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SHORTHAND Noreg.-On the 28th ult, the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., application being made by the trustee within the prescribed time after the and COTTON, and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Fry, J., in the date of adjadication, give op his security to such trustee for the benefit of case of Wallis v. Smith (noted ante, p. 184). The question was whether a sum the creditors, opon payment of such estimated valoe.” The court (JESSEL, of £5,000 which, by one of the clauses in a contract, was to be forfeited by M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) held that, though it is necessary one of the parties to it, as liquidated damages, in case he should commit a that the petitioner, if he is ready to give op bis security for the benefit of substantial breach of the agreement, either in not proceeding forthwith with the oreditors, should state that fact in his petition, it is not necessary, if all due diligence to carry out and complete the several works contemplated, he be willing to estimate the value of bis security, that he should state or in failing to perform any of the provisions therein contained, was really his willingness to do so in his petition, but that it is sufficient that he should only a penalty. The provisions of the agreement are fully stated in the make that statement on the hearing of the petition, though it is better former note, and, upon the construction of the agreement as a whole, Fry, J.

, that he should, in compliance with form No. 10 of the Bankruptoy Forms, came to the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that, in the 1870, make the statement in the petition. In the partionlar case the petievents which had happened, the £5,000 should be forfeited as liquidated tioning creditor beld a obarge upon some property of the debtor as security for damages, and the Court of Appeal affirmed this decision. Under these cir- bis debt, but be considered the security of no value, and stated in the petition cumstances the court allowed the costs of transcripts of a shorthand writer's that he beld do security. The debtor disputed the adjudication, on the notes of the evidence taken in the court below, with the exception of copies of ground that the security had not been stated in the petition. A few days documents which were set out in the notes, and which the court said ought before the bearing of the petition the petitioner's solioitors had, in a letter to not to have been transcribed there.-SOLICITORS, Terrell g Harrison ; Russell, the debtor's solicitors, said, “If the adjudication takes place, the charge Son, $ Scott.

will enure to the general body of creditors, as it is not valued at anything."

At the hearing of the petition it was stated on behalf of the petitioner that APPEAL FOR Costs-Costs out oF_FUND-TRUSTEEJUDICATURE Act, bo was ready to give up his security, but the registrar refased to make the 1873, s. 49-ORDER 55.-In a case of Turner v. Hancock, before the Court of adjudication, and dismissed the petition on the ground that this fact was not Appeal on the 24th ult., the question was again raised which was raised in stated in it. . The Court of Appeal beld that, inasmuch as if the petitioner Parrow . Austin (30 W. R. 50, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 58, 25 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, bed. valaed his security as worth a farthing, he need not have stated his 640)- viz., whether a trustee who has not been allowed costs out of his trast willingness so to valve it in the petition (this being in effeot the same thing fund can appeal on the ground that be ought to have been allowed costs ont

as giving it up for the benefit of the creditors), the defect or irregolarity in of the fund. In Farrow v. Austin it was held that he could, but, as we pointed the petition was a merely, formal

one, within the meaning of secticn 82, out (25 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 635) the decision of the Court of Appeal to the by which no substantial injustice had been caused, and that the registrar contrary in In re Hoskin's Trusts (25 W. R. 779, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 281) and ought to have exercised the power of amendment given by rule 208, by Taylor v. Dowlen (17 W. R. 779, L. R. 4 Ch. 697) were not then cited to the inserting in the petition a statement of the petitioner's readiness to court. In Turner v. Hancock reference was made to In re Hoskin's Trusts, but, give op his security. And the court accordingly amended the petition in notwithstanding, the court (JESSEL, M.R., and Cotton and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) that way, and made the adjadication. The court gave no costs of the came to the same conclusion as the court did in Farrow V. Austin. 'JESSEL, appeal ogh they allowed the petitioner the costs of the hearing before M. R., said that in Stratton v. Cottrell (21 W. R. 234, L. R. 8 Ch. 295, 302) the registrar, because a great deal of ovidence had been adduced there with Lord Selborne said, “The right of a mortgages in a suit for redemption or

the view of proving that the petition had been presonted for a malicious foreclosure to his general costs of suit, unless he has forfeited them by parpose. And the court gave the petitioner the costs of the shorthand some improper defence or other misconduct, is well established, and does writer's notes of the evidence, on the ground that he had been appointed not rest upon the exercise of that discretion of the court which, in litigious under an express order of the court to take those notes.-SOLIDITORS, Beyfus causes, is generally not snbjest to review. The contract between mortgagor 8 Beyfus ; Williams de Graham. and mortgagee, as it is understood in this court, makes the mortgage & security not only for principal and interest, and such ordinary charges and expenses as are usually provided for by the instrument creating the security, but also for the BANKRUPTCY APPEAL-TIME-ENTRY-NOTICE TO RBGISTRAR OF COUNTY costs properly incident to a suit for foreclosure or redemption. In like COURT—" FORTHWITH "-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 143, 144.-In a case manner, the contract between the author of a trust and his trustees entitles of Ex parte Williams, before the Court of Appeal on the 23rd ult., a question arose the trustees, as between themselves and their cestuis que trust, to whether an appeal to the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy from an order in bankruptcy receive out of the trust estate all tbeir proper costs incident to the execu- made by a county court was irregular, on the ground that notice of the appeal had tion of the trust. These rights, resting substantially upon contract, can only not been sent" forth with " to the registrar of the county court in compliance with be lost or curtailed by such inequitable conduct on the part of a mortgagee the provisions of rule 144 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870. The order was or trustee as may amount to a violation or culpable neglect of his duty under made by the county court on the 17th of December. On the 22nd of Decem. the contract. Any departure from these principles in the general course of bor an appeal was entered with the registrar of appeals in London, and, on the the administration of justice in this court would tend to destroy, or, at least, same day, the London agents of the appellant's country solicitors sent a copy very materially to shake and impair, the security of mortgage transactions and of the notice of appeal by post to the country solicitors, by whom it was the safety of trustees. In fact, such a departure, instead of being beneficial received on the morning of the 23rd of December. The offices of the to those who may have occasion to borrow money on seourity, or to repose county court were closed for the Christmas vacation from the 23rd to the confidence as to property in their friends or neighbours, would, in the result, 27th of December, both inclusive. On the morning of the 28th of Decem. throw the former class of persons into the bands of those who indemnify them ber the country solicitors of the appellant left a copy of the notice of selves against extraordinary risks by extraordinary exactions, and would de- appeal with the registrar of the county court. Bacon, C.J., held, prive the latter class of the assistance of all who cannot afford, or are not in apparently on the authority of Ex parte Lamb (30 W. R. 126, L. R. 19 clined, to bestow upon the affairs of other persons their money as well as their ch. D. 169, ante, p. 97), that the notice had not been sent to the registrar trouble and time. A decree, therefore, in a redemption suit, which disallows “forth with," and on this ground he dismissed the appeal without going into the costs of the mortgagee, is of right appealable, and, if appealed agaiost, can the merits. T'he Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and COTTON and LINDonly be supported by proof of special circumstances sufficient to justify such LEY, L.JJ.) said that the appellant had been guilty of no delay, the notice a departure from the ordinary course of the court." JESSEL, M.R., added that of appeal having been left with the registrar at the earliest possible time, it was not the course of the court in modern times to discourage persons from The Chief Judge must have been under some misapprehension. The objeo. becoming trusteos by making trustees who had honestly done their duty tion was aucordingly overruled, and the appeal was heard on its merits. -liable for breaches of trust which they had committed innocently. The SOLICITORS, R. White; Smith, Lawrence, & Co. decision in In re Hoskin's Trusts appeared to have been founded on a mistake of law. James, L.J., there said that the costs of a trustee were subject to the discretion of the court. The Master of the Rolls said that he had always RAILWAY COMPANY-COMPULSORY POWERS-RIGHT TO ENTER ON LAND understood the rule to be as it was laid down by Lord Selborne in Stratton v. REFUSAL OF LANDOWNER TO DELIVER POSSESSION_SHERIFF-MINERALS, Cottrell, and he must treat what James, L.J., said in In re Hoskin's Trusts TRESPASS-COMPENSATION LAND INJORIOUSLY AFFECTED-LANDE as being a mistake, and section 49 and order 55 did not alter the old rule as CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION Act, 1845, ss. 68, 85, 91-RAILWAYS CLAUSES to the costs of a trustee or mortgagee. COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ., con Act, 1845, ss. 6, 77.-In a case of Loosemore v. The Tiverton and North Devon curred. The appeal was accordingly heard on its merits, and, in the result, Railway Company, before Fry, J., on the 27th alt., a question arose as to the the court held that there was no ground for depriving the trustee of his costs right of a railway company, who have given notice to a landowner to treat out of the trust ostate.--SOLICITORS, G. S. & A. Brandon ; G. R. Burn.

for land required for the parposes of their Aot beforo the expiration of the three years limited by the Aot for the exercise of their powers for the com

palgory purobage of land, to enter on the land, ander section 85 of the BANKRUPTOY PETITION -SECURED CREDITOR-GIVING UP SECURITY-Lands Olauses Consolidation Aot, 1845, after the expiration of that ESTIMATE OF VALUE-FORMAL DEFECT-AMENDMENT_BANKRUPTCY_Act, period and just before the expiration of the five years limited for 1869, ss. 6, 82-BANKRUPTCY Rules, 1870, R. 208–BANKRUPTCY FORMS, the completion of the company's works, the compensation payable 1870, No. 10—SHORTHAND NOTES OF EVIDENCE - Costs.-In a case of Ex to the landowner not having been ascertained, and it not being parte Danderlinden, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., a question possible that the compensation should be ascertained, or that the company's aroge opon the construction of section 6 of the Bankroptoy Act, 1869, works on the land should be completed, until after the expiration of the five which provides that the debt of a creditor who petitions for an adjudica- years. The company's Aot was passed on the 19th of July, 1875. Their tion of bankruptoy against bis debtor“must not be a secured debt, unless compulsory powers for the parohase of land expired on the 19th of July, the petitioner states in his petition that he will be ready to give op suob 1878, and the time for the completion of their works expired on the 19th teourity for the benefit of the oreditors, in the event of the debtor being of July, 1880. On the 12th of July, 1878, the company served on the adjudicated a bankrupt, or unless the petitioner is willing to give an plaintiff a notice to treat for some land belonging to bim. The plaintiff on estimate of the value of his security, in which latter case he may be the 2nd of August, 1878, served on the company a counter-notice, requiring admitted as a petitioning oreditor to the extent of the balance of the debt them to purchase the whole of his land, on the ground that the land required doe to him after deduoting the value so estimated, but he shall, on an by the company formed part of the oartilege of a mill belonging to bim,

FOR

arose.

The company treated this notice as invalid, and did not reply to it. On LEASE - AGREEMENT_DISTRESS FOR RENT-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 25.– the 2nd of December, 1878, the plaintiff sent the company a second notice, In a case of Walsh v. Lonsdale, before the Court of Appeal on the 29th ult., oalling on them to elect whether they would take all or none of his land, the queetion which was referred to in The Commissioners for the Exhibition of and saying that, unless they so elected within twenty-one days by notice in 1851 v. The Royal Horticultural Society (ante, p. 331), as to the effect of the writing to bim, he should consider their silence to mean that it was not their Judicature Act upon the position of a person who has taken possession of intention to take the whole of his land. Nothing further was done for a property under an agreement for a lease, no lease having been executed, again long time, and ultimately, on the 10th of December, 1879, the company An agreement had been entered into between the plaintiff and the sent notice to the plaintiff of their intention to apply to the Board of Trade, defendant for the granting of a lease by the latter to the former of a onder section 36 of the Act 30 & 31 Viot. o. 127, to appoint a surveyor to weaving shed, looms, and machinery, at a rent of £110s. per annum value the land, so as to enable them to take possession under section 85 of perloom run by the lessee, it being provided that the lessee the Lands Clau8€8 Aot. The plaintiff took no steps to have the validity of

was not to run less than 540 looms. The lease was to contain such his counter.notice decided, nor did he take any steps to have the compensa- covenants and conditions as were contained in another lease which was tion payable to him ascertained. The company applied to the Board of specified in the agreement, or such of them as were or could be made Trade, who appointed a surveyor, and be on the 2nd of February, 1880, applicable to the tenancy thereby agreed to be created. The lease referred valued the land comprised in the company's notice to treat at £236 103. to was made at a fixed annual rent, payable yearly in advance on the A copy of the valuation was sent to the plaintiff, but he still did nothing. 1st of May in every year during the continuance of the term thereby granted. On the 9th of April, 1880, the company deposited the £236 103. in the And it was expressly thereby agreed that there should, at all times during Bank of England, and on the 5th of July, 1880, they gave the plaintiff a

the continuance of the demise (except in the last year of the term), written notice of their intention to enter on his land, and sent him a bo due and payable in advance on demand & whole year's rens bond of the company, with two sureties, for the £236 10s. The plaintiff the of the demised property, in addition to the proportion (if any) of same day gave the company notice in writing that he should resist their taking the yearly rent due and anpaid for the period previous to such demand. possession. On the following day the company took possession, the plaintiff,

The lessee entered under the agreement, but no lease was executed. After in fact, offering no resistance. The plaintiff' then commenced this ac ion he had been in occupation for some time, paying his rent quarterly, the land. against the company, alleging that their entry was invalid, and claiming an lord served on him a demand for the payment of a year's rent in advance fron injunction to restrain them continuing in possession of his land. He also the date of the demand, calculated on the number of looms (560) which he claimed damages for some clay which they had dug out and removed from the

was then running, and, the demand not being at once complied with, the land. The latter claim arose in this way. The company's notice to treat did landlord levied a distress for the sum which he had demanded. The tenant not include the minerals on the land, and there was evidence that the clay then commenced the action, alleging that the distress was illegal, and claiming on the land was of some commercial value, and was, therefore, a mineral an injunction to restrain the landlord from selling under the distress, and according to the definition given in Hext v. Gill (20 W. R. 957, L. R. 7 Ch. from remaining in possession. It was urged that no distress could be levied 699). The company's line was to be carried across the plaintiff's land on an

for rent in advance, because no lease had been executed, and the tenant was, embankment, so that it was not necessary to excavate his land for the purpose therefore, in possession at law only as tenant from year to year at the rent of constructing the line. But the company dng out from the plaintiff's land, specified in the agreement. It was also urged that the provisions contained and carried away, some loads of clay, for the purpose of puddling some bridges in the lease referred to in the agreement as a precedent for the payment of which they were building on some adjoining land. It was contended on

rent in advance, were not applicable to a case where the rent was uncertain in behalf of the plaintiff that the company's entry on his land was unlawful, amount, depending on the number of looms which the lessee might choose to becauso it was impossible either that their works could be completed within the run, and that, at any rate, a distress could be levied only for a rent certaio, five years, or that the compensation payable to the plaintiff could be ascer.

and must be levied for the whole rent, pot for a part of it. The court (Jesset, tained, under section 68 of the Lands Clauses Act, within that period, and it M.R., and Cotton and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), without finally deciding the con. was said that the provisions of that seotion were powers conferred on the com

struction of the agreement, held that the landlord was prima facie entitled to pany which did not survive the expiration of the five years. Fry, J., said demand payment in advance of a year's rent corresponding to the minimum that the notice to treat created a relation of a somewhat peculiar character number of looms which the tenant was to run, and to levy a distress for between the company and the landowner, some what like that of vendor and that amount, and, cousequently, that an interim injunction could be granted purchaser. It bound the company to take the land, and it bound the land only on the terms of the plaintiffs paying that amount into court. Jessel, owner to give the company the land, subject to his right to compensation. M. R., said that there was an agreement for a lease, under which the The argument was that the provisions of section 68 were powers of the com

intended lessee bad taken possession. Since the Judicature Act, a person pany wbich came to an end at the end of the five years. Suppose the in that position held onder the agreement. There was not, as formerly, two company had given a notice to treat and had entered long before the expiration estates, one a tenanoy at law from year to year, the other a tenancy in of the five years, but the landowner bad taken no steps to have the compensa- equity under the agreeinent. Now there was only one court, and the role tion ascertained, could it be said that the company would be entitled to of equity prevailed. The tenant now beld noder the agreement, on the remain in possession of the land without the compensation payable to the same terms as if a lease, properly framed in pursuance of it, had been landowner ever being ascertained ? If so, he would be without any remedy granted. That being so, he could not complain of the landlord exercising beyond the amount for which the company bad given security. That would be the same rights as he would bave had if the lease had been granted, and, an absurd construction. His lordship thought that the true view was, not that on the other hand, he was protected just in the same way as if the section 68 conferred powers on the company which came to an end at the lease had been granted. The landlord could not ejeot him by virtue expiration of the three years or the five years, but that it gave them powers of his legal estate, unless he could do 80 under the lease. The for the benefit of the landowner, be having the option of requiring those lessee (for be was lessee in equity) had no ground for complaining of the dis. powers to be exercised. It bad been held in previous cases that these powers tress. The question how the lease ought to be framed under the agreement survived the expiration of the three years, and his lordship had great difficulty was one of sotme nicety: His lordship’s present opinion was that there ought in seeing wby, if they survived the three years, they did not equally survive to be inserted in the lease a minimum or dead rent of £810, corresponding the five years. He preferred, however, to rest his decision on this, that to the minimum number of 440 looms wbich the lessee was to run. "If that section 68 imposed on the company obligations to do something for the benefit were so, the provisions of the other lease for payment of the rent in advance of the landowner, and that those obligations did not expire when the com- would be applicable to that minimum rent, and the distrese would be legal to papy's compulsory powers expired.

that extent. The injunction ought, therefore, to be granted only on the terms Reliance was also placed, on behalf of the plaintiff, on the view of the plaintiff paying £810 into court within a week. The defendant would expressed by Malins, V.C., in Field v. The Carmarthen, &c., Railway remain in possession till the payment was made, and would not sell the goods Company (16 W. R. 273, L. R. 5 Eq. 190), that the power of a railway in the meantime. COTTON, L.J., said that, under the lease on the terms of company to enter on land under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Con which the plaintiff must be taken to be holding, the defendant would be ensolidation Act is limited to cases where there is an orgent necessity for an titled to rent in advance of some amount, and there being a primâ facie case, immediate entry. Fry, J., said that, in the absence of authority, he should he ought not to be deprived of bis security. LINDLEY, L. J., said that the have felt great difficulty in coming to any such conclusion, the effect of which plaintiff's rights depended on the lease as it ought to be framed in pursuance was to introduce into section 85 words which were not there. But, if that of the agreement, and that the landlord ought not to be compelled to withauthority was to be treated as binding, bis lordship thought that in the present draw, except on the terms of £810 being paid into coart.-SOLICITORS, case there was an urgent necessity for an immediate entry, for, if the company Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.; Bower & Cotton. had not entered when they did, ibey would, probably, Lave not been able to obtain possession of the plaintiff's land at all. It was also urged that the entry of the company was unlawful, bezause, as

INSOLVENT Estate-ADMINISTRATION_RIGHTS OF SECURED AND UN. the plaintiff had refused to deliver up possession, they ought, under section 91 SECURED CREDITORS-RULES IN BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITY-JUDGMENT BE. of the Lands Clauses Act, to have summoned the sheriff to give them possession. COVERED BY CREDITOR AGAINST Executor BEFORE ADMINISTRATION JUDGBat Fri, J., hold that, as the plaintiff did not actively oppose the entry of MENT-JUDICATURE Act, 1875, 8. 10-BANKRUPTCY Act, 1869, s. 32.—In a the company, section 91 did not apply, and the company were justiâed in case of Winehouse v. Winehouse, before Fry, J., on the 27th ult., the question taking possession without the aid of the sheriff.

arose whether, by the operation of section 10 of the Jadicatore Act, 1875, a And as to the removal of the clay, his lordship held on the evidence that creditor, who recovers judgment against the executor of an insolvent estate the clay was a mineral within the meaning of section 77 of the Railways before the date of a judgment for the administration of the estate, is por Clauses Act, 1845. The removal of the clay was not necessary for the execu- disentitled to the priority which his judgment would formerly have given tion of the company's works on the plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff was him over the other creditors of the testator in the same degree. On the entitled to damages for the improper removal. The provisions of section 6 21st of January, 1879, an action was commenced for the administration of the of the Railways Clauses Act, 1845, for giving compensation to a landowner testator's estate. On the 29th of March a creditor of the testator commenced whose land was injuriously affected by the company's works, did not apply. an action for his debt against the executors as such. On the 9th of April a That section applied to an injury which reasonably or naturally followed from receiver was appointed

in the administration action, upon his giving security, the construction of the worko; not to an injury which resulted from a trespass On the 24th of April the creditor recovered judgment in his

action against by the company.-SOLICITORA, C, M. Strotton ; R. R. Nelson.

the executors, they admitting assets by default in pleading. On the 2nd of

ac

May the ordinary administration judgment was given in the administration idle one. The vendors were, no doubt, entitled to have the conveyancs action. On the 19th of August the receiver's recognizances were completed. executed in a form which should not prejudice any claims they might make; Os the 1st of July, 1881, the chief clerk's certificate was made in the ad. but, on the other hand, all that was desired by the company was a conveyaace minstration action, by which it appeared that the testator's estate wag of the land free from all claims, and not to escap3 any liability in respect of insufficient for the payment of his debts in full. The debt of the creditor who the claims made. The proper course would be to qualify the terms objested bad recovered judgment was allowed in the certificate, he having proved it to by confining the damages to damages covered by the award, and this by producing his judgment, which was admitted by the executors. When his would be effeoted by placing after the words “or otherwise" the words " for judgment was obtained it was supposed that the estate was solvent. The damages covered by the award.”—SOLICITORS, W. Moon, for J. C. Townsend, creditor was not served with notice of the administration judgment, and did Swindon ; Bradford & Foote. not attend the proceedings under it. On the 22nd of July, 1881, the action was heard on further consideration, when an order was made that the residue of the estate, after the payment of costs, should be apportioned among the

PATENT-INFRINGEMENT-LICENSE FOR LIMITED AREA-SALE OUrsida creditors (including the judgment creditor), and paid to them AREA.-In a case of Smith v. Buchanan, before Hull, V.C., on the 23rd ult., a cordingly. In February, 1882, th: fand not having been divided, the point of patent law was raised which, althongh generally accepted, has not judgment creditor took out a summons, asking that his debt might be previously been the subject of judicial decision. The plaintiff had grante i to paid to him in full out of the assets in court, in priority to all the certain parties a liceose to manufacture and sell his patented invention within other creditors. There was evidence that the creditor did not know that the counties of Lancashire and Yorkshire. These licea sees had sold the patented the estate was insolvent until the 28th of January, 1882. Fry, J., held machines to the defendants, who, in their tarn, had sold them outside the that, notwitlistanding section 10, the creditor was entitled to priority by virtue licensed counties-namely, in Glasgow and elsewhere. The plaintiff had con: of his judgment, and that he had not been guilty of any laches which would menced an action for infringement in respect of these galos, and now movel deprive him of it. His lordship said that the role that a judgment obtained for an interim injunction. The case which he sought to establish was that by a creditor against an executor give priority to that creditor over all other the restriction imposed by the limited license attached to the patented debts of the testator of equal degree had been long established. The rule was machines in whatever hands they might be, and he founded this proposition founded on the superior diligence of the creditor. Section 32 of the Bankruptcy upon the maxim that a vendor cannot give his vendes a better title or a Act, 1869, provided that, in bankruptcy, with the exception of certain debts greater right than he himself possesses in the subject-matter of the sale, and for wages and rates and taxes, all debts should be paid pari passu. Was this that in the case of a patent this maxim is absolutely unqualified, inasmuch as latter provision imported by section 10 of the Judicature Act into the the doctrine of purch use for valuable cousideration without notice cannot there administration of the estates of insolvent deceased persons ? Section 10 said be applied. His lordship refused the motion, with costs, upon the ground that that in the administration of those estates, and in the winding up of com- a purchaser from a licensee, whether special or general, acquires the patented panies, "the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective article for all purposes, and can exercise every right of ownership in respect of rights of secured and unsecured creditors as may be in force for the time being it.-SOLICITORS, Shum, Crossman, f Co., Brook f Chapman. under the law of bankruptoy with respect to the estates of persons adjudged bankrupt.” Did these words apply only to the rights of secured creditors as a class in conflict with the rights of unsecured creditors as a class—to the rights of the two classes inter se, regarded as two conflicting classes-or did they CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS. apply also to the rights of the members of each class inter se ? His lordship

(Before Mr. Registrar MORRAY, sitting as Chief Judge.) thought that the former was the true construction. There had been a great many decisions to the effect that section 10 applied only to the administration

March 2.- Ex parte Peach, Re Brown. of the assets, and bad no operatiou with regard to the assets which were to be The Court of Bankruptcy has no jurisdiction in a case of composition administered. It was settled, for instance, that section 10 did not import to restrain the debtor from proceeding to a taxation of the receiver's into the administration of insolvent estates of deceased persons the provisions costs, although it is alleged that the amount of such costs has been agreed of section 87 of the Bankruptcy Act, or the provisions of the reputed owner. ship clause. The property to be administered was that which was the property

between the parties. of the dead man at the time of his death. In In re The Norton Ironworks This was an application on behalf of Frederick Robert Peach for a declara. Company (26 W. R. 53), Jessel, M. R., and in In re The Association of Land tion that the taxing master of this court had no jurisdiction, under the circu n. Financiers (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 373), Maling, V.C., held that section 10 had stances of the case, to tax the costs of the applicant as receiver of the debtor's introduced into the winding up of a company the bankruptoy rule that property, and that the debtor might be restrained from proceeding any further servants' wages should be paid in priority to other debts, while, in In re with such taxation, Albion Steel and Wire Company (26 W. R. 348, L. R. 7 Cb. D. 547), Jessel, On the 10th of March, 1880, the applicant was appointed reosiver under a M. R., held that section 10 did not, in a wioding op, give local rates prioritý petition for liquidation presented by Ambros: Brown. On the 31st of March, over other debts, And in Smith v. Morgan (L. R. 5 C. P. D. 337), the resolutions were passed by a statutory majority of the creditors accepting a Common Pleas Division held that section 10 had not taken away the priority composition of 103. in the pound in satisfaction of the debts, payable by instal. of & judgment creditor in an administration action. In this conflict of ments as therein provided, the whole to be secured to the satisfaction of the authority Fry, J., said it was not easy to say whether, in his view, he was three lørgest creditors, and the applicant was appointed trustee for the receipt following or differing from the authorities, but he thought the weight of and distribution of the composition. authority was in favour of bis conclusion. He was confirmed in it by the On the 14th of April the creditors confirmed the resolutions, which were duly decision of the Court of Appeal in Lee v. Nuttall (27 W. R. 803, L. Ř. 12 registered. The applicant, on the 19th of April, made out his bill of coste, Ch. D. 61), that an executor's right of retainer is not affected by section 10. amounting to £75 13. 3d., and submitted the same to the debtor for his If eection 10 bad required that all debts should, in the administration of the approval, and he signed the applioant's ledger account as being correct. The estate of a deceased insolvent, be paid pari passu, as in bankruptcy, it was applicant had previously, according to his affidavit, stated that be should not difficult to see how the executor's right of retainer could remain. And, allow Mr. King, a proposed surety, to sign any agreement or bond, until the moreover, in In re Withernsea Brick Works (29 W. R. 178, L. R. 16 Ch. D. debtor had agreed to his charges. 337), Lush, L.J., and James, L.J. (though not quite so distinctly), laid it On the 2nd of May, 1881, the debtor came to the applicant's office, and down that this part of section 10 was only intended to introduce into winding said he had gone through the bill, and there were several items which ougbt pp, and into the administration of the estates of deceased insolvents, the to be reduced. The applicant then went carefully over the bill with him, and bankruptcy rule that a secured creditor could prove only for the balance of reduced certain items to the extent of £5 6s. 6d. Th. debtor then said, his debt alter deducting the value of his security. Therefore his lordship beld “Well, as you have money in hand, you may as well receipt the bill at once, that the priority of the judgment creditor bad not been taken away by and the applicant then debited the cash account with the amount of the bill, section 10, and granted his application.-SOLICITORS, H. Aird; 0. B. and gave him a receipt for the sime, and he thereupon, after going through Wooler ; Cunliffe, Beaumont, d Davenport.

the applicant's ledger, with receipts and disbursements, signed the books as

The applicant stated that the debtor never objected to any of his charges RAILWAY COMPANY-LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION Act, 1845, ss. 63, after they had been settled and agreed to on the 2nd of May, 1881, until 65—Foku OF CONVEYANCE-DAMAGES FOR INJURY DONE AFTER AWARD OF January of the present year, when he applied to the taxing master to tax the ARBITRATORS.—In the case of In re The Swindon, Marlborough, and Andover bill, some other differences having since sprung up between them. The Railway Company, before Chitty, J., on the 24th ult., a motion was made on master gave an appointment for the 26th of January, when a clerk in the bebalf of the company that a proper conveyance might be inade to them of employ of the applicant's solicitor attended before him, and objected to his lands taken by them under their statutory powers, upon payment by them of jurisdiction, on the ground that the matter had long since been disposed of by the sam awarded in respect of purchase.money and compensation by arbitrators agreement, and ultimately the master adjourned tho taxation to allow of an appointed under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. It appeared that application being made to the court. the company having taken possession of the lands in question, had, as was Finlay Knight, for Peach, contended, upon the authority of Ex parte Lyons alleged by the vendors, during the construction of their railway, damaged (L. R. 7 Ch. 494), that when the amount of the receiver's charges had been land belonging to the vendors which was not comprised in the award, and that ascertained by agreement between the parties, this court had no jurisdiction to the vendors bad sent in a claim for a further sum in respect of the damages so order a taxation. caused. The conveyance, as delivered to the vendors, purported to convey the land purcbased by the company “ free from all claims in respect of compensa

Brough, for the debtor, was not heard, tion for damage to be sustained by the owner of the lands and hereditaments by Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY held that he had no jurisdiction to make any order reason of the severing of the same from the other lands of the owner, or other. upon the application. In Ex parte Lyons the debtor had given a bill of sale wise injuriously affecting such other lands." The vendors took the objection outside the liquidation to the receiver, and the Court of Appeal held that the that the insertion of the words "or otherwise" would prejudice their pending Court of Bankruptcy had no jarisdiction to set it aside, but here he was asked claims against the company, and therefore declined to execute the conveyance to say that the debtor was bound by the resolutions and the alleged agreein the form delivered to them. CHITTY, J., observed that the contest was an ment with the receiver. He might review the taxation when the bill had

correct.

as

been taxed, but at present he had no jurisdiction to interfere, and the appli. cation must be dismissed.

SOLICITORS' CASES. Solicitor for the applicant, R. Lomar.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Solicitors for the debtor, Yewdall & Son.

(Sittings in Banc, before MATHEW and Caye, JJ.)

March 27.—Copp v. Lynch and The Law Life Assurance Company.* (Before Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM, acting as Chief Judge.)

Solicitor-Agent-Insurance-Commission-Incapacity of solicitor to ro. March 2.--Ex parte Hall, In re Hall.

ceive commission on Insurance unknown to his client. A creditor who alleged that bis debt had been incurred by fraud, In this case, which was heard on appeal from the judgment of Mr. Com. commenced an action against the debtor after the close of his liguidation, missioner Kerr, the action was brought by Mr. Copp, who is a solicitor and but before he obtained his discharge, to recover the balance of the debt, agent to the Law Life Assurance Company, to recover the commission on after deducting the dividends which the creditor had received.

Thé certain premiums payable in respect of the insurance of the

life of one debtor applied for an injunction to restrain further proceodings in the

Jackson, under the following circumstances:-Jackson &ction.

being indebted to the defendant Lynch, offered security to The court refused the application.

assign to him by way of mortgage a contingent reversionary in.

terest to which he was entitled in the event of his surviving bis This was an application on behalf of William Hall, a debtor, whose affairs father and mother, and it was proposed that, as a further security, he should were under liquidation by arrangernent, for an order that the Imperial Dis- insure his life, and assign the policy to Lynch. Copp, who was Lynch's count Company (Limited) be restrained from further proceeding in an action solicitor, and acting for him in the negotiations with Jaokson, introduced commenced by them against the debtor in the Queen's Bench Division on the Jaokson to the Law Life Assurance Company, and he insured his life with 15th of December, 1881, to recover the sum of £82 0s. 70.

that society. The Law Life Assurance Company are in the babit of paying & On the 8th of May, 1879, the debtor filed his petition for liquidation, and commission on the annual premium to any solicitor who introduces a life, and at the first meeting a resolution was passed by thë statutory majority of the it appears on their prospectuses that assurances may be effected through creditors that his affairs should be liquidated by arrangement, and not in bank- solicitors. Jackson baving been introduced by Copp, the company sent the ruptcy, and trustees were appointed, with a committee of inspection. Such annual demand for the premium on his life assurance to Copp, who forwarded resolution was afterwards registered.

it to Lynch, and he sent Copp a cheque for the amount, and debited Jackson's At the date of the petition the Imperial Discount Company (Limited) were account with himself with such amount. The company having received the creditors of the debtor for the sum of £75, balance of principal money due on premium, which in Jackson's case amounted to £55 5s, 5d., returned to Copp a promissory note for £120, dated January 2, 1879, and the company received his commission thereon, which amounted to £2 159, 3d., but Lynch was dividends amounting to £7 199. 5d. They did not, however, assent to any unaware that Copp received any commission. This course of business having arrangement with the debtor otherwise than by proving their debt and continued for three years, but in the fourth year, owing to some mistake, the accepting dividends. At a general meeting of the creditors held under the demand for the premium was sent to Mr. Lynch, and on his sending his cheque liquidatiou a special resolution was passed that the liquidation should be closed for the amount, the commission was handed back to his messenger. From as from the 31st of December, 1880, but no discharge was granted to the that time Mr. Lynch continued to pay the premiums himself and to receive the debtor.

commission, with the amount of which in each instance he credited Jackson, Oa the 15th of December, 1881, the company commenced an action against and refused to hand it over to Mr. Copp: Mr. Copp brought his action to the debtor in the Queen's Bench Division to recover the sum of £82 0s. 7d., recover the amount of the commission thus received by Lynch. being the balance due, with interest up to that time, after deducting the divi- Lynch in his defence denied his liability, on the ground that Copp dende received by the company. The secretary of the company alleged in was acting as bis solicitor and

agentand counter-claimed for his affidavit that the debt had been incurred by fraud, but the debtor denied this the amount of the commission received by Copp on the premiums to be the case.

paid during the first three years of the insurance. The Law Life Assurance Section 15 of the Debtors Act, 1869, provides that " where a debtor makes Company were added as defendants in the alternative. Mr. Commissioner any arrangement or composition with his creditors under the provisions of Kerr gave judgment for the defendant in the action and on the counter-claim, the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, he shall remain liable for the unpaid balance of and the plaintiff now appealed. any debt which he incurred or increased or whereof, before the date of the Crispe, for Mr. Copp. arrangement or composition, he obtained forbearance by any fraud, provided Tomlinson, for Mr. Lynch. the defranded creditor has not assented to the arrangement or composition J. Clerk, for the Law Life Assurance Society, otherwise than by proving his debl and accepting dividends."

It was admitted in the course of the argument that Mr. Lynch was as a fact Herbert Reed, in support of the application.-Å creditor to whom the debtor unaware that Mr. Copp received any commission on the premium until he is indebted in respect of any proveable debt has no remedy against the prop- discovered it as above. erty or person of the debtor except in the manner directed by the Act : Bank- Crispe, for the plaintiff, urged that Mr. Copp was not acting as Mr. Lynch's ruptoy Act, 1869, s. 12, and by rule 289 he is absolutely restrained from com- solicitor, but as the agent of the assurance company, and that as such he mencing or continuing any proceedings whatever. It is said that the debt was entitled to his commission; that if Jackson had effected the assurance due to the company has been incurred by fraud, still, the debtor_not having himself without the intervention of Copp, the premium payable would have obtained his discharge, the company cannot sue: Ex parte Hemming, Re been the same as now, and no smaller; and referred to the cases of Great Chatterton (28 W.R. 218, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 163); Cobham v, Dalton (23 W. R. Western Insurance Company v. Cunlife (L. R. 9 Ch. 525), and Baring v. 865, L. R. 10 Cb. 655). The only remedy of the company is under section 54, Stanton (25 W.R. 237, L. R. 3 Ch. V, 502). which provides that when a person who bas been made bankrupt has not ob- The Court, however, without calling on the other side, upheld the decision tained his discharge, then, from and after the close of the bankruptcy, of the learned commissioner. In both the cases cited there had been knowno portion of a debt proveable under the bankruptcy shall be enforced against ledge of the fact that the agent received commission, and acquiescence in the the property of the person so made bankrupt until the expiration of three practice by the principal. In the present case Mr. Lynch did not know that years from the close of the bankruptoy.

Mr. Copp received any commission, and therefore the rule of law applied that Israel Davies, for the company. -The liquidation having been closed, the where an agent derives a benefit unknown to his principal, such as this comcompany has a right to proceed for the recovery of a debt inourred by fraud, mission, he must account for it to his principal. It was suggested that if Mr. although the debtor may not have obtained his order of discharge. Property Lynch had himself effected the insurance, be would still have had to pay the aoquired by or devolving apon the bankropt after the close of the liquida. same premiam, and that Mr. Copp was the agent of the company, and not tion cannot be claimed by the trustee : Re Pettitt's Trusts (24 W. R. 359, Mr. Lynch's solicitor, but neither of these contentions were correct. Mr. L. R. 1 Cb. D. 479). Indeed, this is clear from the terms of the 15th section Copp was acting as Mr. Lynch's solioitor, and Mr. Lynch was not aware that apart from any authority. Ex parte Wainwright (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 149), he was acting in any other capacity, and the premiums would be lower if shows the position of the debtor in a case in which the liquidation has not these commissions had not to be allowed for. It might be that Mr. Copp been closed ; and Ebbs v. Boulnois (23 W. R. 820, L. Ř. 10 Ch. 479), assumed that Mr. Lynch was aware of the practice, but, as a matter of fact, it supports my contention. Seotion 15 of the Debtors Aot has no applioation appeared that he was not, and that being so, Mr. Lynch had a good defence to this case. In Ex parte Williams (23 W. R. 790, L. R. 20 Eq. 743), to the action, and was also entitled to succeed upon his counter-claim. Bacoo, O.J., held that the creditors have the same rights against an on. Leave to appeal was refused, the court saying that it was a very clear case, disobarged debtor as against a bankrupt under section 54.

and unless solicitors were desirous of receiving these commissions without their Reed, in reply.

client's knowledge, there could be no reason for an appeal. Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM said that for the purposes of the argument Solicitors, 4. E. Copp; West, King, Adams, f Co.; Bockit & Son. fraud was admitted, and it was also admitted that the liquidation had been closed as from the 31st of December, 1880. . It was contended that the only

(Sittings in Banc, before GROVE, J., and HUDDLESTON, B.) romedy of the creditor was under section 54, but in this case the debt would

March 27.-In the Matter of E. D. Lewis, a Solicitor. not be barred by the order of discharge. In Cobham v. Dalton, James, L.J., said that “when the order of disobargo had been obtained, or the bank.

G. Candy argued on behalf of the appellant. roptoy had been olosed, the right of creditors whose debts were not barred

Stone argued in support of the order of the learned judge. as to the fatore assets acorued, the creditors whose debts were barred chambers, under the following circumstances :-One, W. W. Maitland, was

This was an appeal from an order made by Mr. Justioe Ford North, in having lost all remedy." The debt of the company was not barred, and charged with perjury at Bow-street, and a Mrs. Heath, on his behalf, entered Cobham v. Dalton was conolosive apon the point. He would be bound to into an agreement in writing with Mr. E. D. Lewis, a solicitor, the respond. follow Ex parte Williams, but he thought Ex parte Hemming more applicable, ent, by which she retained him to act for Maitland at the police-court only, beganse Ex parte Williams only applied to creditors whose debts were barred. The application would be refased, and the costs must follow the charge five guineas for each attendance at the police-court, and one

and paid him fifty guineas down on account, authorizing him expressly to event.

guinea for each conference with Maitland, in addition to his ordinary Solicitors for the debtor, Reed, Lovell, & Reed. Solicitor for the company, E, H, Adcock.

* Reported by F. H. WILSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

charge. There were five attendances at the police-court, and Mait. land was committed for trial. Thereupon Maitland retained Mr. Lewis to defend him at the Old Bailey; but he had then little or no means. Immedi

OBITUARY. ately before the trial was coming on, on February 28, Maitland had an interview with the respondent; and the question now in dispute was as to the effect of what then took place, as the result of the interview. Maitland being

MR. WILLIAM BULKELEY HUGHES, M.P. unable to raise any more casb, went to another firm of solicitors, who thereupon Mr. William Bulkeley Hughes, barrister, M.P., died at his residence, Plasapplied at cbambers for an order on Mr. Lewis to deliver up the papers in his coch, Anglesea, on the 8th ult., after a long illness, in his eighty-fifth year. possession necessary for Maitland's defence, an undertaking being given to He was the eldest son of Sir William Bulkeley Hughes, knight, and he 19 return them twelve days after the trial. An application to the master was born in 1797, and was educated at Harrow. He was called to the bar at made, and an order for such delivery was drawn up, and the trial was post- Lincoln's-inn in 1824, and practised for some time on the Oxford Circuit. In poned. From this order Mr. Lewis appealed to the judge, and Mr. Justice 1836 he succeeded to the family estates in Anglesea and Carnarvonshire, and North rescinded the master's order, saying that Mr. Lewis was quite right to in the following year he was elected M.P. for the Carnarvon Boroughs in retain the papers, and that his lien thereon was not lost. The matter then the Liberal interest. He held the seat till the general election of 1859, when came before Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Baron Huddleston on March 9; and, he was an unsuccessful candidate. Mr. Hughes bad supported the Govern. after argument, it was referred to Master Mellor to find certain facts. The ment and party of the late Sir Robert Peel, but in 1865 he was returned for master found inter alia) that on February 28 Maitland reasonably believed Caroarvon in the Liberal interest, and held the seat until his death. that unless he brought the respondent £25 or £30 more before a given time He was the oldest member of the House of Commons, although (not having the respondent wonld cease to act for him either in applying for a postpone sat continuously) he was not considered "the father of the House." He was ment of the trial or in delivering a brief to counsel to defend ; and that it a magistrate for Anglesea and Carnarvonshire, having been high sheriff of the was arranged with him that Maitland should go away to raise that sum among former county in 1861. his friends. In fact, he did not succeed, and instead of returning to tell Mr. Lewis so, he retained other, his present, solicitors. After a discussion, The Court allowed the appeal, with costs, saying that Mr. Justice North's

MR. WILLIAM JOHN BOVILL, Q.C. order could not be supported.

Mr. William John Bovill, Q.C., died at Bath, on the 3rd ult., in his seventyOrder made in terms prayed for in conformity with the master's order.- second year. Mr. Bovill was born in 1810. He was called to the bar at Times.

Lincoln's-ion in Hilary Term, 1847, and for several years he had a good

junior practice in the Court of Chancery. He became a Queen's Counsel in (Sittings in Banc, before MANISTY and STEPHEN, JJ.)

1872, when he elected to practise in tbe Rolls Court, but he bad for some time March 28.-- In the Matter of William Unwin,

retired from the active duties of his profession. The deceased was a bench:r This was an application on the part of William Unwin, at one time a soli. of Lincoln's-inn. citor in Sheffield, but who had been struck off the rolls in 1869, to be restored to the roll of solicitors. Digby Seymour, Q.C., and Waddy, Q.C., appeared for Mr. Unwia.

MR. THOMAS HACKE NAYLOR, Wills, Q.C., and Murray, appeared on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society,

Mr. Thomas Hacke Naylor, barrister, recorder of Sudbury, died at his who opposed the application.

residence, Hill House, Chesterton, Cambridge, on the 3rd ult., in his seventyIt appeared that Mr. Unwin had been in practice as a solicitor for thirty-fourth year. Mr. Naylor was the son of Mr. Thomas Naylor, of Carisbrook, three years, when in 1868 he was 'convicted before the late Lord Justice Lush, Isle of Wight, and was born in 1808. He was educated at Queen's College, at the Leeds Assizes, of a bankruptcy misdemeanor, and was sentenced to Cambridge, where he graduated B.A. in 1839. He was called to the bar at nine months imprisonment. Since then he had made three separate applica- the Inner Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1841, and he was a member of the tions to be restored to his former position—rst in 1872 to Lord Romilly, thon old Norfolk Circuit, practising also at the Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Master of the Rolls, and, later, in 1872 and 1875 to the Queen's Bench Divi: Peterborough, Ely, and Bary St. Edmunds Sessions. Mr. Naylor had sion. On the first of these last two occasions, among the grounds which formerly a very extensive criminal business on circuit and at sessions, and were given for refusing the application, the learned judges stated that the practised locally at Cambridge and in the various county courts in the district; petition was, in their opinion, made too soon, and they held out hopes that if but he bad, within the last two or three years, retired. He was a magistrate Mr. Unwin's conduct continued praiseworthy and he chose to renew his for the borough of Cambridge, and he had been recorder of the borough of application, there was a prospect that it might be granted. It was upon this Sudbury since 1965. He took an active part in municipal life at Cambridge. ground chiefly that his learned counsel now relied in pressing his claims He was an alderman for the borough, and he had twice gerred the offi se of before the court, and their position was strengthened by numerous affidavits

mayor. by Mr. Unwin's fellow.townsmen in Sheffield testifying to his good behaviour since he had served his sentence. Wills, on the other hand, for the Law Society, said he was instructed to

MR. WILLIAM CHARLES CRIPPS. oppose the application on the principle that where once a solicitor had been re

Mr. William Charles Cripps, solicitor, died at Tunbridge Wells on the 22nd of moved from the rolls in consequence of a criminal conviction such a decree February. Mr. Cripps was born in 1831. He served his articles with Messrs. should be regarded as absolute and final, and not to be affected by any subse- Carnell & Gorham, of Tunbridge, and he was admitted a solicitor in 1852. He had quent contrition or good conduct on the part of the offender.

practised for nearly thirty years at Tunbridge

Wells, and had been for over four At the conclusion of the argument, which lasted the greater part of the day, geare in partnership with his eldest son, Mr. William Charles Cripps, jun., who the learned judges retired for a short time to consider their judgment. On was admitted a solicitor in 1877. He was a perpetual commissioner for the their return into court,

counties of Kent and Sussex, and he had a very large private practice. Since MANISTY, J., said the case before them was one exciting both sympathy and 1873 he had been registrar of the Tunbridge Wello County Court (Circuit pain. The position of a solicitor was one of the highest responsibility, and it No. 48), and he was solicitor to the Tunbridge Wells Local Board, and also was in his power to be the instrument of good or evil to an inconceivable to the Tunbridge Wells Freehold Land acd Building Society. Mr. Cripps extent. As a profession, solicitors stood deservedly high as men of honour and

was at the time of his death president of the Kent Law Society. He leaves a integrity, bat cases from time to time arose which brought them under the widow, two sons, and two daughters. He was buried at the Tunbridge Wells jarisdiction of this court for crimes and offences with which they were Cemetery on the 27th olt. charged. It was impossible to lay down any general rule in dealing with such cases, and nothing was more difficult than to adjust with exactness the degree of punishment which in different cases had to be inflicted for different offences.

MR. JOSEPH CATTERALL. There were people who seemed only too ready to cavil at the

Mr. Joseph Catterall, barrister, formerly recorder of Wigan, died at judges in these matters, but if these

persons

could appreciate Fleetwood on the 6th ult. Mr. Catterall was the son of Mr. Paul the difficulties whicb the judges had to deal with they would Catterall, of Preston, and was born in 1812. He was educated at the probably be less eager to condemn. For present parposes, however, it was

University of Gottingen, and was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in sufficient to say that, while extreme cases, such as perjary or forgery, ought Easter Term, 1845. He was formerly a member of the Northern Circuit, never to be remitted against solioitors who bad been struck off the rolls, a practising also locally at Preston as a conveyancer. He was for many years more lenient view might be entertained of lesser offences, baviog regard to one of the registrars of the Chancery Court of Lancaster, and from 1862 till the circumstances of each oase. In the present matter he had been greatly 1876 he was Recorder of the borough of Wigan. Mr. Catterall was married led to the conolasion at which he had arrived by what had fallen from the to a daughter of the late Mr. James Stark, bnt he had been for several years judges of the Queen's Benoh when they refused the application of Mr. Uawin A widower. He was buried in his family vault at Fleetwood on the 9th in 1872. The language of those judgments seemed to hold out a hope to inst. Mr. Uowin in the fature, and the court would virtually not be keeping faith with him now if, having regard to the affidavits which had been read pointing to his excellent condoot sinoe, they again refused the application.

SIR JOHN NODES DICKINSON. In his judgment the petition, therefore, shoald be granted, and Mr. Unwin Sir John Nodes Dickinson, knight, died at Rome on the 16th ult., at the restored to the roll of solioitors.

age of seventy-five. Sir J. Dickinson was the son of Mr. Nodes Dickinson, STEPHEN, J., delivered judgment to the same effect, and, dealing in the Staff Surgeon of the Forces, and was born in 1806. He was educated at course of his remarks with certain admissions of Mr. Unwin that he had Caius College, Cambridge, where he graduated as a senior optime in 1829. made use of olients' money on different occasions, which he extenuated by He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1840. He Baying was a common practice, the learned judge said it conld not be too was appointed a puisne judge of the Supreme Court of the colony of New widely known that, when a solicitor is intrusted with bis client's money, he South Wales in 1844. He acted for some time as Chief Justica of the colony, has no business whatever to mix it up with his own, and that, by doing any and in 1860 he received the honour of knighthood. He retired on a pension such thing he takes the first step in a course which may lead to absolute several years ago. Sir J. Dickinson was married to the daughter of the late rain,-Times,

Captain Jauncey, R.N.

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