IT IS ANNOUNCED that one of the recipients of the new Afghan medal is the Bishop of Lahore, who did duty with the Peshawur Valley field force prior to the signing of the Treaty of Gundamuk. While congratulating the right reverend recipient on his military decoration, we may perhaps venture to express a respectful hope that he will not by wearing it, be led into any difficulties by reason of the Constitution of Archbishop STRATFORD, which was intended to obviate the "miscarriage" of "the clergy apparelling themselves like soldiers rather than clerks"; or the provisions of the 74th Canon of 1603 (which Sir R. PHILLIMORE, in the Purchas case, said was still in force), which prescribes "that in private houses, and in their studies, persons ecclesiastical use comely and scholarlike apparel." A war medal may be comely, but it is hardly scholarlike. "An objection is sometimes made to the present system of investigation of title to land on a sale or other dealing-namely, that the investigation has to be repeated every time there is such a sale or dealing. The object of clause 2 is to do away, in proper cases, with the necessity for such repetition. There are cases, for instance, in which, on the occasion of a purchase, the solicitor for the intending purchaser knows that the land has only lately been bought by the intending vendor, and that on that purchase the title was investigated and approved in a manner and under advice with which the intending purchaser's solicitor is satisfied; this clause would enable the second purchaser's solicitor, if he thought it expedient, to abstain from repeating the investigation of the title, and to thus save his client expense and delay. At present, a solicitor could not so abstain except on his own personal responsibility; while it would be contrary to his professional interest to so abstain. It is true, that with the new system of costs by way of commission or ad valorem to be established under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act of last session. THE RIGHT OF SUPPORT FOR BUILDINGS these considerations are subject to some qualification; but clause 2 may still operate usefully in diminishing in some cases the expense of transfer of land." This altogether omits to deal with one objection we have always had to this clause. solicitor can dispense with the investigation of title he must place himself in a position to prove that " the title shown to the property purchased has been previous investigated on behalf of a purchaser through whom the title is deduced." In order to ascertain this the solicitor for the second purchaser must obviously require the vendor's solicitor to produce the contract of sale to the vendor, his abstract and requisitions, and the replies to them. The purchaser's solicitor has to ask for the production of these before he is able to decide whether he will waive further investigation, or whether he will investigate the title afresh. How can the vendor's solicitor possibly consent to produce documents which will reveal to the purchaser all the questions which the vendor raised, and all the defects of title which he may have waived, upon his purchase? Before a BY ADJACENT BUILDINGS. THE case of Lemaitre v. Davis (L. R. 19 Ch. D. 281), recently decided by Vice-Chancellor Hall, is an important decision, as being a step further in the same direction as the now celebrated recent case of Angus v. Dalton (30 W. R. 191, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740). In this case the question was as to the right of support for buildings from adjacent buildings, and it was suggested that Angus v. Dallon the existence of a prescriptive right to support from land. The was not in point because it did not decide anything more than Vice-Chancellor, however, very quickly disposed of this suggestion, holding that the decision in Angus v. Dalton applied to support from buildings as well as from land. The decision in favour of the prescriptive right to support for stretch than that in favour of the right to support from land, buildings from buildings seems to involve a somewhat greater because there is a difference between the land itself and buildings attached to land which hardly seems to have been as yet fully considered-viz., the fact that the latter are apt to decay, and, if not repaired, to fall down. Therefore, if there be a right to support from a building, it would seem to follow that there is an obligation to keep that building in repair in order that it may afford support. This seems to increase the hardship pointed out by the late Lord Chief Justice in Angus v. Dalton. If it is hard that fore, I cannot practically resist, my neighbour should acquire a right against me, so that I cannot do what I will with my land, this hardship seems greater when the question of support of buildings is involved. Not only can I not pull down my building, for which I have no further use, but I must, it would appear, keep it in repair for the purpose of supporting my neighbour's building, or provide on my land some substitute for the support it afforded. It is true that the acquisition of a right to support from a building does not, in the absence of exceptional causes, generally arise in the same way as a right to support from land. A building properly constructed should stand of itself without support from another building, and the acquisition of any right to support must generally involve some trespass ab initio which might have been detected and resisted. But in many cases of ancient buildings there may have been settlements of the soil, or from some such causes, though there was no trespass originally, one building may have come to lean on the other. In such cases, practically speaking, the thing arises from a gradual natural alteration of the physical circumstances, and, in reality, no action of trespass could be brought. If I erect a house on my soil, and the operation of natural causes gradually causes it to lean against my neighbour's house, and, consequently, slightly over my neighbour's land, even supposing there is a theoretical ground of action, practically it would be impossible to bring one. The truth is, that the laws which govern actual things will not fit with absolute exactness into our legal forms. Therefore, if there is a prescriptive right to support for buildings from other buildings, the hardship we speak of is undoubtedly in some cases involved, and somewhat curious questions might follow, which, as far as we know, have never been much discussed. With regard to land, the question of any obligation to actively preserve the existing state of things can but very seldom arise. The ground generally remains as it was if undisturbed by man, but still on a hill side it might be the case IT WAS SUGGESTED to us, last week, by a correspondent, apropos of the question whether the use of trial by jury should not be restricted in civil cases, that it ought to be introduced in a class of criminal cases in which trial by judge now prevails-by reason of acts, which are in themselves lawful, and which, thereviz., cases of offences triable at petty sessions. Our correspondent says that the summary jurisdiction of magistrates is anomalous and contrary to all our English notions that a man in a criminal case is entitled to be tried by his peers. He also dwells on the tendency of magistrates to rely too much on the testimony of the police. We feel that there is a great deal in what our correspondent says, but we cannot, on the whole, agree with his suggestion. It appears to us that it would be, practically, extremely difficult and inconvenient, if not impossible, to carry it out. Petty sessions are held very frequently, and the duty of serving as jurymen is already sufficiently troublesome to persons whose own business is interrupted thereby. Moreover, it would be impossible to summon jurymen from a distance once a week to petty sessions, and there are great objections to confining the choice of jurymen to a small district. Our correspondent calls attention to the fact that in the county courts a jury may be required by either party. This is, no doubt, the case, but in practice, in the vast majority of cases, the parties are satisfied with the decision of the judge. If it were otherwise, we are disposed to think the system would be found a great burden. Admitting, as we do, the propriety of trial by jury in all important criminal cases, we think it will be found that there are many criminal cases of smaller moment for the purposes of which a summary jurisdiction is practically necessary, and the disadvantages of a jury would outweigh the advantages. The mode of administering justice in such smaller cases would cease to be properly called summary if trial by jury were introduced. In our opinion, the proper remedy for the evils to which our correspondent calls attention is the substitution of stipendiary magistrates for the unpaid justices of the peace. A professional man is more likely than a layman to be of judicial habits of mind, and less likely to be the subject of prepossession in favour of the evidence of the police. I. PENDING the introduction by Mr. Chamberlain of the promised Bankruptcy Bill of the Government this session, two Bills have been introduced by private members, the first of which, bearing the names of three members sitting on the Opposition side of the House-viz., Mr. DixonHartland, Mr. Gorst, and Sir E. Lechmere-is based upon the Govern ment Bill of last session, which we have recently discussed at considerable length in these columns. Of course, it is not to be expected that the Government will allow this subject to be dealt with by a Bill introduced by private members, but it may be useful to consider the modifications in the Government proposals which are suggested by the Bill now before us, as it is probable that the Bill may be relegated to a committee along with the other Bills introduced or to be introduced. We, therefore, propose to point out shortly and discuss the changes suggested by this Bill from the Government Bill of last session. that there would be slips. The land of A. slipping, that of B. might slip for want of its support. If such a thing arose from SOME NEW BANKRUPTCY PROPOSALS. some sudden, extraordinary, unexpected operation of natural causes, or was in the natural course of events, however gradual, unavoidable except by disproportionate expenditure, it could hardly be suggested that A. was under any obligation to support his own land in order that it might support the land of B. Even if the catastrophe was reasonably avoidable by taking the proper steps, it might be doubted whether A. would in many cases be responsible. It might depend on circumstances. We see considerable difficulty about the matter. But if this be a doubtful question, wherein does the question of support of buildings by buildings differ, and how can it be put any higher than the natural support of land by land? Why, because it suited my predecessor in title to erect a building for which I have no further use, and because it suited a neighbour to avail himself for his own purposes of the support of that building, should I be bound to obviate in my neighbour's interest the natural consequence of the laws which govern all physical things, whether natural or artificial-viz., the decay of the building? These are difficult questions from the speculative and theoretical point of view, but practically there would probably not be much difficulty or hardship involved. The result of Angus v. Dalton is to give effect to that theory of prescription which rests on practical convenience rather than abstract justice. All experience shows that it is on the whole for the benefit of the community that long enjoyment should be quieted, and that principle is the basis upon which all prescription rests. After a considerable lapse of time, that which was in its inception absolutely unjust and unlawful becomes lawful and just, and to interfere with it works practical injustice and wrong. There is, therefore, nothing really impossible in the theory that after a considerable period obligations may arise from the fact that one owner of land has permitted another's building to derive support from his. In most cases where this question arises-that is to say, in towns or villages-it is generally as much for the benefit of the owner of the servient tenement to keep it in repair as it is for the owner of the dominant tenement that it should be kept in repair. It is to be observed in passing that the Vice-Chancellor adopts in a somewhat cursory manner the Lord Chancellor's dictum in Angus v. Dalton to the effect that the 2nd section of the Prescription Act applies to negative easements as well as to positive. The Lord Chancellor was, we believe, the only law lord who expressed an opinion on this point, but the Vice-Chancellor opines that Lord Coleridge agreed in it because of his general expression of concurrence with his brethren. It hardly seems to us that this very general concurrence is quite sufficient ground for supposing that Lord Coleridge agreed with everything said by each of them. The point cannot in many cases be said to be of much importance, because the decision in Angus v. Dalton, if it is not to be considered as establishing that negative easements are within the 2nd section of the Prescription Act, must be taken as so firmly and fully establishing the doctrine of lost grant as to render it in many cases immaterial whether the Prescription Act applies, but it is observable that in the case we are discussing the question was very material for reasons we will point out, and that this case belongs to a class of similar cases, so that the point decided by the Vice-Chancellor is of some considerable importance with regard to that class of cases. In this case an ecclesiastical corporation had, from time immemorial, been the owners of the servient tenement, and were clearly incapable of alienating. Therefore the doctrine of lost grant would have been, in this case, difficult of application. The Vice-Chancellor came to the conclusion that the fact that the property belonged to an ecclesiastical corporation was no impediment to a title being acquired under the Act. He seems to have decided this point also in a somewhat cursory way, and without discussing it much. He cites Earl De La Warr v. Miles (L. R. 17 Ch. D. 535) as an authority for his decision in this respect, but we cannot make out, on referring to that case, that it had much to do with the point. It is stated that Mr. Edward Clarke, Q.C., M.P., has been elected a Bencher of Lincoln's-inn. Mr. Clarke was called to the bar in 1864, and was made a Queen's Counsel in 1880. Clauses 1 to 4 are in the same terms as the same clauses in the Govern ment Bill of last year, except that, in sub-clause 1 of clause 4, the Clauses 6 and 7 are the same as the Government Bill. Clause 8 slightly varies the Government proposals by limiting the appointment of a receiver and manager prior to adjudication to the official receiver. Clauses 9 to 11 are the same as the Government Bill. In place of clause 12 of the Government Bill the following is proposed: the creditors require it, appoint an interim manager for the conduct of the This appears to us to be a much more workable proposition than the one contained in the Government Bill, but still not without grave should be made for the nominee of a majority of the creditors to be objections as the clause is drawn. We would suggest that provision appointed manager in all such cases, and we doubt the policy of giving the court a power of reviewing the discretion of the official receiver. In clause 13, sub-clause 1, the only alteration proposed is the omission of the words "or manager" from both the first and second lines. In clause 14, sub-clause 1 the following alterations are proposed :In line 4 "seven days" are inserted for "three days"; in line 5, after the words "make out," the following words are inserted: "with the paragraph, beginning with the words "but where any such statement," assistance of a professional accountant," and, in substitution for the last the following words are inserted: "The creditors, at their first meeting, shall allow, by ordinary resolution, out of the bankrupt's estate such sum as they shall consider just for the cost of preparation of such statement." We do not see any improvement in this upon the Government proposals, and think still, as previously expressed by us, that the costs of preparing the statement of affairs ought to be left to the court. Sub. clause 2 is not altered. In clause 15, sub-clause 1, line 1, after the word "summon," the following words are inserted: "at such place as he shall deem the most convenient to the largest body of creditors," and, in line 2, "fourteen days" is inserted in place of " seven days." Both of these alterations we consider would be an improvement. The remaining sub-clauses are not altered. Clause 16 is an entirely new proposal, and requires the trustee to call a meeting of creditors after the "debtor's" examination for the trustee intervals as the creditors shall direct, and, failing such direction, then to report and take further instructions, and to summon meetings at such for him every six months to submit his accounts and take instructions, the notice to be advertised and sent to all creditors who have proved, and the trustee, when called upon by one-fifth in value of the creditors who have proved, also to summon a meeting within eight days after receipt of the requisition. If the attendance of creditors at subsequent meetings could only be ensured, this proposal would be a very beneficial one, but our experience shows us the difficulty of getting them to attend any subsequent meeting except under very special circumstances; so that we fear the proposal would, like the provisions of section 41 of the present Act, become "more honoured in the breach than the observance thereof." Still, the suggestion is one which deserves full consideration from the Legislature. The word "debtor" is used instead of "bankrupt" in this clause, and in all other additions made by the Bill; why, we cannot understand. Clause 17 takes the place of clause 16 in the Government Bill. Subclause 1 is the same. To sub-clause 2 are added words making provision for particulars to accompany each proof, together with bills of exchange and other vouchers. Sub-clause 3 is the same. Sub-clause 4 of the Government Bill is omitted, and sub-clause 5 thereof numbered 4 in the present Bill. Sub-clauses 6 and 7 of the Government Bill are also omitted, and very elaborate provisions made by sub-clauses 5 to 11 for a secured creditor to amend the valuation of his security "on showing to the satisfaction of the official receiver, or trustee, or of the court on appeal, that the security has increased or diminished in value since the previous valuation"; giving the official receiver or trustee power to require a surrender of any security at the valuation price (or, if amended before exercising such option, then at the amended price), or to require the creditor to take to the security at the valuation or amended valuation, or to require the security to be sold by public auction, with power to the creditor to bid at the sale; in case of sale the amount realized to be substituted for the valuation made by the creditor; in case of amendment of valuation the creditor to refund any excess of dividend received by him in case his proof to be reduced, or, on the other hand, to receive an equalizing dividend, but not to disturb any previous dividend; a secured creditor to have power to call on the receiver or trustee to elect which of the three courses he will adopt, and in default of intimation to the creditor within two months, the security to be the absolute property of the creditor, at the valuation price, to go in reduction of his debt. Sub-clause 12 requires the trustee to make up and submit to the committee or creditors, each six months, a statement of all proofs received with full particulars thereof, to be open to inspection to any creditor. Sub-clause 13 gives any person making a proof power to complain to the court of any dealing by the trustee in regard to the admission of proofs, and gives the court power to dispose thereof, and visit the trustee personally with costs. Sub-clause 14 is as follows: "(14.) A creditor shall not vote at any meeting in respect of any proof unless the same has been lodged with the receiver or trustee at least fortyeight hours before the holding of such meeting. Any creditor who has lodged a proof shall be entitled to see and examine the proofs of other creditors before the first meeting and at all reasonable times." We think the proposals contained in this clause well-worked out, and a decided improvement upon the Government Bill. Our only doubt is upon sub-clause 14, but even that, we think, will be much preferable to the present system. Clause 18 is a modification of clause 17 of the Government Bill, and proposes to restrict the voting rights of the holder of a current bill or note, "unless he is willing to treat the liability to him thereon of every person who is liable upon the bill or note antecedently to the debtor, and is not a bankrupt, as a security in his hands, and to estimate the value thereof, and deduct it from his proof in which case he shall in case there are no subsequent indorsers, but not otherwise, on application within the prescribed time," &c., the rest of the clause not being altered. The words first printed in italics are substituted for the words "other than the debtor," which appear in the Government Bill, and the subsequent paragraph printed in italics is new. So far as they go we think these alterations very desirable, but that they are not the only amendments required in the clause as contained in the Government Bill, as we have already pointed out (ante, pp. 124, 226). Clause 19, relating to proxies, is entirely different from clause 18 of the Government Bill. We print it at length : “19.—(1.) Every proxy for the purpose of proceedings under a bankruptcy petition shall be upon an official form to be settled by the court. "(2.) Any creditor may give a general proxy or authority to act for him to his manager, clerk, or other person in his regular and sole employ, whose vote on all matters shall be equivalent to his own, the proxy in that case setting forth the capacity in which the nominee stands to the creditor. "(3.) Any creditor may give a special proxy to vote for or against any specific resolution, or for any trustee or member of committee, provided the name of such trustee or member of committee is filled in in his own writing before execution. "(4.) No proxy may be used that has not been deposited with the official receiver or trustee forty-eight hours before the meeting at which it is intended to be used." This proposal is, we think, a very great improvement upon the Government clause, and we would only suggest that in clause 3, line 1, after the word "vote," the following words might advantageously be introduced: "at any specified meeting or adjournment thereof, or." This would incorporate sub-clause 2 of the Government clause. Clause 20 is the same as clause 19 of the Government Bill, except that "seven days" is substituted for "three days" in line 5 of sub-clause 2, and "teu shillings" for "five shillings" in sub-clause 3. The former alteration we strongly approve, but equally as strongly disapprove of the latter. Any amount which is inserted as the minimum composition to be allowed must necessarily be an arbitrary one, and we think the proposal of the Government places it quite high enough. In sub-clause 2 of clause 21 (clause 20 in the Government Bill) the following words are inserted after the word "trade" in the second line: "but such security shall be always required unless he has already given a general security for all his appointments under this Act that shall be sufficient in the opinion of the Board, and always when he contracts under section 22 of this Act." Sub-clauses 5 to 12 of clause 20 in the Government Bill are omitted, and provision made for the trustee's remuneration to be fixed by the creditors in the nature of a commission or percentage, one-half to be charged upon the net realizations, and onehalf on the dividends distributed, subject to confirmation by the Board of Trade in case the commission exceed ten per cent. where the assets exceed £3,000, unless unanimously adopted by the creditors, and the resolution to state whether the percentage is to cover law, auctioneers', and other expenses, in which case the estate not to be liable for any such expenses. Clause 22, sub-clause 1, provides that it shall be lawful for a trustee so to contract to cover law and other expenses, whilst sub-clause 2 is rather unique, and we print it at length : "(2.) A trustee shall not, under any circumstances whatever, make any any other person that may be employed about a bankruptcy, any gift, arrangement for, or accept from the debtor, or any solicitor, auctioneer, or remuneration, or pecuniary or other consideration whatever beyond the remuneration fixed by the creditors, and payable out of the estate, and in case of his doing so the official receiver shall, as soon as it comes to his knowledge, report the same to the court, who shall direct a criminal prosecution to be commenced against both giver and receiver, who shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years." We forbear commenting upon these proposals beyond stating that they seem to us a very practical and business-like suggestion upon a very to consider. With regard to the sub-clause which we have printed at difficult subject, which it would be well for the Legislature thoroughly length, it is certainly stringent enough, so far as the cases mentioned are concerned, but there is no provision for the contrà case of a trustee paying a solicitor a commission. We believe this is a more common occurrence than the other, though we hope for the credit of the profession that neither case is a very common one. A much more frequent case, in our experience, is that of two or more accountants joining their forces and becoming the remuneration. The same remark applies also to solicitors. In fact, "joint" trustees, one doing the work and allowing the other a share of the practice has become so much an every day occurrence that solicitors and accountants of high standing and undoubted respectability do not hesitate, or are, in many cases, compelled, to follow it. This practice is, we think, to be deplored, as it is the opportunity which the possession of proxies gives to the holders thereof of making arrangements of this kind, which is the chief cause of the touting which is practised by solicitors and accountants of questionable standing. It would, we admit, be difficult to suggest a remedy, as there are, undoubtedly, cases where it is desirable that two trustees should be appointed or two solicitors employed, but these are exceptional. The point is, iu our opinion, one well deserving consideration, as arrangements of kind tend to lower the charaoter of the profession and the respect due to its members. Clauses 23 to 28 are the same as clauses 21 to 26 in the Government Bill, with the following modifications:-At the end of clause 25 (23 in Government Bill) the words "until the next meeting of creditors only" are added, and in clause 28 (26 in Government Bill), sub-clause 3, after the word "shall," are inserted the words "each six months." We think the latter of these additions very objectionable. The proposal of the Government upon this point is open to question, but it would be made considerably worse by the insertion of the words proposed. Clause 29 is the same as clause 27 of the Government Bill, "six months" being substituted for "four months" in the third line, and the rendered and dividends declared in the same manner every six months following words added at the end: "and subsequent accounts shall be until the conclusion of the bankruptcy, but such dividends shall not be declared without making sufficient provision for any claims that the trustee has knowledge will be made after any security is realized." In our opinion the latter proposal is simply impracticable, and if adopted would, like the provision in section 41 of the Act of 1869, soon become a dead letter. The other alteration is not a matter of grave consequence. Clauses 30 and 31 (in place of clauses 28 and 29 in the Government Bill) make a considerable number of changes from the Government proposals, the effect of which would be for the trustee and receiver to pay the moneys of the estate into such bark as the creditors may appoint, and failing any appointment "into such bank as previously kept the debtor's account," instead of into the Bank of England as proposed by the Government Bill. Consequent upon this a number of other changes are also made in those clauses, the effect of which would be to retain for each estate the benefit of any interest the money belonging thereto might earn by reason of any investment, instead of such benefit going to the Consolidated Fund as proposed by the Government. We approve of these amendments in principle, but we think the provision for the investment of surplus funds, except in very rare instances, quite unnecessary, as it is clearly the duty of the trustee in such cases to divide the funds words in italics being new), to audit the trustee's accounts, and to have "(3.) But if the debtor has carried on business in two or more places the court,' for the purposes of the principal Act and this Act, shall, subject to the provisions for the removal of proceedings, be either the High Court of Justice, exercising its jurisdiction in manner provided in this Act, or the county court for the district nearest to where the greatest number of creditors shall carry on their business, and this county court is referred to as mentioned in sub-section 2 of section 52. and not to retain them in investments. Another alteration is the reduction of the time for which a trustee may retain in his hands a sum exceeding £50 from ten to five days. We doubt the advisability of this. Clause 32 proposes a number of changes in clause 30 of the Government Bill by substituting in sub-clauses 1 and 2 the "official receiver, taxing master, or such officer as the Board of Trade may from time to time appoint," for the Comptroller in Bankruptcy, as the person to audit the trustee's accounts, and also requiring the accounts to be accompanied by a statement and estimated valuation of all unrealized assets outstanding at date, and of the steps being taken for their realization," a certified copy of the accounts so audited to be forwarded to the comptroller, and to be open to inspection at the trustee's as well as the comptroller's office," and such account shall, when the funds of the estate will permit, be printed and sent by post to each creditor who has proved his debt." The substitution of the official receiver or taxing master for the comptroller would, we think, effect a decided improvement, as, thereby, local audits of the trustee's accounts would be held, which is what we advocated in our remarks upon the Government Billings are to be instituted must be more clearly defined; but better (ante, p. 152). In sub-clause 1 appears the words "the Commissioners in Bankruptcy." Who are they? We thought they were abolished by the Act of 1869. The only alteration in clause 33 from clause 31 of the Government Bill is consequent upon the changes in clauses 30 and 31 as to the Clause 34 is the same as clause 32 of the Government Bill, with the bank. addition, to sub-clause 5, of the following words: "and shall not cover any fraud he may have committed that may subsequently be discovered." Clause 35 is the same as clause 33 of the Government Bill with the following additions:-To sub-clause 1, "and such examination shall be conducted by the court, or, subject to the control of the court, by the trustee, the official receiver, or by any creditor who has proved his debt. The debtor shall answer all questions relative to his estate, and to the causes which have led to his bankruptcy, as the court may require, and such particulars as the court may think necessary shall be taken down in writing and signed by the bankrupt, and such statements may thereafter be used in evidence against him; and (sub-clause 5), "The notes of the debtor's examination, and the books and accounts of the debtor, shall (except so far as the court shall order otherwise) be open to the inspec tion of every creditor, who has proved his debt, at all reasonable times." These additions would, we think, tend to make the Government proposal more intelligible. The clause in the Government Bill providing for the close of a bank. ruptcy (clause 34) is omitted from the present Bill, and no provision proposed in its place. We should like to hear an explanation of the object of this omission. To be consistent we think a number of other alterations would also have to be introduced, but there would not at present be any utility in following that point up. Clause 36 is the same as clause 35 of the Government Bill, with a verbal alteration in sub-clause 2, consequent upon the omission of the clause as to the close of the bankruptcy. The two first lines read as follows:-"The application may be made any time during the continuance of the bankruptcy, but shall not," &c. There are also some words introduced into sub-clause 6, which slightly modify that provision, but not to any great extent. Clause 37 is the same as clause 36 of the Government Bill, with a verbal alteration in paragraph (c.), consequent on the omission of clause 34 of that Bill. Clauses 38 to 40 are the same as clauses 37 to 39 of the Government Bill, except that the term for which a bankrupt is to be disqualified, as therein provided, is reduced from seven to five years. Clause 41 is entirely new, and is as follows: "41.-Where the bankrupt, being a trader, has omitted to keep such books of account as fully disclose his business transactions and his financial position during the three years immediately preceding his bankruptcy, or has omitted to prepare, once at least in each of those years, a proper inventory or balancesheet of his property and liabilities, this omission, unless otherwise ordered by the court, shall constitute a criminal offence for which the court shall commit the bankrupt for trial, and on conviction he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years." We think this proposal altogether too stringent, and that the Government proposal to make this a ground of objection to the discharge only quite strong enough, if indeed that does not, at the present time at least, go rather too far. Clauses 42 to 44 are the same as clauses 40 to 42 of the Government Bill. The Government proposals as to small bankruptcies (clause 43 of last year's Bill) are omitted, and no provisions proposed in substitution. We do not think the excision of the Government clause any detriment to the Bill, but, at the same time, it will be necessary in some way to cut down the expenses in small estates. Clauses 45 and 46 are the same as clauses 44 and 45 of the Government Bill, and clause 47 is the same as clause 43 of that Bill, with the addition that the official trustee is also to take part "in the public examination of the bankrupt, and supervision of his conduct" (the This proposal we consider altogether impracticable and utterly inconsistent with the previous sub-clauses. In case of a hostile petition being presented, how is the petitioning creditor to know where the greatest number of creditors carry on business? The court in which proceedprovisions might, we think, be made for the transfer of the proceedings than exist under the present Act. The Bill appears to have been introduced with the particular object of presenting the various proposed amendments to the Government Bill for consideration and discussion, and, in this way, may assist in the bringing about of a satisfactory settlement. The promoters do not appear to have considered the various proposals of the Government, as contained in the "supplemental" clauses. If they had, we think it scarcely probable that three such consistent Conservatives would give their approval to the proposal of the Government with regard to distress for rent, as appearing in the Bill of last session. In fact, the clauses subsequent to clause 52 seem to be taken from the Government Bill, without even a consideration whether they require any verbal alterations, consequent upon the amendments previously introduced, or not. So that in clause 70, notwithstanding the omission of the provisions for the close of a bankruptcy, reference is made to such close". under the principal Act or this Act." And, notwithstanding that in consequence of the omission of the first schedule to the Government Bill, the third schedule to that Bill becomes the second schedule to the present Bill, it is still referred to as the third schedule in clause 73. THE JUDICIAL STATISTICS. CHANCERY DIVISION. THE returns for the Chancery Division show that the beginning of the year ending the 31st of October, 1880, there were on the cause books 796 cases for hearing, that 3,386 were set down during the year, that 2,569 were heard, that 946 were otherwise disposed of, and that at the end of the year 673 remained. These numbers are all in excess of those of the previous year, with the exception of the remanets, which were less by 123. The number of orders made by the five courts of the Chancery Division, including those made at chambers, drawn up by the registrars, was 19,117, the number having been 18,418 in 1879. There were issued 3,977 certificates of sale or transfer, as against 3,713 in 1879. Including orders made by the Appeal Court there were 20,370, orders drawn up by the registrar, and the fees thereon amounted to £13,806 98. In 1879 there were 18,655 orders drawn up, and the fees thereon amounted to £12,950 17s. The days on which the Chancery Courts sat, including 13 days in vacation, amounted to 918. In the previous year the courts only sat 770 days; this was principally due to the absence of Vice-Chancellor Malins on 123 days. During the year there were 529 cases referred to the conveyancing counsel of the court, and 106 to the official referees. In 1879 the conveyancing counsel had 465 cases before them and the official referees 65. CHANCERY CHAMBERS. The return of proceedings before the chief clerks of the Master of the Rolls and of the three Vice-Chancellors shows that, during 1879-80, there were issued 953 originating summonses and 39,325 other summonses, making a total of 40,278 summonses. In the previous year the summonses issued numbered 39,533. The several chief clerks made a total of 30,483 orders, as against 30,254 in the previous year. There were 3,385 orders brought into chambers for prosecution, including 127 for the winding up of companies. The accounts passed in chambers were 3,392 in number, including 1,004 by receivers 902 estates were sold by the court, realizing more than a million and a half of money. The chief clerks disposed of 100,965 appointments during the year. At the date of the return 1,084 orders for winding up companies were pending in chambers, and 6,158 orders for accounts and inquiries. The fees collected in chambers amounted to £19,634, as against £15,136 the previous year. CENTRAL OFFICE. The return of the masters of the Central Office shows that in the Chancery Division the number of actions instituted was 5,987 as against 6,237 in the previous year, being a decrease of 248. Of this number it appears that 4,947 were commenced by writ and 910 by originating summons, the remainder consisted of actions transferred from district registries and county courts. The amount collected by stamps was £84,188, as against £18,992 in the previous year. EXAMINERS. The numbers of witnesses examined in the office of the examiners was 196, as against 171 in the previous year. The fees received by stamps amounted to £246, being £14 less than in the previous year. SECRETARY OF THE ROLLS. There were 2,023 petitions presented at the Rolls' Office for the decision of the chancery judges, and of this number 202 were for the winding up of companies. Besides these petitions there were 4,649 petitions for orders of course. The amount of the fees received in the office was £2,906 16s. 8d., being an increase on the amount of the previous year of £779 0s. 8d. TAXING MASters. In the office of the chancery taxing masters the number of orders of reference was 4,940; the number of bills taxed was 9,705, and the number of certificates and allocaturs made was 4,422; in the previous year these numbers were respectively 4,815, 9,469, and 4,299, showing on every one of these three items a considerable increase. The amount of costs taxed was £1,328,057, and the fees received amounted to £36,786, both which items are in excess of those in the previous year. MASTERS IN LUNACY. There were during the period comprised in these returns 117 orders of inquiry in commissions of lunacy. The amount of lunatics' cash paid into court was £148,029, and the amount of percentage on lunatics' income was £20,500. REGISTRAR IN LUNACY. In the return furnished by the Registrar in Lunacy it appears that 439 petitions were presented during the year, and 679 orders made. The funds directed to be brought into court consisted of £307,134 stock and £77,600 cash, and during the same period £687,769 stock, and £56,371 cash, was directed to be sold, transferred, or paid out. CHANCERY PAY OFFICE. During the year 1879-80, the amount paid into court was £12,108,970, and that paid out was £11,904,410, both of which items are somewhat less than those of the two next preceding years. The number of accounts in the books was 35,645. The stock and securities on these accounts was of the nominal value of £69,874,822, and the cash £5,234,014. CHANCERY OF THE COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. The number of suits and matters originated in 1879-80 in the Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster was 557. The orders made numbered 2,338, and there were 562 bills of costs taxed. The fees received amounted to £11,532. Funds to the value of £44,000 were brought into court, and to the value of £343,000 paid or transferred out. QUEEN'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND EXCHEQUER DIVISIONS. The return made by the Queen's Coroner and Attorney and the Master of the Crown Office show that under this peculiar jurisdiction there was in 1879.80 but one person convicted, on whom a sentence of imprisonment was passed and a fine imposed. In the previous year five were convicted. There were 37 applications for mandamus, and 9 were made absolute; 65 other special rules nisi were granted, and 115 were made absolute; 33 writs of habeas corpus were applied for, and 26 granted, and 35 writs of certiorari were issued. The fees received for business done in the Crown Office was £1,040 14s. 6d., being less than the amount for the previous year by £30 11s. 8d. PLEA SIDE. This portion of the return shows that after the 31st of March, 1880, the writs for the three divisions were all issued from the Central Office. During the year the total number of writs issued was 53,333, as against 59,659 in the previous year; 27,560 appearances were entered; there were 22,213 judgments, aud 15,868 executions. In the previous year the numbers were, appearances, 27,516; judgments, 25,200; and executions, 16,660. The fees taken amounted to £84,188 1s. 11d., and in the previous year to £63,958 18s. 1d. The number of bills of costs taxed in the three divisions in 1880, exclusive of bills taxed under the statute, was 12,355. ELECTION PETITIONS. There were 41 election petitions presented during the year 1879-80, which resulted as follows:-In 16 cases the election was declared void, and in 9 valid, in 6 cases no security was given, 9 petitions were withdrawn, and 1 had not been tried at the date of the return. The total coste taxed amounted to £7,459 16s. 3d., of which £3,795 19s. 10d. were taxed off, and £3,663 16s. 5d. allowed. The fees on taxation amounted to £92 0s. 2d. In the previous year there were no proceedings under the Act. ASSOCIATES' RETURNS. Under this heading we find the number of the causes in the three divisions placed together. It appears that the year commenced with 842 remanets, and that 2,181 causes were entered for trial at London and Westminster, and 1,222 at Nisi Prius; 1,008 were tried at London and Westminster, and 790 at Nisi Prius, 1,028 were made remanets, 986 were withdrawn or struck out, and 419 were otherwise disposed of. MASTERS' Returns. These returns show the number of judgments to have been 22,203, as against 25,200 in 1878-9. Of this number no less than 13,268 were taken on affidavit of service, 1,149 on judge's order for substituted service, and 4,424 under order 14. There were 15,293 writs of fieri facias, 354 writs of possession, and 221 writs of elegit issued during the year. Of the motions for a new trial, 105 were refused and 194 granted nisi, 76 were made absolute, and 63 discharged. There were 797 special motions made in the three divisions, including 36 motions for judgment after trial; there were also 41 special cases heard and 47 demurrers. JUDGES' CHAMBERS. Returns relating to judges' chambers show that 63,677 summonses were taken out in 1879-80 as against 74,569 in the previous year; 49,801 orders were made as against 62,886. OFFICIAL REFEREES. The number of cases sent to the official referees was 139 in 1879.80 and 91 in 1878-9. Of the 139 cases 77 were disposed of, 34 were part heard, 12 were withdrawn, 5 stood over by order of the court, and 11 remained to be disposed of. DISTRICT REGISTRIES. The number of writs issued by district registrars in 1879-80 was 32,077 as against 39,835 in the previous year. To these writs of sum6,714 executions taken out. The number of actions transferred from mons 7,757 appearances were entered, 11,116 judgments were made, and district registrars to London was 278, and 267 were remitted to county courts. There were in district registries 13,481 applications in chambers. The fees received in district registries amounted to £25,226, as against £29,764 in the previous year. CORRESPONDENCE. STATUTORY MORTGAGE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-One work on the Conveyancing Act, 1881, gives some variations in the statutory mortgage, 3rd schedule, part 1, but I am not aware of any work in which any variation is suggested for the case of a mortgage to cover further advances. Would the words given below within brackets meet the case and be free from objection, or can you or some reader suggest any improvement? The form might, it seems to me, run thus :"To hold to and to the use of M. in fee simple for securing payment on the day of 1883, of the principal sum of £ as [part of] the mortgage money, with interest thereon at the rate of per cent. per annum [and for securing payment on the day of day of next after the time of the same being advanced, of any other sum which may hereafter be advanced by M. to A. as the residue of the mortgage money, with interest thereon at the rate aforesaid, from the time of the advance. And for the purpose of section 19 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, it is hereby agreed that the mortgage money shall be considered as due on day of 1883 (when present advance is to be repaid)]. In witness, &c." B. [We should not insert the words "as part of the mortgage money," which might raise a doubt as to whether, if there are no further advances, the mortgage money can become due within section 19. Why not omit these words, also the words "as the residue of the mortgage money," and rely on the last clause? There is no need to specify any is received by the mortgagee arising from the sale" is to be held by him sum as the mortgage-money, for under section 21 (3) "the money which "in trust to be applied in discharge of the mortgage money, interest, and costs, and other money, if any, due under the mortgage.— ED. S. J.] |