the clause. Again, suppose that the husband by threats compels his wife to sign a cheque, or even if he forges her signature, she will be unable to institute proceedings against him.

The liability of the husband for the ante-nuptial debts of his wife is, by a singularly-framed clause (clause 9) of this Bill, limited "to the extent of any property whatsoever belonging to his wife [sic] which he shall have acquired or become entitled to from or through his wife "—that is, we presume (in the case of husbands married after the passing of this Bill), by gift or conveyance from her, for under this Bill the husband takes no interest in the property of his wife by operation of law.

We have now referred to the points of chief interest in this proposed measure; but there is one more matter to which we must briefly refer, and that is the conflict of laws on the subject between this country and Scotland. In an article on the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1881 (ante, p. 149), we pointed out some of the inconvenient results which followed from that Act extending to every marriage in the United Kingdom where the bridegroom had a Scotch domicile, instead of being confined, as it should have been, to the territorial limits of Scotland. It appears to us that the difficulties will not be removed by the present Bill. The laws, indeed, of the two countries will be brought more closely to resemble each other, but there will still be important differences which are not unlikely to give rise to cases of conflict. One important and obvious omission is, that if an Englishman marries and subsequently acquires a Scotch domicile, his wife will not come under the provisions of either Act; for the present Bill expressly excludes Scotland, and the Scotch Act only meets the case of the husband having his domicile in Scotland at the time of the marriage. This opens up a prospect of English husbands flitting across the border to acquire a new domicile, and thereby deprive their wives of the protection afforded by modern legislation. If a domiciled Scotchman contracts a marriage in England, and afterwards acquires an English domicile, it may be asked, Which law regulates the rights of the wife and the devolution of her property? For it must be remembered that there are the following important differences between the two laws :

(1) The Scotch Act imposes a statutory restraint on anticipation, which will not be found in the English law if the Bill passes

in its present shape.

(2) It must be remembered that the wife, under the English law (if this Bill passes), will possess unfettered power of alienation, both inter vivos and by will; while in Scotland she is unable to dispose of her property without the consent of her husband.

The chief difficulty, however, to which we called attention in the article referred to that relating to a husband dealing with a wife's property-will be removed if the present Bill should become law; for then, under no circumstances, can a husband in either country make a title to his wife's property. Still, the difficulties which we have pointed out are such as call for solution, and the only effectual remedy seems to be to pass a short Act amending the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act of last session by confining its operation to the territorial limits of Scotland.

The Press Association states that Sir Michael Westropp has resigned the Chief Justiceship of Bombay, and the appointment, it is understood, on this

occasion will be filled from the Indian Civil Service.

Messrs. Blunt, Tebbs, & Lawford, write to the Times as followe, under date March 13:-"Having attended to-day at the Bank of England, as usual, to open a box of securities under order of the High Court of Justice, we were informed that all such securities as had been lodged at the bank under order of the court had been removed to the branch Bank of England at the Law Courts. It is strange that the authorities have given no notice of this, but it will be for the public convenience that the fact should be

known."

A fatal accident occurred on Wednesday at Solihull, near Birmingham, to Mr. Sidney J. Mitchell, solicitor. Mr. Mitchell was with a party of friends witnessing some experiments in the neighbourhood of Solihull. Efforts were being made to destroy the roots of several large trees which had been blown down. Dynamite was used for this purpose, and some labourers had placed a charge beneath a root. Mr. Mitchell was standing at some distance from the spot, but when the charge was fired part of the root struck him upon the head, and killed him instantaneously.

REVIEWS.

SWEET'S LAW DICTIONARY.

A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW, CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TECHNI CAL TERMS IN MODERN USE, AND A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE RULES OF LAW AFFECTING THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS, WITH HISTORICAL AND ETYMOLOGICAL NOTES. By CHARLES SWEET, of Lincoln's-inn. H.

Sweet.

This stately and well-printed book possesses several features which ought to commend it to the favour of the profession. It is pre-eminently practical; it is concise and accurate, and it bears traces of great labour and care in the collection of authorities. In saying that the book is practical we mean that the information given is usually that which the practitioner wants. There is little matter relating to obsolete law, except where it is necessary to explain the existing law, or the meaning of phrases in the ancient books, and in this case it is usually printed in smaller type. The result is that the young solicitor who has not a largo library of books in his office will find in this book a short but fairly comprehensive general outline of the existing law on many of the subjects which are likely to come under his notice, together with a of fences: there will be found in about half a page under that head at p. reference to the leading recent cases. Take, for instance, the subject 354, and under the head of "Boundaries," on p. 107, a good general account of the law. Of course it would be easy to suggest additions of more or less importance to this and almost every other heading, but, so far as we have observed, the author has made a judicious selection of leading topics, having regard to the requisite of terseness which he seems always to have kept before him. As an illustration of the merit of brevity and accuracy which we have ascribed to the work, we would and obscure subject of rests in accounts against trustees at p. 11. These refer to the observations (contained in less than a page) on the difficult appear to us to be an excellent summary of the effect of the cases; and the references in the foot-notes embrace most of the leading authorities on the subject. With regard to the care with which decisions on the various subjects have been collected we may mention that Doherty v. Allman (L. R. 3 App. Cas. 709), on the subject of " meliorating waste," although an Irish appeal, is to be found duly noted, and that the cases on participating policy-holders, on which we recently commented, are collected in a note at p. 590.

It is, of course, inevitable that in the first edition of a work of this kind there should be omissions of headings which ought to be present. We have not observed many such omissions, but we may suggest that relating to distress damage feasant should be more fully stated, and “chief rent,” in its modern meaning, should be noticed; that the rules that a heading should be added relating to "change of name."

CHANCERY PRACTICE.

THE ANNUAL CHANCERY PRACTICE; BEING A COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES, ORDERS, AND RULES RELATING TO THE GENERAL PRACTICE, Procedure, AND JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM TO THE COURT OF APPEAL; WITH COPIOUS NOTES, FORMS, &c. 1882. By THOMAS SNOW and HERBERT WINSTANLEY, Barristers-at-Law. W. Maxwell & Son; H. Sweet.

the practitioners of both branches of the profession a handy and inexThe object of the authors is stated in the preface to be to present to pensive work on the practice of the High Court of Justice, having special reference to the Chancery Division. As regards the cost of the book this statement is entirely borne out; it is rarely that we meet with a law book containing so much matter at so low a price. In general arrangement the book follows the practice of printing the Acts and Orders with notes, but, as regards the Judicature Acts, only those sections are printed which affect the law or the procedure and practice as set forth in the Rules of Court, or which are referred to or incorporated with the rules. The Judicature Acts are followed by Lord Cairns' Act; the sections of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, relating to arbitration, referred to in section 59 of the Judicature Act, 1873; the sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and the Bankruptcy Rules having reference to section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875; and the sections of the statutes relating to interpleader. Then follow the Rules of Court, with the Consolidated Orders relating to the subject-matter of the rules inserted in the notes in large italic type. The notes to the rules are sub-divided according tɔ subject by headings in thick type. The orders as to court fees and stamps are subsequently given, and Part IV. contains a very completu statement of the statutes, consolidated orders, and cases relating to pro. ceedings in chambers in the Chancery Division. Part V. is devoted to proceedings in the Chancery Pay Office, and includes the Chancery Funds Act, 1872, and the rules under that Act; and Part VI. contains such of the forms in the schedules to the Judicature Act, 1875, and the Rules of April, 1880, as are applicable to actions and matters in the Chancery Division, with notes thereon.

So much for the general scheme of the work. With regard to its

execution we can speak very favourably. The cases have been collceted with great industry, examined with care, and stated, so far as we have observed, with clearness and brevity. They are brought down to the end of last year, and there is no list of addenda. The order prohibiting the marking of cases for Mr. Justice Fry, at p. 109, ought to have disappeared, and the similar order relating to Mr. Justice Kay should have been substituted. And we may, perhaps, be allowed to suggest that in the list of abbreviations there should be given some explanation of the meaning of the references to "W. R." and "So. Jo."

ADMIRALTY LAW AND PRACTICE.

INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION. INTERMEDIATE LAW EXAMINATION MADE EASY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO SELF-PREPARATION IN MR. SERJEANT STEPHEN'S NEW COMMENTARIES OV THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. THIRD EDITION. By ALBERT GIBSON, Solicitor. Reeves & Turner.

This appears to us to be one of the most sensible of the numerous examination books which have come under our notice. The title is in one sense rather a misnomer, since the author does not seem to aim at any system of cramming, based upon a study of examiners' peculiarities, or any mode of avoiding honest labour. His object appears to be to direct the course of study, and to afford practice in what is always the great tersely. His system is, in fact, a careful development of that which an intelligent and systematic student would devise for himself.

OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, AND ON APPEALS THEREFROM, &c. By EDWARD STANLEY ROSCOE, Barrister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Sons.

No very considerable alteration appears to have been made in the first part of this work, relating to the chief subjects of the jurisdiction of the court, but in Part II. Mr. Roscoe has brought down to a recent date the cases on the practice of the Admiralty Division. He takes as the groundwork such of the Rules of the Supreme Court as relate to admiralty actions, and inserts in their appropriate places the Admiralty Rules of 1859 and the decisions. The result is a comprehensive and useful manual of practice. The decisions appear to have been carefully noted up, and their effect is given very concisely-sometimes, indeed, as it appears to us, rather too shortly to represent properly the effect of the decisions. For instance, on the subject of the reference of questions of consequential damage to the registrar and merchants, although The Maid of Kent (29 W. R. 897) is referred to at p. 210, we do not find there any reference to the rule indicated by Sir Robert Phillimore in his judgment, that where nautical knowledge is required for the decision of such a case it should be heard by the court with assessors. The case is also referred to in Part I., under the head of "Damage," but the remark of the author there, that "when the question of damage can be decided on the hearing of the action more fitly than by the registrar and merchants, the court will give a decision on the point," is to vague to be of much service to the practitioner. About half of the book is occupied with statutes, orders, and forms; and at the close there is a useful appendix of precedents of bills of costs in actions in the Admiralty Division, stated to have been taken from bills actually taxed.

SHERIFF LAW.

THE

THE LAW OF THE OFFICE AND DUTIES OF THE SHERIFF, WITH WRITS AND FORMS RELATING TO THE OFFICE. BY CAMERON CHURCHILL, Barrister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Sons.

Mr. Churchill's book has grown largely in dimensions in the present edition, and now constitutes a very complete treatise. On all the main functions of the sheriff-as, for instance, the election of county members of Parliament, writs of inquiry, the compensation court, assizes, and writs of execution-the information given is very full and, so far as we have tested it, accurate. The anxiety of the author to supply every possible requirement of the class of persons for whom he writes has led him in this, as in the former edition, to introduce matters which have a very remote connection with his subject. Thus, on the ground that "as in the execution of writs of fi. fa. the sheriff is not unfrequently confronted by a bill of sale," we have presented in the present edition a chapter on bills of sale. It strikes us that it would be almost as reasonable, on the ground that sheriffs' officers are sometimes assaulted, to introduce a chapter on the criminal law relating to assaults. The appendix contains a very full collection of forms, and there is an index which is full, but somewhat peculiarly constructed. We hardly see the advantage of headings such as "Pigott, B.," the reference being only to the opinion of that judge mentioned in connection with Hammersmith and City Railway Company v. Brand.

ADVOCACY.

HINTS ON ADVOCACY: CONDUCT OF CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, CLASSES OF WITNESSES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CROSS-EXAMINING THEM. By RICHARD HARRIS, Barrister-at-Law. SIXTH EDITION. Stevens & Sous.

Mr. Harris has added to this edition of his acute and amusing book some additional specimens of witnesses, such as "The Awkward Witness," "The Expert in Handwriting," and other types. Some of these new sketches tend rather too much in the direction of mere farce. There is, perhaps, some little danger of losing sight of the main useful. ness of the book, which is to afford practical hints to beginners in the profession of advocacy. We doubt whether any tyro will gain much information of practical value from the account of Mr. Grapho's crossexamination,

CORRESPONDENCE.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, The time has, I think, come, by pretty general consent, for taking in hand the law of bankruptcy, and settling the question whether the public gains or loses by it. I venture the assertion that in as large a proportion as nineteen cases out of twenty they lose-i.e., if there was no bankruptcy law at all, the public would be pecuniarily gainers if they had debtor and creditor. The question is, Does the law answer its professed no other remedy for adjusting their claims than the ordinary laws of object? if it does not, and it can be shown that the intentions of the law are perverted to purposes directly opposed to it—which, in the majority of cases is really the fact-its retention is in excusable, and it ought to be washed are so great as positively to encourage recklessness in trading. abolished. The facilities which the law holds out for getting whiteWhat does the average trader care for getting into debt? If anybody presses for payment, that social pest, the liquidating attorney, is always at hand; a petition is filed, a small, packed meeting of creditors, who discharge, and laughs at everybody who has been silly enough to trust squared" for the occasion, do the needful, the rogue gets his him.

are

The evil of all this is so great, commercially, morally, and socially -and in any way in which you can look at it-that it ought not to be tolerated. The enormous expense to the country, the pecuniary loss to the trading community, and the commercial depravity which the present law directly encourage, point to only one remedy-total abolition assert themselves, and let flagrant dishonesty be dealt with as-what it of the whole system. Leave the ordinary laws of debtor and creditor to

is in fact-a crime.

A COUNTRY SOLICITOR OF FORTY YEARS' STANDING.

BILLS OF SALE.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,-In your number for the 28th of January last, you were good enough to insert a letter by me on a point of law relating to bills of sale. Will you kindly find room for the following ?—

A. being heavily indebted to B. was pressed by the latter to`give a bill of sale on his furniture. A. repeatedly promised to do so, but put it off. One day he suddenly appeared at the office of B.'s solicitor to execute the bill of sale. The solicitor carefully explained to him its purport, and from expressions used by A. (B. being also present) he felt tolerably sure that A. in giving the bill of sale was not intending to benefit B.; and before proceeding to register the security he wrote to his client asking if the transaction was bona fide, or a dodge to defeat creditors. B. replied, saying that whatever might be A.'s motive, it was on his own part a bono fide attempt to obtain some security for A.'s very heavy debt to himself. The solicitor thereupon registered the bill of sale. The day after it was executed another creditor put in au execution on the goods and found himself defeated. It may on this state of facts be assumed to be true that A. gave the bill of sale in order

to protect the goods from the creditor's execution, but B. bond fide

intended to obtain security.

Can the bill of sale be supported as against the execution creditor? See Wood v. Dixie (7 Q. B. 802); Alton v. Harrison (17 W. R. 1034); Ex parte Games, Re Bumford (27 W. R. 744); Ex parte Brown (27 W. R. 651); Bridgman v. Green (2 Ves. sen. 626). If A. acted mala fide, but B. bona fide, can the latter keep his security? This is not a case in bankruptcy. A COUNTRY SOLICITOR.

THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY BILL. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Should not husbands be relieved from some of the burdens resulting from marriage? See for an example 25 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL,

464 ["Liability to support bastard children of the wife"]. The liability to maintain a wife who has become a confirmed drunkard is also one which calls for a remedy. Some limit to liability for maintenance is also required in the case of women who have had separate estate, and have disposed of it otherwise than in a reasonable manner. The present tendency seems to be to deprive the husband of the property he would otherwise get by his wife without giving him a sufficient release from responsibilities.

Could not some attempt be made to settle clearly the husband's liabilities on contracts made by the wife? A. B. C.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

PRACTICE STAYING PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL-TERMS.-In a case of Brewer v. Yorke, before the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) on the 15th inst., an application was made for a stay of proceedings under a judgment of the Court of Appeal, pending an appeal to the House of Lords. The judgment had directed payment to the respondent of a fund which was in court, with interest at four per cent, from the date of the chief clerk's certificate. The fund had been invested, and had been sold for the purpose of making the payment. The court ordered the money to be retained in court pending the appeal, and also that the respondent's solicitors should give the usual undertaking to refund the costs in case thet decision should be reversed by the House of Lords. They also ordered than the applicant should undertake to pay the respondent the difference between interest at the rate of four per cent. upon the fund which would be retained it court, and the interest which would be actually obtained by the investment, in case the decision should be affirmed. JESSEL, M.R., said that he had recently introduced the practice when he was presiding in the Rolls Court, because he thought it just that the party who was kept out of his money by reason of the appeal should not lose the interest to which he was entitled if he was ultimately successful. And the court said that the applicant must also pay the costs of the sale and re-investment of the money.

TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY-DISCLAIMER-LEASE OF LAND AND CHATTELSREPUTED OWNERSHIP-ORDER AND DISPOSITION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 15, 23.—In a case of Ex parte Allen, before the Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., the question was raised whether, when the trustee in a bankruptcy disclaims a lease by which land and loose chattels had been demised to the bankrupt at one entire rent, the trustee can, notwithstanding the disclaimer, retain the chattels, on the ground that they were, at the commencement of the bankruptcy, in the possession, order, or disposition of the bankrupt, as reputed owner, with the consent of the true owner. A lease had been made to a liquidating debtor (a trader) of a factory, machinery, and loose tools, at one entire rent, and subject to certain covenants. The trustee in the liquidation applied to the court for leave to disclaim the lease, and an order was made giving him leave to disclaim "the lease and the property belonging to the lessor demised thereby." The trustee, in pursuance of the order, executed a disclaimer of "all such property." He afterwards applied to the court for an order declaring that the chattels upon the demised premises formed part of the debtor's estate divisible among his creditors, and directing the lessor to deliver up the same. It was urged that the chattels had vested in the trustee, as from the commencement of the liquidation, by a superior and independent title by virtue of the reputed ownership clause (section 15, sub-section 5, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869), and that the disclaimer of the lease could have no operation on that title. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), however, held that the trustee was not entitled to the chattels. JESSEL, M.R., said that section 23 was imperfectly drawn, and not easy to apply, but the court must do its best to construe it. In the recent case of Ex parte Glegg (30 W. R. 144, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 7, ante, p. 57) two things were decided (1) that the thing to be got rid of by the disclaimer of a lease was the entire lease, not a part of it; (2) that, though there were no express words in the section to that effect, it was intended that the disclaimer should relieve the trustee from liability altogether, so that no interest in the lease should remain in him between the commencement of the bankruptcy and the date of the adjudication. In the present case there was no evidence of any trade custom which would exclude the application of the doctrine of reputed ownership, and his lordship would assume in the trustee's favour that the debtor was the reputed owner of the chattels. But what was the effect of section 15? It said that the "property of the bankrupt divisible among his creditors, in this Act referred to as the property of the bankrupt, shall comprise" certain particulars. Then section 23 took out of the operation of section 15 certain things. Therefore, section 15 must be read as if it had said "subject to the provisions of section 23 hereinafter contained, the property of the bankrupt divisible among bis creditors shall comprise the following particulars." It was impossible that by virtue of section 15 property could be divided among the creditors if by section 23 it was given to some one else. It followed that the title of the trustee acquired under section 15 was liable to be divested by section 23 in all cases to which that section applied. Section 15 dealt with three classes of property-viz., property belonging to, or vested in, the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy; property acquired by, or devolving on, him during the continuance of the bankruptcy; and property which never belonged to him at all, but which was, at the commencement of the bank. ruptcy, in his possession, order, or disposition (he being a trader), as reputed owner, with the consent of the true owner. Then section 23 said "that where any property of the bankrupt acquired by the trustee under this Act consists of land of any tenure burdened with onerous covenants, of unmarketable shares

in companies, of unprofitable contracts, or of any property that is unsaleable, or not readily saleable, by reason of its binding the possessor thereof to the per99 the formance of any onerous act, or the payment of any sum of money,' trustee might disclaim such property. It applied to all the property of the bankrupt of any of the three descriptions mentioned in section 15. It was quite possible that the bankrupt might be the reputed owner of property which might bind him to the performance of onerous acts, and the intention was that the trustee should not be compelled to keep onerous property of that kind any more than onerous property of the other two kinds. The object of the section was to enable the trustee to disclaim a damnosa hæreditas. The primary object was to enable the trustee to disclaim; the subsidiary operation of the section was to explain how the disclaimer was to take effect in cases to which that subsidiary operation was applicable. The section could not be read literally; it was quite plain that some of the words would not apply to every kind of case. The words which provided what the effect of the disclaimer was to be must be read as applicable to cases to which they could apply, and in cases to which they did not apply, still the trustee could disclaim the property. What then could he disclaim? In the case of property comprised in a lease he must disclaim it all; there was no provision of Blackacre and Whiteacre; could the trustee in bankruptcy of the lessee for the apportionment of the rent and covenants. Suppose there was a lease say, Blackacre is not worth keeping, but Whiteacre is? Could he keep the one property which was valuable, and disclaim the other? That would not be lordship would give no opinion how it would be if there were two distinct fair to the landlord. The trustee must take the property as it was. His demises contained in one piece of parchment. But, when there was really one demise, if the trustee gave up the property he must give it up altogether; he must surrender to the lessor the whole of the property comprised in the lease. And this applied to property which the trustee would take under the reputed ownership clause equally with other property. COTTON, L.J., said that under section 23 nothing could be done by a disclaimer of a lease which could not be done by an actual surrender of it, and, in his opinion, a surrender involved the giving back to the lessor of all the property comprised in the lease, with a corresponding release of the tenant from the covenants of the lease. A surrender implied a surrender of the entirety, and so the disclaimer must be a giving back to the lessor, not of part, but of the entirety of the property comprised in the lease. It was said that section 23 applied only to a lease of land, and not to a lease of chattels. If that was so, the lease could not be disclaimed at all, for the disclaimer must operate as a surrender of the entire lease. It was said that section 15 enabled the trustee to hold the chattels by a superior title. But section 23 applied to property of the bankrupt-i.e., property divisible among his creditors. But, inasmuch as the lease was, by virtue of section 23, taken out of section 15, in his lordship's opinion, not only the land, but the remainder of the property comprised in it, though it passed to the trustee under section 15, must, in like manner, be taken out of that section so soon as the trustee exercised the option given to him by section 23 of disclaiming the lease. He had an option whether he would disclaim or not, but, if he did disclaim, he must give up to the lessor the entirety of the demised property. LINDLEY, L.J., said that section 15 must be construed in connection within section 23. The latter section was not well drawn, and was full of puzzles, but he thought that for the present purpose it was possible to discover its meaning. When a lease was to be disclaimed he thought that that which was to be disclaimed was the property comprised in the lease, and when several properties were treated as one, and were demised by one lease at one entire rent, that was the property which the trustee, if he disclaimed the lease, was to surrender. And the mere fact that the trustee had acquired the chattels by a different title under section 15 would not justify a different construction of section 23. The court refused to give leave to appeal to the House of Lords.--SOLICITORS, Lawrance, Plews, & Baker; Beachcroft & Thompson.

APPEAL-EXTENSION OF TIME-SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES-Ord. 58, r. 15-DISCRETION OF COURT-PRACTICE-DECLARATION OF FUTURE RIGHTS.In a case of Curtis v. Sheffield, before the Court of Appeal on the 8th inst., a question arose as to granting leave to appeal from an order made by ViceChancellor Shadwell, in July, 1836. The suit was commenced in the Court of Chancery to administer the estate of one Joseph Sheffield, who died in July, 1831, and an administration decree was made in November, 1833. The testator by his will, dated the 22nd of July, 1830 (among other legacies), bequeathed to his son, Edward Sheffield, after the death of his (the testator's) wife, the interest on £5,000 consols, so that he should receive the interest as it became due, and after his death the principal was to be equally divided between his surviving children, and should he die without issue his share was to be equally divided among the testator's "surviving" children. The will contained other bequests in similar terms for the benefit of the testator's other children. The testator left his wife surviving him, and also seven children, one of whom was Edward Sheffield, and another was Henry Sheffield. By the order in question, which was dated the 16th of July, 1836, it was (inter alia) declared that, on the decease of the testator's widow, Edward Sheffield would become entitled to the income of £5,000 consols for his life, and that, upon his death, the principal would be divisible in equal shares among his children who should be living at the time of his death, and that, in case he should die without leaving issue, the stock would be divisible in equal shares among the children of the testator who were living at the time of the testator's death. When this order was made all the testator's seven children had attained twentyone, and they were all represented by counsel. The testator's widow died on the 13th of April, 1838, and on the 28th of July, 1838, an order was made that £5,000 should be carried over to a separate account, and that the dividends thereon should be paid to Edward Sheffield during his life, and this order was duly acted on. He died in November, 1881, without issue. All his brothers and sisters had died before him, with the exception of Henry Sheffield, who now asked for leave to appeal from the order of the 16th of July, 1836, so far as it declared who were the persons entitled to Edward