Sheffield's £5,000 on his death without issue. The applicant urged that it was contrary to the practice of the Court of Chancery to make a prospective declaration of rights to arise at a future time, and that, on the true construction of the testator's will, the words "surviving children" of the testator meant children living at the death of Edward Sheffield, and not, as the ViceChancellor had decided, children living at the date of the testator's own death. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L. JJ.) refused the application. JESSEL, M.R., said that the application was made to the discretion of the court, and it was made under circumstances which he thought could never have occurred before. In 1836 Vice-Chancellor Shadwell made certain declarations of right with regard to seven legacies given by the testator's will. He declared the rights of the persons who were entitled to present interests, and he also made declarations of future rights after the deaths of the respective tenants for life. The declarations were made in the presence of all the testator's children, who appeared to have been then of full age and to have been represented by counsel. Subject to a technical rule, there was no more objection to the question being decided then than now. The technicality was of the barest kind-that is, it was not the practice of the Court of Chancery to decide as to future rights, but it was the practice to wait until the event happened on which those rights would arise, unless some special circumstance, such as the fact that some present right depended on the decision, rendered it desirable that the question should be decided at once. But, if all the persons who could possibly be interested in any event were of full age, and were before the court, the reason for the rule ceased. The reason was that the court would not decide if it did not know who were the persons who might become entitled on the happening of the future event; so that they could not be represented before the court. But, in a case like the present, the rule was the barest technicality: the number of the persons interested in the fund might diminish, but it could not increase. Whether there were any special circumstances which led to the declaration of future rights one could not now tell. On the face of the order, without knowing more of the circumstances, it could not be said that the order was not right. The next point, and it was one of a most serious character, was this:-After what time were people entitled to rely on the judgment of a competent tribunal as to their right to property? A great change of opinion on this question had taken place in recent times. It was now thought most important that the right to property under the decision of a competent tribunal, if it was to be questioned at all, should be questioned at once. Formerly there was no limit of time for the bringing of an appeal. Then the practice sprang up of not allowing a re-hearing after the expiration of twenty years. That practice was afterwards embodied in a general order of the Court of Chancery. By a subsequent general order the twenty years was cut down to five. By the Judicature Rules the time was again cut down to one year. The rights of persons were fixed after the expiration of one year, unless, under special circumstances, special leave to appeal was given by the Court of Appeal. Formerly, the judges were much more ready than now to listen to a demand for a re-hearing after the expiration of the twenty years, and circumstances were then considered special which would not be so considered now. Since the Judicature Act this rule had been laid down, that in general the court would not allow an appeal after the expiration of the time, unless the respondent had done something to create an equity against him. What, then, was the case of the present applicant? He said that the order of 1836 was wrong, because the court had given a wrong meaning to the word "surviving.' That was a word the construction of which had perhaps caused more difference of opinion among judges than any other word in the English language. There was no hard and fast rule as to its construction; it was a question as to the meaning of the whole will. There might possibly have been some other passage in the will which led the Vice-Chancellor to depart from the ordinary construction of the word. The applicant was now the sole survivor of the testator's seven children-that is to say, he took his chance during forty-six years of dying during the life of the tenant for life, in which event his estate would have been augmented by the Vice-Chancellor's order as it stood, and now, having had that advantage for forty-six years, the event having happened in his favour, he wanted to have the order altered. This was a special circumstance adverse to allowing an appeal. The cases of Brandon v. Brandon (8 D. M. & G. 365), and Walmsley v. Foxhall (1 D. J. & S. 451), which had been relied on, were entirely different from the present case. In the former there was an obvious error in the decree. In the latter there had been a declaration of future rights in the decree, but the proper persons to argue the question had not been before the court. In the present case everyone who by any possibility could be entitled was of age and was before the court. Moreover, there the applicant came to the court only four years after the expiration of the time. Here he came forty-five years after. It would be an outrageous exercise of the discretion of the court to grant the present application. COTTON, L.J., and LINDLEY, L.J., concurred.-SOLICITORS, Henderson & Buckle; Loxley & Morley.

WITNESS-RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ANSWER-ANSWER TENDING TO CRIMINATE-DISCRETION OF JUDGE.-In a case of Ex parte Reynolds, before the Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., the question arose whether, when a witness under examination declines to answer a question, on the ground that his answer might tend to criminate himself, he is to be the sole judge whether he will answer, or whether he can be excused from answering only if the judge is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for apprehending danger to the witness if he should answer. The examination in the present case was of a witness who had been summoned for examination by the trustee in a bankruptcy, under section 96 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The witness refused to answer a number of questions, on the ground that his answer might tend to criminate himself. The registrar referred the matter to the Chief Judge, who held that the witness must answer, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and CorrON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that there were several dicta on the point, and there was one decision in 1861

He

of the Court of Queen's Bench (consisting of Cockburn, C.J., and Crompton, Hill, and Blackburn, JJ.), in The Queen v. Boyes (1 B. & S. 311). The judgment of the court was delivered by Cockburn, C.J., and he said:-"We are clearly of opinion that to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer. We, indeed, quite agree that, if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question, there being no doubt, as observed by Alderson, B., in Osborn v. The London Dock Company (10 Ex. 698, 701), that a question, which might appear at first sight a very innocent one, might, by affording a link in a chain of evidence, become the means of bringing home an offence to the party answering. Subject to this reservation, a judge is, in our opinion, bound to insist on a witness answering, unless he is satisfied that the answer will tend to place the witness in peril.” That decision was not technically binding on this court, but the Master of the Rolls said that he should differ from it with very great hesitation. thought it stated the law correctly, and that, if it was necessary for this court to affirm it, they would be acting well and wisely in so doing. The rule was stated in the same way in the standard works on Evidence of Mr. Best, Mr. Phillips, and Mr. Pitt Taylor, who also pointed out that, if a witness was allowed to escape from answering on his own mere statement that his answer might tend to criminate himself, this would always enable a witness friendly to an accused person to decline to give any evidence at all-an evil so great as to outweigh the possibility that sometimes the compelling a witness to answer might assist in convicting him of a crime out of his own mouth. And even those judges who had entertained the opposite view, that the statement of the belief of the witness, that his answer would tend to criminate him, was to be received as conclusive, had always said that there was an exception in the case of manifest mala fides on the part of the witness. In the present case his lordship believed that the witness had declined to answer merely because be did not wish afford any assistance to the creditors of the bankrupt. He must, therefore, answer the questions, though, of course, he would still be entitled to object to answer any particular question which would obviously tend to criminate him, or which, in the opinion of the judge, would reasonably tend to do COTTON, L.J., said that he adhered to the decision in The Queen v. Boyes. LINDLEY, L.J., said that he had always regarded the point as settled by The Queen v. Boyes. The rule was settled twenty years ago, and this court ought not to disturb it.—SOLICITORS, G. S. & H. Brandon; Bellamy, Strong, & Baker.

So.

TRESPASS-NUISANCE-OBSTRUCTION ON LAND-CAUSE OF ACTION-REVERSIONER-WEEKLY TENANT.-On the 17th inst., the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision of Fry, J., in the case of Cooper v. Crabtree (ante, p. 110, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 193). The defendant, whose land immediately adjoined that of the plaintiff, had erected a hoarding on poles, for the purpose of preventing the access of light to a window in a cottage which stood on the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff alleged that the poles had been improperly placed on his land; the defendant said that they stood on his own land. The plaintiff also alleged that the hoarding made a rattling and creaking, and that it caused an intolerable nuisance to himself and his tenant. And he claimed an injunction to restrain the trespass, and, in any event, an injunction to restrain the nuisance, and also damages. The tenant of the cottage, who was only a weekly tenant, gave evidence of the nuisance to himself and his family, bat the plaintiff adduced no evidence of injury to the reversion. Fry, J., said that a reversioner could not maintain an action of trespass; such an action could be maintained only by a person who was in the actual possession of land. A reversioner might maintain an action in the nature of an action on the case in respect of an entry on his land, or a nuisance. But then he must show either an actual injury to the reversion, or that the act complained of was of such a permanent character that it must necessarily injure the reversion. Neither of these things bad been shown, and therefore the action must be dismissed. On the hearing of the appeal the case of nuisance was abandoned, and the plaintiff relied solely on the alleged trespass. And the court affirmed the decision of Fry, J., on substantially the same ground.—SOLICITORS, Jaques & Layton; Williamson, Hill, & Co.

ACTION OF DECEIT-MISREPRESENTATION-ONUS OF PROOF-PROSPECTUS the 17th inst., the action was brought by a shareholder in a company to recover OF COMPANY. In a case of Smith v. Chadwick, before the Court of Appeal on damages from some financial agents, who had been employed to bring out the company, on the ground that the plaintiff had been induced to subscribe for shares by fraudulent representations contained in a prospectus issued by the defendants. Fry, J., had decided in the plaintiff's favour, but his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that the action was brought to recover damages from the defendants for inducing the plaintiff to take shares in the company by means of false and fraudulent representations--that is, by means of representations which were material to induce him to take the shares, and which were either false to the knowledge of the defendants, or were made by them so recklessly without knowledge of the facts that in a court of law they would stand in the same position as if the statements had been false to their knowledge. The questions, therefore, were whether any such representations had been made by the defendants to the plaintiff, whether they were false to the know. ledge of the defendante, or were made by them so recklessly that they were equally liable, and whether the representations were material to induce the plaintiff to take the shares. The law on the subject was clear. A man might issue a prospectus containing statements which he believed to be true, but, if he had made them recklessly, without inquiry, he would not be allowed to escape merely because he had good intentions. If the statements were such

that the court could see that they were material to induce the plaintiff to act on them, it would be assumed that he did act on them. It might be shown that he did not rely on them, by showing either that he knew all the facts, or that he had bound himself in some way not to rely on them, but to take the risk himself, or he might have s'ated that, in fact, he did not rely on them. But, if it was not shown in one of these ways that the plaintiff did not rely on representations which were material, the assumption was that he did rely on them. There might be cases in which it was not obvious what the meaning of the statements was. If a statement was so ambiguous that the court could not tell what it meant, the plaintiff must tell the court what he did rely on, in what sense he understood the statement. It would not do for him to say, "I relied on the statement in the prospectus whatever its meaning might be. Find out the meaning for me." He might have thought it had quire a different meaning from that which the court gave to it. Again, the defendant in an action for deceit would be excused if he had reasonable ground for believing the statement which he had made to be true, and, moreover, a mis-statement might be so trivial as to give no ground for an action. Here the plaintiff said he understood the statements in the prospectus to mean what the words composing them obviously conveyed, and that he was unable to express in any other words what he understood to be their meaning. That was not dealing fairly with the court nor with the defendants. He was not entitled to say he relied on the representations, but to refuse to tell what was the meaning he put upon them was.

One of the alleged misrepresentations was that the prospectus had stated the name of a person as a director of the company when he had, in fact, withdrawn his name. JESSEL, M.R., said that no doubt the directors were an important element in forming a judgment as to whether a man would take shares in a company, but then he must know something about them. There might be, of course, names so well known that the court could come to the conclusion that the name of even one director might influence people in joining the company. For instance, it would be an obvious inducement in the case of a new bank if the chief partner in Rothschilds' was on the list of directors. But, if the public were told that Jones, of the New eut, or Robinson of Ratcliff-highway, were directors, that alone would not do. Still, if the plaintiff said that Jones or Robinson was his great friend, that be had always followed his advice, and that it was his name which had induced him to take shares, that would be enough. In the absence of such evidence it was impossible to support an action of deceit on the ground that one man who had consented to become a director, but had withdrawn, bad wrongly been put on the list of directors.

Another alleged misrepresentation was that the purchase-money to be given for the business which the company was to acquire was, as stated in the prospectus, to be paid partly in cash and partly in paid-up shares, and the cash was to be paid by instalments, but the prospectus did not state, what was the fact, that the instalments were to bear interest. JESSEL, M. R., said that this was a mere omission. If a man stated falsely the contents of a written document, he could not escape by saying be had offered to show the document. But, if he only stated part of the contents, and said the whole was in a document open to be inspected, it was different. The common case of a lease with restrictive covenants might be taken. A vendor might properly state some of the covenants of a lease, and say nothing about a restrictive covenant against carrying on a trade; but, on the other hand, it would be wrong for him to say there was no restrictive covenant. In the present case the plaintiff was not entitled to complain. Fry, J., had relied on the language of Lord Cairns in Peek v. Gurney (L. R. 6 H. L. 403), "There must, in my opinion, be some active mis-statement of fact, or, at all events, such a partial and fragmentary statement of fact as that the withholding of that which is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false." Here the statement was absolutely true. What Lord Cairns referred to was a case where what was concealed cut down what was stated, as, for instance, if a vendor said he had an estate in fee, concealing the fact that it was leased; for an estate in fee alone would mean an estate in possession, so that to state it as an estate in fee alone would be absolutely false. And JESSEL, M.R., cited with approval the words of Turner, L.J., in Jennings v. Broughton (5 De G. M. & G. 140), "Although I think it is the undoubted duty of this court to relieve persons who have been deceived by false representations, it is equally the duty of this court to be careful that, in its anxiety to correct frauds, it does not enable persons who have joined with others in speculations to convert their speculations into certainties at the expense of those with whom they have joined." COTTON, L.J., said that the action was in the nature of a simple common law action of deceit, and it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the misrepresentations had been made by the defendants with knowledge or recklessly, and also that he was deceived by them, and induced to act upon them to his prejudice, upon which prejudice he claimed damages. A mere omission, unless it made the whole statement untrue, was not enough to support an action of deceit. There being some doubt as to the meaning of the prospectus, the plaintiff ought to have stated in what sense he took it. His lordship referred to what he said in Arkwright v. Newbold (17 Ch. D., p. 324), "In my opinion it would not be right in an action of deceit to give a plaintiff relief on the ground that a particular statement, according to the construction put on it by the coart, is false, when the plaintiff does not venture to swear that he understood the statement in the sense which the court puts on it. If he did not, then, even if that construction may have been falsified by the facts, he was not deceived." LINDLEY, L.J., said that the plaintiff, in effect, said he had taken shares on the faith of the prospectus, and wanted the court to spell out what was material and what had misled him. That was for him to do.-SOLICITORS, Darley & Cumberland; Ashurst, Morris, & Co.

PRACTICE-APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER-ABSENCE OF OWNER OF LEGAL ESTATE JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 25, SUB-SECTIONS 5, 8.-In a case of Berry v. Keen, before the Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., an appeal was

brought from an order appointing a receiver of the rents of land which the plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed to be beneficially entitled to the land under a will, and they alleged that the defendants were in possession without any title whatever. The legal estate was outstanding in some mortgagees of the testator. The appointment of a receiver was objected to on the ground that it had been made in the absence of the owners of the legal estate, reliance being placed on Dunn v. Ferrier (16 W. R. 922, L. R. 3 Ch. 719). The court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal. JESSEL, M. R., said that section 25 of the Judicature Act was intended to do away with such decisions as Dunn v. Ferrier. Under the present practice a receiver of the rents of land could, in a proper case, be appointed in the absence of the owner of the legal estate.— SOLICITORS, Brook & Chapman; G. E. Carpenter.

LEASE AGREEMENT - FORFEITURE

- PROVISO FOR RE-ENTRY-ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 25.-In a case of The Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851 v. The Royal Horticultural Society, before the Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., the action was brought to recover the possession of land which the plaintiffs had, by an agreement in writing, agreed to demise to the defendants, on the ground that the plaintiffs were entitled to re-enter under the terms of a proviso for re-entry contained in the agreement. No lease had been executed. Fry, J., held, on the construction of the agreement, that no breach had happened entitling the plaintiffs to re-enter. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L. JJ.) reversed the decision. And JESSEL, M.R., observed that since the Judicature Act the effect of a holding under an agreement for a lease is the same at law as in equity. In such a case now, both at law and in equity, the tenant holds under the agreement, and is not simply, as he was formerly at law, a tenant from year to year. The result is that in every court he is now liable to be ejected, if he would have been liable to be ejected supposing that a lease had been actually granted in pursuance of the agreement. And now a mortgagor could maintain an action to recover possession of land, though the legal estate was outstanding in the mortgagee. -SOLICITORS, Fladgate, Smith, & Fladgate; Webb, Stock, & Burt.

APPEAL-EXTENSION OF TIME-EX PARTE APPLICATION-FORM OF NOTICE OF MOTION-ORD. 58, R. 15.—In a case of Berry v. Gawkroger, before the Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., an application was made ex parte for leave to serve a notice of motion for leave to appeal from the order made on the further consideration of the action, notwithstanding the expiration of the time for appealing, on the ground that there was on the face of the order an evident error which bad only recently been observed. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) at first expressed some doubt whether such an application should be made ex parte. But ultimately they gave leave to serve the postponed notice of motion, and to include in it a notice of appeal from the order on further consideration, in case the leave to appeal should be granted, and the court said that the notice might also include a notice of a motion to vary the chief clerk's certificate, upon the footing of which the order on further consideration had been made.-SOLICITORS, Peace & Co.; Williamson, Hill, & Co.

PRACTICE-MODE OF TRIAL-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO JURY-ORD. 36, RR. 3, 26.—In a case of Clarke v. Skipper, before Fry, J., on the 13th inst., a formerly a chancery action, to have the issues of fact tried by a jury. The question arose as to the right of a defendant, in what would have been action was brought to restrain the commission of an alleged nuisance by noise. The writ was issued on the 7th of January, and on the 2nd of February a by Fry, J. The plaintiffs' counsel then proposed that the motion should motion by the plaintiffs for an interlocutory injunction came on to be heard stand over to the trial of the action, with liberty to the plaintiffs to apply to expedite the trial when the parties should be ready. This was assented to by both sides delivered their pleadings, the plaintiffs' reply being delivered on the defendants' counsel, and an order to that effect was made. After this the 2nd of March, and on the same day the plaintiffs gave notice of trial of the plaintiffs, under rule 3, that they desired to have the issues of fact tried the action before Fry, J. On the 6th of March the defendants gave notice to withstanding the plaintiffs' notice of trial, the issues of fact might be tried before a judge and jury, and they afterwards moved before Fry, J., that, notbefore a judge and jury, pursuant to the defendants' notice. The plaintiffs opposed the application, urging (inter alia) that what took place on the 2nd of February amounted to a bargain between the parties that the trial should be before a judge alone, and that, if the application was granted, the plaintiff's Would lose the advantage of having the trial expedited, for which they had given up their application for an immediate interlocutory injunction. FRY, J., however, granted the defendants' application. He said that the action was defendants by rule 3, subject to the discretion of the court. one which fell within rule 26, which made the right to a jury, given to the His lordship was of opinion, both on the construction of the rules and on the decisions, that the defendant had a prima facie right to a jury; in other words, that the jury rested on the plaintiff. And his lordship was of opinion that what took burden of showing that the court ought to exercise its discretion in refusing a place on the 2nd of February did not amount to any bargain between the parties as to the mode of trial. It was for the plaintiffs to make the application which they then made, but it was for the court to decide whether it ought to be granted, and though the assent of the defendants' counsel facilitated the decision, yet it was not a material element in inducing the plaintiff's to shape their course. The plaintiffs had not shown any sufficient ground for depriving the defendants of their prima facie right to a jury. If necessary the plaintiffs could now move for an interlocutory injunction.SOLICITORS, Vandercom, Hardy, & Oatway'; Wilkins, Blyth, & Dutton.

ADMINISTRATION ACTION-SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR ACCOUNT-WILFUL DEFAULT-DISTRICT REGISTRAR-JURISDICTION ACCOUNTS · FORM OF REPORT-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, ss. 64, 66-ORD. 3, R. 8- ORD. 15, R. 1-ORD. 35, RR. 1A, 4. In a case of Bennett v. Bowen, before Fry, J., on the 18th inst., the question arose whether an account against an executor on the footing of wilful default is an 66 ordinary account," within the meaning of rule 8 of order 3, so that a summary judgment for such an account, in default of appearance of a defendant executor, can be given under rule 1 of order 15. FRY, J., said that it was perhaps not very easy to draw the border line as to the accounts which were meant to come within rule 8 of order 3, but, baving regard to the broad distinction which had always existed between an account against an executor where wilful default was alleged and proved, and an account where there was no such allegation or proof, he could not hold that an account on the footing of wilful default was an ་་ ordinary account." Therefore a summary judgment for such an account could not be given under rule 1 of order 15. There was the further question whether a district registrar has power to make a summary order for an account in a case which properly falls within rule 8 of order 3, and rule 1 of order 15. FRY, J., held that, by virtue of rule la of order 35, and rule 4 of the same order, which provides that where an action proceeds in a district registry, the district registrar may exercise all such authority and jurisdiction in respect of the action as may be exercised by a judge at chambers," a district registrar has power to make such a summary order. His lordship also held, following the decision of Hall, V.C., in In re Smith (25 W. R. 452, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 692), that, if the judgment directs that the accounts which it orders to be taken shall be taken in the district registry (but not otherwise), the accounts can be taken there. His lordship also said that the report made by a district registrar to the court of the result of the accounts which he has taken ought to be in the form of a chief clerk's certificate, showing on the face of it the materials upon which the registrar has proceeded, and the persons who were represented before him.-SOLICITORS, H. Keeble; Robert Carter.

-

WILL-ATTESTATION-ACKNOWLEDGMENT-REQUEST BY THIRD PERSON. In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on the 21st inst., a motion was made (In the Goods of Bishop) for probate of a will under the following circumstances :-The will was prepared by the person whom the testator had named as executor, and was duly executed in the presence of the executor and of the wife of the latter. The executor immediately afterwards sent for two other persons, who, in the hearing of the testator, he requested to attest the will. They accordingly signed their names as witnesses, and on their leaving the room the testator thanked them for what they had done. HANNEN, P., held that there had been a due acknowledgment of the testator's signature to the attesting witnesses, on the authority of Inglesant v. Inglesant (L. R. 3 P. D. 172). In that case the testatrix had herself sent for the attesting witnesses, but in the present case, although another person had sent for them, the request for their signature was made in the presence and hearing of the testator, and he afterwards thanked them for signing the | will. It must, therefore, be inferred that he understood what was done, and the will would be admitted to probate.-SOLICITOR, Sealy.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.
(Before NORTH, J., at Chambers.)

March 9.-Edwards v. Mallam; Kelsey, claimant.

This was an interpleader summons which came on for hearing before Mr. Justice North, sitting at chambers, and involved a decision upon a point of considerable practical importance. The facts, as to which there was no dispute, were as follows :-The defendant was a tailor at Faroham, in Surrey, and on February 16 last, being in difficulties, he executed a deed by which he assigned all his property to the claimant, W. Kelsey, as trustee for realization and distribution among such of his creditors as should be willing to execute and take the benefit of the deed and release him from the debts due to them. On the same day, February 16, the claimant took possession of the property included in the deed of assignment, and he remained in possession until March 2, when the sheriff of Surrey seized under a fi. fa. in execution of a judgment obtained by the plaintiff. The claimant thereupon produced the deed of assignment, but the sheriff refused to withdraw, upon the ground, as the fact was, that the deed had not been executed by the claimant or any of the creditors. On March 4 the claimant executed it as trustee, and also as a creditor, the sheriff having taken out the usual interpleader summons. At the hearing,

J. C. Earle, for the claimant, urged that the case was governed by the decision in Siggers v. Evans (24 L. J. Q. B. 305), and that the property passed under the deed so soon as it was communicated to and assented to by the claimant, who, being a creditor, could not be said to be a mere agent of Lush-Wilson, for the plaintiff, relied upon the fact that at the time of the levy the deed did not appear to have been assented to by any of the creditors, and contended that the case cited was not now law.

the defendant.

NORTH, J., however, was of opinion that this case was governed by that of Siggers. Evans, and that as the claimant was a creditor, and so a beneficiary under the deed, the deed was not revocable by the defendant after the claimant had unequivocally shown his assent to it, and he, therefore, allowed the claim.

Solicitor for the plaintiff, William Morley.
Solicitor for the claimant, William Sturt.
Solicitors for the sheriff, Abbott, Jenkins, & Co.

SOLICITORS' CASES.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Sittings in Bane, before GROVE, J., and HUDDLESTON, B.)
March 22.-In re W. H. Brown, Solicitor.

Alfred Wills, Q.C., and W. Murray, appeared for the Incorporated Law

Society in support of the rule.

G. Sills appeared for the defendant to show cause.

1881, and he made the following report thereon after hearing the evidence This matter was referred to Master Brewer by an order of November 22, adduced and reading the affidavits :-"First, that in August, 1877, the de£1,139 7s. 5d. for investment, but instead of investing it he wilfully leat fendant received from the bankers of one Francis Hill, administatrix, and misapplied it in his own name, together with £360 12s. 7d., making £1,500, without any security whatever, to J. H. Bryan; and afterwards, in January, 1878, the affairs of the defendant went into liquidation, and J. H. Bryan afterwards repaid the whole of the £1.500 to the trustee under that liquidation, and Mrs. Hill thereby has lost £1,139 78. 5d. Secondly, that the defendant by misrepresentation and concealment on July 20, 1877, obtained from Mrs. Hill a power of attorney for the transfer and sale of £2,000 worth of stock in the New Three per Cent. Consols, standing in the name of Thomas Hill, deceased, by which the defendant on July 26 sold them and received the proceeds thereof (£2,000), and wilfully and corruptly misapplied them, amounting to £1,896 18s. 6d., by paying these proceeds into his banking account with the Leicestershire Bank; and at the time of the payment the defendant's account was overdrawn to the extent of £7,635, which the defendant well knew. Thirdly, that in 1870 the defendant received for one Mary Pridmore £2,500 to be placed out on mortgage; and the defendant informed her that he had fo placed it, whereas in truth and fact the defendant never placed it on mortgage at all, but appropriated it to his own use, and never informed her of it, and she has lost that sum. Fourthly, that one Samuel Stokes died in 1873, and appointed Richard Greaves and the defendant trustees under his will, and the defendant as such trustee received for the estate £4,025 10s. 3d. after Stokes's death, and before 1875; but the defendant has in no way accounted for that sum or any part of it, but has applied the same to his own use. Richard Greaves, the co-trustee, has filed an affidavit, in which he says, I do not blame the defendant, or make any complaint against him.' Fifthly, that the defendant received from J. C. Sowerby, about eighteen months before the defendant's liquidation, £8,000 to pay off a mortgage; but he neglected and failed to pay it off, and has applied the same to his own use. There has been a dividend of 5s, in the pound paid on all these sums, which amount to £17,561 58. 11d." It appeared that Mr. Brown was tried in London in the Court of Queen's Bench before Mr. Justice Watkin Williams about these matters in December, 1880, when the jury found him not guilty.

Sills, in showing cause, said this mode of carrying on business was no doubt irregular and could not be defended; but no fraud was intended by his client in the first instance. It was not a case of a man being in difficulties and resorting to these means to extricate himself therefrom. The bank knew of these transactions, and were a party in a sense to them; for they knew he was overdrawing, and held securities of his up to over £7,000.

A. Wills said there was no evidence of any such knowledge or countenance in the bank.

Sills said his client bad carried on his business with admirable success for twenty-three years. In two cases of misapplication all the money had been repaid, and no complaint had been made. When the defendant was on his trial for a criminal offence, the difficulty was to choose what witness to call to character, so many presented themselves; the chairman of quarter sessions, the clerk of the peace, and men of large business testified to his good name. The county people were all satisfied that this trouble was due to the defendant's being dragged down by the bankruptcy of a olient called Ingram, who owed him £8,000. As a result no public appointment held by the defendant had been abandoned, and he still remained the receiver on several large estates. He begged the court to deal as leniently with the case as the circumstances warranted. Wills was not called on by the court to argue, and

GROVE, J., in delivering judgment, said :-It has been my misfortune to sit and hear many cases of this sort; but I do not know that I ever met a stronger or worse case. Here is a solicitor charged with misappropriation of moneys in five cases; and the master finds that in most, if not all of them, this has been done wilfully and corruptly. One sum was intrusted to him for investment, but Mr. Brown paid it into his bank in his own name. Another sum was intrusted to him to take care of, to be handed over on the death of the person who gave it to him; that was dealt with in the same way. Then came the sum he misapplied under the will of Mr. Stokes. The whole matter of mitigation urged is, that he was dragged into difficulties by the failure of Ingram; that he would have paid the money back if he had had the funds. Is there any forger or embezzler tried at the Old Bailey who does not seek to avail himself of the same defence? But, assume that he would have paid the money back which he misapplied in placing in a bank on which he was overdrawing to any extent they would allow him, how is that any exouse? It is a fundamental duty of the solicitor's office that he must not traffic with his client's money for his own use. It is as bad a case as one can well conceive. It seems to me that this court has no option in the matter, but that Mr. Brown must be struck off the rolls, expressing the opinion that our utmost punishment is quite inadequate to the

offence.

HUDDLESTON, B., concurred in that last remark, and said:-I had occasion at the summer assizes of 1880 to read the depositions in this case when Mr. Brown was to be tried at Oakham, and expressed a decided

us if

opinion thereon to the grand jury. But I found that some indiscreet admirer of Mr. Brown's had endeavoured to corrupt the body of jurors from which the jury were to be summoned to try his case, that he had called on them and tried to influence them in various ways. As I found that thus the fountains of justice were, as it were, poisoned, I felt it necessary to postpone the case and to order the person who had interfered to be punished. I am bound to say that it was not brought home to Mr. Brown that he had ordered this to be done or sanctioned it in any way. The prosecution was then removed to London, and Mr. Brown was tried and acquitted. Whatever opinion as to his criminality the jury may have formed cannot influence we are satisfied with the facts. An officer of the court has been conclusively found guilty of a scandalous violation of his duty to this court and his clients. Each one of the five cases proved would be a justification for his suspension from practice as a solicitor. His lordship then dealt with the sums obtained by misrepresentation and concealment from an illiterate and aged woman. As to another sum handed to him by a lady, she said it was for investment on mortgage; but his version of the affair was very much worse-that it was given to keep as a sacred duty to be handed over to some one else after her death. As to the £4,025 under Mr. Stokes's will, it was said his co-trustee found no fault with Mr. Brown in regard to that; but he might have ingratiated himself in some way with his co-trustee. Although this court does not investigate criminal matters, it certainly will take notice of gross and wilful negligence. As to the £8,000 handed to him by Mr. Sowerby to pay off a mortgage, Mr. Brown said there was a little difficulty in arranging the matter. But the master finds that the money was paid to him eighteen months before his liquidation, and that there was plenty of time to pay it off. It is said that Mr. Brown has long borne a bigh character among his county neighbours; but it is just that high character which has enabled him to commit these frauds. Those who do these things generally do bear an outward appearance of honesty, respectability, and morality. And if the public still continues to hold this opinion of Mr. Brown, all I can say is the sooner the public is undeceived the better. Rule absolute,-Times.

SOCIETIES.

LAW UNION FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, The annual general meeting was held on the 16th inst., Mr. James Caddon (chairman) presiding.

Mr. F. MCGEDY (actuary and secretary) read the notice convening the meeting and the minutes of the previous meeting. The report and accounts were taken as read. The following is a copy of the report:

The net

The directors have pleasure in submitting to the shareholders the accounts of the company for the financial year ended November 30, 1881, being the twenty-seventh year of the company's operations. The new insurances for the year, in the fire department, were 6,904 in number, and amounted to £5,979,479, yielding in new premiums the sum of £7,650 03. 8d. In the life department 264 new policies were issued, insuring the sum of £278,301, the new premiums upon which amounted to £11,355 8. 2d., of which £4,638 1s. 3d. were single premiums. Thirty life annuities were granted for £2,021 103. per annum, the purchase-money for which amounted to £20,760 63. 7d. Eight annuitants died during the year, resulting in the falling in of annuities to the amount of £334 14. 6d. per annum. losses in the fire department were £9,393 5s. 1d. The claims under life and endowment policies amounted to £43,099 18. 10d. (less re-assurances). The total number of policies in force in the life department at the close of the year was 3,279, insuring the sum of £2,812,759 (including bonus additions). The gross income for the year was £178,415 18s. 8d., inclusive of purchasemoney received for granting annuities. The average rate of interest obtained on the total assets of the company was £4 4s. 6d. per cent. The excess of receipts over expenditure for the year in the life department was £54,865 10s. 3d., by which sum the life assurance fund has been increased. The total receipts of the fire department (less re-insurance) were £38,816 48., and the total payments amounted to £20,766 03. 9d., leaving a surplus on the year's account of £18,050 3s. 3d. Out of this surplus the sum of £4,000 has been added to the fire insurance fund, which now stands at £40,000, being more than one year's net premium income. The remainder of the surplus, namely, £14,050 38. 3d., has been carried to the profit and loss account, making the balance at credit of that account £39,081 78. 5d. The directors recommend to the shareholders the payment out of such balance of a dividend of 3s. per share and a bonus of 18. per share, making together a dividend and bonus of 48. per share, which is equal to a distribution of £20,000 for the year. There will be then remaining at credit of profit and loss account the sum of £19,081 7s. 5d. The dividend will be paid as usual on the 1st of Jane and let of December, but the bonus of 1s. per share, if agreed to, will be paid forthwith.

The CHAIRMAN said—Gentlemen, the accounts before you are so plain and explicit, and present such satisfactory results, that I feel it is quite unnecessary to say one word about them. It may, however, not be amiss just to remark that the new life policies for the past year average £1,049 per policy, while in the previous year that average was £980. Sixty-four policies became claims during the past year, the average amount thereof having been only £595, while the average amount of the subsisting policies was £857. Eighty-six policies, insuring the aggregate sum of £64,872, lapsed, the annual premiums whereon amounted to £1,369 168. 8d. Forty-six policies, for the aggregate amount of £56,991, were surrendered, the annual premiums on those policies having been £1,346 Ss. 10d. One of the best proofs of the great prosperity of the company is that during the space of

three years the shareholders have received in the shape of dividend and bonus a sum nearly equal to the whole paid-up capital, and yet we have still in hand £19,000 undivided profits applicable to future dividend and bonus. The eyes of the shareholders are, however, sufficiently open to the value of their property, and need no hints from me upon the subject. Before moving the adoption of the report, I shall be happy to answer any questions should any gentleman desire further information. No one asking any question,

The CHAIRMAN moved the adoption of the report.

Mr. C. PEMBERTON (vice-chairman).—I have much pleasure in seconding that motion, and I wish I could have seen a larger number of shareholders here, in order that I might have pointed out to them the importance of their co-operating with us with the view of extending the business. I can only say I hope the future will be as prosperous as the past has been with this company. The report was adopted unanimously.

Mr. HARCOURT MASTER proposed, "That the recommendation of the directors in their report now read as to the payment of dividend and bonus be adopted, and that a dividend of 3s. per share and a bonus of 1s. per share, free of income tax, be paid to the shareholders for the financial year ending on the 30th of November, 1882, the dividend to be payable as usual on the 1st of June and the 1st of December, and the bonus to be distributed imme diately."

Mr. H. ROSCOE seconded the motion, which was agreed to.

On the motion of Mr. EDMUND JAMES, seconded by Mr. RICHARD WARD, the following directors, who retired in pursuance of the terms of the deed of settlement, were unanimously re-elected :-Messrs. G. M. Arnold, F. Charsley, Charles Cheston, William Crossman, G. D. Harrison, Henry Mason, H. Munster, George Thomas, F. R. Ward, H. S. Wasborough, J. R. Wood, and Sir Erasmus Wilson.

On the motion of Mr. A. R. OLDMAN, seconded by Mr. H. E. BURY, Mr. Theodore Waterhouse was re-elected an auditor on behalf of the shareholders.

The CHAIRMAN, on behalf of the board, appointed Mr. James J. Darley as the directors' auditor.

Mr. H. Roscoe proposed that the sum of seventy-five guineas be paid to each of the auditors. He felt quite sure that, although this amount was an increase of twenty-five guineas over the preceding year, the shareholders would feel that it was by no means an excessive payment for the services which the auditors rendered. The company's figures were growing year by year, and necessitated a good deal of care and attention, which he was sure the auditors had never failed to bestow when they were called upon to discharge their

duties.

Mr. E. JAMES Seconded the motion, and it was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN next proposed a vote of thanks to the solicitor, Mr. George Burges, for his great assiduity and attention to the business of the company.

Mr. C. PEMBERTON seconded the motion, and it was carried, and briefly acknowledged by Mr. BURGES.

The CHAIRMAN.-I beg to propose a vote of thanks to the actuary and staff for the able and energetic manner in which they have conducted the business of the company. I am sure that the shareholders are very much indebted to those gentlemen for the advantages they are receiving, and I can testify to the fact that the greatest possible attention is paid by all of them to the smallest point of detail which may arise in the business transactions of the

office.

Mr. PEMBERTON.-I have great pleasure in seconding_that_motion, as I also can testify to the good qualities of our excellent actuary, who never loses an opportunity of doing his utmost for the good of the company.

Mr. GEORGE TAYLER.-Before the proposition is put to the vote, I should like to say one word. I have not been here now for some years, although as an original shareholder I used at the commencement to attend these meetings occasionally. Now I am here I must say the success of the company has been so great and so marked that every one who has been connected with it for a great number of years, as I have, must feel that some reference should be made on these occasions to the great services rendered by the actuary and the other officers; and therefore I rise to express my personal thanks, not only to them, but to the directors past and present for their efficient services. I would respectfully suggest that, as a bonus is being given to the share. holders, the directors might consider whether this is not a fitting opportunity to make some substantial recognition of the services of the actuary and staff. I should certainly very much approve of something of the kind being done, and it seems to me that this is a favourable occasion for doing it. However, I throw out the suggestion, leaving it to the consideration of the directors, although if it is in order for me to make a motion on the subject I shall be happy to do so.

The CHAIRMAN.-No doubt the directors will at their next or some early meeting be glad to take the matter you suggest into their consideration. I think you may safely leave it to the board.

The resolution was carried unanimously.

Mr. F. McGEDY.-I rise on my own behalf and that of the staff to return my sincere thanks to the gentlemen present for the very kind vote which they have just passed. I wish especially to refer to the services of Mr. Rogers, chief of the fire staff, and of Mr. Macpherson, chief of the life staff, who discharge their duties very energetically, and I may say that all the clerks do their best to promote the interests of the company. The past year and the two preceding years have been exceedingly prosperous for the office, but, of course, we cannot expect that this great prosperity will always continue, We must make up our minds to experience a little adver

sity some time or other, and I hope that when that time comes you will appreciate as you have done hitherto the services which we render. I may mention that one of the largest fire insurance companies in London, with an influential board of directors, obtained in premiums last year £723,475, and the claims and expenses were £712,175, leaving a surplus on the year of £11,300 only. That was the experience of a first-class office, and I only allude to it for the purpose of showing that, although our business is small in comparison, yet we have out of a fire premium income of £37,000 been able to put away £17,000. I often hear it said in the City, "Ob, you are a small fire office;" and no doubt we are as compared with offices having an income of hundreds of thousands, derived from foreign business and special risks; but, altbough small, our business is of a very high character.

The CHAIRMAN.-Perhaps I may add that whenever we attempt to get an enormous income for the sake of the large figures, from that time our pros perity will cease. It is only by being extremely cautious and accepting ouly good business that this state of things can by possibility arise. We found that to be the case before we gave up the foreign business.

Sir ERASMUS WILSON.-I have your permission, I think, Sir, to say a few words on the present occasion. Oor meeting has been one of great unanimity. If it were permissible to make use of such a word as regret or sorrow, I should only use that word in connection with the fact of our extreme unanimity and prosperity having prevented us from hearing, as we have heard on previous occasions, the lucid and satisfactory account which you, Sir, have been in the habit of giving to us year by year of the progress of the company. But at the present moment, while making use of the word success, not boastfully, but as representing the characteristic of the report-for if we talked about success without having real success, our figures would contradict us-we may, with great satisfaction, appeal to the figures before us in the report and accounts. As our actuary has told us, this is a comparatively small company. It is little, but it is good, It is fortunately so small that it leaves room for individual action and influence in connection with its management and its success. If I go to a shop to buy an article I like to be served by the principal. I feel more satisfied with the article when I get it home, when it has been served in that manner. Now, I want to call your attention to this fact, that in this shop we are the principals, and as such we look to all matters of detail, and we are greatly indebted for our prosperity to the personal attention and care-I will not say labour, because it is a labour of love-which has been given to the company by our chairman. The spirit which guides and influences our chairman is necessarily infused into the rest of the establishment. The fact of this being a successful company is due, not only to the way in which the business is conducted financially, but also to the care and attention which have been bestowed upon it by our chairman and the other directors and officers. Our chairman has pointed to the attendance-book on the table, and I am bound to say that if that book is examined there will not be found any neglect of duty on the part of the directors, and no absences unless they were brought about by illness or causes beyond control. Now, gentlemen, I wish to propose that the best thanks of the meeting be given to the chairman for his careful attention to the business of the undertaking during the time he has been with us, and also to express a hope that he will be spared to continue that attention, and carry on the company to a higher point of success even than it has hitherto attained. I need hardly look for a seconder to this resolution. I am sure all will be desirous to become seconders, and, therefore, I will put it to the meeting.

The motion was carried by acclamation.

The CHAIRMAN-I feel, gentlemen, that I really do not deserve anything like the commendation which has been so eloquently expressed by friend Sir Erasmus Wilson. All I can say is, that I have endeavoured to promote the interests of the company by every means in my power. Nevertheless, our success could not have been attained unless I had the co-operation and the valued assistance of my co-directors and of Mr. McGedy-and I may add that the fire department owes a great deal of its success to the care and ability of Mr. Rogers in particular. Gentlemen, I thank you very much for your kind expressions towards myself,

The meeting then separated.

LEGAL PROCEDURE.

THE following suggestions have been laid before the Lord Chancellor by the Incorporated Law Societies of Manchester and Liverpool:1. District registrars should have all the powers, not only of a master and chief clerk, but also of a judge in chambers.

2. Where a summons is adjourned by a district registrar to a judge in chambers, the matter should go direct to the judge (without it being required that a fresh summons should be issued) as originally contemplated by ord. 35, rr. 6, 7; and, further, in causes in the Chancery Division, without first going before the chief clerk; the present practice is not authorized by the rules and orders, and does not obtain in the Rolls Court. The district registrar should send a minute with the summons in the same manner as the chief clerk does.

3. Appeal summonses should issue out of the district registries; the record is otherwise imperfect. 4. On a trial in the provinces before a judge, with or without a jury all questions should be argued at the time, so as to enable the sutors and their solicitors to be present; there should be no reservation of points for argument in London, a practice which entails the payment of fresh fees to counsel, and the expense of the attendance of the solicitor in London in most cases, and other additional costs. The judge, of course, will have discretion to reserve his judgment.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. ARTHUR CRABTREE, solicitor and proctor, of Macclesfield, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Married Women in and for the County of Chester.

Mr. WILLIAM PARR, solicitor, of Ormskirk, has been appointed a Perpetua Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Married Women in and for the County of Lancaster.

Mr. JAMES JOHN LAMBERT, Solicitor, of Manchester and Chorlton-cumHardy, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds to be executed by Mr. HUGH QUINN, solicitor, of Liverpool, has been appointed a Perpetual Married Women.

Mr. JOHN WORRELL CARRINGTON, barrister, has been appointed Chief Justice of the Islands of St. Lucia and Tobago. Mr. Carrington was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Trinity Term, 1872. He has been for several years Solicitor-General of Barbadoes, and he recently acted as AttorneyGeneral for that island.

Mr. CHARLES SHEPPARD, solicitor, of Battle, has been appointed a P'erpetual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women for the Counties of Sussex and Kent.

Mr. JOHN CLERK BRODIE, writer to the signet, of Edinburgh, has been appointed Deputy Keeper of the Signet in Scotland.

Mr. JOSEPH GRIFFITH, solicitor, of Newcastle-under-Lyme, has been elected an Alderman for that borough. Mr. Griffith is mayor of the borough for the present year. He was admitted a solicitor in 1875.

Mr. EDWARD HENSLOWE BEDFORD, solicitor, of 9, King's Bench-walk, Temple, has been appointed Solicitor to the Joiners' Company. Mr. Bedford was admitted in 1864.

Mr. THOMAS LLANWARNE, solicitor, of Hereford, has been elected Clerk to the Allensmore School Board. Mr. Llanwarne was admitted a solicitor in 1859. He is clerk to the county magistrates for the Dore Division.

Mr. JOSEPH CHALLINOR, solicitor, of Leek, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Staffordshire (Mr. John Robinson) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Challinor was admitted a solicitor in 1850, and is clerk to the deputy lieutenants for the Totmonslow Division.

Mr. JOHN EADEN, solicitor (of the firm of Eaden & Knowles), of Cambridge, has been appointed Under-Sheriff of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire for the ensuing year. Mr. Eaden was admitted a solicitor in 1832.

Mr. WILLIAM NEWTON, solicitor (of the firm of Newton & Wallis), of Newark, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Nottinghamshire" (Sir Henry Bromley) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Newton was admitted a solicitor in 1852. He is registrar of the Newark County Court, clerk to the Newark Board of Guardians, and superintendent registrar. His partner, Mr. William Wallis, is coroner for the borough of Newark.

Mr. HENRY FREDERICK VALENTINE FAULKNER (of the firm of Faulkner & Owen), of Louth, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Lincolnshire (Mr. William Henry Smyth) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Faulkner was admitted a solicitor in 1869.

Mr. WILLIAM STEPHEN JONES, solicitor (of the firm of Jones & Forrester), of Malmesbury, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Wiltshire (the Right Hon. Edward Pleydell Bouverie) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Jones is clerk to the county magistrates at Malmes bury. He was admitted a solicitor in 1846.

Mr. HENRY ALLEYNE BOVELL, barrister, has been appointed to act as Solicitor-General for the Island of Barbadoes. Mr. Bovell was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in November, 1876.

Mr. GEORGE O'CONNOR PARNELL, solicitor (of the firm of Salt & Parnell), of Bristol, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. WALTER REGINALD COLLINS, solicitor (of the firm of Brown, Collins, & Woods), of Swansea, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Glamorganshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women. Mr. JOHN JOSEPH BICKERSTETH, barrister, has been appointed by Lord Herries, lord lieutenant of the East Riding of Yorkshire, to the office of Clerk of the Peace for the East Riding, in succession to the late Mr. George Leeman, of York. Mr. Bickersteth is the son of the Right Rev. Robert Bickersteth, D.D., Bishop of Ripon. He is a graduate of Christ Church, Oxford, and he was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Hilary Term, 1875. He is a member of the North-Eastern Circuit.

Mr. HOWARD HORNER, solicitor, of Wakefield, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. JOHN PENNOCK, solicitor (of the firm of Pennock & White), of Liverpool, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. JOHN HENRY BRAND, barrister, President of the Orange River Free State, has been created a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. Sir J. Brand is the son of Sir Charles Brand, many years Speaker of the House of Assembly of the Cape Colony, and was born in 1823. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1849. He was elected President of the Orange River Free State in 1874.