Many more instances of the useless and puzzling discrepancies between the two practices might be given, but we have quoted enough to illustrate our meaning. We cannot think that these differences in practice were ever designed or intended. It would appear as though the drafting of the rules in bankruptcy and liquidation were given to two different draftsmen, each of whom performed his task without consultation with the other, and in the haste of getting the rules out they were not sufficiently revised so as to correct these glaring inconsistencies. This, of course, is merely a surmise, but it is the only way in which we can account for the discrepancies. If, without troubling the Legislature, the rules had long ago been thoroughly revised, so as to wipe out these anomalies, we think there would have been considerably less complaint to be found with the working of the present law. And the correction of these are not the only amendments in the law of bankruptcy which might be made by rules alone. The whole system of proxies, for example, might be re-modelled upon the basis of the Government proposals by the making of new rules to take the place of rules 85 and 86, as section 80, sub section 8, is, we think, sufficiently wide for that purpose.

REVIEWS.

BUILDING LEASES.

THE LAW RELATING TO BUILDING LEASES AND BUILDING CONTRACTS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF LAND BY, And the CONSTRUCTION OF, BUILDINGS. With a full Collection of Precedents, together with the Statutes relating to Building, with Notes and the Latest Cases under the Various Sections, and a Glossary of Architectural and Building Terms. By ALFRED EMDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Haynes.

This is a careful digest of a branch of law which, so far as we know, has not yet been fully treated. The subject, it will be seen, embraces both building leases, contracts to build, and the law relating to the construction of buildings; and the arrangement of the work naturally follows in general these divisions. The first five chapters are chiefly devoted to agreements for building leases and building leases. It might have been more convenient to treat of the persons by whom building leases may be granted, and agreements for such leases entered into, first, but the author has postponed it to his fourth chapter. And the chapter on the form of agreement to build might, we should have thought, have been combined with chapter 6 on "the contract to build." Chapter 6, relating to the contract to build, is followed by chapters on the duties and liabilities of the architect, preliminary drawings, specifications, &c., approval and performance of work, and other matters relating to these subjects, including a useful chapter on "extras." Chapter 16 is devoted to the subject of specific performance of building contracts and agreements for building leases; and chapters 18 to 23 relate to different branches of the subject of the rights and liabilities of the building lessee, so far as they are distinct from his rights and liabilities under the general law of landlord and tenant. With regard to the execution of this part of the work we can speak favourably. The cases have been carefully collected, and, although they are sometimes stated at greater length than we should think necessary, they are, in the instances we have examined, stated with accuracy. We are not quite prepared to state that all the author's deductions from them are the best that could be made; for instance, although he has certainly Lord Blackburn's authority for his statement that in Lewis v. Hoare (29 W. R. 357), "all that the plaintiff had to show was that the work had been done so as morally to entitle the builder to a certificate," we should have preferred Lord Watson's way of putting the matter, that "if the certificate had been given, it could not have made the houses more complete than they were in fact, and the fact that it was withheld did not render them less so." And in the statement of Marsden v. Sambell (28 W. R. 952), at p. 125, we find no reference to Mr. Justice Fry's observations as to the reason

In

able time" within which a right to rescind a building contract on the ground of delay must be exercised. These, however, are very small matters. general we think the digest of the cases has been well and carefully executed, Part 2 contains precedents of contracts to build, of agreements for building leases, of building leases, mortgages, and other forms relating to building matters. It is sufficient to say that the precedents of agree. ments for building leases follow, in their general structure, the excellent forms in Davidson. The precedents of building contracts seem also to be well framed and complete. We may, however, draw the author's attention to the form of contract adopted by Sir E. Beckett, and contained in a little book published by him. We have known a modification of this form adepted with very satisfactory results. Part 3 of the book dontains the statutes relating to building, and is followed by a glossary

complete and satisfactory manual, alike for the lawyer as for the architect and builder.

THE CONVEYANCING ACT,

THE CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881, and the Vendor
AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874, WITH NOTES; AND FORMS AND PRECEDENTS
ADAPTED FOR USE UNDER THE ACTS; ALSO THE SOLICITORS' REMUNera-
TION ACT, 1881. By EDWARD PARKER WOLSTENHOLME, Barrister-at-
Law, one of the Conveyancing Counsel to the Court; and RICHARD
OTTAWAY TURNER, Barrister-at-Law. William Clowes & Sons.
In our review of the first edition of this work we ventured to

express some surprise that, though it of course contained many valu-
able observations, it also contained an unexpectedly large number which
seemed open to adverse criticism. Upon the additions which have
been made to the notes, we have the same opinion to express
namely, that they contain valuable and instructive observations, but
not these alone. We shall notice only the following. At p. 55, in an
addition to the note upon section 18, apparently by way of warning
against excluding the mortgagor's power of leasing, great stress is laid
upon the inconvenience which might result to the mortgagee if he
should foreclose and find a common law lessee of the mortgagor in
possession. We must beg leave to repeat our opinion that these fears
are chimerical. The mortgagor's lessee would not have accepted the
lease for love of the mortgagor, but because he liked the tenancy;
and he would in most cases be quite willing to continue it under the
mortgagee, if the latter did not wish to eject him. But the question
does not (as the advocates of section 18 sometimes seem to insinuate) lie
between having no power of leasing at all, and giving an unlimited
power of leasing to the mortgagor. If the mortgagee has a proper
power of leasing, he would not be likely to suffer much inconve-
nience from the absence of a power of leasing in the mortgagor.
And we can easily imagine that consequences much more serious
than those depicted by our learned authors might follow from
leaving to the mortgagor the absurd power given by section 18, sub-
section (1), including, as it does, power to grant building leases for five
years at a peppercorn rent. Large additions have been made to the
precedents. The eminent position among conveyancers enjoyed by
Mr. Wolstenholme makes it a delicate task for less considerable persons
to criticize precedents issued under his sanction. We shall only men.
tion a very few points which have occurred to our notice within the
range of less than half a dozen pages. That an observation formerly
made by us (suprà, p. 160) upon a form of covenant to keep up
fire insurance, in the first edition at p. 128, and now at p. 155, was not
ill founded, is shown by the fact that the form is now corrected in
accordance with our criticism. At p. 152 there is a form of covenant
for payment of interest which begins with these words :-" And also so
long as any principal money shall remain due under these presents after
the day aforesaid." We submit that the words in italics do not
indicate with desirable strictness the day referred to, there being more
than one "day aforesaid," notably the day of the deed's date.
next form is as follows:-

The

"[TO FOLLOW DEMISE OF LEASEHOLDS.] "Trust of "And [mortgagor] hereby covenants with [mortgagee(s)] that principal term [mortgagor] will henceforth stand possessed of the premises in mortgage by sub-demise, comprised in the said lease for the residue of the term thereby granted In trust for [mortgagee(s)] and to assign and dis pose of the same as he [they] or the persons or person entitled to the principal money for the time being due on these presents shall from time to time direct, but subject to the proviso for redemption hereinafter contained."

always been to make the trust of the residue of the term, in favour of The common practice in mortgages by sub-demise has hitherto the mortgagee and his representatives, apply only "after any sale made under the aforesaid power of sale." Messrs. Prideaux and Whitcombe (11th ed., vol. 1, p. 514) adapt this to the Act by saying:-" After any sale of the said premises or any part thereof, under the statutory power of sale." It is seldom that anything is gained by deserting a well-established form without any reason; and we here see nothing in the estab. lished form to require such a violent departure from it as is displayed by that of Messrs. Wolstenholme and Turner. We do not see how the phrase, presents," appearing in the preceding form; and still less how it is better "due on these presents," is better than "due under these upon the security of these presents," appearing in the form before that; nor is it usually thought desirable to have in the same page several different phrases, even if they are all equally good, for expressing the same thing.

than "due.

COMPENSATION,

THE LAW OF COMPENSATION UNL TR THE LANDS CLAUSES, RAILWAY CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, 1875, THE ARTIZANS AND LABOURERS' DWELLINGS IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1875, AND OTHER ACTS, WITH A FULL COLLECTION OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS. By EYRE LLOYD, Barrister-at-Law. FIFTH EDITION. Stevens & Haynes,

The profession has sufficiently indicated the estimation in which this work is held, and it is perhaps superfluous to add anything to the praise we have bestowed on former editions of this work as a useful treatise on a branch of law of considerable importance and difficulty, but we may say, as the result of our investigation of the present edition, that we think the author is justified in his statement that great care and attention have been expended in its preparation. Defects in the statement of, and in references to, cases have been corrected, and the recent decisions have been diligently collected and, in general, very accurately stated; we may point out, however, that the important fact that the married woman was entitled absolutely for her separate use has apparently been dropped out of the statement on p. 10 of the effect of Peters v. Lewes, &c., Railway Company (29 W. R. 874). The work is eminently a practical one, and is of great value to practitioners who have to deal with compensation cases.

CORRESPONDENCE.

PRIDEAUX'S CONVEYANCING.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, We have read your review of the new edition of this work, and have noted a few points made by the writer in the way of adverse criticism, with respect to which we should be glad to be allowed a few words in reply. The points are as follow:

(1) That we make a trustee give an undertaking for safe custody of

deeds.

(2) That in precedents of mortgage deeds we do not negative the leasing power conferred by section 18 of the Act.

for a fixed period, and in a mortgage to secure an existing debt and (3) That in a mortgage containing a provision for continuing the loan future advances, we do not insert any express provision as to when the mortgage money is to be considered to have become due for the purposes of the statutory power of sale.

(4) That in one of the precedents we add the words "his heirs and assigns" after the name of the covenantee, although it is unnecessary. (5) That in an assignment of letters patent, the vendor is made to assign as beneficial owner and also to enter into express covenants for title, which is surplusage.

(6) That in a surrender of a lease we make the lessee surrender all his estate. (7) That the definition of a conveyance in section 2 may not include a surrender of a lease, in which case express covenants for title would be necessary.

(8) That in form 3 of mortgage we use the expression "the aforesaid power" when there is no "aforesaid power."

(9) That it ought to have been explained how an equitable tenant for life is 66 a person entitled in right of the term" under section 65 of the Act.

We reply as follows:

(1) This is done advisedly. Before the Act it was the practice to make a trustee covenant (inter alia) for safe custody, subject to the qualification that his liability should continue so long only as he holds the documents. This is the precise effect of an undertaking for safe custody under the Act, and, with much deference to Mr. Wolstenholme, who seems to take a different view, we are unable to see why a trustee's liability since the Act should not be made co-extensive with what it was

before.

(3) The time when the mortgage money becomes due clearly appears on the face of the deed in both the cases put.

(4) The words "his heirs and assigns" might, no doubt, be omitted, but they are not incorrect. The precedent is expressed to be given for the benefit of those who do not wish to adopt the Act in all respects. (5) Some surplusage here is admitted.

(6) The lessee is not in this precedent made to surrender "all his estate, &c." The words "and all other his estate, if any, &c.," occur in a subsequent part of the precedent, and their insertion is quite consistent with the omission of the "all the estate" clause at the end of the parcels in the precedents generally.

(7) It is clear that the term "conveyance" includes a surrender, as the 2nd section provides that "conveyance' shall include any assurance or puy dealing with property.

(8) The "aforesaid power of sale" is a misprint for the "statutory aower of sale." The slight mistake is an obvious one and could deceive

po one,

(9) The words of the 65th section being "any person beneficially entitled in right of the term," there can be no doubt that an equitable tenant for life is such a person. FREDERICK PRIDEAUX. JOHN WHITCOMBE.

Lincoln's-inn, May 2.

[We reply that (1) Mr. Wolstenholme obviously would not recommend the exclusion of the undertaking for safe custody if he were satisfied that its effect is precisely equivalent to the covenants by trustees formerly adopted, and no one is better able to judge on this matter. (2) We are glad to find that our correspondents have now remedied the omission of forms for excluding the power of leasing to which we drew attention.

(3) On this point we need only call our correspondents' attention to the opinion of Mr. Wolstenholme, at p. 130 of his first edition and p. 157 of his second edition, where, to the form of agreement for mortgage to continue for a time certain, he appends an express proviso that the principal money shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed to become due on the day on which such principal money is covenanted to be paid; and adds in a note," This clause seems required to prevent any question as to the date when the statutory powers of sale, &c., arise.”

(4) If the words "heirs and assigns" might be omitted, then they are surplusage. We did not say they were incorrect, but that their insertion was inconsistent with the rule, followed elsewhere in the precedents, of adopting the Act.

dent we referred to, we also confess that we inadvertently did them an (5) and (6) As our authors frankly confess the surplusage in the preceestate," &c. The words do not occur at the end of the parcels, but in injustice in saying that the lessee is made to surrender "all other the why the lease is recited in this precedent, instead of the surrender being the next paragraph. Our correspondents, by the way, omit to explain section 2. That section provides that "conveyance expressed to be read as an annex to the lease. (7) Our correspondents do not accurately quote the provision of includes " assurance

on a sale, mortgage, demise, or settlement of any property, or on any other dealing with or for any property," not, as Our correspondents say, "any assurance or any dealing with property." "Surrender of a lease is not specified; is it an assurance on a dealing ejusdem generis with those specified? The doubt appears to us to be sufficient to call for the insertion of express covenants for right to surrender and further assurance.

(8) We may remind our correspondents that misprints of this kind in a book of precedents are serious matters. The mistake we pointed out does not appear to be calculated to deceive no one.

(9) Our correspondents affirm that an equitable tenant for life is a "person beneficially entitled in right of the term," but they unfortunoccasions alleged reasons for doubting this opinion.-ED. S. J.] ately omit to give any reasons for their opinion. We have on previous

CASES OF THE WEEK.

SOLICITOR-POWER TO BIND CLIENT-FRAUD-APPEAL-LEAVE TO WITHDRAW DEFENCE AND PUT IN NEW DEFENCE-ORD. 58, R. 5.—In a case of Williams v. Preston, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., a question action was brought to enforce the performance of an alleged agreement by a arose as to the extent of the authority of a solicitor to bind his client. The married woman to give the plaintiff a mortgage or charge upon separate estate belonging to her as security for moneys advanced to her by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, by his statement of claim, alleged that the moneys had been advanced by him on the application of the married woman's solicitor, who was her duly authorized agent for the purpose. The action was defended by the solicitor on behalf of the married woman by her instructions, and he delivered a statement of defence in her name which, in effect, admitted the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff then moved for judgment on the admissions in the pleadings. No and judgment was given by Jessel, M.R., upon an affidavit of service of the one appeared on behalf of the married woman on the hearing of the motion, notice of motion on her declaring the plaintiff entitled to the mortgage which he claimed. This was in June, 1881. In July, 1881, the solicitor absconded. The married woman afterwards appealed from the judgment, and by her notice of appeal she also asked that she might be at liberty to withdraw her statement of defence, and to deliver a fresh defence, and to adduce such affidavit in which she said that the defence which the solicitor had delivered evidence against the plaintiff's claim as she might be advised. She filed an on her behalf was untrue, and that he had delivered it fraudulently, and that she had never authorized him to borrow money from the plaintiff, and had never received the money alleged to have been borrowed, and that she knew nothing about the judgment until after the solicitor had absconded. It was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that, even if the fraud alleged by the defendant had been committed by the solicitor, still she, having employed him as her solicitor in the action, was bound by the admissions which he had made on her behalf, and that her only remedy was by means of an action for damages against him. The court (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ.), however, held that they had jurisdiction to grant the application, and that it ought to be granted if the defendant should succeed in proving her

allegations, and they ordered the application to stand over for the attendance of witnesses.-SOLICITORS, E. J. Lewis; Wolferstan, Avery, & Jennings.

APPEAL DISMISSAL FOR DEFAULT OF APPELLANT TO GIVE SECURITY FOR COSTS-FORM OF ORDER.-In a case of Harris v. Fleming, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., a question was raised as to the proper form of order when an appeal is dismissed in consequence of the failure of the appellant to comply within a reasonable time with an order that he should give security for the costs of the appeal. The form given in Seton on Decrees (4th ed., p. 1614) is an absolute dismissal of the appeal, while the form of dismissal of an action in the High Court for default of the plaintiff to give security for costs is (pp. 1541-2) only a dismissal for want of prosecution. In the present case the registrar had drawn up the order dismissing the appeal absolutely in accordance with the form in Seton. The appellant moved to vary the minutes, and it was urged that the form in Seton was wrong, and that the order ought to show that the dismissal of the appeal was, not on the merits, but only for want of prosecution. The appellant, it was said, would be entitled, if he should be able to give the security before the expiration of the time limited by the rules for appealing, to present a fresh appeal, and an order absolutely dismissing the appeal would be an obstacle in the way of his exercising this right. The court (JESSEL, M.K., and LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ.) held that the order was in the right form, and, without absolutely deciding the point, inclined to the opinion that the appellant would not be entitled to bring a fresh appeal.-SOLICITORS, Clarke, Rawlins, & Clarke.

SOLICITOR-COSTS-TAXATION-COMMON ORDER-RETENTION OF COSTS AND PAYMENT OF BALANCE TO CLIENT-6 & 7 VICT. c. 73, 8. 41.-On the 3rd inst., the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ.), reversed the decision of Chitty, J., in a case of In re Angove (ante, p. 314). The question was whether the common order to tax a solicitor's bill of costs could be obtained, and this depended on the question whether the bill must be taken to have been paid by the client. On the 30th of May. 1881, the solicitor delivered to the client his bill of costs, amounting to £100 98. 7d., and on the next day he delivered to the client a cash account, which, after deducting the amount of the bill, showed a balance of £1 18s. 1d. to the credit of the client. On the 24th of November, 1881, the client called at the solicitor's office and requested payment of the balance due to him, which he said was £1 16s. The solicitor did not remember the exact amount, and, being in a hurry, did not look at his papers, but gave the client a cheque for £1 163. On the 23rd of February, 1882, the client obtained the common order to tax the solicitor's bill. The solicitor applied to discharge this order, on the ground that the receipt by the client of the £1 16s. as the balance of the cash account amounted in law to payment of the solicitor's bill. Chitty, J., refused to discharge the order. He said that in law a payment of £1 169. was not a payment of £1 189. 1d. He was of opinion that, if the solicitor intended by the payment which he made to the client to settle finally all accounts between himself and the client, he ought to have drawn the client's attention to this at the time of payment, in order that the client might have an opportunity of having the bill of costs at once taxed, if he wished that this should be done. JESSEL, M.R., said that the only question was whether the bill had been paid. So far as he knew, there was no difference between the payment of a solicitor's bill and the payment of any other bill, such as a tradesman's bill. Did the client assent to and settle the cash account ? If he did, this was equivalent to payment of the bill of costs. The client's demand of the balance of the cash account as such, and the acceptance by him of the £1 16s. as such, had the same effect, as showing that he accepted the account, as if the whole balance had been paid to him by the solicitor. If the balance had been £100, and he had said to the solicitor, Pay me half the balance of £100, that would have amounted to an acceptance of the account, and, therefore, to payment of the bill. The bill, therefore, having been paid, the common order to tax could not be obtained. LINDLEY, L.J., said that it did not follow that, because the balance had not been paid to the client, the bill had not been paid by him. If two people met together and settled an account between them, by setting off one bill against another, that would be payment of the bills. It would be a good plea of payment in an action at law. HOLKER, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Angove; Emanuel & Simonds.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S CHOSE IN ACTION-REDUCTION INTO POSSESSION" PROPERTY" CREDITORS' DEED-NON-COMMUNICATION-BANKRUPTCY-REPUTED OWNERSHIP-ORDER AND DISPOSITION-TRUST FUNDNOTICE TO TRUSTee—BankrupTCY ACT, 1849, s. 125-STATUTE OF LIMI TATIONS-TRUST-CLAIM BY ONE CESTUI QUE TRUST AGAINST ANOTHER.In a case of In re Biaggi, before Fry, J., on the 29th ult., a question arose as to the nature of the interest of a husband in a chose in action of his wife, which he has not reduced into possession-whether that interest is a mere possibility, or whether it will pass by a deed under the description of "property' of the husband. A wife was absolutely entitled, subject to the life estates of her mother and her father, to a share of a trust fund. Her husband executed a deed for the benefit of his creditors, by which he assigned to a trustee a leasehold house and his furniture, and "all other personal estate and interest." FRY, J., held that the reversionary chose in action of the wife passed by the deed, subject to the condition that it must be reduced into possession by the husband. Subject to the performance of that condition, his lordship was of opinion that the busband's interest in the chose in action was 66 property," and that it passed by an assignment of " property."

costs of the deed, to divide the proceeds of sale among the creditors rateably, and that this was, in effect, a mortgage to the trustee to secure his debt. In any event the deed would operate for this purpose, and, therefore, FRY, J., held that it must operate entirely. Another question was whether the reversionary interest had passed to the assignee in bankruptcy of the husband, the bankruptcy (which took place under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861) having been subsequent to the execution of the deed, on the ground that it was in the order and disposition of the husband as reputed owner, because no notice had been given by the trustee of the creditors' deed to the trustees of the trust fund." The evidence was not satisfactory on this point. But FRY, J., said that it was the duty of the assignee in the bankruptcy to complete his title to the fund by obtaining, as provided by section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1849, an order from the Court of Bankruptcy for the sale of the wife's interest for the benefit of the creditors under the bankruptcy. No such order had been obtained, and until it had been obtained the assignee could not claim the fund. If he did not succeed in obtaining the order, the trustee under the creditors' deed would have the better title. His lordship gave the assignee six weeks to enable him to obtain the order from the Court of Bankruptcy. A further question arose as to the Statute of Limitations. For this purpose it is necessary to state the facts more fully. The trust was created by a settlement in 1835, and under it the trust fund was limited on trust to pay the income to a mother during her life, for her separate use, and after her death to pay the income to the father during his life, and after his death the fund was to be divided in equal shares among their five children. In 1849 the fund had been invested, partly in the purchase of some leasehold property, and partly on a mortgage of other leasehold property. In June, 1849, all the persons interested in the fund executed a deed sanctioning this mode of investment, and giving the trustees a power of sale and re-investment. In 1854 one of the daughters was about to marry the bankrupt, and D., one of the trustees of the settlement, agreed to lend her a sum of £300. To secure the repayment of this sum, with interest, a deed was executed by which the father and mother, the daughter (with the assent of her intended husband), and one of her sisters assigned to D. their respective interests in the trust fund by way of mortgage. The deed contained a declaration that, as between the assigning parties, the £300 and the interest thereon should be primarily chargeable on the share in the trust fund of the daughter who was then about to marry. On April 18, 1854, the marriage took place. On April 26, 1861, the creditors' deed was executed. On April 30, 1861, the wife died. On January 23, 1862, the mother died. During her life the interest on the £300 was paid by her, it having been from time to time deducted by D. from her income. In December, 1862, some of the leasehold property on which the trust fund was invested was sold, and out of the proceeds of sale the £300, and all interest then due on it, was paid to the mortgagee, and on December 23, 1862, he assigned the mortgage debt to the trustees of the settlement upon the trusts of the settlement. On June 2, 1868, the adjudication of bankruptcy was made. On March 12, 1877, the father died. During the period of bis tenancy for life under the settlement-i.e., from the death of the mother until his own death-he in effect paid the interest on the mortgage debt of £300; or, in other words, no interest on it was paid to him or to the trustees of the settlement, and his income as tenant for life under the settlement was to that extent diminished, In 1879 the trustees of the settlement paid into court the share of the bank. rupt's wife in the trust fund, less the £300. The fund in court was claimed by the assignee in the bankruptcy, and by the trustee under the creditors' deed, and a petition was presented by the assignee. The executrix of the father also claimed to be paid out of the fund in court the interest on the £300 which he had paid during his tenancy for life. It was objected that this claim, or the greater part of it, was barred by the Statute of Limitations. FRY, J., said that as one of the trustees of the settlement was a party to the deed of 1854, those trustees must be taken to have had notice of that deed. At any rate they had notice of it by means of the deed of the 23rd of December, 1862. The result was that they became trustees of the share of the bankrupt's wife on the terms of the deed of 1854, and one of those terms was that out of that share whatever should have been paid to the mortgagee by the other assigning parties should be repaid to them. That trust was still subsisting, it had been in no way extinguished. Consequently, the fund which was paid into court was paid in on that trust. The Statute of Limitations did not apply, and the executrix of the father was entitled to be paid out of the fund in court the interest on the £300 which he had paid, in priority to any other claim.-SOLICITORS, W. W. Aldridge; H. L. Pemberton; O. E. Dawson; F. Woodhouse.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-SPECIFIC OR RESIDUARY LEGACY.-On the 3rd inst. the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M, R., and LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ.) reversed the decision of Fry, J., in a ease of Broadbent v. Barrow (30 W. R. 483, ante, p. 282). The question was whether a legacy was specific, general, or residuary. A testator bequeathed a number of pecuniary legacies, and then he bequeathed all his personal estate of which he should die possessed, and which should not consist of money or securities for money, to R. absolutely. And he gave and devised all the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, both real and personal, to trustees upon certain trusts. The personal estate was insufficient for the payment of the pecuniary legacies in full. Fry, J., held that the gift to R. was specific. He said that he accepted the definition of a specific legacy given by Jessel, M.R., in Bothamley v. Sherson (23 W. R. 848, L. R. 20 Eq. 304)-viz., that it must be (1) a gift of part of the testator's property itself, and (2) a gift of a part emphatically as distinguished from the whole. Fry, J., said that the gift to R. fulfilled both those conditions. JESSEL, M.R., said that the will was very obscure. There were, however, some principles of law which would enable the court to come to a conclusion as to the proper meaning of the words which the testator had used, though his lordship had not the slightest idea what his real meaning was. It was a curious thing that Fry, J., had considered that he was followBothamley v. Sherson, and had based his decision upon it. The Master

In cases, such as Mayor and Corporation of, &c., the initial letter of the city or borough should govern the distinctive mark.

Owners of ships by name of ship.

Overseers of parishes by names of parish.

Names in which "de" occurs as part of the surname, or is preceded only by Christian names, should be indexed under "D."

Foreign companies should be indexed under the initial letter of the first word in their name, e.g., Banco de Lima under "B," Société d'Aclimatisation, "8."

Foreign titles should be indexed under the initial letter of the proper or local name in the title, e.g., Comte de Paris under "P," Dac de Montebello under "M."

The Christian and surnames of all parties to an action should be entered in full in the cause book.

Parties are not to be allowed to see the cause book unless by express leave obtained from a master or an order by a judge.

All searches in the cause book for writs of summons or otherwise are to be made by the clerks in the Central Office, and the result communicated to the party applying.

When a certificate is given, and no inspection of a præcipe is required, only one fee of 18. to be taken (or 4s. if higher scale).

A separate index is to be kept of writs in administration actions and of administration summonses, which index the public may search without fee.

Separate books are to be kept for entering returns to writs of execution, index to lower scale certificates in Chancery matters not actions, and return books and debt attachment book.

No other books to be kept for entries except the cause books (and desk book for facilitating reference). The judgment books may be kept in the cause book room with the cause books, or in a separate room.

Writs of Summons, Appearances, and Amendments.

Copies of writs of summons should be signed with the name of the solicitor or solicitors' clerks suing them out as under :

C.D. and Co.

or A.B.

for C.D. and Co.

The stamp is to be on the copy writ filed.

In the Chancery Division an order of course to amend a writ of summons as the plaintiff may be advised will not justify an alteration that strikes out the name of any plaintiff or defendant, or makes a person out of the jurisdiction a party. In all the divisions an amendment of a writ of summons may be made by leave of a master (on payment of fee) before service. A plaintiff can be struck out only by special leave given in the order to amend; a defendant, by special leave, or on the written statement (to be âled) of the plaintiff's solicitors that a notice of discontinuance under order xxiii. has been duly given.

In Chancery actions an amendment to a writ of summons pursuant to an order of court or judge, may be made either on an undertaking to get the order drawn up, or on a separate memorandum or certificate being left for filiog, signed or initialed by the judge or registrar, showing the order to have been made.

In an information, where there is no relator, the Attorney-General's signature on the writ is not required; but where there is a relator (whether a person or body corporate) the original writ (not the copy filed) must be signed by the Attorney-General, and if any amendment be made, it must be authorized by his signature on the original writ or draft.

In entering appearances a note should be made in the cause books "Statement of claim required" or "Statement of claim not required," and in cases where the action is for recovery of land, and the defence is limited, a further note to that effect should be added.

If no time is specified in an order to amend, the amendment must be made within 14 days.

No writs are to be issued in Probate Division causes unless on a certificate that the affidavit required by order v., rule 10, has been filed.

Where appearances are entered in the Central Office in Probate and Admiralty Division actions, a list or copy of the appearances entered shall each day be addressed and sent to the principal registrars of the Probate and Admiralty Divisions. Such list to be made out at the close of the day by one of the junior clerks in the writ, &c., department.

If a solicitor has caused an appearance to be entered by mistake, the mistake may be rectified with the consent in writing of the solicitor for the plaintiffs, and on the fiat (on the production of such consent) of a practice master to be given on a præcipe with a 2s. 6d. (search) stamp.

A defendant in person may change his address for service (without order to change address) by leave of master, but must forthwith give notice to the other side.

In the case of infants the appearance is accepted without any authority or order; an order being obtained by the defendant's solicitor after the appearance has been entered.

In the case of a married woman, an order to defend separately must be obtained before appearance is entered. If a writ of summons bas been lost the filed copy may, for the purpose of amendment, or for any other purpose, be treated as a duplicate, but only by leave of a practice master, and on the party giving an undertaking to produge the original at the Central Office when found,

Substituted Service. Affidavit of Service.

Unless the order shall otherwise direct, a copy of the order and of the writ shall be deemed to have been served on the day following the day on which a prepaid letter containing such copy shall have been posted.

Subpoenas.

Subpoenas remain in force only till the end of the sitting or assize for which they were issued. A new writ must afterwards be isssued or the former writ may be (at the option of the parties) altered as to date and sitting, or assize, and re-issued as a new writ.

The date of return in the writ and præcipe may, before service, be amended without the direction of a master, and without fee, provided the amended date be within the sitting or assize for which the subpoena issued.

A subpoena in an interpleader issue should be headed in the title of the original action, and in the title of the interpleader issue, and should be applied for in, and issued out of, the room in which the writ of summons in the original action was issued.

Removal by appearance to London of Actions commenced in District
Registries.

A fresh London distinctive mark to be given.

No separate district registry cause book to be kept.
No letter need be sent to the district registrar.

Writs of summons issued out of a district registry cannot be amended by order or fiat of master unless the action has been removed to London by appearance or otherwise.

No writ issued out of a district registry can be amended in the Central Office unless the duplicate filed in the district registry has been previously received in the Central Office.

If it becomes necessary to send to London (for amendment or otherwise) the copy writ filed in the district registry, authority may be given to send the copy writ to the Central Office by sealing a duplicate of the præcipe for appearance, which shall be transmitted to the district registrar by the solicitors concerned.

Distringas.

When the settlement comprises more than one sum, and the sums are in the shares or securities of different companies, a separate affidavit and notice should be made for each company, and the affidavit should be that the funds comprise "amongst others" the sum of, &c. [specifying the sum in the books of the one company], and a stamp of 10s. will be required for each separate notice.

If there are more sums than one, but all in the books of the Bank of England, or in the books of any one company, one affidavit and notice will be sufficient for all the sums.

In actions not specifically assigned to the Chancery Division by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34 (i.e., so called common law actions brought in the Chancery Division), no certificate of lower scale shall be given out till after appearance. In the cause books such actions shall be distinguished by

the letters L.S.

When deposited documents, or documents on the file, are ordered to be delivered to a solicitor, on his undertaking to return them, he must sign a receipt and undertaking to return (which may be indorsed on the order), and leave the order and indorsement at the Central Office to be returned to him on his bringing back the documents. The signature of the solicitor must be witnessed by his olerk, or by someone known to the officer delivering out the documents.

Pleadings and Documents filed in Default.

None of these documents will be placed in the bundles containing the writs of summons and pleadings filed on entering judgment, but will be made up into two sets of separate bundles.

The first containing all statements of claim filed in default.

The second containing summonses, warrants to tax, notices, and miscellaneous documents.

All these documents must have the date of filing and the name of the defendant against whom they were filed written on them, and be entered in the canse books under the head of pleadings, such entry to show the date of filing, nature of document, and name of defendant against whom they are filed.

None of these documents will (for the present) be delivered out without an order, but any defendant against whom documents have been filed may, after appearance, inspect the same without fee.