set to every advocate, for while zealous for his clients, he was always just towards his opponents. The Lord Chief Justice has said what all who knew Sir John Holker would have wished to have expressed- no success ever spoilt him, and to the last he was what he was at first-unaffected, simple-minded, kindly, and considerate. But my lord has said these things, and I do but echo his words. One thing only we can do, and that is-while cherishing the memory of a friend who is gone, and while strewing these few flowers upon his grave, to draw from his example the knowledge that plain, straightforward, honest conduct can win much of success and the commendation and admiration of the good and the just among the English public.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
HONOURS EXAMINATION.
April, 1882.

At the examination for honours of candidates for admission on the roll of solicitors of the Supreme Court, the examination committee recommended the following gentlemen as being entitled to honorary distinction :First Class.

In the opinion of the committee the standard attained by the candidates does not justify the issue of any first-class list.

Second Class.

[In Alphabetical order.]

George Francis Colborne, B. A., who served his clerkship to Mr. John Edward Ward, and to Mr. Thomas Colborne, of Newport, Monmouth. Edgar Ernest Deane, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Arthur Deane, of Batley, and to Samuel Robinson, of Bradford. Alfred Otho Harnett, who served his clerkship to Mr. Webster Butcher, of London.

John William Hudson, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Walton Berry, of Bradford.

Thomas Ormandy Jackson, who served his clerkship to Mr. Stephen Hart Jackson, of Ulverston.

Joseph Patrick McKenna, who served his clerkship to Mr. Alfred Clement Kent, of Liverpool.

John Tatham Ware, who served his clerkship to Mr. Henry John Ware, of York.

Third Class.

[In Alphabetical order.] Stuart Frederick Bates, who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Spence Watson, of Newcastle-on-Tyne. Charles Frederick Bennett, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Smith, of Sheffield,

Frederick William Boorman, who served his clerkship to Mr. Edward White Bewley, of Gravesend.

Frank Joseph Carr, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Dees & Thompson, of Newcastle-on-Tyne.

Edward Robert Porter Etheredge, who served his clerkship to Mr. Edward Atkinson, of Manchester.

George Murray Hill, B.A., who served his clerkship to Mr. John Wreford Budd, of London.

Leeds.

Harold Bee James, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Warren, of Thomas Ambrose Nelham, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Raven, of London.

Gerard Paxon, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Thomas France Collins, of London.

John Ostler Philpin, who served his clerkship to Mr. Antony Temple, of Kington.

William Latimer Sayer, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Simon Rackham, of Norwich.

Sidney George Spreat, who served his clerkship to Mr. Joseph Addison, of London.

The council have given class certificates to the above-named candidates. The rumber who attended the examination was 52.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.

The following candidates were successful at the Preliminary Examination held on the 10th and 11th of May, 1882 :

Allen, William Edward
Anderson, William
Auden, Thomas Edward
Ayscough-Smith, Hugh H.
Bait es, James Elliott
Bakewell, George
Balden, Samuel Dinsdale
Barrow, Albert Stuart
Barrowclough, John

Beeching, Herbert John
Bell, Robert

Bennett, Ernest William Thomas

Besant, Henry Edgar Robert

Bird, John Arthur

Bird, John William Edwin

Bolton, Walter Septimus

Bostock, Henry

Bostock, Wiliam Masefield

Boucher, Guy Boucher

Brockbank, William Edward

Bromley, Richard

Bunting, Milward Bethick

Burton, Frederick George
Burton, Harry

Canning, Philip Lovell Hampden

Caunter, Henry Lyde
Cavell, Harry St. John
Chaldecott, Francis Miller
Chamberlain, George Harry

Christie, George Norman

Clench, Sidney Augustus
Clough, Robert William
Conolly, John

Cooke, Walter Aiusworth

Coombs, Richard Samuel Gurney

Copnall, Henry Hampton

Cottrell, Charles
Crawshay, G. S.
Cutler, G. H. W.
Daniell, Herbert Basil
Day, John Estcourt
Dixon, Albert Edward
Dixon, Herbert Griffith
Docker, George Dudley
Duke, William Griffiths
Eaton, Arthur Frederic
Evans, Alfred
Fernihough, George
Fletcher, William
Forward, John Adams
Gallaher, Thomas Henry
Gifford, James
Glover, Arthur

Goodwin, Thomas Henry

Gratton, Herbert Sterland
Green, Arthur Gordon
Greenboam, Alfred
Grist, Edward James
Guise, Hubert Charles
Hands, Albert Edward
Hankinson, Richard Cecil
Hardcastle, Melvill Joseph
Harper, James

Harris, Reginald Brunel
Henderson, James Stewart
Hervey, Charles Lionel
Hodgkinson, Edward Dixon
Hodgson, Henry

Horsfall, Frederick Wilson
Howard, William John
Howell, Edward Rawson
Huband, Thomas

Hughes, William

Hulme, Robert Edwards
Isaacs, Alfred Henry
Johnson, Arthur Ambrose
Jones, Ebenezer Gwyn
Jones, Frederick Arthur

Jones, Jobn Parry

Jones, John Thomas
Jones, Watkin

Kent, Frederick Edwin
Kesteven, John Broughton
Kite, Ernest Acton

Koek, Edwin Rowland
Laybourne, Percy
Leach, Ralph Cecil
Lee, Arthur

Lewis, George Herbert

Lilly, Humphrey Chetham
Litchfield, Herbert

Livett, William Bridges
Llewellin, William Cleeves
Lloyd, Frederick Charles
Lloyd-Worth, William Worth
Lucas, Edward
Lumb, George

Markham, Christopher Alexander
Masters, Thomas James Poole
Mathews, Frederic Jobn
Maudsley, Laurence Long
Maugham, George
Mayson, Joseph

Messent, Fraucis Edward
Morton, John Tatham
Mote, William Jabez
Mullock, Richard Arthur
Neve, William

Newton, George Daniel
Nichols, John

Norman, Arthur

North, John Hudson

Owen, John Vulliamy

Palmer, Thomas Joseph Mills
Pearson, Alfred Cross

Peren, Robert Henry
Phillips, Frank
Philipps, John Lewes
Phillips, Hugh Stowell
Phillips, Mark Thomas
Philpott, Thomas Vincent
Pierce, Walter William
Piper, Charles

Poole, Francis Joseph
Preston, Sydney Elliott
Pye, William Edmund
Rawlins, Frederick Percy
Ray, Percy Charles
Rayner, Wilfred
Raywood, Richard

Richardson, William Henshaw
Rickards, Henry James

Roberts, Lewis Jones

Robinson, Frederick Palmerston

Robinson, George Henry
Rorke, George Samuel
Row, Charles

Savory, Arthur Edmund
Savory, John

Saxon, William Kershaw
Scales, William Johnston
Senior, Bernard
Serjeant, Charles
Simmons, Robert
Smith, Charles Arthur
Smith, Harold Seton
Smith, Harry Hall

Smith, Henry

Smyth, Percy Meliss

Southworth, William Turner
Spencer, John Wilson

Stammers, Sidney Joseph Richard
Stoughton, John Arnold

Stoddart, George Robert Douglas
Swarbreck, Thomas

Sweet, Arthur Francis

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Sir CHARLES SYNGE CHRISTOPHER BOWEN, who has been app inted a Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal, in succession to the late Sir John Holker, is the son of the Rev. Christopher Bowen, and was born in 1836. He was educated at Rugby, and was successively scholar and fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. He obtained the Hertford Scholarship in 1855, the Ireland Scholarship and the Chancellor's Prize for Latin verse in 1857, and the Arnold Prize in 1859, and he graduated first class in litere humaniores in 1858. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in 1861, and practised on the Western Circuit. He was for several years recorder of the borough of Penzance, and he was junior common law counsel to the Treasury from 1872 till 1879, when, upon the resignation of Sir John Mellor, he was appointed a judge of the Queen's Bench Division, and received the honour of knighthood. Lord Justice Bowen is a bencher of Lincoln's-inn.

The Right Hon. JOHN DAVID FITZGERALD, LL.D., one of the judges of the Queen's Bench Division in Ireland, who has been appointed an additional Lord of Appeal in Ordinary under the provisions of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, was born in 1816. He is an LL.D. of Trinity College, Dublin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in 1838, when he joined the Munster Circuit. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1847, and he represented Ennis in the Liberal interest from 1852 till 1860. In 1855 he was appointed SolicitorGeneral for Ireland, and in the following year he became Attorney-General, and was sworn in as a member of the Irish Privy Council. He retired with his party in February, 1858, but he returned to office in June, 1859, and in the following year he was appointed a pusne judge of the Court of Queen's Bench:

Mr. JOHN THOMPSON, Q.C., Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, has been appointed Prime Minister for that province.

Mr. THOMAS JOSEPH TEE, solicitor (of the firm of Ashley, Tee, & Son), of 7, Frederick-place, Old Jewry, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. CHARLES HENRY REILLY, barrister, of Calcutta, has been appointed to officiate as Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Legislative Department. Mr. Reilly was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Trinity Term, 1870.

Mr. WILLIAM MARKBY, D.C.L., Reader on Indian law in the University of Oxford, has been elected an Honorary Fellow of All Souls College.

Mr. VICTOR ALEXANDER WILLIAMSON, barrist r, who has been created a Companion of the Order of St. Michael amd St. George, in recognition of his public services in Mauritius ani Fiji, is the son of the late Sir Hedworth Williamson, baronet. He was born in 1838; was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, and was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1865. He was formerly a member of the North-Eastern Circuit.

COMPANIES.

WINDING-UP NOTICES. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

GLOBE ACCIDENT ASSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J, dated May 22, it is ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Wyatt and Barraud, Cannon st, solicitors for the petitioner

HENRY STUART AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by the Vice-Chancellor, dated May 15, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Galloway, Prescot, solicitor for the petitioner

LONDON AND PROVINCIAL TRADERS' WHOLESALE STORES, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before June 28, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to James Waddell, Queen Victoria st. Friday, July 7, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims NATIONAL FUNDS ASSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Chitty, J., has fixed Wednesday, June 7, at 12, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator WYNAAD DISTRICT GOLD MINING COMPANY, LIMITED. - Petition for winding up, presented May 15, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on June 10. Lawrance and Co, Old Jewry chbrs, solicitors for the petitioner

[Gazette, May 26.] ANGLO-UNIVERSAL BANK, LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J., dated May 20, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the bank be continued. Ashurst and Co, Old Jewry, solicitors for the petitioner

GLYN NEATH COLLIERIES, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented May 24, directed to be heard before Hall, V.C., on June 9. Munton and Morris, Queen Victoria st, agents for Parker and Brailsford, Sheffield, solicitors for the petitioners

KEIGHLEY HERALD NEWSPAPER COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before June 24, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William Mann, Keighley, Cashier to William Land and Son, Keighley. Monday, July 3, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

MYSORE REEFS GOLD MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented May 25, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Saturday, June 10. Shell and Co, George st, Mansion House, solicitors for the petitioner

WHITEHAVEN IRON MINES, LIMITED.-Bacon, V.C., has, by an order dated May 5, appointed John Henry Tilly, Queen Victoria st, to be official liquidator

[Gazette, May 30.]

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. FIRST CHESHIRE PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-Petition for winding up, presented May 24, directed to be heard before Fry, J., on Friday, June 9. Prior and Co, Lincoln's inn fields, agents for Harris, Liverpool, solicitor for the petitioner

[Gazette, May 26.] COMMERCIAL BANK CORPORATION OF INDIA AND THE EAST.-Chitty, J., has, by an order dated April 20, appointed Richard Alabaster, Guildhall clibrs, to be official liquidator, in the place of William Hopkins Holyland [Gazette, May 30.]

COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER, LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

ROGER LEIGH AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented May 25, directed to be heard before the Vice-Chancellor, 21, Old sq, Lincoln's inn, on June 12, at 10.30 Ritson and Grundy, Manchester, agents for Bryan, Hindley, solicitor for the petitioner

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.

[Gazette, May 26.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Swan inn, Wood Newton, Northampton. May 23
NELSON TRETOTAL SICK AND BURIAL SOCIETY, Mission hall, St George's Market,
London rd, Southwark. May 22
[Gazette, May 26.]

COHEN'S PERSEVERANCE BENEFIT SOCIETY, Cocoa Rooms, Railway st, Kington on Hull.
May 26
ROYAL FREE MINERS' FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Globe Inn, Cinderford, Gloucester. May 25

[Gazette, May 30.]

LEGISLATION OF THE WEEK.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. May 25.-Bill Read a Second Time.

Conveyancing (referred to Select Committee).

Bills in Committee.

Poor Rates (passed through Committee); Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment. Bills Read a Third Time.

PRIVATE BILLS-Didcot, Newbury, and Southampton Junction Railway; Easton Neston Mineral, and Towcester, Roade, and Onley Junction Railway; Harris's Endowment and Dundee Education; Newhaven Harbour; Padiham and Hapton Local Board; Radstock, Wrington, and Congresbury Junction Railway; Rothwell Gas; Rugby Gas; Stroud Water. New Bill.

Bill to extend and improve the Middlesex Land Registry, and to amend the law relating thereto (Mr. HopwooD).

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CREDITORS' CLAIMS.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF.

...........

Monday, June

DARE, HENRY ARTHUR KEKEWICH HALL, Inner Temple. June 8. Glyn v Lee Warner, Tuesday
also Molesworth v Glyn, Hall, V.C. Wing and Dubane, Gray's inn sq
FERNE, CHARLES, Merton, Surrey, Builder. June 20. London Joint Stock Loan, Dis-
count, and Investment Company, Limited v Ferne, Hall, V.C. Armstrong, Chancery
lane

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Wednesday.... Thursday Friday Saturday.

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COURT OF

APPEAL.

5 Mr. Farrer King

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V. C. BACON.

Mr. Pemberton

Farrer King Farrer

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King

Mr. Justice FRY.

V. C. HALL.

Latham

Merivale

Latham Merivale

Latham

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Mr. Justice
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Mr. Cobby
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Mr. Merivale

Mr. Justice
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Mr. Ward

Teesdale
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10

Carrington Jackson

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SALES OF ENSUING WEEK.

June 7.-Messrs. EDWIN FOX & BOUSFIELD, at the Mart, at 2 p.m., Freehold and
Leasehold Properties (see advertisement, May 20, p. 4).
Leasehold Estates (see advertisement, this week, p. 4).

PAYNE, JAMES, Gloucester, Stone Merchant. June 10. Philp v Payne, Fry, J. Stephen- June S.-Messrs. C. C. & T. MOORE, at the Mart, at 1 for 2 p.m., Freehold and

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LEGAL NEWS.

The following are the circuits which have been chosen by the judges for the ensuing Summer Assizes-viz. :-Western Circuit, Lindley, L.J., and Lopes, J.; South-Eastern Circuit, Pollock, B., and Hawkins, J.; Midland Circuit, Giove and Fry, JJ.; North Wales Circuit, Huddleston, B.; South Wales Circuit, Manisty, J.; Oxford Circuit, Bowen, L.J., and Watkin Williams, J.; North-Eastern Circuit, Mathew and Cave, JJ., and Northern Circuit, North, J., and another judge not yet selected.

On the motion in the House of Commons, on the 25th ult., for going into committee on the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment Bill, the Attorney-General said the object of the Bill was to take away from the judges of the Supreme Court the power to make rules and regulations for the conduct of the business of the courts which they now possessed, and to provide that any rules they might make should not come into operation until they had been laid for forty days upon the table of the House. He could not assent to the Bill, which, he believed, was founded on a rumour that the judges intended to make such alterations in procedure as would practically to a great extent abolish trial by jury. If the Bill could be modified so as to limit its operation to any rules which should alter the mode of trial and make it necessary that such alteration should be laid before Parliament, he would favourably cousider it. Sir H. Giffard said the existing power for the judges to alter the law, especially that of trial by jury, by making rules, should be limited. The Solicitor-General pointed out that the judges only had power to modify the rules, not the provisions of the Judicature Act.

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Creditors must forward their proofs of debts to the Registrar. To Surrender in London. Langdale, Percy William, and William Richard Eaton Turner, Bedford row, Holborn, Solicitors. Pet May 26. Hazlitt. June 14 at 12 Skinner, Richard Smith, Cullum st, Fenchurch st, Merchant. Pet May 26. Pepys. June 11 at 12.30 Ziepcke, Ludwig, Upper East Smithfield, Tower hill, Ship Store Dealer. Pet May 26. Pepys. June 14 at 1 To Surrender in the Country.

Bridge, William, Vartry rd, Stamford hill, Surveyor. Pet May 26. Pulley. Edmonton,

June 15 at 12

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