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CURRENT TOPICS.

LONDON, NOVEMBER 5, 1881.

THE MANCHESTER TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION is now, it appears, in full working order, so far, at least, as regards arbitrators, rules, and scale of fees. But sad to say, although there are numerous judges doubtless eager to leave their mills and counting-houses, MR. R. H. LEACH, the Senior Registrar of the Chancery Divi-and to forsake the dull routine of making money; although there sion, has been granted further leave of absence until Christmas. are rules framed on the attractive principle of "making as little regulation as possible"; although there is a scale of fees "arranged in a spirit of economy," the public display a shocking lack of

WE UNDERSTAND that Mr. J. N. HIGGINS, Q.C., will in future appreciation of these advantages. There is one suitor only before attach himself to the court of Mr. Justice KAY.

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the court. Now, although a good deal may be done in the way of lengthening out the hearing of a single case, an end must come sooner or later, and then there confronts us the sad spectacle of

judicial machinery standing idle for want of raw material. The question which now must press seriously for consideration by the promoters of the new tribunal is how to ensure a constant supply of controversy. It appears to us that they might take a hint from the practice prevalent elsewhere. It is, we believe, usual to present a book to the first couple married in any church or chapel. Now if the promoters would present a handsomely-bound copy of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, to the originator of the great first cause," at the same time suggesting that the tribunal will be ready to discuss points of doubt arising under that Act, we think there would be a reasonable prospect of occupation for the Tribunal.

66

THERE IS A GROWING ANXIETY among a large class of solicitors as to the course which will be taken by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society with reference to settling the scale under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act. The council ought to have, and no doubt will have, through its president, a leading part in settling the general order which will prescribe and regulate the remuneration of solicitors in conveyancing matters. And before the order is made the whole council will have an opportunity of considering its proposed provisions, and making observations and suggestions thereon, which must be taken into consideration by the framers of the order before it is made. We agree with our correspondent ALIQUIS (who, by the way, does not belong to the "smaller fry" of whom he speaks) that no one supposes the council will consciously ignore or slight the interests of the humbler members of the profession. But there is a widespread feeling that a body composed mainly of partners in large firms, whose business lies chiefly in large transactions in which a very small percentage will be remunerative, may not be fully aware of the amount of labour and anxiety involved in those comparatively small transactions which form the staple of the business of the great majority of solicitors. It will be a fatal mistake to prolike the last voluntary scale, actually gives, on a small purchase, less to the solicitor for all the labour and responsibility of investigating the title, &c., than the auctioneer receives for the mere sale. Perhaps we may be permitted to suggest that it is above all things desirable that the president of the Incorporated Law Society, and the president of the country law society, who is to be his colleague on the committee, should be thoroughly at one as to the scale to be allowed in small transactions. Divided counsels will inevitably lead to disaster.

THE PROMOTION of Mr. Justice LINDLEY to the Court of Appeal deserves the plaudits bestowed upon it in the daily press. It is necessary to have judges of learning in that court, and the new Lord Justice is a judge of great learning, and not less dis-pound a compulsory scale of remuneration on purchases which, tinguished by common sense, fairness of mind, and unvarying Courtesy. The appointment of Mr. FORD NORTH, Q.C., to the judgeship in the Queen's Bench Division vacated by Lord Justice LINDLEY occasioned a little surprise when it was first announced. But it is only fair to add that the more his appointment has been thought over the less is the surprise, at any rate in Lincoln's-inn. Mr. NORTH, during almost the whole of his career, has had a large and important practice, and in the last few years he has shown considerable skill and ability as a leader in one of the more stirring and active courts of the Chancery Division. As a junior Mr. NORTH was especially noted for the neatness and precision of his draftsmanship both in conveyancing and in drawing pleadings. The qualities which produced these merits continued to be seen in his arguments while within the bar, and they will, no doubt, do him good service on the bench. It is too much to ask of every newly-made judge that a great career shall seem a certainty for him. It is something to feel sure, as we do in the present case, that the new judge will prove a good, serviceable, working member of the court.

THE SOLEMN CEREMONY of the presentation and swearing of the Lord Mayor, which will take place on Wednesday next in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, is dealt with somewhat singularly by the Judicature Act of last session (44 & 45 Vict. c. 68). By section 17 of that Act it is enacted that "the presentation and swearing of the Lord Mayor of the city of London, which has heretofore taken place in the Court of Exchequer at Westminster after every annual election into that

office, pursuant to charters granted by her Majesty's royal predecessors to the citizens of London, and to" 24 Geo. 2, c. 48, "shall henceforth take place in the Queen's Bench Division of her Majesty's High Court of Justice, or before the judges of that Division at the same time and in the same manner has hath been heretofore accustomed in the Court of Exchequer." Turning to 24 Geo. 2, c. 48, s. 11, we find it there recited that the charters direct that "the Mayor of the city of London, after he is chosen, shall be presented and sworn before the King or Queen of England in their Court of Exchequer, or before the barons of the said court," and it is enacted that the "solemnity of presenting and swearing in the manner and form heretofore used on the twenty-ninth day of October shall be kept and observed on the ninth day of November in every year." It may be doubted whether the new statute ensures all the solemnity of the old one. The old statute, read with the recited charters, expressly provides for the Lord Mayor being received either by the Sovereign in person or by the barons. The new one leaves it a little doubtful whether a presentation to and swearing before an officer of court would not be equally valid with a presentation to and swearing before the judges; for, says the statute, the presentation and swearing are to take place in the Queen's Bench Division or before the judges of that Division. The oration, in delivering which the late venerable Chief Baron used to take so much delight, may, we hope, be considered to be permitted rather than required by the statute.

WE OBSERVE that Mr. Justice WATKIN WILLIAMS has been making some observations to the grand jury at the Exeter Assizes with regard to the present system of holding four criminal assizes yearly. He observes that there seems to be an absurdity in the present arrangement by which the quarter sessions are held one week, and a week or two afterwards a similar machinery is brought into play for the purpose of trying what, with very few exceptions, is a very similar class of prisoners. We think that every person familiar with the course of criminal practice must have felt this. The cases that come before the judges at assizes are not, in many cases, necessarily more difficult, nor do they necessarily involve heavier punishments, than those tried at quarter sessions. A larceny may be as difficult a case as a perjury, and if there is a previous conviction, may involve penal servitude. In the one case our system requires the highest judicial capacity, with all the pomp and ceremony of the assizes; in the other, some muddle-headed local magnate, without the slightest judicial training or capacity, may preside. The suggestion of the learned judge is, that there should be some sort of an amalgamation of the sessions and assizes; that they might be held together quarterly, and if it were thought necessary by the local authorities to have the assistance of a judge of the High Court of Justice, they could demand it, but if not, they need not do so. This would obviate the inconvenience, loss of time, and trouble involved in having a double machinery for similar purposes. This suggestion is worthy of consideration, but the learned judge, of course, throws it out quite in the rough, and, before deciding as to its desirability or otherwise, it would be necessary to know in detail how it was proposed to fill in the sketch.

The learned judge suggests that it would be a great advantage to the judges, as well as to the local magistrates, that they should be associated together in the administration of the law of the country. We do not know whether the learned judge had any definite idea in his mind when he made this somewhat complimentary remark to the grand jury, but we fail exactly to see the meaning of it. A chairman of quarter sessions trying a case in one court, and a judge trying a case in another, cannot, as far as we can see, derive much advantage from their mutual proximity. The former might occasionally consult the latter if puzzled by any point of law, but we doubt whether this would really prove of much advantage in practice, and what advantage the judge can derive we are at a loss to see. So far as any benefit may be derived by the unpaid magistracy from observations of the judicial demeanour and impartiality of the judges, they have opportunities of observing those characteristics already at assizes, and would have less opportunity if occupied at assizes by judicial duties of their The opinion which we have often expressed before,

own.

and which we continue strongly strongly to hold, is that our present system of allowing the characters and liberties of our fellow subjects to be disposed of at quarter sessions under the guidance of persons totally destitute of special training or fitness, is in reality nothing short of a public scandal, and could not long continue could public attention be sufficiently awakened to it. The appointment of competent paid professional chairmen to preside at sessions, men whose knowledge and position would enable them to deal with all but cases of murder or other cases of very exceptional difficulty or importance, is, in our opinion, the proper mode of economising the time of our judges in this respect. We fear the amalgamation of sessions and assizes would be an obstacle to the success of such a course, because we contemplate men of position in practice taking such appointments, as in the case of recorders. And if the sessions and assizes were held together, there would be a difficulty about this when civil business was taken at assizes. The subject needs, and as, it seems to us, must soon receive, consideration in connection with the general judicial arrangements of the country.

THE ACT OF THE LATE SESSION, " to amend the law of Coroners in Ireland," 44 & 45 Vict. c. 35, deserves the attention of the legal profession. It will be remembered that Sir R. CROSS's Consolidation Bill of 1879, which applied to England only, restricted the office of coroner to barristers and solicitors. Any hopes which may have been founded on this measure have been doomed to be disappointed, for when we read the Irish Act of which we speak cine or surgery, and registered as such under the Medical Act of we find that any person who " is duly qualified to practice medi1858, or any Act amending the same," is qualified to be elected It is left, therefore, to the electors, who, in Ireland, by 9 & 10 coroner equally with a barrister, solicitor, or justice of the peace. Vict. c. 37, s. 8, are those who enjoy the county parliamentary franchise, to decide whether a doctor or a lawyer is a proper person to fill the post. The Act 44 & 45 Vict. c. 35, also abolishes property qualification; prescribes an annual salary, equal to the average amount of inquests held for five years, in lieu of fees; cuts down the duration of the poll at elections from two days to exceeding two shillings a day, and empowers a coroner to discharge one; provides for the payment of “ poor" witnesses at a rate not a jury in case of disagreement and summon a fresh one. England, it will be remembered, that, in case of inability of a coroner's jury to return a verdict, the coroner is functus officio, unless agreement should be arrived at by the curious lecture from the judge of assize in open court.

the

In

process of a

Mr. Hunt's toast at the Ohio bar dinner :-To Our Clients,-In the hours of The following affecting sentiment was, says the Central Law Journal, our ardent desire to impart to others that deep knowledge of the law for which our years of student life and later experience so eminently qualify us, our client is there to listen and believe. In our hours of despondency and sorrow over untoward judgments and adverse verdicts, our client is there to receive our execrations, because his proofs did not support his statements. In our hours of victory, when our hearts swell with the memory of our successes in verdict and judgment, lo, our client is there to wring our band in congratulation and admiration-and pay our fee. And in our festivities, when the good things of this life, in meat and drink, are before us, and the bowl goes round and beauty smiles upon us, and we glow over the thought that our bank accounts are ample, and our communications with our clients have driven want for ever from our doors, what can be mere fitting-more delicately and more beautifully appropriate-than that our clients should be remembered and toasted?

In the Queen's Bench Division on Thursday, says the St. James's Gazette, before Grove and Bowen, JJ., Willis, Q.C., with whom was Murray, on behalf of the defendants in the case of Nerlander v. Eddolls, appealed against not being a solicitor was entitled to recover the sum of two guineas for legal a decision of the judge of the Southwark County Court holding that a person work done and disbursements made in connection with a case tried in that court. No one appeared in support of the decision. Their lordships were of opinion that the case came within the provisions of the Solicitors Acts, which prohibited unauthorized persons from recovering costs claimed by them for work done as agents in the preparation and conduct of causes in the county courts. The restriction was a most wholesome one, as it protected suitors from being made the victims of mere knaves who touted for business outside the county courts. If the restriction were removed, legal proceedings would be rendered no cheaper; on the contrary, the costs would be much increased by regular solicitor's bill, be subject to the taxation and the control of the court. allowing any person to make any charge he chose, which would not, like a In these circumstances the decision of the county court judge must be reversed.

THE NEWSPAPER LIBEL ACT. THE provisions of the Act passed during the last session, intituled, somewhat clumsily, the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, introduce important changes in the law relating to libel. These provisions illustrate very forcibly the disadvantages arising from the piecemeal mode of legislation which unfortunately is scarcely avoidable owing to the rapidly fluctuating exigencies of modern civilization. It is impossible that the law should preserve any thing like breadth and symmetry of general structure, exposed as it is to this constant patching and paring. But the legist or student who would fain approach the law from a scientific point of view must admit with a sigh that the law was made for men, not men for the law. It is like the case of an old country house; the original design has been entirely lost sight of; the lines and idea of the old structure can hardly be conjectured, what with wings added here and stories there; but, after all, houses are meant to be lived in, and the successive owners were obliged to make elegance and symmetry subservient to use.

The first thing that strikes one with regard to the Act is that it obviously arose out of certain definite exigencies in connection with the newspaper press, and that little or no attempt was probably made to consider the matters directly aimed at in their relation to the law of libel in general. The worst of legislation of this sort is that it necessarily involves a possibility of entirely dislocating the structure of the law on a particular subject, and of introducing violent anomalies and inconsistencies. Newspaper proprietors, publishers, and editors now stand on a different footing in certain respects from that of other persons with regard to the law of libel. It may be right that they should do so, but we doubt whether the question has ever been duly weighed from this point of view, the object having merely been from time to time to free that particular class of persons from hardships against which they were, perhaps justly, clamorous.

The 2nd section of the Act provides that any report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting shall be privileged, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, and if such report was fair and accurate and published without malice, and if the publication complained of was for the public benefit; provided always that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceeding, if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant has refused to insert in the newspaper in which the report containing the matter complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement of explanation or contradiction by or on behalf of such plaintiff or prosecutor. The words appear to be taken verbatim from the report of a Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to consider the subject. A great many questions will necessarily arise on the wording of this section, and it appears to us that the restrictions involved by some of the words will very much cut down the scope of the protection afforded. What meetings may be said, in this relation, to be open to the public? Many of the meetings as to which such questions have arisen in the decided cases, and the proceedings of which are commonly reported, especially in country newspapers, are not, we apprehend, open to the public. Is a political meeting, to which the admission is by ticket only, open to the public? We do not suppose that meetings of vestries, boards of guardians, other public boards, and such like, are open to the public in fact. Nor, again, are meetings of shareholders, subscribers to large charities, and other similar meetings. It seems doubtful whether any meeting to which there is not absolutely free admission to any member of the public who chooses to apply for it can be said to be open to the public.

libel. Of course if such libel is wholly unconnected with the subject-matter of the original libel it would, we should think, make the letter or statement of explanation or contradiction unreasonable. But it may often happen that it is incidental or necessary to the vindication of the party libelled that he should accuse his accuser. If A. at a public meeting accuses B. of misapplying funds, a letter of contradiction alleging that A. was once guilty of adultery would be clearly inadmissible; but how if it is a necessary part of B.'s explanation to allege that A. was the party who misapplied the funds? Thus our editor will be placed in a delicate position. It prohibits the commencement of any criminal prosecution against allowance of the Director of Public Prosecutions, or in Ireland of a newspaper proprietor, publisher, or editor for libel without the the Attorney-General. We adverted some time ago to the necessity for some check on the power of the private individual to set the Crown in motion in cases of criminal prosecutions for libel, and it appears to us that this check will prove most convenient and salutary. But here the objection to the piecemeal character of the legislation which we before put forward again arises. Why should this protection be confined to newspaper proprietors and editors? We can imagine many cases in which well-meaning persons may have unfortunately brought themselves within the law of libel without much, if any, moral blame attaching to them, and against whom it is not right that a criminal prosecution should be instituted to gratify private malice and vindictive feeling. We do not see, inasmuch as libel is the subject both of civil and criminal proceedings, why in any case the uncontrolled discretion of a private individual should be allowed to determine whether the nature of the case calls for the vindication of the public right, and consequently the application of criminal law.

The 3rd section of the Act is one which will be very beneficial.

The 4th section of the Act, as we recently pointed out, may be said to be a section reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division in Reg. v. Carden (L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 1). It provides that a court of summary jurisdiction, upon the hearing of a charge against a proprietor, publisher, or editor, or any other person responsible for the publication of newspaper for a libel published therein, may receive evidence as to the publication being for the public benefit, and as to the matters charged in the libel being true, and as to the report being fair and accurate, and published without malice, and as to any matter which, under this or any other Act or otherwise, might be given in evidence by way of defence by the person charged on his trial or indictment, and the court, if of opinion, after hearing such evidence, that there is a strong or probable presumption that the jury on the trial would acquit the person charged, may dismiss the case. Again, with regard to this provision, the objection before urged arises. The power of pleading the defence to which this section relates was given by Lord Campbell's Act, and it is not confined to cases of newspaper libels, but applies to all defendants in criminal proceedings for libel. In Reg. v. Carden it was held that the magistrate, upon the preliminary inquiry, has no power to inquire into the matters which constitute such a defence, because it is only on plea pleaded by the terms of Lord Campbell's Act that the truth of the libel becomes material. This decision must be taken to stand as to cases other than those dealt with by the section of the Act we are discussing. Therefore, in the case of a newspaper proprietor or other such person connected with a newspaper as mentioned in the section, the magistrate can inquire into the truth of the libel, and whether its publication was for the public benefit; in the case of any other person he cannot. Take the case of a person writing a libellous letter to a newspaper and being indicted with the editor for the libel. The magistrate apparently, on proof of the publication of the libel, is bound to commit the one for trial, whereas in the case of the other he must go into the further question arising upon the defence that the libel was true, and that it was for the public good that it should be published, and may come to the conclusion that he ought not to commit for trial. This seems to be an anomaly.

The provisions that the report must be fair and accurate, and published without malice, do not present much difficulty. The question whether the publication was for the public benefit may, no doubt, give rise to difficulty, but the same question arises in the case of a plea under Lord Campbell's Act to an indictment for libel, and a jury may be trusted to deal reasonably with such a The Act provides for a summary conviction and fine in cases of question. More difficult questions will arise as to whether letters libel where the defendant consents to the case being summarily or statements of explanation or contradiction tendered to the news- dealt with, and also brings libel within the Vexatious Indictment paper by the plaintiff or prosecutor are reasonable. An editor will Act. The provisions of the Act with regard to the registration of sometimes be placed in a difficulty. It will not unfrequently hap-newspapers deal with matters of machinery, and have already been pen that the letter or statement so tendered will itself contain a discussed in our columns.

is not so plain. It has been stated by a very eminent judge of the

THE PROCEDURE COMMITTEE'S REPORT. Chancery Division, that two-thirds of the cases which come before

III.

A FURTHER portion of appellate jurisdiction is cut out for the
Court in Banc, namely, appeals from chambers in the Queen's

Bench Division.

"Similar considerations have led us, on the whole, to the conclusion that the interlocutory appeal from the judge at chambers in the special cases in which, under resolution 9, it will be allowed should be to the Court in Banc, which must, as we have seen, exist for some purposes, and which can transact the appeals from judges' chambers more expeditiously, and probably with less expense to the suitor, than the Court of Appeal." Hence it is proposed as follows:

"8. The appeal from a master shall be to a judge in chambers. "9. The appeal from a decision of a judge at chambers shall be to the Court in Bane; such appeal shall only take place, in cases of special difficulty and importance, when allowed by the judge giving the decision, or with special leave of such court.

"As the jurisdiction of the judge at chambers extends beyond matters of procedure, the following resolution was necessary :"10. The resolution as to limiting appeals from a judge in chambers shall apply to matters of procedure and practice only.”

We are at present concerned with these resolutions only so far as concerns the appeal from chambers, but we quote the whole that the scheme may be seen in its connection and entirety.

Now, with much care and trouble a uniform code of procedure for the Queen's Bench and Chancery Divisions has been twice provided. First, by the schedule of rules attached to the Judicature Act, 1873; secondly, in what must be assumed to be an improved shape, by the rules attached to the Judicature Act, 1875. Not only this, but numerous additional rules and numerous decisions have further explained and enlarged these rules, the Court of Appeal performing the useful function of upholding a uniformity of practice. It is now proposed to throw this machinery out of gear; and not, indeed, to cancel what has been done, but to provide means for its cancellation, and to draw the procedure into separate lines, by creating two distinct Courts of Appeal for the Queen's Bench and the Chancery Divisions, the latter of which is to continue as now to be the Court of Appeal and the former a court composed of judges of the Queen's Bench Division, the one composed of judges of higher, the other of judges of less rank and authority, yet the one of less rank and authority not bound (as it certainly would not in the proposed state of things be bound) to follow the decisions of the one of higher rank and authority.

This is so strange a result that the very statement of it is enough to throw doubt on the proposal; and, if this is the only alternative, it would seem better to retain the present system.

If the object is to lessen the number of appeals on matters of practice in the Queen's Bench Division, this might be readily done by taking away the appeal to the Divisional Court, and sending the litigant direct to the Court of Appeal. But although this would reduce by half the number of hearings of those cases which now reach the Appeal Court, and would certainly not add to the business of that court anything like the number of those which now go no further than the Divisional Court, it would undoubtedly increase very materially the number of cases which the Appeal Court would have to consider. And although the strong reluctance now entertained by that court to occupying its time with these matters is, to a great extent, due to their consciousness that almost every hearing by them of a matter of practice is a third appeal, with a fourth set of costs, that reluctance would probably still continue if the ground of objection were lessened by the hearing being only a second appeal. For even now these appeals interrupt the regular course of business; if increased in number they would do so still more. They also consume the strength of a court, which thinks, perhaps truly, that it might be better occupied than in hearing matters of secondary importance.

But, on the other hand, it would be a most serious misfortune if the controlling action of an appellate court acting for both

Divisions were removed.

There is, however, another point to be considered. It is believed by many, and the present proposals seem to exaggerate this view to the highest point, that the course of procedure in the two Divisions ought, in some respects, to run in different lines. Why,

sion.

But no

In such a

him are pure common law cases. Why, then, should it have been laid down by the same learned judge that the mere circumstance of an action being brought in the Chancery Division is a sufficient reason for following a different practice as to discovery from that sanctioned by the Court of Appeal in the other Division? Some may think that interrogatories may often be quite as idle and mischievous in the former Division as in the latter. But at any rate the opinion is held; and it may be that different rules on some points should prevail in different classes of actions, though not in actions distinguished by this rude and inaccurate classification. But clearly the distinction should be minimised, and its limits should be carefully laid down. It is submitted that these objects would be best attained if worked out by a court of appeal for practice more constant in its constitution than the present court (a quality, however, in which the present Court of Appeal surpasses that which is proposed by the Committee for one merely of the Division), and in which the two lines into which practice tends to separate might be equally represented, and by whose decision all judges would be bound. The advantages of a court constant in its elements may be well illustrated by what took place when the Judicature Acts first came into operation. It happened that for some months the business at the chambers of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Divisions was transacted by that very experienced and able judge, Lord Justice (then Justice) Lush; and during his rule the practice was rapidly assuming a clear, consistent, and practical shape. judge can be expected to remain always at this harassing work, and on his removal from chambers, under a succession of judges rapidly changing, and in a kind of judicial work where no judge considers himself bound by precedent, the practice quickly began to fall to pieces, and everything went into confuWe have, then, a reason why for practice there should be a court of appeal as constant in its elements as can be reasonably attained, and one where each kind of practice (as things now stand) should be equally represented by experience and knowledge, but neither be predominant by a casting vote. court, if anywhere, a serious attempt might be reasonably anticipated to establish, so far as possible, a uniformity of practice, and to discriminate carefully the classes of cases in which, if that were found necessary, different rules should prevail. There would be no difficulty in constituting such a court from the judges of appeal; and the reason above stated points to a court of two members of the Court of Appeal, selected by the court for that purpose, continuing to exercise their function without change for a reasonable length of time (say three months), and changed alternately, so that the tradition might continue constant. Further, it is manifestly desirable that the questions of practice should be rapidly disposed of, and should not either be themselves delayed by the rarity of the occasions when the court sits to take such business, or, by their interposition, distract and disarrange, as they do now, the order of other appeal business. And this end would also be attained by the existence of a court whose primary function would be to transact such business. It is further desirable that the judges of such a court should be members of a comparatively small body, so that in the event of new and doubtful points arising, which may occasion a difference of opinion, the general this condition would also be answered by the court now proposed. sense of its members may be taken with the less difficulty. And If, however, the Court of Appeal cannot be raised to such a strength as to allow of two judges being withdrawn from it for this purpose, the same object might be effected, though less perfectly, by constituting the court of two judges of the High Court. Yet such an alternative could not be accepted without grave misgivings whether the results would be as favourable, or nearly as favourable. It is easy to speak of points of practice as subordinate and trivial; but, in fact, all who are experienced in the conduct of litigation know well that they are of the highest importance to the right and just trial of the matter litigated; and if judges of the Court of Appeal continue to be what they are now, in weight, knowledge, and in breadth of view, it is not easy to see why their power and ability should not be used to bring and keep into a coherent and steady shape so important a branch of law.

And there is this further consideration. Is it prudent or reason

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