[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-A parliamentary return just issued shows that during the year 1880 the total amount received by the Treasury Solicitor on behalf of the Crown in respect to persons dying without known next of kin was £56,448 138. 11d.

This return is an annual one, and might easily be made an invaluable document to the public-namely, by adding the names, addresses, and descriptions of the intestates, and the amount of each "windfall."

Since the passing of the Treasury Solicitor Act, 1876, under which this return is made, the receipts have been as follows:-1877, £127,876 19s. 11d.; 1878, £139,769 9s. 3d.; 1879, £140,879 3s. 5d. The particulars above suggested would occupy but little space, as the cases average annually between thirty and forty only. 1, Great College-street, Westminster, Feb. 24.

EDWARD PRESTON.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

PRACTICE-DEmurrer-ALLEGATION OF SPECIFIC GROUNDS-Ord. 28, rr. 1, 2.-In a case of Bidder v. McLean, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th ult., the question was raised whether under the present practice it is essential that a demurrer should in all cases state specifically the grounds of demurrer. The action was brought to obtain a declaration that certain stock of a railway company was held by the defendants upon certain trusts. One of the defendants demurred to the statement of claim, "on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not show any cause of action to which effect can be given by the court as against the defendant, and on other grounds sufficient in law to sustain the demurrer." The plaintiff took out a summons, asking to have the demurrer set aside, "on the ground that it does not state specifically whether it is to the whole, or to a part, and to what part of the statement of claim, and that it does not state any ground in law for the demurrer, and that no ground of demurrer, or only a frivolous ground of demurrer, is stated." It was urged that under rule 2 of order 28 it is now necessary in all cases to state specifically the grounds of demurrer. The court (JESSEL, M. R., and BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), however, held that no such absolute general rule can be laid down, but that it must depend upon the nature of each case whether the demurrer should state specific grounds. And in the present case they held that no more specific grounds of demurrer could have been stated, and they accordingly refused the application.-SOLICITORS, Beale, Marigold, & Co.; Hargrove & Co.

BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE-PRESSURE BY CREDITOR-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 92-EVIDENCE-ADMISSION-SERVICE OF COPY OF DEPOSITION ALREADY ON FILE-COSTS-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 50.-In a case of Ex parte Hall, before the Court of Appeal on the 23rd ult., a question arose as to fraudulent preference. On January 17 a trader received an advance of £700 from one of his creditors, on a promise by him that he would forthwith supply the creditor "with goods, or their equivalent, to cover the advance." He failed to keep his promise, notwithstanding repeated requests by the creditor that the goods might be sent to him. On February 14, the creditor had an interview with him, and insisted on having the goods or their equivalent. The goods, however, were not sent, nor was any equivalent given by the debtor. On February 17 the debtor sent his brother-in-law to the creditor to tell him that it was all up with him, that he could not go on any longer, and that he had made up his mind to stop payment. In consequence of this information the creditor went to see the debtor, and was told by him that he was done up, and that his bankers had told him to stop. The creditor then pressed him to perform his promise, and threatened that he would instantly commence proceedings against him if he did not do so. The debtor promised to send the goods, and the creditor went away. On the 19th of February the debtor gave B., a friend of the creditor, some bills of exchange, accepted by some other firms, requesting B. to hand over the bills to the creditor. B. informed the creditor that he had the bills for him, and he afterwards applied to B. for them, but not (as the court held on the evidence) until after the 24th of February, on which day the debtor filed a liquidation petition. The proceedings for liquidation fell through, and on the 10th of March the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt upon the act of bankruptcy committed by the filing of the liquidation petition. Mr. Registrar Perys, as Chief Judge, held that the delivery of the bills of exchange was void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy, as being a fraudulent preference, and the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. The court held that, independently of the question of fraudulent preference, there was a fatal objection to the claim of the creditor to the bills, in the fact that he did not elect to take them as an equivalent for goods until after the act of bankruptcy had been committed, by which time they had become the property of the trustee. The debtor could not compel the creditor to accept the bills as an equivalent for goods; it was the right of the creditor to say whether he would accept them as an equivalent or not, and, until he had accepted them, the property in them did not

pass to him. But JESSEL, M.R., said that he agreed with the registrar that the transaction amounted to a fraudulent preference, even if the property in the bills had passed to the creditor before the act of bankruptcy. The handing over of the bills after the creditor had gone away could not be said to have been the consequence of bonâ fide pressure on the part of the creditor. It was clearly a voluntary act on the part of the bankrupt. It would be absurd to call that which was done on the 17th of February pressure at all. The threat of proceedings against a man who was going to stop payment in a week could not be called pressure. Of course the case would be entirely different if the creditor had known nothing about the state of the debtor's affairs. The pressure on the 14th of February could not be taken into account, because it was plain that it had produced no effect. BAGGALLAY, L.J., thought there was as clear a fraudulent preference as could possibly be conceived. LINDLEY, L. J., said that the first point was enough to dispose of the case, but he was inclined to think that the view of the Master of the Rolls was right as to the fraudulent preference. It was quite clear the transaction fell within the first part of section 92, and his lordship felt much doubt whether, having regard to the intimation which the creditor had received of the state of the bankrupt's affairs, he was, within the meaning of the proviso at the end of the section, "a purchaser or payee in good faith and for valuable consideration."

Another point arose as to evidence. The trustee had given the creditor notice that on the hearing of the application he should use as evidence a deposition of the creditor, which had been taken on a previous occasion and was on the file of the proceedings in the bankruptcy, and had served the creditor with a copy of the deposition. The objection was raised in the Court of Appeal that this deposition could not be used as evidence on this occasion, the trustee having given notice to cross-examine the creditor on an affidavit which he had made on the present application, and not having crossexamined him. The court held that the deposition could properly be used against the creditor as an admission made by him, and said that, if he wished an opportunity of giving an explanation, his counsel might have applied for leave to call him as a witness in chief.

There was also a question as to costs of copies of the deposition. It was urged that it was in accordance with the practice that a copy of the deposi. tion should be served on the other side. JESSEL, M.R., said that he was very loth to recognize any such practice. Notice of a deposition which was already on the file ought to be sufficient. The party to whom the notice was given could then go and look at the file, and take such extracts as were necessary. The court ought not to sanction a practice of serving copies of long examinations. The costs of the copy served on the creditor would, therefore, not be allowed. Under the particular circumstances of the case his lordship thought that the costs of the copies of the deposition supplied for the use of counsel should be allowed. But it must not be supposed that the costs of such copies would in all cases be allowed; the court might think fit to allow only the costs of taking extracts.-SOLICITORS, Hamlin & Grammer; Munns & Longden.

DELAY

BANKRUPTCY-TRADER-VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT INTENT TO COSTS. In a case of Ex parte Russell, before the Court of Appeal on the CREDITORS-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 91-13 ELIZ. c. 5-TRUSTEES— 24th ult., the question arose whether a voluntary settlement executed by a trader about three years before he filed a liquidation petition was void, either under section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, or under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, as against the trustee in the liquidation. Section 91 provides that "any settlement of property made by a trader, not being a settlement made before and in consideration of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration, or a settlement made on or for the wife or children of the settlor of property which has accrued to the settlor after marriage in right of his wife, shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt within two years after the date of such settlement, be void as against the trustee of the bankrupt appointed under this Act, and shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt at any subsequent time within ten years after the date of such settlement, unless the parties claiming under such settlement can prove that the settlor was at the time of making the settlement able to pay all his debts without the aid of the property comprised in such settlement, be void against such trustee." In the present case the settlor had carried on for some years the business of a baker, and had saved some money, with which he had bought some freehold houses. On the 8th of August, 1878, he executed a voluntary settlement of the houses, and of the furniture in his dwelling house, for the benefit of his wife and children. Before he made the settlement he consulted his solicitor, who advised him that the settlement would be of no avail unless he was able to pay all his debts without the aid of the property which he proposed to settle, and asked him to draw up a statement of his affairs. The settlor accordingly drew up a memorandum, which stated that his assets (independently of the property he proposed to settle), consisted of cash £25, a hand cart value £7, working utensils value £40, and fixtures value £20, total £92, and that his debts owing amounted to £58 159., and with this his solicitor was satisfied, and prepared the settlement. At the time when he executed the settlement the settlor was about to purchase a grocery business, which he intended to carry on in addition to his other business. In September, 1878, he made the purchase of the grocery business, paying £90 for the goodwill and fixtures. He carried on this business for about six months, but lost money by it, and he then sold the goodwill and fixtures for the same sum which he had given for them. He continued to carry on the baker's business alone, and in July, 1881, he filed a liquidation petition, and he then estimated his liabilities at £1,158. The trustee applied to the court to set aside the settlement as void either under section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act, or under the Statute of Elizabeth. He deposed that the debtor's estate was not worth more than £230. He had

sold the debtor's utensils and fixtures in his shop to an incoming tenant by auction-the utensils for £6 138. 4d., and the fixtures for £5 15s. 93. There was also evidence that, at the date of the settlement, the debtor owed other debts, which he had not included in his estimate, which made the total amount of his debts at that date £111. But he said that he had also, at the same date, some flour, worth about £20, which he had not included in the estimate of his assets. The debts due at the date of the settlement had all been paid before the filing of the liquidation petition. The judge of the Salford County Court set aside the settlement, on the ground that it was void under the Statute of Elizabeth, because the settlor thereby withdrew from his creditors the only means whereby he could carry on the grocery business, so that they should not lose in the event of that business not proving successful. But his honour declined to express any opinion whether the settlement was void under section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act. The trustees of the settlement applied to the Chief Judge, and he held that the settlement was not void under either Act. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L.JJ.), held that the settlement was void under both Acts. JESSEL, M.R., said that in his opinion, on the face of the bankrupt's own estimate of his assets at the date of the settlement, he was not able to pay all his debts without the aid of the property comprised in the settlement." His debts were presently due; how could it be said he was able to pay them when he could do so only by selling the implements of his trade? It was clear, however, in the present case, that the bankrupt really owed debts exceeding the amount of his own valuation of his assets. It was urged that the goodwill of his business ought to be taken into account. But that could not be reckoned as an available asset to satisfy debts which were presently due. His lordship was also of opinion that the county court judge was right in holding that the settlement was void under the Statute of Elizabeth. The principle of the decision of Malins, V.C., in Mackay v. Douglas (20 W. R. 652, L. R. 14 Eq. 106), applied-viz., that a man could not be allowed to go into a hazardous business at the risk of his creditors. The object of the Statute of Elizabeth was to prevent that sort of thing. The object of the settlement here was to put the settlor's property out of the reach of his creditors, in case he should fail in the new business which he was about to commence, and that was the very thing which could not be done by a voluntary settlement. BAGGALLAY, L.J., concurred. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the settlement was made, not simply to benefit the settlor's wife and children, but to protect them against the risk of his failing in the new business. It fell within the principle of Mackay v. Douglas, which was one of the most valuable decisions upon the Statute of Elizabeth. He also thought the settlement was void under section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act. The court must look, not merely at the amount of the settlor's assets, but also at the position which he was assuming. If he was about to retire from business, the value of the utensils of his trade and the goodwill of his business might well be taken into account, but not if he was intending to carry on his business. He must be able to pay his debts in the way in which he was proposing to pay them, and that would not be by selling the implements of his trade, if he was going on with his business. The judge of the county court gave the trustee in the liquidation his costs out of the debtor's estate, but left the trustees of the settlement to bear their own costs. The Court of Appeal ordered the settlement trustees personally to pay the costs of both appeals. JESSEL, M.R., said that the trustees might well have desired to have the question decided by a court, but, when they had got a decision, if they wished to appeal they must take the consequences. - SOLICITORS, Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.; Stacpoole & Son.

COMPANY-WINDING UP-PETITION BY SHAREHOLDER WITHIN A YEAR AFTER INCORPORATION OF COMPANY-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 79-CosTSSECURITY UNDERTAKING BY SOLICITOR.-In a case of In re The German Date Coffee Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the court (JESSEL, M. R., and BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) affirmed an order for the winding up of the company, which had been made by Kay, J., on the petition of some shareholders, on the ground that the whole substratum of the company had failed, and that it bad become impossible to carry on the business of the company as defined by the memorandum of association. One of the objections taken to the petition was that it had been presented before the expiration of a year from the date of the incorporation of the company, and it was urged that, inasmuch as one of the grounds assigned by section 79 of the Companies Act for the winding up of a company is that the company has not commenced its business within a year from its incorporation, it could not be right, when that state of things did not exist, to make a winding-up order on the ground that it was "just and equitable to do so. LINDLEY, L.J., said that, if it was evident within the year that the whole thing was abortive, the Act did not require that the company should go on for a year, but it might be wound up within the year under the "just and equitable" clause.

,,

After the appeal had been set down, the petitioners gave notice of an application that the company should give security for the costs of the appeal. Thereupon, the company's solicitors gave their personal undertaking to be answerable for the costs of the appeal, and the application for security was withdrawn. The appeal being dismissed with costs, the court, instead of leaving the petitioners to enforce the undertaking, made an order that the solicitors personally should pay the costs of all the respondents served with notice of the appeal.—SOLICITORS, John Tucker; Longcroft & Myers; Nye & Greenwood; R. Recce.

LIBEL INJUNCTION-JURISDICTION-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.-In a case of The Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company v. Beale, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th ult., a question arose as to the jurisdiction of the court to restrain by injunction the publication of a libel. The action was brought by a company against one of their shareholders to restrain the publication and issue by him of a circular addressed to the shareholders, on the ground that it contained

gross and libellous misstatements as to the financial position of the company. Bacon, V.C., granted an interlocutory injunction, and on the appeal one of the objections raised was that the court had no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel, at any rate, on an interlocutory application. JESSEL, M.R., said that he had no doubt whatever as to the jurisdiction of the court to grant an injunction in restraint of a libel. It was plain that this jurisdiction was given to the courts of common law by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 79, and by section 82 of that Act was extended to ex parte and interlocutory applications. This jurisdiction, which was clearly possessed by the common law courts, was, by the Judicature Act, transferred to the High Court, and extended to all actions, in whatever division they might be brought. But then the question whether that jurisdiction had been properly exercised in the present case was quite another matter. It was a jurisdiction which required to be very carefully exercised. No doubt in the case of an atrocious libel, which was wholly undefended, it might be very proper to restrain it upon an interlocutory application. But when no immediate injury was to be apprehended, it would be very dangerous to grant an interlocutory injunction in such cases. The statements complained of in the present case were not proved to be untrue. In general, no doubt, a plaintiff who sought to restrain the publication of a particular statement was bound to show that that statement was untrue. All that had been done was to bring forward the secretary of the company, who only said in his affidavit that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief the statements contained in the circular were untrue. When affidavits were made on information and belief the rules of the court required that the grounds of the information should be stated, and that bad not been done. It was clear, therefore, that there was no evidence to show that the statements complained of were untrue, and on this ground an interlocutory injunction ought not to have been granted. Moreover the injunction was in restraint of the publication of a circular which had been already issued to all thé chareholders, and, so far as he understood, there was no allegation that it was intended to continue the publication. There was no ground, therefore, for the intervention of the court before the trial of the action. The act was over, the mischief, if mischief there had been, was done, and there was no apprehension of any further issue. A third and a fatal objection was that the circular appeared to be in the nature of a privileged communication, being a circular by one shareholder asking for the co-operation of his brother shareholders in an attempt to reconstruct the company. The defendant said that he was acting bona fide, and there was no evidence that he was not doing so. His lordship could see no ground for taking it out of the character of a privileged communication, and, in his opinion, a judge should hesitate long before he decided so difficult a question as that of privilege on an interlocutory application. The order of the Vice-Chancellor was accordingly discharged. BAGGALLAY and LINDLEY, L.JJ., expressed similar opinions as to the jurisdiction, and BAGGALLAY, L. J., expressed his approval of the decision of Fry, J., iu Thomas v. Williams (28 W. R. 983, L. E. 14 Ch. D. 864), and of that of Jessel, M. R., in Beddow v. Beddow (26 W. R. 570, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 89), and said that the point had also been decided in Thorley's Cattle Food Company v. Massam (28 W. R. 966, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 763.—Solicitors, Beall & Co.; Snell, Son, & Greenip.

INJUNCTION-RESTRICTIVE COVENANT-USING BUILDING-PRIVATE DWELL, ING-HOUSE-CIRCUS-MODEL LODGING-HOUSE.-In an action of Worsley v. Swann, an interlocutory application was made before Hall, V.C., on the 23rd ult., for an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with the building of a circus, and from erecting a "Peabody Building," or model lodging-house, upon a plot of land at York. The land in question had been sold by the plaintiffs to the defendant, who had, upon the sale, entered into a covenant that any building which should be erected upon the land should not be used for certain specified purposes, or otherwise than as, and for, a private dwellinghouse." The plaintiff had commenced to build a circus or amphitheatre upon one part of the land, and a model lodging-house upon another part, and, in answer to the present motion, it was contended that the covenant only guarded against user, and there was no case for an injunction until the buildings were made use of in some manner repugnant to the covenant. The Vice-Chancellor, however, said that it was as much in the interest of the defendant as of the plain. tiffs that the injunction should be granted before greater expense was incurred. There was a plain breach within the spirit of the covenant, not only with respect to the circus, but also with respect to the lodging-house, which, in his lordship's opinion, could not be considered to come under the definition of "private dwelling-house." An injunction, until the trial of the action, was accordingly granted.-SOLICITORS, Tathams & Pym; Warrener & Cross.

a

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT OF "HOUSE AND PREMISES "-MEADOW AND STABLING.-In an administration action of Randolph v. Fitzgibbon, which came before Hall, V.C., on the 22nd ult., upon further consideration, the question arose as to what passed under a gift of a "house and premises.' The Countess Dowager of Clare, by her will, dated February 29, 1872, gave to the Hon. Mrs. Gerald Dillon a portion of the property under the description Ryde." The testatrix at her death occupied the same house, and with it some of "the house and premises in which I now reside, situate in the terrace at meadow land and stabling situated upon the opposite side of the road to that upon which the house stood, all the property being leasehold, and the question was now submitted to the court whether or not the meadow land and stabling was included in the gift. His lordship said that he could not construe the word "premises" as meaning no more than "appurtenances," nor could he treat the bequest as not containing the word at all. The testatrix, without doubt, used the expression in its secondary and popular sense, and he, therefore, held that it included the property in question.-SOLICITORS, Warrens ; Stevens, Longbourne, & Stevens.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-SPECIFIC OR GENERAL LEGACY.-In a case of Broadbent v. Barrow, before Fry, J., on the 25th ult., the question arose whether a legacy was residuary, specific, or general. A testator bequeathed a number of pecuniary legacies and then he bequeathed all his personal estate of which he should die possessed, and which should not consist of money or securities for money, to R. absolutely. And he gave and devised all the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, both real and personal, to trustees upon certain trusts. The testator's personal estate being insufficient for the payment of his pecuniary legacies in full, the question arose whether the bequest to R. was residuary or specific or general, and FRY, J., held that it was specific. He said that he accepted the definition of a specific legacy given by Jessel, M.R., in Bothamley v. Sherson (23 W. R. 848, L. R. 20 Eq. 304)—viz, that it must be (1) a gift of part of the testator's property itself, and (2) a gift of a part emphatically, as distinguished from the whole. FRY, J., said that the gift to R. fulfilled both these conditions. He also said that it was clearly not a residuary gift, though it would have been so, if it had not been followed by the other residuary gift to the trustees. If any of the pecuniary legacies had lapsed by the death of the legatee before the testator, it would clearly have fallen, not into the gift to R., but into the gift to the trustees, whereas, if the gift to R. had lapsed by her death before the testator, it would have fallen into the gift to the trustees. -SOLICITORS, S. Copping; Young, Jones, Roberts, & Hale; Lawford, Waterhouse, & Lawford; Solicitor to the Treasury.

PRACTICE-FOREIGN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY-EXTENSION OF BUSINESS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM-RETURN OF DEPOSIT-LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES ACT, 1870 (33 & 34 VICT. c. 41), s. 3.-In the case of In re The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society (Limited), before Chitty, J., on the 25th ult., a petition was presented for payment out "to the depositors" of the deposit of £20,000 required by the Life Assurance Companies Act, 1870, 8. 3, to be deposited in court by a foreign life assurance company desirous of commencing business in the United Kingdom. CHITTY, J., pointed out that the section of the Act referred to required the deposit to be returned "to the company," but made the order prayed for upon its appearing that the Board of Trade Rules, framed in pursuance of the Life Assurance Companies Acts, 1870 to 1872, sanctioned the mode of payment desired.— SOLICITOR.-R. C. Want.

WINDING UP-CONTRIBUTORY-SUPPLEMENTAL LIST - CERTIFICATE OF

CHIEF CLERK RES JUDICATA-COMPANIES ACT, 1862-GENERAL ORDERS, RR. 28, 29.—In the case of In re Dubois, also before Chitty, J., on the 27th ult., an application was made by the official liquidator of a company in liquidation to include Dubois' name on the supplementary list of contributories of the company in respect of 105 shares. It appeared that the company was wound up on the 26th of June, 1875, and that when the list of contributories was first taken in, the name of Dubois was entered by the then official liquidators as a contributory in respect of the shares, but on the 25th of July, 1877, Dubois appeared before the chief clerk and stated that the shares were in fact fully paid up, having been treated as such by the company in consideration of advances by him to them; and the liquidator expressing himself satisfied that such was the fact, Dubois' name was taken off the list and did not appear in the schedule to the chief clerk's certificate which was filed on the 2nd of May, 1878. Another official liquidator was subsequently substituted, and in March, 1881, he entered Dubois name as a contributory in a supplemental list. Dubois again attended before the chief clerk and took the objection that the list of contributories having already been settled by the chief clerk, with the omission of his name from the certificate, the question whether or not he should be a contributory had been finally adjudicated on, and could not be re-opened now after a lapse of several years. Upon the matter being adjourned into court it was contended on behalf of the official liquidator that there was nothing on the face of the chief clerk's certificate showing any adjudication, and that there was no reported case where a liquidator of a company had been held, on the ground of laches, to have lost his right to put a contributory's name on the list. CHITTY, J., said that it was too late to add Dubois' name as a contributory. The certificate of the chief clerk omitting the respondent's name from the schedules of contributories was binding. It was true that in the present case the certificate was not sufficiently specific within the General Orders under the Companies Act, 1862, rr. 28, 29, but it was the usual practice, with a view to save expense, to omit from the certificate the names of contributories who had established their claims to be treated as fully paid-up shareholders. He must, therefore, hold that the matter had been finally adjudicated upon, and that the attempt to put the respondent on the list was too late, although his decision might have been otherwise had a case of fraud been made out.-SOLICITORS, Blackford, Riches, Kilsby, & Wood; J. H. Lane.

submitted that the court, under the powers contained in the 5th section of the Act, could, after the five years mentioned in section 3, rectify the register, and that the above words were not such "special and distinctive" words according to section 10 of the Act as could be registered as a trade-mark. For the re spondents it was submitted that after the five years the registration was conclusive, and that the court could not, after that date, alter the register, whether the mark had been originally a proper one to be registered or not. Section 3 of the Trade-Marks Registration Act provides as follows :-" The registration of a person as a first proprietor of a trade-mark shall be prima facie evidence of his right to the exclusive use of such trade-mark, and shall, after the expiration of five years from the date of such registration, be conclusive evidence of his right to the exclusive use of such trade-mark, subject to the provisions of this Act, as to its connection with the goodwill of a business." CHITTY, J., was of opinion that the effect of section 3 was to give the persons registering a trade-mark the exclusive right to the user thereof after the period of five years from the date of registration. The enactment meant, not only that the title of the person registering was not to be brought into question, but also that the owner had the exclusive right to use the thing itself which was registered. The 5th section no doubt did not contain any limitation as to the time within which an application must be made to rectify the register, but be considered that section was to be read subject to the provisions of the 3rd section, and that after five years the thing registered was a trade-mark for all purposes. Although this was so, still the public were protected against any improper mark being registered by the following safeguards-first, by the fact that all trade marks were required to be advertised for three months before being registered; secondly, that the registrar had a discretion under the 17th and 18th rules under the Act as to the registration of any mark; and, thirdly, by the lapse of time before the applicant acquired an absolute right. On the whole he considered Messrs. Palmer had an unimpeachable title to the mark in question, and that the application must be refused.-SOLICITORS, Wilson, Bristows, & Carpmael; Hollams, Son, & Coward.

LICENSING LICENSING ACT, 1872 (35 & 36 VICT. c. 94), s. 3-SALE BY RETAIL-CLUB SUPPLYING INTOXICATING LIQUORS TO MEMBERS FOR CONSUMPTION OFF THE PREMISES NECESSITY FOR LICENSE.-In the case of Graff v. Evans, which was heard before a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division at Westminster on the 28th ult., the question was raised whether clubs come within the provisions of the Licensing Act, 1872. It was an appeal from a decision of the Westminster metropolitan police magistrate, Convicting the appellant, who was the manager of the Grosvenor Club, for selling by retail certain intoxicating liquors without being duly licensed, conclub is a bona fide working man's club, and the respondent being a member of trary to the provisions contained in section 3 of the Licensing Act, 1872. The it went there and purchased from the barman a bottle of whiskey and a bottle of Bass's ale, which were supplied to him. He paid 38. 11d. for the refreshconcealment. The magistrate drew a distinction between sale for consumption ments, which were wrapped up and taken away out of the club openly and without license. The court (FIELD, J., and HUDDLESTON, B.) held that the conviction on and off the club premises, and held that in the latter case the club required a must be quashed; that there is no difference in principle between a sale on or off the premises, and that the transaction in question was not a sale within the meaning of section 3, and therefore no license was required.-SOLICITORS, Lewis & Lewis; A. J. Bristow.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS.
(Before Mr. REGISTAR BROUGHAM, acting as Chief Judge.)
Feb. 18.-Ex parte Gann, Re Gann.

Debtor arrested pending proceedings under a petition for liquidation by arrangement or composition ordered to be released.

This was an application by William George Gaun for his release from Holloway Prison.

On the 12th of January last, Messrs. C. W. Hooper & Sons obtained an W. G. Gann to prison for twenty-one days for the non-payment of £17 12s. 7d. order from the judge of the Clerkenwell County Court for the committal of The order was immediately drawn up and placed in the hands of the warrant officer to execute, but, before he could enforce it, Gann filed a petition for liquidation in the London Bankruptcy Court.

On the 14th of January an injunction was granted restraining proceedings by Messrs. Hooper & Sons until after the 5th of February, and on the 6th a granted on the 15th until after the 27th of February. These orders were further injunction was granted until after the 14th, and another injunction was Served on Messrs. Asburst, Morris, Crisp, & Co., the solicitors for Messrs. Hooper & Sons, that of the 15th being served on the evening of that day.

On the morning of the 15th the warrant officer, finding that Messrs. Hooper & Sons had not been further restrained, endeavoured to arrest the debtor, but without success, and in the evening the officer met the debtor's wife, who produced to him a restraining order, made that day by the Court Bankruptcy. He said, "That is all right, but they ought to have had it down at our court"-meaning the Clerkenwell County Court.

On the following day, and before any notice of the restraining order had been given to the Clerkenwell County Court, the warrant officer saw the debtor at his house, and told him that he had come to arrest him. The debtor produced the restraining order made on the previous day, but the officer said that would not do; he must go to prison. He was then conveyed to Holloway Gaol.

Mattinson, in support of the application, contended that this court having granted a further restraining order on the 15th of February until the 27th, the arrest was unjustifiable, and that the debtor must be released.

Corrie Grant, for the detaining creditors, submitted that the restraining

order of the 5th of February having expired on the 14th, the arrest was right, no notice having been served upon the high bailiff of any further order.

Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM said the warrant officer was the agent of the high bailiff, and if he arrested a debtor with the knowledge of a restraining order, he did so at his peril. It was admitted that the order was shown to the warrant officer when he arrested the debtor, and, if he had any doubt upon the subject, it was his duty to have gone to his principal for instructions. If he had done so, the registrar did not suppose the high bailiff would have disregarded the order of this court. It was enough for the debtor to show that, when the officer arrested him, he knew there was a restraining order in existence. The order in this case appeared to have been served at the office of the solicitors for the detaining creditors on the 15th. The debtor would be released, and the detaining creditors must pay the costs of the application.

Solicitor for the debtor, W. H. Herbert.

Solicitors for the detaining creditors, Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, & Co.

SOCIETIES.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

At the usual monthly meeting of the directors, held at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, on Thursday, March 2, the following being present-viz., Mr. Desborough (chairman), and Messrs. Boodle, Desborough, jun., Hedger, Sawtell, Scadding, Sidney Smith, and A. B. Carpenter (secretary), a grant of £40 was made to the widow and daughter of a member and £10 to the widow of a non-member, one new member was elected, and the ordinary general business was transacted.

SHEFFIELD DISTRICT INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. The following are extracts from the report of the committee :The committee, in presenting the seventh annual report, have to announce that the number of members is 134.

Bills in Parliament.—The session of 1881 will be long remembered as that when two most important Bills (originally introduced by Lord Cairns when Lord Chancellor) passed, with very little alteration, through the two Houses of Parliament. These were the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 41, and the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 43 & 44 Vict. c. 44. The history of these Bills has been so often discussed by the profession that any lengthy comments thereon are not now needed. It is probable, however, that the first will effect a considerable reform in conveyancing, and conduce greatly to the shortening of deeds; and the latter is intended to give to solicitors what has been so long needed, adequate remuneration for trouble bestowed, without taking into account the mere length of deeds. It may not be out of place to add that a clause-the principle of which has been supported during several years by your society, to relieve lessees against forfeiture on breach of covenant-was introduced into the former Act, and has passed with the rest, leaving, however, the question of assignment without license an exception to the rule. The provisions as to mortgages, appointment of new trustees, enlargement of terms held at nominal and unpaid rents into fee simples, and many other useful provisions, form parts of an Act which it behoves every member to study thoroughly. A very desirable alteration has been effected by introducing the title "Statutory Declarations' Act, 1835," instead of the long and confused sentence with which most statutory declarations ended. With reference to the influence of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act upon conditions of sale, the attention of members is directed to the subsequent part of this report, under the heading of Conditions of Sale. The Solicitors' Remuneration Act legalizes the adoption of a commission scale in conveyancing charges, and gives to each of the presidents of the Incorporated Law Society of England, and the president of one of the Associated Provincial Law Societies, a voice in the arrangement of the scheme and the drawing up of rules and orders, which have to lie on the table of both Houses of Parliament, without objection, for a month, before coming into force. Your committee have co-operated with the committees of other provincial law societies, and with the Associated Provincial Law Societies, in attempts to agree upon a workable scale-one which can be obtained without pressure, and yet one which will be fairly remunerative to the practitioner; and there seems every prospect that the efforts of the profession will be crowned with success, the terms of the order having been agreed on by all.

Professional Matters.-Many conveyancing questions in connection with the profession came before the committee during the year, and a circular was, in the month of May, 1881, issued to each member, stating the decision of the committee on the following points:

1. Declaration of identity on dissolution of partnership.—It has, until lately, been the practice in the country to identify the persons signing a notice of disssolution of partnership by declaration on a half-crown stamp. The Gazette authorities have not been in the habit of requiring this where a London solicitor was the attesting witness, and they have now arranged where a country solicitor, whose name appears in the Law List, is the attesting witness, equally to do without a declaration of identity. This step was taken after a correspondence between Mr. E. W. Williamson and Mr. H. Hughes, a member of this society.

2. Valuations for Somerset House.-Nearly the universal practice has been to obtain the aid of a professional valuer in arriving at the price of property directed to be sold by a will and so coming into a re-iduary account, and this whether the property be freehold or leasehold. From recent inquiries made at Somerset House, it has been found that it is not essential to the passing of the account that the valuation should be made by a professional valuer. If the solicitor shows the method in which he arrives at the value, his estimate will be accepted.

3. The fee on production of an assignment to a landlord or his agent.The committee decided that, although in the case of a consent being required by a lease, the vendor is to obtain such consent and to pay the fee, if any, yet where the lease requires the lessee, his executors, administrators, or assigns, to produce the deed within so many days after execution, and to pay the fee, the duty to do this lies upon the purchaser, who has also to pay the fee on production.

4. In the case of a coal or mineral lease to be made, the committee decided that, in the absence of a previous bargain to the contrary, if the lease contemplates the getting of all the coal or other minerals under land of the lessor, which is at the time of the lease used as agricultural land, the lessor is not entitled to any stipulation that the lessee shall pay damage for subsidence, and that, in case of subsidence, the landlord must compensate the tenant of the surface. The committee also decided that the cost of any survey, necessary to ascertain the area under which coal or minerals are to be demised, should fall upon the lessor.

Other questions on which the committee have passed resolutions are set out under Miscellaneous.

Legal Procedure.-The report of the Committee on Legal Procedure occupied much of the time of your committee. The Associated Provincial Law Societies took place through their secretary, Mr. Marshall, of Leeds, and your committee have interested themselves in the proposed rules and orders. Communications were in substantial accord with the Associated Provincial Law Societies, but were not able to send a representative to the meeting held on the subject in London. A committee of solicitors in London now periodically meets on the question. MISCELLANEOUS.

Fees on Swearing Affidavits.-The committee passed a resolution that it is advisable, as a general rule, that the fees for swearing affidavits should be paid and received in cash at the time.

Court Fee on Probates.-The committee decided that, for the present, the old system as to fee for probate under seal (that is, on the gross amount) should be continued.

Cockburn v. Edwards.-The committee draw the attention of the members to this case, which lays down the rule that a solicitor, in preparing a mortgage from his client to himself, ought not to omit to insert a clause qualifying the power of sale, by requiring a notice to be previously given.

Fees to Valuers.-The committee have had before them the question of the payment to valuers of an ad valorem fee on a valuation. They thought that each transaction would have to be dealt with on its own merits, but that the payment of a commission was not desirable.

The United Iaw Clerks' Society, having been in existence half a century, is about to celebrate its jubilee at the Freemasons' Tavern. Lord Justice Holker has consented to preside on the occasion, and will be supported by several of her Majesty's judges.

A parliamentary return, moved for by Mr. Hopwood, shows that in the twenty years from 1861 to 1880 inclusive 512 persons were convicted of capital offences, of whom 279 were executed, 194 had their sentences commuted to penal servitude for life, and 16 for various shorter terms; while 13 were removed to Broadmoor. In one case the sentence was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal, three prisoners committed suicide, and six received a free pardon.

On Wednesday, before the Court of Appeal at Westminster, an applicant in person, whose name did not transpire, applied to their lordships for a new trial of an action for libel which he had brought against a solicitor, and which he said bad been decided against him by Mr. Justice Lopes without a jury. He was proceeding to read a paper setting forth the facts, when Lord Justice Brett said: You have no counsel, I believe. Who wrote this paper for you? clerk was he?-The applicant gave the name of the solicitor, which the reporter in the daily paper abstains from mentioning.-Lord Justice Brett: Did you pay him for this ?-Applicant: I did, my lord.-Lord Justice Brett: Then you had better go and tell Mr. Brown and h's employer what you have told me, and they will probably bear more about it. If Mr. Brown advised you to do all this, he only advised you to take up the time of the court by reading nonsense. I mean to write to the law society and tell them what has been done by this solicitor's olerk.-The applicant then left the court.

PENDING LEGISLATION.

CONVEYANCING.

A Bill intituled an Act for further improving the Practice of Conveyancing; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted, &c.:

Preliminary.

1. Short titles; commencement; extent; interpretation.] (1.) This Act may be cited as the Conveyancing Act, 1882; and the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (in this Act referred to as the Conveyancing Act of 1881), and this Act may be cited together as the Conveyancing Acts, 1881, 1882. (2.) This Act, except where it is otherwise expressed, shall commence and take effect from and immediately after the thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, which time is in this Act referred to as the commencement of this Act.

(3.) This Act, except where it is otherwise expressed, does not extend to

Scotland.

(4.) In this Act

(.) Property includes real and personal property, and any estate or interest in any property, real or personal, and any debt, and any thing in action, and any other right or interest in the nature of property, whether in possession or not;

(ii.) Purchaser includes a lessee or mortgagee, or an intending purchaser, lessee, or mortgagee, or other person, who, for valuable consideration, takes or deals for property.

Investigation of Title.

2. Protection to solicitor, trustees, &c, dispensing partially with investigation of title.] (1) Where the solicitor of a purchaser finds that the title shown to the property purchased has been previously investigated and accepted on behalf of a purchaser through whom the title is deduced, it is hereby declared to be in the discretion in good faith of the solicitor to dispense with further examination or investigation of the title so previously investigated and accepted; and he shall not be answerable in respect of any loss that may arise from bis dispensing therewith in good faith accordingly.

(2.) Where the solicitor is acting for trustees, executors, agents, or other persons in a fiduciary position, those persons also shall not be answerable in respect of any loss that may arise from his dispensing therewith in any cir

cumstances.

(3.) This section applies only to solicitors dispensing as aforesaid on purchases made after the commencement of this Act.

Searches.

3. Official negative and other certificates of searches for judgments, Crown debts, &c.-3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74.] (1.) Where any person requires, for purposes of this section, search to be made in the Central Office of the Supreme Court of Judicature for entries of judgments, deeds, or other matters or documents, whereof entries are required or allowed to be made in that office by any Act described in the First Schedule to this Act, or by any other Act, he may deliver in the office a requisition in that behalf, referring to this section. (2.) Thereupon the proper officer shall diligently make the search required, and shall make and file in the office a certificate setting forth the result thereof, and he may at any time add to or amend that certificate; and cffice copies of that certificate shall be issued on requisition, and an office copy shall be evidence of the certificate.

(3.) In favour of a purchaser, as against persons interested under or in respect of judgments, deeds, or other matters or documents, whereof entries are required or allowed as aforesaid, the certificate, according to the tenour thereof, shall be conclusive, affirmatively or negatively, as the case may be.

(4.) General Rules shall be made for purposes of this section, prescribing forms and contents of requisitions and certificates, and regulating the practice of the office, and prescribing, with the concurrence of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the fees to be taken therein; which Rules shall be deemed Rules of Court within section seventeen of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as altered by section nineteen of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1881, and may be made, at any time after the passing of this Act, to take effect on or after the commencement of this Act.

(5.) If any officer, clerk, or person employed in the office commits, or is party or privy to, any act of fraud or collusion, or is wilfully negligent, in the making of or otherwise in relation to any certificate or office copy under this section, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

(6.) Nothing in this section or in any rule made thereunder shall take away, abridge, or prejudicially affect any right of any person to make any search in the office; and every such search may be made as if this section or any such Rule had not been enacted or made.

(7.) Where a solicitor obtains an office copy certificate of result of search under this section, he shall not be answerable in respect of any loss that may arise from error in the certificate.

(8.) Where the solicitor is acting for trustees, executors, agents, or other persons in a fiduciary position, those persons also shall not be so answerable. (9.) Where such persons obtain such an office copy without a solicitor, they shall also be protected in like manner.

(10.) Nothing in this section applies to deeds inrolled under the Act of the session of the third and fourth years of King William the Fourth (chapter seventy-four) "for the abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and for the substitution of more simple modes of Assurance," or under any other Act. (11.) This section does not extend to Ireland.

Notice.

4. Restriction on constructive notice.] (1.) A purchaser shall not be prejudi. cially affected by notice of any instrument, fact, or thing unless(.) It is within his own knowledge; or

(ii.) It has come to the knowledge of his counsel, as such, or of his solicitor, or other agent, as such; or

(iii.) It would have come to the knowledge of the purchaser, or of his solicitor, or other agent, as such, if such inquiries and inspections had been made as ought reasonably to have been made by them or one of them.

(2.) This section shall not exempt a purchaser from any liability under, or any obligation to perform, any covenant, condition, or provision contained in any instrument under which his title is derived, mediately or immediately; but such liability or obligation may be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as if this section had not been enacted.

(3.) This section applies to purchases made either before or after the commencement of this Act; save that, where an action relative to a purchase is pending at the commencement of this Act, the rights of the parties shall not be affected by this section.

Leases.

5. Contract for lease not part of title to lease.] (1.) Where a lease is made otherwise, any preliminary contract for or relating to the lease shall not form under a power contained in a settlement, or conferred by Act of Parliament or part of the title, or evidence of the title, of any person to the lease, or to the benefit thereof.

(2.) This section applies only if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the instrument creating the power, and shall have effect subject to the terms of that instrument and to the provisions therein contained. (3.) This section applies only to leases made under powers created after the commencement of this Act.

Married Women.

6. Abolition of acknowledgment of deeds, and of examination of married women-40 & 41 Vict. c. 18.] (1.) The acknowledgment of deeds by married women under any Act of Parliament, and the examination of married women in court, or otherwise, prescribed by the Settled Estates Act, 1877, are hereby abolished.

(2.) On a surrender by husband and wife of copyhold land, in which the wife alone has, or she and her husbend in her right bave, an equitable estate, the separate examination of the wife is hereby abolished; and every such surrender shall, without such examination, be binding on the married woman and all persons claiming under her; but this provision does not affect the custom of any manor relative to surrender or admittance.

(3.) The enactments described in Part I. of the Second Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed.

(4) The foregoing provisions of this section, including the repeal therein, apply only to deeds executed, and applications and surrenders made, after the commencement of this Act. (5.) Notwithstanding the repeal or any other thing in this section, the certificate, if not lodged before the commencement of this Act, of the taking of an acknowledgment by a married woman of a deed executed before the commencement of this Act, with any affidavit relating thereto, shall be lodged, examined, and filed in the like manner and with the like effects and consequences as if this section had not been enacted.

(6). There shall continue to be kept in the Central Office of the Supreme by married women lodged therein, containing the names of the married Court of Judicature an index to all certificates of acknowledgments of deeds women and their husbands, alphabetically arranged, and the dates of the certificates and of the deeds to which they respectively relate, and other particulars found convenient; and every such certificate lodged after the commencement of the Act shall be entered in the index as soon as may be after the certificate is filed.

ment of this Act shall be delivered to any person applying for the same; and (7.) An office copy of any such certificate filed before or after the commence. every such office copy shall be received as evidence of the acknowledgment of the deed to which the certificate refers.

7. Power for married woman to dispose of proprietary interests, release powers, equity to settlement, &c.] (1.) A married woman may, as fully and effectually as if she were not married, by deed, made with the concurrence therein of her husband,

(i.) Dispose of any present or future or reversionary interest, vested or contingent, in any property; and

(ii.) Release or extinguish any power given or reserved to her in respect of any property; and

(iii) Release or extinguish her right or equity to a settlement out of any property; and

(iv.) Dispose of, release, or disclaim any property,

to which interest, power, right, equity, or property, she, or her husband in her right, is for the time being entitled, under any instrument made before or after the commencement of this Act, or otherwise.

(2.) The powers given to a married woman by this section shall not prevent the exercise of any power given or reserved to her independently of this section, except where and as far as any act done under this section amounts to a suspension or extinguishment of that other power.

(3.) This section does not authorize a married woman to deal in any manner with

(i.) Property, which she is restrained from affecting by alienation, anticipation, or otherwise; or

(ii.) Property settled on her by settlement, or agreement for settlement, made on her marriage.

(4.) The Act described in Part II. of the Second Schedule to this Act is hereby repealed.