Champion, Robert, Canterbury rd, Kilburn, Dealer in China. Pain, Marylebone rd May 8 at 3 at offices of Clayton, Richard, Leominster, Hereford, Innkeeper. May 1 at the White Horse Inn, Cozens, Samuel Edmund, Phoenix Wharf, Borough, Wharfinger. offices of Webb and May 18 at 3 at offices Davies, Isaac, Porth, Rhondda Valley, Glamorgan, Contractor. May 9 at 12 at offices of Morgan, Pontypridd Davies, William, Llanelly, Carmarthen, Grocer. May 6 at 11 at offices of Rees and Co. Thomas st, Llanelly Davies, William Meredith, Festiniog, Merioneth, Draper. May 9 at 11 at the White Bear Hotel, Manchester. Ellis, Festiniog Davis, John William, Kingston-upon-Hull, Grocer. May 8 at 3 at the Law Society's Hall, Lincoln's inn bldgs, Bowlalley lane, Hull. Watson and Co Day, Thomas, Goole, York, Shipbuilder. May 9 at 3 at offices of Hind and Everatt, Goole Dixon, James, Halifax, York, Stone Merchant. May 10 at 3 at offices of Craven and Sunderland, Bradford rd, Brighouse Dunt, Joseph, Gt Suffolk st, Southwark, Greengrocer. May 5 at 3 at offices of Cooper and Co, Lincoln's inn fields Durand, George, Nottingham, Tailor. May 9 at 12 at offices of Acton and Marriott, Elstone, James, Speldhurst Mill, nr Tunbridge Wells, Miller. May 10 at 3 at the Rose Fawcett, Christopher, Kingston-upon-Hull, Merchant. May 8 at 11 at the Law Society, Fells, Morris, Liverpool, Glazier. May 5 at 3 at offices of Lumb, Imperial chmbrs, Dale st, Liverpool Forsythe, James, Metropolitan Meat Market, Meat Salesman. May 11 at 12 at offices of Gibson and Wilson, Southampton bldgs, Chancery lane Fieldson, William, Norwich, Printer's Manager. May 4 at 3 at offices of Henry, Fudger, Frederick, Northampton, Kid Leather Dresser. May 9 at 2.30 at offices of Gausden, Charles Henry, jun, Eastbourne, Sussex, Auctioneer. May 8 at 3 at offices of Gething. Ebenezer, and William Gething, Brynmawr, Brecon, Tin Plate Manufacturers. May 10 at 12 at offices of Smith and Lawrence, Cambrian pl, Swansea. James and Co, Merthyr Tydfil Gillespie, John, Upper Thames st, Iron Merchant. May 5 at 2 at Guildhall Tavern, Gresham st. Tilson and Byrne-Jones, Bucklersbury Godden, John, Ruckinge, Kent, Farmer. May 9 at 2 at office of Hallett and Co, Bank st, Ashford Gough, John, Derby, Tailor. May 8 at 2 at office of Calder, Derwent st, Derby Grayson, Alfred, Bradford, Lancaster, Book Keeper. May 10 at 3 at 35, Cannon street, Manchester. Alderson, Manchester Greedus, Robert, Compton st, Brunswick sq, Glass and China Dealer. May 10 at 3 at office of Hayward, King st, Guildhall Hancock, James, Alsager, Chester, Grocer. May 7 at 11 at office of Bennett, Picadilly bldgs, Hanley Harris. John, Nuneaton, Warwick, Boot and Shoe Maker. May 11 at 3 at Newdegate Arms Hotel, Newdegate st, Nuneaton. Buckby, Leicester Hirst, Jonas, Halifax, Iron and Tin Plate Worker. May 9 at 11 at offices of Garsed, Barum Top, Halifax Hodges, William, Leicester, Boot and Shoe Manufacter. May 16 at 3 at office of Hincks, Bowling Green st, Leicester Holmes, Martha, Margate. May 8 at 2 at 6, Grosvenor terrace, Margate. Hills, Margate Hopkins, Henry, Worcester, Commission Agent. May 5 at 2 at the Hop Market Hotel, Worcester. Sargent, Birmingham Hurst, Edwin Henry, New London st, Seed Merchant. May 12 at 2 at office of Lousada and Emanuel, Austin Friars Isherwood, Daniel, Bolton, Wholesale Draper. May 8 at 3 at 8, York st, Manchester. Hulton and Co, Bolton James, Thomas, Hanley, Stafford, Butcher. May 8 at 11 at offices of Ashmall, Albion st, Hanley Jennings, John, Bradford-on-Avon, Wilts, Draper. May 10 at 12 at Cross Keys Hotel, Orange gr, Bath Jones, James, Upper Boat, nr Pontypridd, Boat Builder. May 12 at 11 at office of Price Bank chmbrs, Pontypridd Kemp, Henry, sen, Ryde, Hants, Licensed Victualler. May 9 at 2 at offices of Fardell and Dashwood, Market st, Ryde Lambert, Agnes, Crewe, Chester, Grocer. Msy 2 at 11 at offices of Pointon, Albert chmbrs, Church side, Crewe Lester, Ablett Charles, St Bartholomew rd, Islington, Auctioneer. May 8 at 3 at 145, Fleet st. Moore, Clifford's inn Lewis, William Henry, Worcester, Hosier. May 8 at 11.30 at Hen and Chickens Hotel, New st, Birmingham. Tree, Worcester Linford, Charles, Wombwell, York, Joiner. mott, Regent, st, Barnsley May 12 at 2 at offices of Paiker and Hick Locke, Charles, Bethnal Gn rd, Hardware Dealer. May 16 at 2 at offices of Armstrong, Chancery lane Manser, Henry David, Fitzhughs, Southampton, Traveller. May 8 at 3.30 at offices of Lamport, Portland st, Southampton SCHWEITZER'S COCOATINA, Arti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder. Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality, with the excess of fat extracted. The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Luncheon, or Supper, and invaluable for Invalids and Children." Highly commended by the entire Medical Press. Being without sugar, spice, or other admixture, it suits all palates, keeps better in all climates, and is four times he strength of cocoas THICKENED yet WEAKENED with starch, &c., and IN REALITY CHEAPER than such Mixtures. Made instantaneously with boiling water, a teaspoonful to a Breakfast Cup, costing less than a halfpenny. COCOATINA A LA VANILLE is the most delicate, digestible, cheapest Manilla Chocolate, and may be taken when richer chocolate is prohibited. In tin packets at 1s. 6d., 3s., 5s. Cd., &c., by Chemists and Grocers. Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprictors, H, SCHWEITZER & CO 10, Adam-street, London, W.C, May 5 at 11 at Royal Hotel, M'Innes, Donald, Birmingham, Restaurant Keeper. Monks, Francis Albert, Croydon, Watchmaker. May 11 at 3 at 59, Lincoln's inn fields. Mottram, Montague, Eldon rd, Kensington, Master Mariner. May 3 at 2 at office of Odden, George, Whitstable, Kent, Baker. May 9 at 11 at office of Walthew, High st, Oram, Eugene, Greyhound rd, Fulham Fields, Oilman. May 5 at 12 at office of Shearman, Gresham st Orme, John, Orton-on-the-Hill, Leicester, Farmer. May 9 at 11 at office of Fowke, Colmore row, Birmingham Parker, John, Halifax, Beerhouse Keeper. May 8 at 3 at office of Garsed, Barum Top, Halifax Perry, Thomas, Bangor, Ship Builder. May 11 at 2 at Queen's Head Cafe, Bangor. Hughes and Pritchard, Bangor Pemberton, Thomas, Burslem, Stafford, Joiner. May 5 at 11 at office of Ellis, Market pl, Burslem Phillips, Frederick, Chatham, Watchmaker. Apr 29 at Holborn Viaduct Hotel in lieu of the place originally named Powter, Robert Henry, Tollington park, Boot Manufacturer. May 10 at 3 at office of Reach, John Roof, West Lynn, St Peter, Norfolk, Grocer. May 5 at 12 at office of Bead, Charles, Swindon, Wilts, Private Accountant. May 9 at 11 at offices of Kinneir and Tombs, High st, Swindon Roberts, Edwin, Wakefield, York, Licensed Victualler. May 6 at 11 at Queen's Arms Scales. Richard, Rawtenstall, Lancaster, Grocer. May 9 at 3 at offices of Addleshaw and Warburton, Norfolk st, Manchester Simpson, Jonathan, Stockton on Tees, Durham, Boot and Shoe Maker. May 2 at 11 at Smith, Samuel, Bolton, Lancaster, Joiner. ton and Donnelly May 8 at 2 at office of Johnson and Tilly, May 10 at 3 at Garden st, Bury. Ander. Southam, Susan, Brewer st, Regent st, Tailor. May 13 at 1 at offices of Norman, Gt Marlborough st, Regent st Thomas, William, Merthyr Tydfil, Glamorgan, Grocer. May 8 at 11 at office of Vaughan, Tucker, William Henry, and William Simpson Stevenson, Liverpool, Ship Chandlers. Whale, Edward Joseph, Malmesbury, Wilts, Farmer. May 6 at 11.30 at King's Arms Wilmott, Richard, Ashton-juxta-Birmingham, Fancy Leather Case Maker, May 9 at 2 at offices of Brown, Waterloo st, Birmingham Winker, Henry, Whitby, York, Auctioneer. May 5 at 3 at offices of Lewis, Zetland rd, Middlesborough Wright, William Charles, Wigan, Lancaster, Decorator. May 8 at 11 at offices of Byrom, King st, Wigan ROBE MAKERS MANUFACTURERS AND HOUSE FURNISHERS, 200, 203, and 204, TOTTENHAM COURT ROAD, w. Estimates and Designs submitted free for entirely Furnishing Residences, Chambers, Offices, &c. -PAINTING, DECORATING, & HOUSE REPAIRS.- To Her Majesty, the Lord Chancellor, the Whole of the Carved Oak Furniture, Reproductions from Ancient Designs, &c. Bedroom Furniture, including Bedstead and Bedding, from £7 108. per set. THIRTY LARGE SHOW ROOMS. HEWETSON, THEXTON, & PEART, 200, 203, and 201, Tottenham Court-road, London, W. N.B.-Household Furniture Warehoused or Removed on reasonable terms. BY SPECIAL APPOINTMENT, Judicial Bench, Corporation of London, &c. SOLICITORS' AND REGISTRARS' GOWNS. BARRISTERS' AND QUEEN'S COUNSEL'S DITTO, CORPORATION ROBES, UNIVERSITY & CLERGY GOWNS.: ESTABLISHED 1689. 94, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON. CURRENT TOPICS. LONDON, MAY 6, 1882. WE REGRET to learn that the illness from which Lord Justice BAGGALLAY is suffering at present confines him to his bed, but it is hoped that he will be able to resume his seat in the Court of Appeal in the course of a few days. A SET OF RULES for the government of the Central Office of the Supreme Court has just been settled by the Practice Masters and will be found in another column. Such a code of office practice has long been wanted, and it will probably be found that not only will it assist solicitors and their clerks, but it will save the masters much time now taken up in answering questions on office practice and regulations. It will, moreover, help to make the practice throughout the Central Office absolutely uniform, and will set at rest many doubtful and difficult questions frequently arising. It should be observed that there is little or nothing new in these rules, which are founded either on existing general orders of one or other of the Divisions of the High Court, or on old and wellestablished practice, as varied by the Orders of the Supreme Court of April, 1880. THE STATE OF BUSINESS in the Chancery Division has probably given rise to the rumour of the intended appointment of a new judge, to which we referred last week. Causes have recently accumulated with even unwonted rapidity, and the interlocutory business has also largely increased. Mr. Justice NORTH, sitting for Mr. Justice CHITTY, has been able, during the whole of this week, to take nothing but interlocutory matters. A heavy cause has blocked the court of Mr. Justice FRY, and it is understood that other lengthy causes are about to come on. Meantime many causes with witnesses which are ready to be heard, and have already been in the paper, have been postponed, and witnesses who had been summoned from long distances have been sent back. In one of these causes a number of witnesses have been summoned three times, at an expense of at least £50 each time. We have always been reluctant to urge additions to the judicial bench in order to meet temporary emergencies, but we imagine that the Whitsuntide cause-paper of the Chancery Division will show, when taken in connection with the cause-papers for recent sittings, that there is a steady and rapid increase of business which calls for some addition to the judicial strength of that Division. THE QUAINT SPECTACLE of an election of a registrar of deeds, accompanied by all the circumstances of canvassing, conveyances, special trains, and general commotion accompanying a hotly contested county parliamentary election, has just been witnessed at Beverley. Under 6 Anne, c. 35, the election of the registrar of the East Riding Registry is to be made by all the freeholders within the East Riding and the town of Hull, of the yearly value of £100, and is to be "performed by balloting" of a very peculiar kind. Any five of the justices of the East Riding, appointed by the major part of the justices, are to be "scrutators of the ballot," and are to "meet on the day and place of election, and there, in the presence of the electors, shall place one or more glass vessels to be provided for that purpose, into which each elector present shall put one open paper, containing the name of such person as he approves of to be registrar." The vacancy in the registrar ship caused by the death of Mr. JOHN MAISTER, who was elected in 1946, after a two days' polling, was on the present occasion contested by three candidates. The canvass is stated to have extended over three months, and the contest between two of the candidates was very close, the successful candidate being elected by a majority of only thirty-four. The registrar is paid by fees, and has to enter into a recognizance with two sureties "of the penalty of £2,000," for the "true and faithful performance of his duty in the execution of his office." PRACTITIONERS who may happen to have charge of an action for libel will do well to study the case of Scott v. Sampson (reported in this week's WEEKLY REPORTER, also in L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491). It was there held by MATHEW and CAVE, JJ., that in an action for libel neither evidence of rumours before publication that the plaintiff had committed the offences charged in it, nor evidence of particular facts tending to show the misconduct of the plaintiff, can be admitted in reduction of damages, but that evidence of the general bad reputation of the plaintiff is admissible. The importance of the judgments consists in the fact that hitherto the law had to be gathered from a number of scantily reported, and often contradictory, rulings at Nisi Prius, of which Leicester v. Warren (2 Camp. 251) is perhaps the best known, whereas the recent decision (see the judgment of CAVE, J.) extracts the principles from these rulings, and lays down the law in the three categorical propositions above stated, so that a Court of Appeal, if the decision should in future come up for review, will have comparatively easy work to do. We think that the decision will be accepted as good law. It arose, it will be remembered, from the action in which a theatrical critic sued the editor of a newspaper for a libel, alleging that he had endeavoured to extort money by threatening to publish_defamatory matter concerning a deceased actress. The defendant had attempted to give evidence of rumours of similar endeavours, and of previous acts "which were said to have been of a discreditable character," as that he had after a quarrel with a particular actor written for a newspaper a false and dishonest criticism of that actor's acting, "for the purpose of gratifying his spite against that gentleman." But Lord COLERIDGE, Č.J., rejected both kinds of evidence, and it is this rejection which has been supported. Leicester v. Warren appears to be distinctly overruled, but it is pointed out that "Sir JAMES MANSFIELD in that case expressed his own dissatisfaction with the arguments adduced in support of the admissibility of the evidence, but yielded to three cases which were cited before him," and are shown not to have been in point, because merely supporting the proposition that evidence of general bad reputation is admissible. "To deny this would," as is cited from Starkie on Evidence, "be to decide that a man of the worst character is entitled to the same measure of damages with one of unblemished reputation. A reputed thief would be placed on the same footing with the most honourable merchant. To enable the jury to estimate the probable quantum of injury sustained, a knowledge of the party's previous character is not only material, but seems to be absolutely essential." Far otherwise is it with evidence of rumours and particular acts. evidence it is well observed by CAVE, J., that "to admit evidence of rumour is to give anyone an opportunity of spreading, through the means of the publicity attending judicial proceedings, what he may have picked up from the most disreputable sources,' while evidence of particular acts of misconduct "at the most tends to prove, not that the plaintiff has not, but that he ought not to have, a good reputation," and in effect "throws upon the plaintiff the difficulty of showing an uniform propriety of conduct during his whole life." Of such THE DISTRESS AMENDMENT BILL of Sir HENRY HOLLAND, which reached the stage of committee this week, is a measure which seems to stand a fair chance of passing. Mainly it applies to agricultural tenancies only, but the last clause, which provides that "no arrears of rent shall be recovered by any distress but within two years after the same shall have become due," is a general one. With regard to agricultural tenancies of any extent, the Bill proposes to exempt live stock on the premises for agistment, male stock used for breeding purposes, and machinery, if they are "the bona fide property of a person other than the tenant." In the case of the live stock not used for breeding, the exemption is not to attach unless the owner has given to the landlord notice in writing, within four days, of the contract of agistment. In the case of live stock of either kind, the landlord may, from time to time, by notice in writing to the owner of the live stock, stating the amount of rent in arrear, require such owner of live stock, within four days after the delivery of the notice, to pay to such landlord or his agent the said amount, or to remove his live stock from the premises within the said four days"; and the Bill proceeds to provide that, "if within such period the arrears be not paid by the said owner, or his live stock removed from the said premises, the said stock shall not be entitled to exemption." By subsequent clauses the amount paid by the owner is recoverable by him from the tenant, and may be set off against a sum due by him to the tenant for agistment, and the removal of the stock in pursuance of the landlord's notice determines the owner's agreement with the tenant. If a distress be proceeded with in disregard of the exemptions, the owner may proceed against the party levying it, or causing it to be levied, before justices of the peace for a "summary order for restoration of the live stock seized, or for payment of the real value thereof," but any party who thinks himself aggrieved by any order of justices is to have an appeal to quarter sessions. The Bill, so far as it extends the idea of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871, and the Railway Rolling Stock Protection Act, 1872, seems to be unobjectionable in principle, and we fail to see why the same principle should not be extended to all kinds of tenancies, and to the goods of third persons of whatever kind. THE QUESTION how far the liability of a carrier of passengers has been extended by two recent decisions, and the bearing of the doctrines enunciated in them on a certain notorious channel passage, was mooted by a leading journal a few days ago. The old rule acted on in Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Ex. 341), and Hamlin v. Great Northern Railway Company (1 H. & N. 408), seems to have been considerably altered by the enlarged sympathy for suffering shown by the Court of Appeal in Macmahon v. Field (L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 591), on which we recently commented. Looking at that case in connection with Hobbs v. London and South-Western Railway Company (L. R. 10 Q. B. 111), the question whether the colds caught, the suffering endured, and the engagements missed in consequence of that wearisome tossing, would now be held to be "natural results," anticipated by both parties, seems a matter of uncertainty. It may be found that in the particular voyage alluded to the conditions attached to the contract of carriage exonerate the railway company from the consequences of such a delay. And the mere fact that a royal perwas crossing, might possibly be held to relieve the company, if the delay could be attributed solely to the disarrangement of traffic consequent thereupon. Lord Justice JAMES, in the Court of Appeal, once said that a "railway company must be at liberty to accept any traffic brought to it-a special train for the Queen, or a royal visitor-although it thereby disabled itself later in the day from keeping the times mentioned in its time tables." And the interference of the Government with the management of the company, and the exigencies of the case, might not impossibly be held to excuse them. In cases of ordinary accident and delay, the law seems to press hardly on the shoulders of railway companies, broad though they be; but this stringency, in the same manner as the strange perverseness of juries, tends to render the traffic services, in general, wonderfully effective. another column that the curious decision of Mr. Justice CHITTY in In re Angove has been reversed by the Court of Appeal. A solicitor delivered to his client a bill of costs, and on the next day delivered to him a cash account, showing a balance to the credit of the client, after deducting the amount of the bill of costs, of £1 18s. 1d. The client, six months afterwards, called at the solicitor's office and asked for payment of the balance due to him, which he said was £1 16s. The solicitor, taking the client's word for the amount, and not referring to his papers, gave him a cheque for that amount. The client afterwards obtained the common order to tax the solicitor's bill, and Mr. Justice CHITTY refused to discharge the order, on the ground that, "in point of law, a payment of £1 16s. was not a payment of £1 18s. 1d." The question was obviously not whether the balance due to the client had been paid, but whether the solicitor's bill had been paid by the client. The demand by the client of the balance he supposed to be due to him on the account showed that he accepted the account, setting off the bill of costs against the amount due to the client; and this would clearly be a good payment of the bill. NO LESS THAN THREE QUESTIONS were asked in the House of Commons on Monday night in relation to the railway passenger duty and the exemptions therefrom. Mr. GLADSTONE, in his separate answers to the querists, held out no prospect of amending legislation. We cannot but think that this is much to be deplored. It is material to point out in connection with the subject that the have felt bound to make arrangements with the railway companies, Select Committee of 1876 reported that "the Inland Revenue based on different plans, and known as the ticket, mileage-fraction, and percentage systems (which are all entirely outside the law), as a temporary means of doing justice to the railway companies, and at the same time protecting the interests of the revenue;" and added, "that without imputing any blame to the officers of the Board of Trade or Inland Revenue, who appeared only to have acted for the best, the committee could not but regard a state of affairs in which they were forced to countenance a departure from the law as decided by the House of Lords, as in the highest degree unsatisfactory." Nor should it be forgotten that certain arrears of duty amounting, in 1866, to from two to four millions sterling, though practically condoned, have never been legally remitted, so that the companies are still legally liable to pay the whole of this very large amount. A WAY OUT OF THE MORTMAIN ACT. THE mode of evading the provisions of 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, pointed out by Wallgrave v. Tebbs (2 K. & J. 313); Tee v. Ferris (1b., 357), and other cases, is attended with these disadvantages-that the testator must trust entirely to the honour of the persons to whom he devises the property absolutely, and that no communication of the charitable intentions of the testator must have been made to the devisees during his life, or at all events there must have been no express or implied undertaking by them to carry them out (Robotham v. Dunnett, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 430). A much better mode of accomplishing the objects of persons who desire to make gifts to charities to take effect after their death, without regard to the question how far their property may then consist of pure personalty, appears to have been opened up by the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Robson, Emley v. Davidson (30 W. R. 257). In this case R., the owner of property amounting to about £20,000, and consisting as to about half of pure personalty, and as to the remainder of money on mortgage of leaseholds, resorted to this device. He executed a deed whereby he covenanted to pay £20,000 to trustees, at or before twelve months from the date, upon trust to pay the income thereof to his wife and to himself successively for life, and after the death of the survivor upon such trusts as his wife should by will or codicil appoint. The wife, on the same day, executed a will whereby, in exercise of the power, she appointed the £20,000 to the same trustees, upon trust (after payment of certain legacies) to pay the residue to such persons IT WILL BE SEEN from the report which will be found in and for such purposes as she should by deed poll direct; and by a deed poll, also executed the same day, she directed the same trustees to pay the residue of the £20,000 to certain persons to be elected as charity trustees according to a certain scheme, and for certain charitable purposes set out in the deed poll. The covenantor retained the deed of covenant in his hands, and the £20,000 was not paid during his lifetime. In an action for the administration of his estate, his next of kin contended that the provisions made by the deed poll were void, as being contrary to the provisions of the Act, and also that the charitable provisions made by the will of the wife and the deed poll were void under the same statute as to so much of the £20,000 as ought to be raised out of the testator's personalty savouring of realty. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the covenant, will, and deed were not void as constituting together a scheme to evade the Act, and that, as the £20,000 was a debt due to the trustees which might have been enforced under the covenant in R.'s lifetime, it was, though ultimately devoted to charitable purposes, enforceable against his estate whether consisting of pure or impure personalty. The grounds of the decision were stated as follows by the Master of the Rolls:-" Though the deed seems to have remained in the covenantor's possession, he was liable to pay this money within twelve months; and, if he had paid it, it would have been invested in consols, in which case, of course, the present question could not have arisen. It was, no doubt, a debt created without value; but still it was a debt, and, as the law now stands, a debt for all purposes. If he had become bankrupt, the debt would have ranked for a dividend; and if he had died insolvent, it would have ranked for a dividend; therefore, to all intents and purposes, it is a debt. It is a mere accident that by our law a debt can be enforced out of real estate, and in this particular case there is not the slightest reason for believing that there was any intention to avoid the statute. I do not think the man knew anything about the statute, or ever heard of pure or impure personalty, or anything of the sort. The object was of a different kind; it was, no doubt, to establish the charity, but not to avoid the statute. Nothing could have been easier; within twelve months he could have called in the mortgage and paid off the money. There was a present obligation on which he could be sued, and, that being so, it seems to me there is no objection at all to paying that debt out of his assets, real or personal, when he dies, and he did die some long time afterwards, though it happened that the wife died first. When he died it turned out that some part of his assets consisted of impure personalty. Now, let us look at the mischief of the statute. It does not affect a case of this kind; the creditors cannot get real estate in any shape or way, they are only entitled to have the mortgage called in, and to have the mortgaged property turned into money to pay their debts; there is nothing devoted in any shape to land or interest in land, or kept out of the power of alienation, which it was the real object, or one of the real objects, of the statute to keep always in view; and, looking at the nature of the transaction, there is no ground whatever upon which this debt can be refused payment out of the assets." It would not be very profitable to discuss the question how far this decision is reconcileable with Jeffries v. Alexander (8 H. L. Cas. 594). That case was one of great difficulty, and the Court of Appeal were certainly justified by the observations of Lord Kingsdown in his judgment, in saying that one of the grounds of the decision was that the covenant could not have been enforced against the settlor in his lifetime, whereas in the recent case the covenant might have been so enforced. Nor do we propose to consider at length the question whether the settlement of a mere debt for charitable purposes is within the Act. The Act says nothing about debts, and we are not aware of any decision tending to show that the judicial legislators who have expanded the provisions of the Act to such an extraordinary degree, have ever considered that a gift of a mere debt is within its provisions. What we desire to draw attention to is the remarkable change which has occurred in the current of judicial opinion with regard to the attitude to be adopted in construing gifts intended to take effect for the benefit of a charity after the death of the donor, and also the practical results which are likely to flow from the recent decision. 66 trustees to pay a yearly sum during her life for a charitable object, and either by deed or will to secure to be paid to the trustees, within three months after her decease, such sum of money as would suffice to produce in perpetuity a specified yearly sum for the same charitable object. By her will she bequeathed such sum of money as should be deemed sufficient, if invested in Government securities, to produce the annual sum specified in the covenant, without any direction that the sum should be paid out of her pure personal estate. The present Master of the Rolls said that the money covenanted to be secured, whether it were regarded as a voluntary debt or as a legacy, was payable, not out of the pure personalty of the testatrix, but out of her assets generally. It must, therefore, fall upon realty as well as personalty. If such gifts for in reality it was a gift, being postponed to debts for value, and not differing from legacies further than in taking priority over them—were held valid, testators would be enabled to give in a roundabout fashion what the law forbade them to give directly. This was the very mischief aimed at by the Mortmain Act." We have only to compare these observations with the extract given above from the judgment of the same learned judge in In re Robson to see how altered is the standpoint from which such gifts are viewed. In Fox v. Lownds the Master of the Rolls points out as one of the reasons for deciding against the charitable gift that if it were regarded as a voluntary debt, it was payable, not out of pure personalty, but must fall upon realty as well as personalty. In In re Robson the same learned judge said that it was a mere accident that by our law a debt can be enforced out of real estate. The decisions are, of course, not inconsistent, but the observations in the recent case seem to us to indicate a considerable change in the mode of looking at charitable gifts. Still more does the ruling of the court that the three instruments did not form a scheme to evade the provisions of the Act. If a debt The actual mode of disposition decided by the recent case to be valid is cumbrous, and involves the necessity of trusting to another person to appoint to the charitable purposes intended. But the importance of the recent decision lies in the fact that it seems to authorize a much simpler mode of disposition. which can be enforced against the covenantor during his lifetime is not within the Act of Geo. 2, an easy mode is opened up for the owners of landed property to give what is in effect a charitable legacy. There can be no need for the elaborate machinery of three instruments. All that is required is a covenant to pay a sum to trustees, to be held by them upon trust for the covenantor for life, and after his death upon trust for the charity intended to be benefited. It does not appear from the report of the recent case whether the deed of covenant was executed by, or whether its execution was made known to, the trustees during the life of the covenantor; it would, no doubt, however be desirable that the deed should be executed by the trustees. It is clear, however, from the recent case that it may be retained by the covenantor during his life. If this is done, the trustees being, of course, persons in whom the covenantor has confidence, he may rest assured that no attempt will be made to enforce it during his lifetime, and after his death his charitable intentions will take effect without any deduction or abatement in consequence of the sum given being to be raised partially out of property savouring of realty. It is impossible to suppose that the deed can be held void as being a scheme to evade the mortmain law, for according to the Master of the Rolls the mischief of the Act "does not affect a case where the charitable creditor "cannot get real estate in any shape or way." At the Central Criminal Court on Wednesday, Mr. Justice Hawkins had occasion to repeat the complaints he had made several times recently as to the slovenly and careless way in which depositions were sent up from the policemiserable, and magistrates' clerks did not appear to take the slightest care in courts. He remarked that the manner in which they were taken was simply the matter. According to Kemp's Mercantile Gazette the number of bills of sale published in England and Wales for the week ending April 29 was 1,003. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 961, showing an increase of 42, being a nett increase in 1882, to date, of 68. The number published in Ireland for the same week was 25. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 49, showing a decrease of 24, being a nett decrease, in 1882, to In Fox v. Lownds (23 W. R. 404), a lady covenanted with date, of 140. to the trustee, seven days before the meeting is to be held a notice setting forth the time and place at which it is to be held, and the liquidation is 304, and is as follows:-"General meetings subsepurpose for which it is summoned." The corresponding rule in Exquent to the appointment of a trustee shall be summoned by him by giving seven days' notice by post to each of the creditors who have proved their debts, stating the object of the meeting and the business proposed to be transacted thereat." A comparison of the two rules will show that in bankruptcy it is necessary to give all the creditors notice whether they have proved their debts or not, whilst in liquidation only those who have proved need be general meeting may, however, at any time be similarly sumAgain, in liquidation, rule 305 provides that "a moned by any creditor with the concurrence, including himself, of one-fourth in value of the creditors who have proved their debts." But there appears to be no such power given to the creditors under a bankruptcy. LIQUIDATION versus BANKRUPTCY. SINCE it is very doubtful whether the present law relating to liquidation by arrangement and composition with creditors is doomed to be repealed this session, the recent case of parte Horrocks (ante, p. 182) appears to be of consider able importance, as affording a striking illustration of the very unnecessary differences in the regulations and rules which have been made under section 78 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, with regard to bankruptcy, and under section 125, sub-section 11, and section 126, paragraph 10, of the same Act, with regard to liquidation and composition. In the case of Ex parte Horrocks the Court of Appeal held that rule 288, which relates to liquidation and composition proceedings alone, must be construed in conjunction with rule 285 in cases of proceedings by joint debtors, and that in order to transfer the proceedings in such a case from one court to another, resolutions of not only the joint, but also of each class of the separate, creditors must be passed. It was admitted that those rules do not in any way regulate the procedure in cases of bankruptcy, and therefore that in bankruptcy, where there is no provision at all for meetings of separate creditors to be held, a resolution of the joint creditors alone, under section 80, sub-section 5, would be sufficient to effect a transfer of the proceedings. We are inclined to take exception to the ruling of the court, and to hold with the argument of counsel for the appellant, that rule 285 was intended to refer to first meetings alone, and that rule 288 can only derive validity from, and in so far as it is in accordance with, section 80, sub-section 5. That sub-section refers to liquidation equally with bankruptcy by virtue of section 125, sub-section 7, which provides that, "with the modifications hereinafter mentioned (viz., the exception of the provisions with respect to the close of the bankruptcy, discharge of a bankrupt, release of the trustee, and audit of the accounts by the comptroller-sub-section 9), "all the provisions of this Act shall, so far the same are applicable, apply to the case of a liquidation by arrangement in the same manner as if the word bankrupt included a debtor whose affairs are under liquidation, and the word 'bankruptcy' included liquidation by arrangement." But for sub-section 5 of section 80 the rule would obviously be ultrà vires, and it is equally clear that the sub-section cannot be superseded by the rule. If, therefore, under that sub-section, in cases of bankruptcy, the joint creditors under that sub-section, in cases of bankruptcy, the joint creditors alone can transfer the proceedings, it would follow that they alone would have the same power in liquidation. Rule 288 read by itself is not in any way inconsistent with this view, and we fail to see any good reason why such a different rule from the one regulating proceedings in bankruptcy should have been laid down in cases of liquidation proceedings. It is highly inconvenient that there should be different rules, and all the arguments of the Master of the Rolls in favour of the rule laid down by the court would be equally as strong in cases of bankruptcy as in liquidation; and, we may add, would be also equally as strong in respect to the appointment of a trustee, and yet (following the practice from the very earliest days of bankruptcy law) the separate creditors have no voice in the appointment of a trustee under a joint adjudication. As was said by the Master of the Rolls, "the rules are not easy to construe," but a judicial interpretation having at length been placed upon them, that interpretation is of course now law, whatever may be the opinion of others as to what was the intention of the Act and Rules. Bearing the case of Ex parte Horrocks in mind, it may be interesting to consider a few more instances of the difference between the respective practices in bankruptcy and liquidation under the Bankruptcy Rules, which have proved constant puzzles to the practitioner and pitfalls for the unwary. The first instance we will take is as to the convening of meetings of creditors subsequent to the appointment of a trustee. Rule 95 relates to bankruptcy only, and is as follows:-"Where a meeting of creditors is summoned by a trustee, it shall be summoned by the trustee transmitting to each creditor at the address given in his proof, or, when he shall not have proved, the address given in the list of creditors by the bankrupt, or such other address as may be known summoned. methods of declaring a dividend by a trustee, as any of our readers A still more important discrepancy appears in the different will at once see by comparing sections 41 and 42 of the Act, and rules 131 et seq., which apply to bankruptcy, with rules 312 and 314, which relate to liquidation only. In the former case provision is to be made in calculating the dividend for those creditors only who have proved their debts (except in the cases specially provided for by section 42), whilst in liquidation the trustee has to provide for all creditors named in the debtor's statement, whether they have proved or not, unless the claims shall have been previously adjudicated upon. Again, "reasonable" notice of the intention to declare a dividend in bankruptcy must be sent to every creditor mentioned in the bankrupt's statement of affairs who has not proved his debt, besides being gazetted, whilst in liquidation it is provided only that "seven days" before the declaration of a dividend a notice shall be gazetted. In bankruptcy, too, notice of a dividend having been declared is required to be gazetted, and a copy sent to each creditor who has proved, but nothing of the kind is mentioned in the liquidation rules. follows:- between the two parties. dividend any such claimant or creditor whose debt he so re And |