been equitable instead of legal, and the mortgagee had
obtained a foreclosure decree, "he would have been entitled to
enforce that decree for twenty years by every process which a
court of equity could give." But nobody showed the faintest
desire to deprive the plaintiffs in Heath v. Pugh of any "process
which a court of equity could give." On the contrary, Lord
Coleridge, in giving judgment at law against them, expressly
said: "If they think that by going to the Chancery Division
they can get anything under their foreclosure decree, let
them go.
We do not interfere with them in any way."
Then Lord Cairns continued:-"The court [i.e., the Chancery
Division] is now not a court of law or a court of equity, it is a
court of complete jurisdiction." Surely, the more plausible
inference from this is, not that the statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4 now
means something different from what it used to mean, but that the
plaintiffs were at liberty to have taken Lord Coleridge at his word,
to have gone to the Chancery Division, and there (his suit not
having been barred by the statute) to have obtained the remedy
which, while the court there was not a court of complete jurisdic-is
tion, they could only have obtained by resorting separately to the
court of law. "And," continued his lordship, "if there were a
variance between what, before the Judicature Act, a court of law
and a court of equity would have done, the rule of the court of
equity must now prevail." But the Act speaks of any conflict or
variance "with reference to the same subject-matter," and there never
was the faintest variance between the rules of law and the rules of
equity (this, again, is the correct language of the Act) as to how and
from when the statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4 ran in respect of the right
to commence an action of ejectment. Dr. Lamson might as well
have said that the courts of law and the courts of equity were at
variance, because the latter did not hang murderers while the former
did, and have claimed to be acquitted on this ground. Lord Cairns
continues:-"The argument of the appellants must, therefore, be,
that the possession of a legal mortgage, passing the legal estate as
a pledge, put the mortgagee in a worse position than if he had not
got it; and exposed him to the risk, as soon as twenty years from
the date of the legal mortgage bad expired, of forfeiting and losing
the benefit of the suit and proceedings which he had in the mean-
time properly taken, in the proper court, to have himself adjudged,
by reason of the default of the mortgagor, the absolute owner of
the land." We cannot for the life of us see why the appellants
might not be content to say that the mortgagee was in no worse
but only in just the same position; and that the only risk to which
he was exposed was the risk of having to continue his proceedings
in the court in which they had been properly taken, instead of
improperly beginning new proceedings elsewhere.

And this we humbly confess to be our opinion. We think
—(1) that the plaintiff Heath, by pottering about for several
years instead of at once taking steps to get a new trustee
appointed and then forthwith bringing his action, had com-
mitted a laches which made him no very proper subject for
peculiar indulgence; and this laches does not seem to be affected
by the fact that the co-trustee afterwards appointed was a joint
plaintiff with him in the action; (2) that he and his co-
trustee had perhaps mistaken their remedy; and that the reason-
ing by which Lords Selborne and Cairns strove to show that they
had not, more properly shows that they might have got their
remedy otherwise and elsewhere; (3) that the method by which
the result was arrived at is to be regretted, as tending to
introduce vagueness and looseness into regions where the total
absence of such qualities is greatly to be desired.
think (4) that the practical effect is to establish a rule which will
tend to the public convenience, and which would have given us
unmixed satisfaction if it had been established by any means of

which we felt able to approve.

But we

The sittings for the trial of special and common jury actions will commence at the Guildhall on Monday next. There are, says the Times' reporter, nearly two hundred causes at present entered, of which number over eighty are marked for special juries, while a few are to be tried without juries.

In the House of Lords on Thursday, Earl Cairns asked why it was that no judicial appointments had been made under the Act of 1876 consequent on the death of Sir James Colville, and the resignation of Sir Montague Smith. The Lord Chancellor replied that, having regard to the appellate business of the Privy Council, he did not think there was any urgency in filling up the vacancies.

UNSATISFACTORY EVIDENCE.

THE result of the experience which a lawyer acquires with
the important social duty of giving evidence is very far from being
regard to the conduct of mankind when called upon to exercise
whose practice has afforded him sufficient opportunities of obser-
satisfactory. We are perfectly sure that any barrister or solicitor
vation would upon reflection admit that the amount of down-
and, in addition to cases of "flat" perjury, there are a still larger
right perjury committed in courts of justice is very great indeed;
number of cases in which witnesses, more or less consciously,
inevitable tendency on the part of those called on to give evidence
exaggerate or garble the truth. There is, no doubt, an almost
of occurrences. The process of trying to recollect in such a case
to piece in the details of a partially remembered occurrence or set
gives rise to a number of conjectures or theories, which gradually
usurp in the mind the position due to actually remembered facts;
very apt to harden into positive statement in the heat of
and, again, a degree of recollection far short of absolute certainty
excitement or of resentment caused by a cross-examination
insinuating doubts as to the witness's accuracy or credibility.
Not to be quite sure of anything which one nevertheless in some
measure asserts, is felt to be a derogatory position. There is a
certain amount of weakness involved in taking such a line, and
so, under a hostile suggestion of doubt, people are frequently
from mixed truth and falsehood. Nothing is commoner than
driven over the line which separates perfect truthfulness
for a witness in examination in chief to qualify his state-
ment with some expression importing that he is not abso-
lutely certain, such as "I believe," or, "to the best of
influence of questions which really impute no more uncertainty
my recollection." He is then cross-examined, and, under the
than the witness-in-chief voluntarily expressed, he gradually gets
surer and surer, till at length, being asked, in accordance with the
swear it," he
procedure common in such cases, whether he_will "
replies with much vehemence that he will. It is a common thing
to find witnesses professing to be able to speak to the details of
and that in cases where there was nothing peculiar in the nature
conversations and transactions which took place a year or so back,
of the thing so as especially to impress the mind. Let any one of
our readers endeavour to recall the details of some conversation,
even of an important nature, that took place a year and a half
ago, or even a few months ago, and we think he will probably
have a more or less firm belief as to the general import of what
find it very difficult actually to remember them, though he may
passed.

be unreliable from somewhat similar causes :-A matter which, in
To take another instance in which evidence is peculiarly apt to
criminal trials, frequently becomes the subject of discussion is the
identification of persons, and we have a strong opinion that very
great numbers of the community are wholly destitute of a sense of
dence of identity is often given with a positiveness which under
the responsibility which attaches to evidence of this sort. Evi-
the circumstances seems astonishing. We think it is probable
that uneducated
persons, whose life experiences are somewhat
narrow, may have a keener memory for the faces of those who on
trifling occasions are brought in contact with them than those
whose experience is broader and who deal more with abstractions.
A busy professional man does not notice particularly the personal
appearance of the driver of the hansom that he hails for the pur-
pose of being conveyed to chambers. It is very probable that the
cabman may notice the hirer's countenance more particularly,
forming thereupon perhaps a judgment as to whether he looks
like an extra sixpence or not. But still, we cannot help doubting
whether people in general notice so particularly and remember so
well the persons whom they casually encounter for a very brief
space as one must suppose a great many people to do from the way
in which evidence of identification is often given. There are a
good many causes tending towards rash and unreliable identifica-
tion, such as, for instance, conceit, love of the marvellous, a wish to
be mixed up with sensational matters, an honest but injudicious
eagerness to forward the cause of justice.
which the evidence of identity conspicuously failed, statements
In a certain trial, in
were made by one or two of the witnesses which very forcibly
illustrate the way in which evidence of identity may be vitiated.

of business. It often ends in their being suspected of shuffling by the judge, and accused of it by the opposing counsel. The imperturbable witness, who is as bold as brass, who is quite sure, and who has his story quite pat, has a much better time of it. He may often be a great liar, but he gives much less trouble to the judge and jury and all parties concerned, except perhaps the counsel on the other side.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The procedure ordinarily followed by the police in such cases is to put the accused person among a number of others and see whether the witness can identify such person. One of the witnesses, who had in the first instance failed to identify the accused, stated, by way of explanation, that the bold and unconcerned demeanour of the accused had led him to think that she could not be the person. This statement is most suggestive of the possibility of error in such cases. It is obvious that this witness was endeavouring, not to identify in the proper sense of the term, but to select one out of the number of persons before him by a wholly illegitimate test. It is yery difficult to say how the witness may most safely be tested, but it is obvious that the usual course adopted is not free from danger. The mischief RIGHT OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OR LIQUIDATION TO is that the witness knows that one among the persons submitted to him is an accused person. He is expected to identify someone, and seeks to bring to the aid of memory other indicia than those which it furnishes. A person whose mind is disciplined by education ought to be able to resist this tendency; a person who should consciously yield to it would be guilty of a grave moral offence, but undisciplined and impulsive persons may perhaps be, to some extent, pardoned if they confuse together criteria which ought to be kept entirely

distinct.

TENANT'S FIXTURES.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-With your permission I desire to call attention to the hardship which may result in practice from two comparatively recent decisions of the Court of Appeal-namely, Ex parte Stephens, In re Lavies (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 127), and Ex parte Brook, In re Roberts (L. R. 10 Ch. D. 100). The law as stated in those cases is now I think clear, that the effect of in the debtor is to place the trustee in the position of never having had a disclaimer by a trustee in bankruptcy or liquidation of a lease vested any estate in the leasehold property. Consequently any severance by the trustee of the fixtures attached to the property at the time of his appointment is necessarily wrongful (it being immaterial whether the severance took place before or after the disclaimer), and gives the landlord a right to recover the value of the fixtures from the trustee. A case has now occurred within my own experience illustrating forcibly the hardship of which I speak. A hosier, on taking a lease of his shop and premises, purchased the fixtures and fittings from the landlord at a valuation for £800. Within a few years he failed, and was made bank. rupt. A trustee was appointed, and, after examining into the state of affairs, disclaimed the lease. He then removed the fixtures and fittings, treating them as mere furniture or chattels, and sold them. The obtained an order that there should be an inquiry as to whether the landlord disputed his right to remove or sell them, and applied for and trustee had removed and sold any and what tenant's fixtures, and, if so, what was their value, and the amount of damage caused to him by their removal. The inquiry was taken before Mr. Registrar Brougham, who held that everything attached to the floors or walls of the premises, however slightly, was a tenant's fixture if it required the drawing of a single nail or screw to detach it; and on that ground he gave the landlord the value, not only of gasfittings, show-cases, counters, &c., but also of mirrors and clocks, the whole having, as I have already mentioned, been purchased by the debtor on taking the shop. The landlord has been, or will be, therefore, as you will see, paid twice over, first by the tenant, and now by the trustee, while, under section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, he is also entitled to prove against the estate for any damages he may have sustained by the disclaimer. I do not wish to question the correctness in law of the decisions to which I have referred, but I venture to say that they have entirely reversed what was before the universal belief and practice. It seems to me that, with his claim to distrain for one year's rent in full, and now his right to tenant's fixtures in the event of a disclaimer, the landlord is unfairly preferred to other creditors on no sufficient grounds. I therefore venture to hope that steps will be taken to bring the point prominently forward whenever the new Bankruptcy Bill is again claiming attention.

There can be no doubt, on the part of the practical man as well as the moralist, of the great importance of impressing on the community, in all ways which may be available, the sacredness of the duty involved in giving testimony. The oath which, from the most ancient times, has been imposed on the witness is both the expression of the character of the duty involved and an attempt to insure its fulfilment. We question whether the oath, as now administered, adds as much as it is sometimes thought to do to the sense of obligation felt by the witness, though it may perhaps have some effect. There can be no doubt of the very considerable influence that may be exercised, and no doubt is often exercised, in this matter by conscientious professional men in the performance of the function of taking the evidence in preparing for any legal proceeding. A person engaged in getting up evidence must necessarily have it in his power, to a large extent, to minister to, or to restrain, the tendency on the part of a witness to deviate from, or improve upon, the truth. Great experience, tact, and a high sense of duty are all needed in order, on the one hand, to do justice to a case, and, on the other, not to induce any paltering with the truth on the part of witnesses. We have no doubt that in many cases these qualifications are forthcoming, but in some we fear they are not. Again, the influence of judges in this matter is obviously very great, and we are afraid that sometimes, though of course unconsciously, the course they take tends to drive a witness over the line of strict veracity. The judge is, after all, mortal; he has got to take a note, and he wishes to take a clear one. For this purpose he sometimes drives a witness into being clearer than the witness has any right in conscience to be. Nothing is commoner than for a witness coming to speak to a conversation after a long interval of time, to say only that the import of it was so and so. The judge immediately asks what was said, and requires the very words so far as the witness can remember. This he does, no doubt, on the principle that stating the general result of conversations is hardly evidence, and would be open to abuse, but the inevitable result is that the witness is driven to try to mould his recollection of the general import of what passed into a conversation, which, after the lapse of so long a time, he is not really able to do with perfect truth. The result is that his evidence becomes an articial production, something like the speeches which Thucydides puts into the mouths of generals and statesmen. We doubt whether it would not be safer and better on the whole to take all that the witness can truthfully give-viz., his general recollection of what took place. The absence of detail would be matter which would go to the weight of the evidence. We do not mean to say that a judge is not right in challenging in a judicious manner general statements as to the results of conversations, but to insist on a witness always giving a conversation, so that it may appear in the " direct oration on the judge's notebook, seems to us to be contrary to natural possibility. We are afraid that witnesses whose consciences are tenderly scrupulous discussing, the several cases known to me of official rulings under often get scant consideration in court. They are a source of trouble to the judge, whose temper is perhaps sorely tried by stress

STAMP DUTIES.

WILLIAM STurt.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] otherwise specially engaged with stamp duties took serious interest in Sir,-Supposing that, now-a-days, anyone beyond those officially or them, I would say that the case given in Mr. Simey's communication, appearing in your number for April 29 (p. 403), was an interesting one.

Long before the passing of the Stamp Act, 1870, with its section 8 (which section was applied to the instrument in Mr. Simey's case), the question of whether an instrument contained but one or more than one (distinct) matter, and so attracted separate duties, was, on all hands, admittedly the most perplexing of stamp questions, and was the subject of not a few decisions of the courts.

I believe myself correct in saying that section 8, in the intention of its framers, and probably in effect and operation, re-enacted the law embodied in these judicial decisions, or the leading ones.

Since the passing of the Stamp Act, 1870, the only judicial decision under section 8, I believe, is that in Hadgett's case (26 W. R. 115), which But case was, at the time, discussed at some length in your columns." I could fill some amount of your space by stating merely, without

section 8.

* SOLICITORS' JOURNAL for January and February, 1878.

actly and clearly within the terms of the articles. It was the contract under which the trustee acquired the shares, and by that contract he was bound. But it was said that when he bought the shares he was a trustee for others, and bought them with trust money, and that debts of the company arising subsequently to the purchase of the sbares must be postponed to the prior equitable right of the cestuis que trust. The answer to that was that the charge of the bank by virtue of the articles of association was prior and took effect when the shares were transferred into the names of the trustees. It was one of the terms on which registration was made, it being stipulated by the company as a condition precedent that, if persons taking shares should owe the company any money, the company were to have a charge on the shares registered in the names of such persons for the amount of the debt. That alone was conclusive. Independently of time, the charge of the company from its nature must be prior. The trustees bought the shares on the terms of this liability to a charge in favour of the company. How, then, could the cestuis que trust take the benefit of the purchase without complying with the terms of the contract? In his lordship's opinion the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor was right, and the appeal must be dismissed, with costs. LINDLEY, L.J., was of the same opinion. He failed to see on what ground the equitable owner of the shares could claim the benefit of the investment and repudiate the terms on which the shares were held. HOLKER, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Bircham, Drake, & Co. ; Ingle, Cooper, & Holmes.

the recovery of the debt, but to make Holt a bankrupt, and thus procure his
removal from the office of trustee. This was a gross abuse of the bankrupt
law, and it occurred after the well-known decision of the Court of Appeal in
Ex parte Griffin (28 W. R. 208, 12 Ch. D. 480), which made a great noise
in the profession at the time. There it was held by James, L.J., and Brett,
L.J., to be a gross fraud on the bankrupt law to buy up a debt in order to be
able to threaten the debtor with bankruptcy proceedings, with the view of
forcing him to abandon proceedings which he had taken to recover a debt due
to him, and Cotton, LJ., said that the bankruptcy proceedings must fail,
because they were not taken to obtain the payment of the
debt, but the debt was purchased in order to take the pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy. A solicitor who after that chose to be
concerned in buying up a debt with the view of taking bankruptcy
proceedings against the debtor for a collateral purpose had no right to
complain if his conduct was viewed with disapprobation by a court of
justice. His lordship was not prepared to say that, as this occurred after
the removal of the solicitor's client from the office of trustee, and no injury
had, in fact, been done to the estate by his conduct, it alone would have
been sufficient ground for depriving the solicitor of his coste, but he did
not say that the registrar was wrong in taking the subsequent conduct into
account in connection with the previous misconduct of the solicitor. It
would have been wiser not to discuss the matter a second time in the
Court of Appeal, when the only result could be to add the censure of the
court to the dismissal of the appeal with costs. LINDLEY, L.J., could not
see on what principle it would be right to allow Sheard one farthing out of
the estate. So far from representing it for any beneficial purpose, he
appeared to have been appointed for the purpose of checkmating the
creditors. His conduct had been such as to compel any court of justice not
to allow him a single sixpence. And what better position could his solicitor
claim? His lordship thought that the whole of the proceedings in this
bankruptcy, on the one side and the other, had been shocking and dis-
oreditable to every one concerned. He thought that the solicitor had looked
exclusively to the interests of his own client. A solicitor who did that,
and who forgot that other people had rights and interests, might go too
far. A man was not bound to sacrifice everything and everybody to the
interests of his own client, or to do everything which his client told him to
do. His lordship thought that the appellant had gone lengths which, if
he were indicted for conspiracy, might put him in a very awkward position.
The court, however, was not trying any case of that kind now, but that the
appellant had gone too far in his zeal for his client was painfully manifest.
HOLKER, L.J., thought it clear that it was a gross abuse of the bankruptcy
law for persons to buy debts due to other persons for no other purpose than
to enable them to carry the choice of trustee, or to enable them to place
anybody in a position of control with reference to the bankrupt's affaire.
He could not see that there was anything in such a transaction very different
from the conduct of a man who bought up the right of another to exercise
his franchise to vote for a member of Parliament, or for a member of any
other institution. It seemed to his lordship to be the same thing, and to be
a piece of bribery. He regretted that this did not appear to be the view of
the public in general, for he believed it was the commonest thing in the
world for people to buy the rights of creditors to vote, and, having purchased
that right, to exercise it in order to elect trustees who should be favourable
to themselves or to a particular class of the creditors. But, although that
was apparently the view of a portion of the public who had to do with
bankruptcy, nevertheless there were many sins committed with reference
to the administration of bankruptcy; and if such conduct were investigated
n a court of justice, the court ought to arrive at the conclusion that it was
not justifiable, but was a scandalous abuse of the law. Indeed, that seemed
to have been practically decided in Ex parte Griffin, and it would be well for
the community, and very advantageous in order to secure the moral dealings
of people, that that decision should be more generally known than ap.
He thought that it would not be straining the law at all
parently it was.
to say that the proceedings relating to the purchase of Holt's debt, with the
view of making him a bankrupt and ousting him from his position as trustee,
amounted to a conspiracy, for which the persons engaged in it might be
indicted.-SOLICITORS, Harper & Battcock; H. F. Barnett.

SOLICITOR TO Trustee in BankrupPTCY-RIGHT TO COSTS OUT OF BANK-
LUPT'S ESTATE-DISCRETION OF COURT-IMPROPER CONDUCT-ABUSE of
BANKRUPTCY LAW--TAXATION OF COSTS-POWER OF COURT TO GO BEHIND
ALLOCATUR.—In a case of In re Pooley, before the Court of Appeal on the 4th
inst., a question arose as to the power of the Court of Bankruptcy to refuse
to allow the costs of the solicitor of a trustee in bankruptcy to be paid out of the
estate of the bankrupt, on the ground that the trustee or the solicitor has been
guilty of improper conduct. One Pooley having been adjudicated a bankrupt,
one Sheard was in December, 1879, appointed trustee in the bankruptcy. He
bad been a clerk, employed at a salary of £2 5s. a week, in the office of a
newspaper of which Thomas Pooley, a son of the bankrupt, was the editor,
and by whom Sheard was requested to act as trustee. Sheard was in April,
1880, removed from his office by the court, on the ground that he was a mere
tool of the bankrupt, and one Holt was appointed trustee in his place. The
evidence, in the opinion of the registrar and of the Court of Appeal, showed
that the appointment of Sheard was procured by buying up a large debt due
by the bankrupt, the purchaser being Rodney Pooley, another son of the
bankrupt, and the present appellant being his solicitor, and afterwards solici-
tor to Sheard as trustee, By means of this large debt the appointment of
Sheard as trustee was carried. The court held that the purchase was made
merely for the purpose of carrying the choice of trustee, and that the solici.
tor knew this. After Holt had been appointed trustee Rodney Pooley bought
up a debt which he owed with the view, as the court held, of making him a
bankrupt, and thus procuring his removal from the office of trustee in the
bankruptcy. The solicitor acted in this transacti on again, and was, as the
court held, aware of the nature of it. A debtor's summons was afterwards
issued against Holt in respect of this debt, but it did not appear that any
further proceedings in bankruptcy were taken against him. After the re-
moval of Sheard the costs of his solicitor were taxed, and an allocatur made
by the taxing master. An application was made that the payment of
the costs out of the estate should not be allowed, on the ground that Sheard
and his solicitor had acted improperly. Mr. Registrar Hazlitt held that he
could not go behind the allocatur, and on this ground refused the application.
The Court of Appeal held that notwithstanding the allocatur, the application
could be entertained, and remitted it to the registrar to hear the evidence.
The registrar then refused to allow the costs out of the estate, and his
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and LINDLEY
and HOLKER, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that the ground on which the pay-
ment of the costs had been refused appeared to him to be very simple and
very plain. The solicitor's right to costs out of the estate was simply the
right of Sheard, his client. He had no independent right. He might have
a right of action against Sheard, but that was his only legal right. Sheard, if
he had conducted himself properly, would have a right to an indemnity out of
the estate, and according to the ordinary rule the court would allow the solicitor
to avail himself directly of his client's right against the estate. The registrar
had declined to allow this in the present case on the grounds-(1) that mis
conduct was proved against Sheard which would disentitle him to costs out of
FORFEITURE CLAUSE-VALIDITY-GIFT OVER-EJECTMENT BILL IN COURT
the estate; (2) that personal misconduct was proved against the solicitor; the oF CHANCERY-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 22-PRACTICE-DISMISSAL OF
allowance of the costs being a matter within the discretion of the court. His ACTION FOR WANT OF PARTIES.-In a case of Hurst v. Hurst, before the
lordship was sorry that he could not disagree with the registrar on either Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., a question arose as to the validity of a clause
point. He could not imagine a grosser abuse of the bankruptcy law than of forfeiture contained in a will. The testator gave all his freehold and lease-
the whole story from end to end disclosed. It was not for him to say now hold property to his executors and trustees upon trust (inter alia) to permit
whether it amounted to an indictable conspiracy. From beginning to end, as his son to receive the rents of certain specified freehold and leasehold houses
regarded the appointment of the trustee, the conduct of the bankrupt, his to and for his own use and benefit during his life, and after his death upon
two sons, Sheard, and the solicitor was deserving of the strongest reprehension trust that the executors and trustees should convey and assign the houses to
of the court, as being an abuse of the bankruptcy law, and as being an im the children of the son in equal shares, absolutely, on their attaining the age
proper attempt to obtain by improper means the appointment of an improper of twenty-one years. But, in case any of the children of the son should die
person as trustee of the estate. Could a man who was so appointed trustee, before attaining that age, then on trust to convey and assign the shares of the
a man who had obtained the appointment, not for the honest purpose of pro- children or child so dying to the others or other of such children; but, in case
tecting the bankrupt's estate and administering it, but for the purpose of pro- of the son not having any issue, or in case none of his children should live to
tecting the interests of the bankrupt himself, be a man whose conduct was attain twenty-one, then the testator declared that the property, the rents of
such as to entitle him to his costs out of the estate? How could the court which would be receivable by the son during his life, should be conveyed and
better manifest its displeasure and disapproval as regarded similar proceed assigned by his executors and trustees to, and divided equally between, such of
ings in future than by depriving such a trustee of his costs? The registrar the children of the testator's daughter as should live to attain the age of
had done so, and his lordship entirely concurred in the propriety of his deci- twenty-one. The testator had, by a previous clause, given other freehold and
sion. Then, after the removal of Sheard, a most censurable course of pro- leasehold property in a similar way to his executors and trustees on trust for
ceeding was adopted by Rodney Pooley and the solicitor in purchasing Holt's his daughter for her life, with remainder to her children on their attaining
debt. It must be taken from the answers of the solicitor to questions put to twenty-one. By a subsequent clause the testator declared that the bequest
him in his examination that he knew that the object of the purchase was, not thereinbefore made to his son and daughter respectively should be subject to