Page images

Champion, Robert, Canterbury rd, Kilburn, Dealer in China, May 8 at 3 at offices of Pain, Marylebone rd

Chandler, Joseph, Crayford, Kent, Nurseryman. May 13 at 12 at Masons' Hall Tavern

Masons' avenuo, Bosingball st. Martin, London Wall Childs, George, jun, Sunderland, Non Trader. May 0 at 12 at offices of Fairclough,

Foylo st, Sunderland

Clnyton, Richard, Leominstor, Hereford, Innkoopcr. May 1 at tho White Horse Inn,

West st, Leominster, in lieu of the placo originally named Cleevc, Henry Lacy, Winchflold, Hants, Farmer. May 8 at 4 at offices of Webb and

Lear, Cross st, Basingstoke Cozens, Samuel Edmund, Phojnix Wharf, Borough, WharHngcr. May 18 at 3 at offices

of Chandler and Co, Coleman st Davies, Isaac, Porth, Rhondda Valley, Glamorgan, Contractor. May 9 at 12 at offices

of Morgan, Pontypridd Davios, William, Llanolly, Carmarthen, Grocer. May 0 at 11 at offices of Rees and Co.

Thomas st, Llanolly

Davies, William Merodith, Festiniog, Merioneth, Draper. May 9 at 11 at the Whito

Boar Hotel, Manchester. KUis, Festiniog Davis, John William, Kingston-upon-Hull, Grocer. May 8 at 3 at the Law Society's

Hall, Lincoln's inn bldgs, Bowlalley lane, Hull. Watson and Co Day, Thomas, Goole, York, Shipbuilder. May 9 at 3 at offices of Hind and Evoratt,


Dixon, James, Halifax, York, Stono Merchant. May 10 at 3 at offices of Craven and

Sunderland, Bradford rd, Brighouse Dunt, Joseph, Gt Suffolk st, Southwark, Greongrocor. May 5 at 3 at offices of Cooper

and Co, Lincoln's inn fields Durand, George, Nottingham, Tailor. May 9 at 12 at offlcos of Acton and Marriott,

Victoria st, Nottingham

Elstono, Jamos, Speldhnrst Mill, nr Tunbridgo Wells, Miller. May 10 at 3 at the Rose

and Crown Hotel, Tonbridge. Curtis and Bctts, South sq, Gray's inn
Evans, William, Norton Subcourse, Norfolk, Whoolwright. May 9 ot 3 at the Swan

Inn, Norton Sabcourse. Syer, Great Yarmouth
Fawcett. Christopher, Kingston-upon-null, Merchant. May 8 at U at tho Law Society,

UoT/lnlley lane, Hull. Leak and Co, Kingston-upon-Hull
Fells, Morris, Liverpool, Glazier. May 5 at 3 at offices of Lumb, Imperial chmbrs,

Dale st, Liverpool

Forsythe, James, Metropolitan Meat Market, Meat Salesman. May 11 at 12 at offices of

Gibson and Wilson, Southampton bldgs, Chancery lane Fieldson, William, Norwich, Printer's Manoger. May 4 at 3 at offices of Henry,

Furnival's inn, Holborn Fudger, Frederick, Northampton, Kid Leather Dresser. May 9 at 2.30 at offices of

Palmer and Co, Railway approach, London Bridge Andrew, Northampton Gamage, Thomas, Staines rd, Hounslow, Builder. May 0 at 3 at tho Red Lion Inn,

Hounslow. Wools and Co, Uxbridge Gausden, Charles Henry, jun, Eastbourne, Sussex, Auctioneer. May 8 at 3 at offices of

Champion and Co, Terminus rd, Eastbourne Gething, Ebenezer, and William Gething, Brynmawr, Brecon, Tin Plate Manufacturers.

May 10 at 12 at offices of Smith and Lawrence, Cambrian pi, Swansea. James and

Co, Merthyr Tydfil

Gillespie, John, Upper Thames st, Iron Merchant. May 5 at 2 at Guildhall Tavern,

Gresham St. Tilson and Byrne-Jones, Bucklcrsbury Godden, John, Ruckinge, Kent, Farmer. May 0 at 2 at offlco of Hallett and Co, Bank

st, Ashford

Gough, John, Derby, Tailor. May 8 at 2 at office of Caldor, Derwent st, Derby
Grayson, Alfred, Bradford, Lancaster, Book Keeper. May 10 at 3 at 35, Cannon stroet,

Manchester. Alderson, Manchester
Grcedus, Robert, Compton st, Brunswick sq, Glass and China Dealer. May 10 at 3 at

office of Hayward, King st, Guildhall Hancock, James, Alsager, Chester, Grocer. May 7 at 11 at office of Bonnett, Picodilly

bldgs, Hanley

Hon-is. John, Nuneaton, Warwick, Boot and Shoo Maker. May 11 at 3 at Newdegate

Arms Hotel, Newdegate st, Nnneaton. Buckby, Leicester Hirst, Jonas, Halifax, Iron and Tin Plato Worker. May 9 at 11 at offices of Garsed,

Barum Top, Halifax

■Hodges^ William, Leicester, Boot and Shoo Manufacter. May 10 at 3 at office of Ilincks,

Howling Green st, Leicester Holmes, Martha, Margate. May 8 at 2 at 8, Grosvcnor terrace, Margate Hills, Margate

Hopkins, Henry, Worccstor, Commission Agent. May 5 at 2 at tho Hop Market Hotel,

Worcester. Sargent, Birmingham Hurst, Edwin Henry, New London st, Seed Merchant. May 12 at 2 at office of Lousada

and Emanuel, Austin Friars Ishcrwood, Daniel, Bolton, Wholcsalo Draper. May 8 at 3 at 8, York st, Manchester.

Ilulton and Co, Bolton

James, Thomas, Hanley, Stafford, Butcher. May 8 at 11 at offlcos of Ashmall, Albion st, Hanley

Jennings, John, Bradford-on-Avon, Wilts, Drapor. May 10 at 12 at Cross Koys Hotel, Orango gr, Bath

Jones, James, Upper Boat, nr Tontypridd, Boat Builder. May 12 at 11 at office of Price Bank chmbrs, Pontypridd » Kcm

p, Henry, sen, Ryde, Hants, Licensed Victualler. May 9 at 2 at offlcos of :l Dashwood, Market st, Ryde


Lnmbert, Agnes, Crewe, Chester, Grocer. May 2 at 11 at offices of Pointon, Albert

chmbrs, Church side, Crewe Lester, Ablett Charles, St Bartholomew rd, Islington, Auctioneer. May 8 at 3 ot 146,

Fleet st. Moore, Clifford's inn Lewis, William Henry, Worcester, Hosior. May 8 at 11.30 at Hon and Chickens Hotel,

New st, Birmingham. Tree, Worcester Linford, Charles, Wombwell, York, Joiner. May 12 at 2 at offices of Paiker and Hick

mott, Regent, st, Barnsley Locke, Charles, Bethnal Gn rd, Hardware Dealor. May 16 at 2 at offices of Armstrong, Chancery lano

Monsor, Ilonry David, Fitzhughs, Southampton, Traveller. May 8 at 3.30 at offices of Lamport, Portland st, Southampton

M'Innes, Donald, Birmingham, Restaurant Keeper. May 6 at 11 at Royal Hotel,

Templo row, Birmingham. Blewitt, Birmingham Moass, Samuel John, Plymouth, Licensed Victualler. May 8 at 11 at office of Campion,

Bedford circus, Exeter Monks, Francis Albert, Croydon, Watchmaker. May 11 at 3 at 69, Lincoln's inn fields.

Cooper and Co

Mottram, Montague, Eldon rd, Kensington, Master Mariner. May 3 at 2 at office of Cogswell and Corp, Argyll st, Regent st. Knight, Argyll st. Regent st

Newton, David, Newbold Moor, Derby, Beerhouse Keeper. May 0 at 2 at office of Cowdell, Markot st, Chesterfield

Odden, George, Whitstable, Kent, Baker. May 9 at 11 at office of Walthew, High st, Whitstable

Oram, Eugene, Greyhound rd, Fulham Fields, Oilman. May 6 at 12 at office of Shearman, Gresham st

Orme, John, Orton-on-the-Hill, Leicester, Farmer. May 9 at 11 at office of Fowke, Colmore row, Birmingham

Parker, John, Halifax, Beerhouse Keeper. May 8 at 3 at offlco of Garsed, Barum Top, Halifax

Perry, Thomas, Bangor, Ship Builder. May 11 at 2 at Queen's Head Cafe, Bangor.

Hughes and Pritchard, Bangor Pemberton, Thomas, Burslem, Stafford, Joiner. May 5 at 11 at office of Ellis, Market pi,


Phillips, Frederick, Chatham, Watchmaker. Apr 29 at Holborn Viaduct Hotel in lieu of

the place originally named Powter, Robert Henry, Tollington park. Boot Manufacturer. May 10 at 3 at office of

Foreman and Co, Gresham st. Msson, Curtain rd Price, John, Brynmawr, Brecon, Boot and Shoe Manufacturer. May 8 at 12 at offices

of Powell, Brynmawr

Raine, Joseph, Mickleton, York, Innkeepor. May 6 at 1 at King's Head Inn, Barnard

Castle. Maw, jun, Bishop Auckland Reach, John Roof, West Lynn, St Peter, Norfolk, Grocer. May 6 at 12 at office of

Athenaeum, Kind's Lynn Bead, Charlos, Swindon, Witts, Private Accountant. May 9 at 11 at offices of Kinneir

and Tombs, High st, Swindon Roberts, Edwin, Wakefield, York, Licensed Victualler. May 6 at 11 at Queen's Arms

Inn, Kirkgate, Wakefield. Browning, Bradford
Russell, Arthur, Fortsea, Hants, Linendraper. May 9 at 3 at offices of Ladbury and

Co, Cheapside. King, Portsea
Scales. Richard, Rawtcnstall, Lancaster, Grocer. May 9 at 3 nt offices of Addleshaw

and Worburton, Norfolk st, Manchester Simpson, Jonathan, Stockton on Tees, Durham, Boot and Shoe Maker. May 2 at 11 at

offlco of Best, High st, Stockton on Tees Simpson, Thomas, Lancaster, Fishmonger. May 8 at 2 at office of Johnson and Tilly,

Sun st, Lancaster

Smith, Samuel, Bolton, Lancaster, Joiner. May 10 at 3 at Garden st. Bury. Anderton and Donnelly

Southam, Susan, Brewer st, Regent st, Tailor. May 13 at 1 at offices of Norman, Gt

Marlborough st, Regent st Thomas, William, Merthyr Tydfil, Glamorgan, Grocer. May 8 at 11 at office of Voughan,

High st, Merthyr Tydfil Tucker, William Henry, and William Simpson Stevenson, Liverpool. Ship Chandlers.

May 0 at 2 at office of Goffoy and Co, Commerce chmbrs. Lord st, Liverpool Walker, Richard, North Shields, Northumberland, Grocer. May 8 at 2 at offlco of Purvis, King st, South Shields Whale, Edward Joseph, Malmesbary, Wilts, Farmer. May 6 at 11.30 at King's Arms

Hotel, High st, Malmesbury. Mullings and Co, Wootton Basset Whittaker, George, and Edmund Whittaker, West Butterwick, Lincoln, Grocers.

May 3 at 2 at Darby and Joan Hotel, Crowle. Burtonshaw, Crowlo Williams, Jane, Llanolly, Carmarthen, Innkeeper. May 9 at 11 at office of Howell,

Stepney, st, Llanelly

Wilmott, Richard, Ashton-juxta-Birmingham, Fancy Leather Case Maker, May 9 at 2

at offices of Brown, Waterloo st, Birmingham Winker, Henry, Whitby, York, Auctioneer. May 6 at 3 at offices of Lewis, Zetland rd,


Wright, William Charles, Wigan, Lancaster, Decorator. May 8 at 11 at offices of Byrom, King st, Wigan

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small]


Arti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powdor.

Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of tho Finest Quality, with tho excess of fat extracted.

The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Lunchcou, or Supper, and invaluable for Invalids and Children." Highly commended by the entire Medical Press.

Being without sugar, spice, or other admixture, it suits all palates, keeps better in all climates, and is four times ho strength of cocoas Thickened yet Weakknkd with starch, ic, and In Beauty cnEAPEB than such Mixtures.

Made instantaneously with boiling water, a tenspoouf ul to a Breakfast Cup, costing less than a halfpenny.

Cocoatina A La Vanille is the most delicate, digestible, cheapest Manilla Chocolate, and may be taken when richer chocolate is prohibited:.

In tin packets at Is. Od., 3s., 6s. Cd., Ac, by Chemists and GrocciB.

Chnrities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietors, B, SCHWEITZER * CO 10, Atiam-street, London, W.C,


Hewetson, Thexton, & Peart,


200, 203, and 204, TOTTENHAM COURT ROAD, W.

Estimates and Designs submitted frco for entirely Furnishing Residences, Chambers, Offices, &c. —PAINTING, DECORATING, & HOUSE REPAIRS.—

Carved Oak Furniture, Reproductions from Ancient Designs, &c. Bedroom Furniture, including Bedstead and Bedding, from £7 10s. per set.


Hewetson, Thexton, & Peart,

200, 203, and 201, Tottenham Court-rood, London, W.

N.B.—Household Furniture Warehoused or Removed on reasonable terms.



To Her Majesty, the Lord Chancellor, the Whole of the Judicial Bench, Corporation of London, ic.


Barristers' And Queen's Counsel's Ditto, CORPORATION ROBES. UNIVERSITY I CLERQT (ORIS.:



LONDON, MAY 6, 1882.


We Regret to learn that the illness from which Lord Justice Baggallay is suffering at present confines him to his bed, but it is hoped that he will be able to resume his seat in the Court of Appeal in the course of a few days.

A Set Of Rules for the government of the Central Office of the Supreme Court has just been settled by the Practice Masters and •will be found in another column. Such a code of office practice has long been wanted, and it will probably be found that not only will it assist solicitors and their clerks, but it will save the masters much time now taken up in answering questions on office practice and regulations. It will, moreover, help to make the practice throughout the Central Office absolutely uniform, and will set at rest many doubtful and difficult questions frequently arising. It should be observed that there is little or nothing new in these rules, which are founded either on existing general orders of one or other of the Divisions of the High Court, or on old and wellestablished practice, as varied by the Orders of the Supreme Court of April, 1880.

The State Of Business in the Chancery Division has probably given rise to the rumour of the intended appointment of a new judge, to which wc referred last week. Causes have recently accumulated with even unwonted rapidity, and the interlocutory business has also largely increased. Mr. Justice North, sitting for Mr. Justice Chittt, has been able, during the whole of this week, to take nothing but interlocutory matters. A heavy cause has blocked the court of Mr. Justice Fry, and it is xmderstood that other lengthy causes are about to come on. Meantime many causes with witnesses which are ready to be heard, and have already been in the paper, have been postponed, and witnesses who had been summoned from long distances have been sent back. In one of these causes a number of witnesses have been summoned three times, at an expense of at least £50 each time. We have always been reluctant to urge additions to the judicial bench in order to meet temporary emergencies, but we imagine that the Whitsuntide cause-paper of the Chancery Division will show, when taken in connection with the cause-papers for recent sittings, that there is a steady and rapid increase of business which calls for some addition to the judicial strength of that Division.

TnE Quaint Spectacle of an election of a registrar of deeds, accompanied by all the circumstances of canvassing, conveyances, special trains, and general commotion accompanying a hotly contested county parliamentary election, has just been witnessed at Beverley. Under 6 Anne, c. 35, the election of the registrar of the East Riding Registry is to be made by all the freeholders within the East Riding and the town of Hull, of the yearly value of £100, and is to be "performed by balloting " of a very peculiar kind. Any five of the justices of the East Riding, appointed by the major part of the justices, are to be " scrutators of the ballot," and are to "meet on the day and place of election, and there, in the presence of the electors, shall place one or more glass vessels to be provided for that purpose, into which each elector present sLall put one open paper, containing the name of such person as he approves of to be registrar." The vacancy in the registrar

ship caused by the de;:th of Mr. John Maister, who was elected in 1846, after a two days' polling, was on the present occasion contested by three candidates. The canvass is stated to have extended over three months, and the contest between two of the candidates was very close, the successful candidate being elected by a majority of only thirty-four. The registrar is paid by fees, and has to enter into a recognizance with two sureties "of the penalty of £2,000," for the " true and faithful performance of his duty in the execution of his office."

Practitioners who may happen to have charge of an action for libel will do well to study the case of Scott v. Sampson (reported in this week's Weekly Reporter, also in L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491). It was there held by Mathew and Cave, JJ., that in an action for libel neither evidence of rumours before publication that the plaintiff had committed the offences charged in it, nor evidence of particular facts tending to show the misconduct of the plaintiff, can be admitted in reduction of damages, but that evidence of the general bad reputation of the plaintiff is admissible. The importance of the judgments consists in the fact that hitherto the law had to be gathered from a number of scantily reported, and often contradictory, rulings at Nisi JPrius, of which Leicester v. Warren (2 Camp. 251) is perhaps the best known, whereas the recent decision (see the judgment of Cave, J.) extracts the principles from these rulings, and lays down the law in the three categorical propositions above stated, so that a Court of Appeal, if the decision should in future come up for review, will have comparatively easy work to do. We think that the decision will be accepted as good law. It arose, it will be remembered, from the action in which a theatrical critic sued the editor of a newspaper for a libel, alleging that he had endeavoured to extort money by threatening to publish defamatory matter concerning a deceased actress. The defendant had attempted to give evidence of rumours of similar endeavours, and of previous acts "which were said to have been of .a discreditable character," as that he had after a quarrel with a particular actor written for a newspaper a false and dishonest criticism of that actor's acting, "for the purpose of gratifying his spite against that gentleman." But Lord Coleridge, C.J., rejected both kinds of evidence, and it is this rejection which has been supported. Leicester v. Warren appears to be distinctly overruled, but it is pointed out that "Sir James MansField in that case expressed his own dissatisfaction with the arguments adduced in support of the admissibility of the evidence, but yielded to three cases which were cited before him," and are shown not to have been in point, because merely supporting the proposition that evidence of general bad reputation is admissible. "To deny this would," as is cited from Starkie on Evidence, "be to decide that a man of the worst character is entitled to the same measure of damages with one of unblemished reputation. A reputed thief would be placed on the same footing with the most honourable merchant. . . . To enable the jury to estimate the probable quantum of injury sustained, a knowledge of the party's previous character is not only material, but seems to be absolutely essential." Far otherwise is it with evidence of rumours and particular acts. Of such evidence it is well observed by Cave, J., that "to admit evidence of rumour is to give anyone ... an opportunity of spreading, through the means of the publicity attending judicial proceedings, what he may have picked up from the most disreputable sources," while evidence of particular acts of misconduct "at the most tends to prove, not that the plaintiff has not, but that he ought not to have, a good reputation," and in effect "throws upon the plaintiff the difficulty of showing an uniform propriety of conduct duting his whole life."

Tins Distbess Amendment Bill of Sir Henby Holland, ■which reached the stage of committee this week, is a measure which seems to stand a, fair chance of passing. Mainly it applies to agricultural tenancies only, but the last clause, which provides that "no arrears of rent shall be recovered by any distress but within two years after the same shall have become due," is a general one. With regard to agricultural tenancies of any extent, the Bill proposes to exempt live stock on the premises for agistment, male stock used for breeding purposes, and machinery, if they are " the bond fide property of a person other than the tenant." In the case of the live stock not used for breeding, the exemption is not to attach unless the owner has given to the landlord notice in writing, within four days, of the contract of agistment. In the case of live stock of either kind, the landlord may, "from time to time, by notice in writing to the owner of the live stock, stating the amount of rent in arrear, . . . require such owner of live stock, within four days after the delivery of the notice, to pay to such landlord or his agent the said amount, or to remove his live stock from the premises within the said four days"; and the Bill proceeds to provide that, "if within such period the arrears be not paid by the said owner, or his live stock removed from the said premises, the said stock shall not be entitled to exemption." By subsequent clauses the amount paid by the owner is recoverable by him from the tenant, and may be set off against a sum due by him to the tenant for agistment, and the removal of the stock in pursuance of the landlord's notice determirj,es the owner's agreement with the tenant. If a distress be proceeded with in disregard of the exemptions, the owner may proceed against the party levying it, or causing it to be levied, before justices of the peace for a " summary order for restoration of the live stock seized, or for payment of the real value thereof," but any party who thinks himself aggrieved by any order of justices is to have an appeal to quarter sessions. The Bill, so far as it extends the idea of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871, and the Railway Rolling Stock Protection Act, 1872, seems to be unobjectionable in principle, and we fail to see why the samp principle should not be extended to all kinds of tenancies, and to the goods of third persons of whatever kind.

TnE Question how far the liability of a carrier of passengers has been extended by two recent decisions, and the bearing of the doctrines enunciated in them on a certain notorious channel passage, was mooted by a leading journal a few days ago. The old rule acted on in Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Ex. 341), and Hamlin v. Great Northern Railway Company (1 II. k N. 408), seems to have been considerably altered by the enlarged sympathy for suffering shown by the Court of Appeal in Macmdkon v. Field (L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 591), on which we recently commented. Looking at that case in connection with Hobhs v. London and South-western Railway Company (L. R. 10 Q. B. Ill), the question whether the colds caught, the suffering endured, and the engagements missed in consequence of that wearisome tossing, would now be held to be " natural results," anticipated by both parties, seems a matter of uncertainty. It may be found that in the particular voyage alluded to the conditions attached to the contract of carriage exonerate the railway company from the consequences of such a delay. And the mere fact that a royal personage was crossing, might possibly be held to relieve the company, if the delay could be attributed solely to the disarrangement of traffic consequent thereupon. Lord Justice James, in the Court of Appeal, once said that a "railway company must be at liberty to accept any traffic brought to it—a special train for the Queen, or a royal visitor—although it thereby disabled itself later in the day from keeping the times mentioned in its time tables." And the interference of the Government with the management of the company, and the exigencies of the case, might not impossibly be held to excuse them. In cases of ordinary accident and delay, the law seems to press hardly on the shoulders of railway companies, broad though they be; but this stringency, in the same manner as the strange perverscness of juries, tends to render the traffic services, in general, wonderfully effective.

It Will Be Seen from the report which will be found in

another column, that the curious decision of Mr. Justice Chitty in In re Angove has been reversed by the Court of Appeal. A solicitor delivered to his client a bill of costs, and on the next day delivered to him a cash account, showing a balance to the credit of the client, after deducting the amount of the bill of costs, of £ 1 18s. Id. The client, six months afterwards, called at the solicitor's office and asked for payment of the balance due to him, which he said was £1 16s. The solicitor, taking the client's word for the amount, and not referring to his papers, gave him a cheque for that amount. The client afterwards obtained the common order to tax the solicitor's bill, and Mr. Justice Chitty refused to discharge the order, on the ground that, "in point of law, a payment of £l 16s. was not a payment of £1 18s. Id." The question was obviously not whether the balance due to the client had been paid, but whether the solicitor's bill had been paid by the client. The demand by the client of the balance he supposed to be due to him on the account showed that he accepted the account, setting off the bill of costs against the amount due to the client; and this would clearly be a good payment of the bill.

No Less Than Thuee Questions were asked in the House of Commons on Monday night in relation to the railway passenger duty and the exemptions therefrom. Mr. Gladstone, in his separate answers to the querists, held out no prospect of amending legislation. We cannot but think that this is much to be deplored. It is material to point out in connection with the subject that the Select Committee of 1876 reported that "the Inland Revenue have felt bound to make arrangements with the railway companies, based on different plans, and known as the ticket, mileage-fraction, and percentage systems (which are all entirely outside the law), as a temporary means of doing justice to the railway companies, and at the same time protecting the interests of the revenuo;" and added, "that without imputing any blame to the officers of the Board of Trade or Inland Revenue, who appeared only to have acted for the best, . . . the committee could not but regard a state of affairs in which they were forced to countenance a departure from the law as decided by the House of Lords, as in the highest degree unsatisfactory." Nor should it be forgotten that certain arrears of duty amounting, in 1866, to from two to four millions sterling, though practically condoned, have never been legally remitted, so that the companies are still legally liable to pay the whole of this very large amount.


Tub mode of evading the provisions of 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, pointed out by Wallgrave v. Tebbs (2 K. & J. 313) ; Tee v. Ferris {lb., 357), and other cases, is attended with these disadvantages—that the testator must trust entirely to the honour of the persons to whom he devises the property absolutely, and that no communication of the charitable intentions of the testator must have been made to the devisees during his life, or at all events there must have been no express or implied undertaking by them to carry them out (Robotham v. Dunnett, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 430). A much better mode of accomplishing the objects of persons who desire to make gifts to charities to take effect after their death, without regard to the question how far their property may then consist of pure personalty, appears to have been opened up by the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Robson, Emley v. Davidson (30 W. R. 257).

In this case R., the owner of property amounting to about £20,000, and consisting as to about half of pure personalty, and as to the remainder of money on mortgage of leaseholds, resorted to this device. He executed a deed whereby he covenanted to pay £20,000 to trustees, at or before twelve months from the date, upon trust to pay the income thereof to his wife and to himself successively for life, and after the death of the survivor upon such trusts as his wife should by will or codicil appoint. The wife, on the same day, executed a will whereby, in exercise of the power, she appointed the £20,000 to the same trustees, upon trust (after payment of certain legacies) to pay the residue to such persons and for such purposes as she should by deed poll direct; and by a deed poll, also executed the same day, she directed the same trustees to pay the residue of the £20,000 to certain persons to be elected as charity trustees according to a certain scheme, and for certain charitable purposes set out in the deed poll. The covenantor retained the deed of covenant in his hands, and the £20,000 was not paid during his lifetime. In an action for the administration of his estate, his next of kin contended that the provisions made by the deed poll were void, as being contrary to the provisions of the Act, and also that the charitable provisions made by the will of the wife and the deed poll were void under the same statute as to so much of the £20,000 as ought to be raised out of the testator's personalty savouring of realty. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the covenant, will, and deed were not void as constituting together a scheme to evade the Act, and that, as the £20,000 was a debt due to the trustees which might have been enforced under the covenant in E.'s lifetime, it was, though ultimately devoted to charitable purposes, enforceable ngainst his estate whether consisting of pure or impure personalty.

The grounds of the decision were stated as follows by the Master of the Rolls:—" Though the deed seems to have remained in the covenantor's possession, he was liable to pay this money within twelve months; and, if he had paid it, it would have been invested in consols, in which case, of course, the present question could not have arisen. It was, no doubt, a debt created without value ; but still it was a debt, and, as the law now stands, a debt for all purposes. If he had become bankrupt, the debt would have ranked for a dividend; and if he had died insolvent, it would have ranked for a* dividend; therefore, to all intents and purposes, it is a debt. It is a mere accident that by our law a debt can be enforced out of real estate, and in this particular case there is not the slightest reason for believing that there was anyintention to avoid the statute. I do not think the man knew anything about the statute, or ever heard of pure or impure personalty, or anything of the sort. The object was of a different kind; it was, no doubt, to establish the charity, but not to avoid the statute. Nothing could have been easier ; within twelve months he could have called in the mortgage and paid off the money. There was a present obligation on which he could be sued, and, that being so, it seems to me there is no objection at all to paying that debt out of hi*, assets, real or personal, when he dies, and he did die some long time afterwards, though it happened that the wife died first. "When he died it turned out that some part of his assets consisted of impure personalty. Now, let us look at the mischief of the statute. It does not affect a case of this kind; the creditors cannot get real estate in any shape or way, they are only entitled to have the mortgage called in, and to have the mortgaged property turned into money to pay their debts; there is nothing devoted in any shape to land or interest in land, or kept out of the power of alienation, which it was the real object, or one of the real objects, of the statute to keep always in view; and, looking at the nature of the transaction, there is no ground whatever upon which this debt can be refused payment out of the assets."

It would not be very profitable to discuss the question how far this decision is rcconcileable with Jeffries v. Alexander (8 H. L. Cas. 594). That case was one of great difficulty, and the Court of Appeal were certainly justified by the observations of Lord Kingsdown in his judgment, in saying that one of the grounds of the decision was that the covenant could not have been enforced against the settlor in his lifetime, whereas in the recent case the covenant might have been so enforced. Nor do we propose to consider at length the question whether the settlement of a mere debt for charitable purposes is within the Act. The Act says nothing about debts, and we are not aware of any decision tending to show that the judicial legislators who have expanded the provisions of the Act to such an extraordinary degree, have ever considered that a gift of a mere debt is within its provisions. What we desire to draw attention to is the remarkable change which has occurred in the current of judicial opinion with regard to the attitude to be adopted in construing gifts intended to take effect for the benefit of a charity after the death of the donor, and also the practical results which are likely to flow from the recent decision.

In Fox v. Lovmds (23 W. R. 404), a lady covenanted with

trustees to pay a yearly sum during her life for a charitable object, and either by deed or will to secure to be paid to the trustees, within three months after her decease, such sum of money as would suffice to produce in perpetuity a specified yearly sum for the same charitable object. By her will she bequeathed such sum of money as should be deemed sufficient, if invested in Government securities, to produce the annual sum specified in the covenant, without any direction that the sum should be, paid out of her pure personal estate. The present Master of the Rolls said that "the money covenanted to be secured, whether it were regarded as a voluntary debt or as a legacy, was payable, not out of the pure personalty of the testatrix, but out of her assets generally. It must, therefore, fall upon really as well as personalty. If such gifts—for in reality it was a gift, being postponed to debts for value, and not differing from legacies further than in taking priority over them—were held valid, testators would be enabled to give in a roundabout fashion what the law forbade them to give directly. This was the very mischief aimed at by the Mortmain Act." We have only to compare these observations with the extract given above from the judgment of the same learned judge in In re Robson to see how altered is the standpoint from which such gifts are viewed. In Fox v. Lownds the Master of the Rolls points out as one of the reasons for deciding against the charitable gift that if it were regarded as a voluntary debt, it was payable, not out of pure personalty, but must fall upon realty as well as personalty. In In re Robson the same learned judge said that it was a mere accident that by our law a debt can be enforced out of real estate. The decisions are, of course, not inconsistent, but the observations in the recent case seem to us to indicate a considerable change in the mode of looking at charitable gifts. Still more does the ruling of the court that the three instruments did not form a scheme to evade the provisions of the Act.

The actual mode of disposition decided by the recent case to be valid is cumbrous, and involves the necessity of tiusting to another person to appoint to the charitable purposes intended. But the importance of the recent decision lies in the fact that it seems to authorize a much simpler mode of disposition. If a deht which can be enforced against the covenantor during his lifetime is not within the Act of Geo. 2, an easy mode is opened up for the owners of landed property to give what is in effect a charitable legacy. There can be no need for the elaborate machinery of three instruments. All that is required is a covenant to pay a sum to trustees, to be held by them upon trust for the covenantor for life, and after his death upon trust for the charity intended to be benefited. It does not appear from the report of the recent case whether the deed of covenant was executed by, or whether its execution was made known to, the trustees during the life of the covenantor; it would, no doubt, however be desirable that the deed should be executed by the trustees. It is clear, however, from the recent case that it may be retained by the covenantor during his life. If this is done, the trustees being, of course, persons in whom the covenantor has confidence, he may rest assured that no attempt will be made to enforce it during his lifetime, and after his death his charitable intentions will take effect without any deduction or abatement in consequence of the sum given being to be raised partially out of property savouring of realty. It is impossible to suppose that the deed can be held void as being a scheme to evade the mortmain law, for according to the Master of the Rolls the mischief of the Act "does not affect a case where the charitable creditor "cannot get real estate in any shape or way."


At the Central Criminal Court on Wednesday, Mr. Justice Hawkins had occasion to repeat the complaints he had made several times recently as to the slovenly and careless way in which depositions were sent up from the policecourts, lie remarked tbat the manner in which they were taken was simply miserable, and magistrates' clerks did not appear to take the slightest care in the matter.

According to Kemp's Mercantile Qazelte the number of bills of sale published in England and Wales for the week ending April 29 was 1,003. The number in ihe corresponding week of last year was 961, showing an increase of 42, being a nett increase in 1832, to date, of 68. The number published in Ireland for thb same week was 25. The nrjmter in tl e corresponding week of last year was 49, showing a decrease of 24, being a nett decrease, in 1882, to date, of 140.


Since it is very doubtful whether the present law relating to liquidation by arrangement and composition with creditors is doomed to be repealed this session, the recent case of Ex parte Horrocks (ante, p. 182) appears to be of considerable importance, as affording a striking illustration of the very unnecessary differences in the regulations and rules which have been made under section 78 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, with regard to bankruptcy, and under section 125, sub-section 11, and section 126, paragraph 10, of the same Act, with regard to liquidation and composition. In the case of Ex parte Horrocks the Court of Appeal held that rule 288, which relates to liquidation and composition proceedings alone, must be construed in conjunction with rule 285 in cases of proceedings by joint debtors, and that in order to transfer the proceedings in such a case from one court to another, resolutions of not only the joint, but also of each class of the separate, creditors must be passed. It was admitted that those rules do not in any way regulate the procedure in cases of bankruptcy, and therefore that in bankruptcy, where there is no provision at all for meetings of separate creditors to be held, a resolution of the joint creditors alone, under section 80, sub-section 5, would be sufficient to effect a transfer of the proceedings. We are inclined to take exception to the ruling of the court, and to hold with the argument of counsel for the appellant, that rule 285 was intended to refer to first meetings alone, and that rule 288 can only derive validity from, end in so far as it is in accordance with, section 80, sub-section 5. That sub-section refers to liquidation equally with bankruptcy by virtue of section 125, sub-section 7, which proTides that, "with the modifications hereinafter mentioned" (viz., the exception of the provisions with respect to the close of the bankruptcy, discharge of a bankrupt, release of the trustee, and audit of the accounts by the comptroller—sub-section 9), "all the provisions of this Act shall, so far the same arc applicable, apply to the case of a liquidation by arrangement in the same manner as if the word 'bankrupt' included a debtor whose affairs are under liquidation, and the word 'bankruptcy' included liquidation by arrangement." But for sub-section 5 of section 80 the rule would obviously be ultra vires, and it is equally clear that the sub-section cannot be superseded by the rule. If, therefore, under that sub-section, in cases of bankruptcy, the joint creditors alone can transfer the proceedings, it would follow that they alone would have the same power in liquidation. Rule 288 read by itself is not in any way inconsistent with this view, and we fail to see any good reason why such a different rule from the one regulating proceedings in bankruptcy should have been laid down in cases of liquidation proceedings. It is highly inconvenient that there should be different rules, and all the arguments of the Master of the Rolls in favour of the rule laid down by the court would be equally as strong in cases of bankruptcy as in liquidation; and, we may add, would be also equally as strong in respect to the appointment of a trustee, and yet (following the practice from the very earliest days of bankruptcy law) the separate creditors have no voice in the appointment of a trustee under a joint adjudication. As was said by the Master of the Rolls, "the rules are not easy to construe," but a judicial interpretation having at length been placed upon them, that interpretation is of course now law, whatever may be the opinion of others as to what was the intention of the Act and Rules.

Bearing the case of Ex parte HorrocJcs in mind, it may be interesting to consider a few more instances of the difference between the respective practices in bankruptcy and liquidation under the Bankruptcy Rules, which have proved constant puzzles to the practitioner and pitfalls for the unwary. The first instance we will take is as to the convening of meetings of creditors subsequent to the appointment of a trustee. Rule 95 relates to bankruptcy only, and is as follows:—" Where a meeting of creditors is summoned by a trustee, it shall be summoned by the trustee transmitting to each creditor at the address given in his proof, or, token he shall not have proved, the address given in the list of creditors by the bankrupt, or such other address as may be known

to the trustee, seven days before the meeting is to be held a notice setting forth the time and place at which it is to be held, and the purpose for which it is summoned." The corresponding rule in liquidation is 304, and is as follows :—" General meetings subsequent to the appointment of a trustee shall be summoned by him by giving seven days' notice by post to each of the creditors who have proved their debts, stating the object of the meeting and the business proposed to be transacted thereat." A comparison of the two rules will show that in bankruptcy it is necessary to give all the creditors notice whether they have proved their debts or not, whilst in liquidation only those who have proved need be summoned. Again, in liquidation, rule 305 provides that "a general meeting may, however, at any time be similarly summoned by any creditor with the concurrence, including himself, of one-fourth in value of the creditors who have proved their debts." But there appears to be no such power given to the creditors under a bankruptcy.

A still more important discrepancy appears in the different methods of declaring a dividend by a trustee, as any of our readers will at once see by comparing sections 41 and 42 of the Act, and rules 131 et seq., which apply to bankruptcy, with rules 312 and 314, which relate to liquidation only. In the former case provision is to be made in calculating the dividend for those creditors only who have proved their debts (except in the cases specially provided for by section 42), whilst in liquidation the trustee has to provide for all creditors named in the debtor's statement, whether they have proved or not, unless the claims shall have been previously adjudicated upon.

Again, "reasonable" notice of the intention to declare a dividend in bankruptcy must be sent to every creditor mentioned in the bankrupt's statement of affairs who has not proved his debt, besides being gazetted, whilst in liquidation it is provided only that "seven days" before the declaration of a dividend a notice shall be gazetted. In bankruptcy, too, notice of a dividend having been declared is required to be gazetted, and a copy sent to each creditor who has proved, but nothing of the kind is mentioned in the liquidation rules.

We will only give one more instance of the differences between the two parties. Rule 72 regulates the practice in bankruptcy for the rejection by a trustee of proofs of debt. It is as follows:—" A creditor's trustee, as soon as may be after his appointment, and after the receipt of a proof of debt, shall examine every proof and the grounds of the debt, and, in writing, reject or admit it, in whole or in part, or require further evidence in support thereof, and when he shall admit or reject any claim he shall give notice thereof in writing to the creditor, stating, in case of rejection, the grounds thereof." Rule 74 also refers to bankruptcy, and provides :—" Any creditor, dissatisfied with the decision of the trustee in respect of a proof, may, within fourteen days after the receipt of the notice from the trustee, apply to the court to vary or reverse the decision, and the creditor shall give notice to the trustee thereof seven days before the day so fixed." In liquidation the practice is regulated by rule 313, which is as follows:—" Whenever the trustee shall reject the claim or proof of any creditor he shall give notice to such creditor by post in the form given in the schedule, and where the creditor is resident in Europe, the trustee shall be entitled to exclude from dividend any such claimant or creditor whose debt he so rejects unless such creditor shall, within fourteen davs from the time at which the trustee's notice should have been delivered to him in the ordinary course of post, apply to the court to admit his proof, and proceed with such application with due diligence. Where any such creditor is resident beyond the limits of Europe, such length of notice shall be given to him as the court shall order." Under this rule a form of rejection by the trustee is given in the schedule (form 126), which contains no statement of the grounds of rejection such as is required by rule 72. So that in liquidation it is not necessary, as it is in bankruptcy, that the trustee should give notice of his grounds of rejection. Again, in liquidation provision is made for the case of creditors resident beyond Europe, who could not possibly apply to the court within the fourteen days allowed by the rule in ordinary cases, but no such provision is made in bankruptcy. And further, in bankruptcy the creditor has to give seven days' notice to the trustee of the day fixed for hearing, whilst no length of

« PreviousContinue »