CURRENT TOPICS.

IT IS WORTH WHILE to remark, in connection with the announcement that the Select Committee of the House of Lords have no intention of scrutinizing the exercise of the judicial functions of the Land Court, that, any examination of the com

This follows from the case of Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board of Works (L. R. 5 H. L. 418), in which it was held by the House of Lords that though an arbitrator may be asked what

LORD JUSTICE BAGGALLAY was too ill to attend the Court of Appeal at Lincoln's-inn on Monday last, and that court has since sat with two judges only to hear interlocutory matters.

MR. JUSTICE FRY has risen for a few days, and will not sit again in court till next Thursday. Mr. Justice KAY, instead of intermitting his sittings at present, has announced his intention of terminating the sittings of his court on Friday, the 31st inst., four days before the commencement of the Easter Vacation.

A NEW ORDER OF TRANSFER has been issued, which we print elsewhere, for the transfer of twenty causes from the list of ViceChancellor HALL to that of Mr. Justice FRY; twenty causes from the list of Mr. Justice CHITTY to that of Mr. Justice FRY, and sixty causes from the list of Mr. Justice CHITTY to that of Mr. Justice KAY, for the purpose of trial or hearing only.

THE ADJOURNED MEETING of the Rule Committee of Judges was held on Wednesday in the Lord Chancellor's room at Westminster, to take into further consideration the Report of the Legal Procedure Committee. The Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, Mr. Baron POLLOCK, Lord Justice LINDLEY, Sir JAMES HANNEN, and Justices FRY and MANISTY were present.

A PRACTICAL POINT of some importance to country solicitors has been noticed in the reports of two law societies recently published by us. It has been the practice in the country to identify persons signing a notice of dissolution of partnership by a declaration bearing a half-crown stamp. In London, on the other hand, notices of dissolutions of partnership for the London Gazette are received without any such declaration where a London solicitor is the attesting witness. It has recently been arranged that where a country solicitor whose name appears in the Law List is the attesting witness, a notice of dissolution for the Gazette will be received from the country without any declaration.

AT A MEETING of the Hull Law Society, held on February 21, the following resolution was moved by Mr. LowE, the president of the society, and seconded by Mr. SHACKLES: "That in the opinion of this society, the office of Registrar of Deeds for the East Riding of Yorkshire (now rendered vacant by the death of Mr. MAISTER) should be filled by the appointment of a member of the legal profession, who should pledge himself to attend personally to the duties of the office, and keep such indexes as will render the search for deeds, &c., more simple and expeditious than at present.' The resolution was carried by a very large majority. London practitioners will wish that the latter part of the resolution could be enforced on the officers of the Middlesex Registry.

passed in his own mind when exercising his discretionary powers on the matters submitted to him for consideration. And Baron CLEASBY, in delivering his opinion in that case, said that " with respect to the office of judges [as distinguished from arbitrators] it has been felt that there are grave objections to their conduct being made the subject of cross-examination and comment (to which hardly any limit could be put) in relation to proceedings before them; and as everything which they can properly prove can be proved by others, the courts of law discountenance, and I think I may say prevent, them from being examined. But those objections do not apply to a person selected as arbitrator for the particular occasion by the parties." And it is to be observed that Lord CAIRNS in his judgment, remarked that, "as regards the reception of the evidence the line has been most properly and accurately drawn by Mr. Baron CLEASBY."

LORD CAIRNS' proposed supplement to the Conveyancing Act has been issued to the public. The reader will have noticed that no small part of the objections urged by us against the Act of last year turned upon the inaccurate language in which it is drafted. Our objections to the new Bill are seldom or never confined to the language alone; we observe, indeed, that a good many alterations for the better have been made in its language. But its matter is generally such as to do credit to the discretion of the Select Committee by whom its provisions were struck out last year. It seems to be pervaded by a desire to make purchasers safe at all costs: a sentiment which is highly laudable within due bounds, but which cannot be carried too far without offering dangerous facilities to rogues, who could desire nothing better than that all purchasers from them should obtain an indefeasible title. Something of the same questionable policy appears in the proposal of section 2, that it shall be in the discretion of a solicitor (acting, of course, in good faith) to dispense with the investigation of a title which has been previously investigated and accepted on behalf of a purchaser. If this provision should pass, persons who by their own carelessness in investigation have obtained a bad title will be greatly helped towards passing it on to a new purchaser, upon whom the loss, if any, will fall. It will be seen from the letters which have appeared in our columns that, in the opinion of many members of the profession, the separate examination of married women, which the Bill proposes to abolish, is by no means a useless ceremony, and that it cannot be abolished without offering dangerous facilities and temptations to marital bullying. It is difficult to regard any part of the Act with any feeling more cordial than doubt and hesitation. The language, as we have said, has been improved; but a great deal of room is left for further improvement. We propose to return hereafter to a more detailed examination of the provisions of the

Bill.

THE APPEARANCE of two judges in the witness-box in the Phillimore case, suggests the consideration whether these learned persons, and other persons whose time is especially valuable, might not be allowed to give evidence on affidavit under ord. 37, r. 1, which empowers the court or a judge at any time, for sufficient reason, and unless the production of the witness be bona fide de

sired for cross-examination, to order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the trial. Except as modified by this rule, it is clear law that any person, however considerable (except only the Sovereign), may be summoned by subpoena from Northumberland to Cornwall. As an instance of the universality of the rule, Bentham asked, "Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor to be passing in the same coach while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpenny worth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper and the barrowwoman were to think proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it ?" "No," he answers, "most certainly not." And, in a note to a learned work on Evidence, we find the following curious story:"We remember a prosecution for blasphemy, in which the defendant, by way of showing the divided state of opinion on theological subjects, actually subpoenaed the heads of all the religious persuasions he could hear of, and when the day of trial arrived, these found themselves all shuffled together in the waiting-room-the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Chief Rabbi being of the party." With regard to the capacity of a judge to give evidence on matters not relating to his judicial functions, it was at one time supposed that a judge was incapacitated by being named as a judge in the commission under which the court is sitting (7 Hen. 4, 41a), but this doctrine has long been exploded (R. v. Hacker, J. Kelynge, 12). It is still a matter of doubt, however, whether a judge can give evidence in the very cause which he is trying, the better opinion being that he cannot. See the question discussed in Taylor on Evidence, s. 1244.

A DECISION was pronounced last week by Mr. Justice KAY which will, we believe, be found to enlarge the idea of our readers as to what, for the purposes of the Stamp Act, constitutes a promissory note. The facts of the case (Hodges v. Newport), so far as they are material, were as follows. The defendant was the executor of a deceased person, who had, together with the plaintiff, given a joint promissory note for £350 to a banker. The whole of the money was paid at maturity by the plaintiff, who now claimed to receive credit for half the amount in taking accounts between himself and the estate of the deceased joint acceptor of the note. In order to prove that the joint acceptor had not been a mere surety for the plaintiff, but had been, as between himself and the plaintiff, liable to pay half the amount of the note, the plaintiff at the trial tendered in evidence a document, purporting to be signed by the deceased, and worded as follows:"I agree to pay the sum of £175, being half the sums of the joint bill in Stuckey Bank, my due [sic].-(Signed) SAMUEL NEWPORT." This document, supposing it to be a promissory note, was not properly stamped; and the Stamp Act does not permit an inland promissory note to be stamped after execution, even on payment of a penalty; so that upon that hypothesis the document was excluded from being put in evidence. Mr. Justice KAY, relying upon the language of the Stamp Act, 1870, s. 49, subsection (1), held that the document was a promissory note within the meaning of that section. The section upon which the learned judge relied enacts that "the term promissory note means and includes any document or writing (except a bank-note) containing a promise to pay any sum of money." These words are no doubt very wide, and it would seem that a document may be a promissory note for the purposes of the Stamp Act, though it is by no means obviously a promissory note for other purposes and in the ordinary sense of the word. Sir JOHN BYLES, it will be remembered, gives the following definition :-"A promissory note is an absolute promise in writing, signed, but not sealed, to pay a specified sum at a time therein limited, or on demand, or at sight to a person therein named or designated, or to his order, or to the bearer." The decision tends to throw uncertainty over some questions which have not hitherto been treated in practice as doubtful. acknowledgment intended to take a debt out of the Statute of Limitations would be very likely to use the word "agree," and would certainly contemplate the future payment of a money claim. Can it be that these documents, even if containing a reference to a preceding promissory note, require to be stamped as promissory

A mere

notes? The same remarks apply to acknowledgments of a liability to "answer for the debt of another person," within section 4 of the Statute of Frauds. It will be a consideration of some gravity if these and such like documents require to be stamped as promissory notes in order to be admissible as evidence; but it is difficult to explain the ruling of Mr. Justice KAY upon any other hypothesis.

IT IS TO BE HOPED, but hardly to be expected, that the justice of the decision in Walker v. Matthews (30 W. R. 338) will commend itself to the rural mind. A cattle dealer bought in market overt two cows from a man who had stolen them. The dealer sold the cows to a bona fide purchaser, who had no notice of the felony. Section 100 of the Larceny Act, 1861, provides that if any person guilty of felony in stealing any property shall be convicted thereof, "in such case the property shall be restored to the owner or his representative," and the court, before whom any person is tried, shall have power to award writs of restitution for the property, or to order the restitution thereof in a summary manner. And it was decided in Scattergood v. Silvester (15 Q. B. 506) that the effect of conviction under this Act is to re-vest the property in stolen goods in the original owner, notwithstanding any intervening sale in market overt. The person from whom the cows were stolen traced them to the purchaser and demanded their restitution, but he refused to give them up. Some months after, the thief was convicted of having stolen the cows, and the person from whom they were stolen, after again demanding them from the purchaser, brought an action against him to recover them. The purchaser counter-claimed for the cost of their keep while they were in his possession, up to the time of the conviction of the thief, on the ground that until that time the property in them did not vest in the plaintiff. But he was met by Mr. Justice LOPES with the observation that if the property in the cows was in him, he could not recover the expenses of keeping his own property; still less if he was keeping them wrongfully. And the court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the counter-claim.

On Saturday and Monday the appeals in the cases of The Law Society of the United Kingdom. Shaw and another, and The Law Society of the United The actions were for penalties against firms of law stationers carrying on business Kingdom v. Waterlow Brothers & Layton, were heard by the Court of Appeal. in London, it being alleged that the defendants acted as proctors in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division without being duly qualified within the Solicitors Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vier. c. 127), s. 26. The nature of the acting complained of consisted in the defendants, by themselves, or their servants, lodging and registering the papers required for probate of wills at Somerset House, applying for and obtaining the grant of probate, answering inquiries made by the officials in regard to such applications for a grant of probate, and discharging such duties in the name of solicitors or proctors, The only difference in the of the two cases was that the defendants in the first case acted for, and in the name of solicitors practising in London; the defendants in the second case acted for, and in the name of, solicitors practising in the country. The actions were tried together before Mr. Justice Grove in Middlesex; the jury were discharged; by consent judgment was entered for the plaintiffs for £50, being the amount of one penalty, and execution was stayed to enable the opinion of the Court of Appeal to be taken by the defendants. The court reserved judgment.

facts

On Wednesday afternoon, in Lincoln's-inn Hall, Mr. Justice Chitty presided over the annual distribution of prizes to the Inns of Court Rifle Volunteers. In the absence of the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Bulwer, Q.C., M.P., Major Russell commanded the battalion, which was drawn up in the hall, and received Mr. Justice Chitty (late major in the corps) with a military salute. In the course of his remarks, Mr. Justice Chitty referred to the eminent men who had preceded him in the position he that day occupied in regard to this ceremony, and said he felt that the honour of following great lawyers, politicians, and soldiers in that presidential chair was due to his having served for more than seventeen years in the ranks of the regiment. He expressed his deep regret that he had been obliged by profssional avocations and other duties to retire from active volunteering, and then, to show that the duties of a volunteer were not incompatible with the attainment of the highest professional honours, he enumerated the many eminent judges who had been active members of the Inns of Court Volunteer Corps, adding that these examples would seem to show that the members of the regiment might be regarded as carrying the judge's wig in their knapsacks. He urged the younger members of the profession to enter the ranks, and assured them, from his own experience, of the social advantages of being members of the cerpe. In proof of the view that volunteering gave men the power to work instanced the fact that the commanding officer was one of her Majesty's cc insel, was editor of Law Reports, was a member of Parlia ment, and yet found time to be frequently with his regiment,

than where the object is to resist specific performance or to have

the contract rescinded.

The error into which Mr. Justice Fry fell in Redgrave v. Hurd -inadvertently, no doubt, as his chapters on misrepresentation and fraud abundantly show-was in confounding the case of a representation where the person induced to contract has means of investigating with that where the investigation and not the representation has induced the contract. If the representation really induced the contract, the question as to the means of investigation does not matter at all. If there was an investigation, and it was relied on, then in fact the question of representation does not arise. The facts in cases which give rise to these questions are generally similar. There is some representation to bring the parties together, and there is usually some sort of inquiry; what the court has to decide is, Which was it that induced the contract?

THE WORKING OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.

THE case of Moyle v. Jenkins (L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 116), in which it was decided by Grove, Lopes, and Bowen, JJ., that the notice which is a condition precedent to suing under the Employers' Liability Act, and which must be given within six weeks from the occurrence complained of, must be in writing, is the only case upon the construction of the Act which has yet reached the High Court; but the useful work of Mr. Ruegg contains an abstract of thirteen cases from April to October, 1881, which have been decided in the county courts. We propose shortly to consider such legal points as arose in these cases, and to offer a few remarks on some other points on the Act. The following is a brief abstract of the principal sections of the

Act:

A work an, unless he knew of the defect or negligence which caused his injury, and did not give information of it, or knew that his employer or a superior was aware of it, has the same right of compensation as if he had not been in the service of the employer for personal injury, caused either

(1) By defect in machinery arising from, or not remedied by, the negligence of the employer, or some person to whom the supervision of the machinery is intrusted:(2) By the negligence of any person in the service of the employer having the sole or principal duty of superintendence, and not ordinarily engaged in manual labour :

workman was bound to conform :

(3) By the negligence of any person in the service, &c., to whose orders the (4) By the act or omission of any person in the service, &c., in obedi. ence to bye-laws, not being bye-laws sanctioned by a Government department under the authority of Parliament, if the injury resulted from some impropriety

therein :- or

(5) By the negligence of any person in the service, &c., who has the charge of any "signal points, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway."

It is material to observe at the outset that these enactments do not abolish the doctrine of "common employment." A fellowservant suing a fellow-servant must still fail to recover unless he can bring himself within the words of one of the exceptions which the statute ingrafts upon the rule of Priestley v. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1), that the master is not liable.

No question appears yet to have arisen upon the meaning of the five sub-sections above abstracted. The difficult questions which may arise on what is "a principal duty of superintendence" and what is being "ordinarily engaged in manual labour" would seem to be questions of fact rather than of law, and so would the still more difficult question as to whether there was "impropriety" in any particular bye-law. But it is clear that such questions can never be satisfactorily determined by a jury, and it is easy to imagine a case where a county court judge may be destitute of the proper special knowledge on which to form an opinion. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the assistance of assessors, as provided for by section 6 of the Act, will be frequently invoked.

The 5th sub-section gives rise to two questions. Is the expression "train confined to a train properly so called, a completed train in motion, or will it also apply to any line of carriages or trucks which may be got together in the course of railway work? We incline to the more inclusive meaning; but the question is not free from doubt. If "train" is to be read strictly, all shunting operations, which are clearly within the mischief of the Act (for what fellowship has a shunter with a plate layer ?),

would be excluded from it.

66

Secondly, does "railway" include ' tramway? We think not. A tramway we take to have a well-defined meaning separate from that of a railway, the distinction being that the owner of a railway owns the land over which the rails run, whereas the owner of a tramway does not. If tramway was to be included, it would have been expressly mentioned. The principal legal points in the county court cases have arisen upon the important sections as to notice. These are sections 4 and 7, of which an abstract is as follows::

An action is not maintainable unless written notice giving the name and address of the party injured, with particulars, be given within six weeks and the action is commenced within six months, or in case of death, within twelve months. In case of death the want of notice is no bar if the judge be of opinion there was reasonable excuse for such want of notice. No notice is to be deemed invalid by reason of any defect therein, unless the judge be of opinion that the defendant is prejudiced by the defect, and that the defect was (sic in the Act) for the purpose of misleading. The notice may be served by post by a registered letter.

Upon these sections we find from Mr. Ruegg's appendix that in the Bow County Court service by an unregistered letter has been widow" who was so excited in mind that her medical man ordered held good; that in the Oldham County Court the pregnancy of a her not to be consulted on the subject " has been held a reasonable where a formal notice had not been given until ten weeks, but excuse for not giving notice in time; and that at Cockermouth, within fifteen days the plaintiff wrote to defendants' manager, stating that he should hold the company liable, and claiming comsufficient." To the decisions at Bow and Oldham no exception pensation, "it was held by the judge that this notice was the judge, and it is well to point out that far more liberal views of can be taken. Both of the questions were purely questions for the Act might have been taken without the possibility of being upset. Where an Act of Parliament uses the words "reasonable," "satisfied," "in the opinion of," and so forth, in connection with the decision of a judge upon a point, it clearly constitutes that judge an absolute arbiter upon that point. The Cockermouth decision seems clearly wrong, or, as Mr. Ruegg more politely puts it," questionable," and may be contrasted with the more accurate construction of the Act in the Manchester court, where the judge nonsuited a plaintiff who proceeded upon a notice in these words, "The boy, William Tarley, who was hurt at your mill on the 22nd of February, will require a considerable sum of compensation. Do you think we can settle the matter out of court, or must we bring an action?" This notice, which is not very dissimilar to that which was admitted to be incorrect in Moyle v. Jenkins, if a written notice was requisite, failed because the Legislature, using negative words, says in section 4 that the action shall not be maintainable unless, &c., and, as the court has held in Moyle v. Jenkins, the words of section 7, which prescribe the form of notice, are to be read into section 4.

A question which may, perhaps, arise is whether the "information" of defects and negligence, for failing to give which, under section 2 the workman forfeits his right to compensation, must also be in writing. Moyle v. Jenkins leaves the point untouched, but it may be contended that that decision impliedly decides it. The words in section 7 are: "Notice in respect of an injury under this Act shall give the name and address, &c." In one sense the information is "notice in respect of an injury." But we cannot think that so extended an application of section 7 will be given by the High Court. The information is to be given before the injury can possibly happen: the notice, of course, can only be given after it has happened. On the other hand, it is remarkable that the only other notice in respect of an injury to which section 7 can apply is the notice under section 4.

It is observed by Mr. Ruegg that "more than one application to remove an action under the Act by certiorari to the High Court on account of the largeness of the amount claimed has been refused." The applications for removal being made, according to the ordinary practice, in chambers, no report of the applications was, of course, obtainable; but we are somewhat surprised that no attempt has been made to appeal from the refusals to remove. The sections of the County Court Act (Act of 1846, s. 90; Act of 1856, s. 38), no doubt make the removal a matter of discretion, and the High Court would, no doubt, be extremely reluctant to interfere with that discretion. Still it seems equally clear that

both the removal and the refusal to remove may be appealed against to a divisional court, and to the Court of Appeal (see section 19 of the Judicature Act of 1873), and even to the House of Lords (see section 3 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876), in succession. Perhaps the reason for acquiescing in the decision of the judge at chambers is, that the parties are content with the possibilities of an appeal. But is it so certain that an appeal lies? The Act itself is silent as to appeal, but express as to certiorari. If an appeal lies, it must come from the County Court Acts. But might it not be argued, that by expressing certiorari, which also would have come from the County Court Acts if appeal would, and looking also to the rule that an appeal cannot be given by implication, the right of appeal does not exist? We think, on the whole, that the right exists, but we cannot help suspecting that some legal doubt upon the subject may account for the fact that of the three cases in which Mr. Ruegg tells us that an appeal was intended, none of them has, as yet, been heard of. In Moyle v. Jenkins the respondent succeeded, so that it was not necessary to raise the point.

The only other question which occurs to us upon the Act is the rather grave one whether the County Court Rules which have been made under the Act are not ultrà vires. The 6th section allows rules to be made "for the purpose of regulating the conditions (sic) and mode of appointment " of assessors, "and all matters of procedure relating to their duties, and also for the purpose of consolidating" actions," and otherwise preventing multiplicity of such actions." The rules (order 39b of the County Court Rules of 1880) provide (inter alia) for the time within which a summons is to be delivered to the bailiff, and within which a jury must be demanded. These rules are clearly not within the particular words of section 7 under which they are made, and there are no general words. It will be contended, of course, that they are within the general words of section 32 of the County Court Act, 1856, and there is some reason for this contention. But we greatly doubt whether the Legislature intended that the procedure in actions under the Employers' Liability Act should differ from that in another action, except as indicated in the Act itself. We commend this and other doubtful points to the notice of Mr. Burt, who has, we observe, given notice of his intention to introduce an amending Bill.

CORRESPONDENCE.

STAMPING DEEDS AT THE ROYAL COURTS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Among the recent improvements at the Royal Courts of Justice provided for the convenience of the profession there is a department for the stamping of deeds.

Under existing arrangements documents can be stamped with any of the following sums-viz., 1s., 2s., 5s., 10s., £1, and £5; but not with either 2s. 6d. or 6d. ; consequently, to stamp a document with either of these two latter amounts it is still necessary to go to Somerset House. Could not the authorities be prevailed upon to cure this apparent defect by providing an apparatus for both these amounts, and so enable stamping for any sum, from 6d. to £5, to be "done on the premises"? I have no doubt that if attention is drawn to this omission the defect will be remedied.

TENDERS INVITED FOR COSTS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

J. V.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS BY MARRIED WOMEN. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Referring to a letter under this head in your issue of the 25th ult., from a commissioner, perhaps you will allow me to express my entire concurrence with what he has said on the subject of abolishing these examinations.

In the course of my experience, which is rather a long one, I have had many instances of their practical utility, one of which, with your permission, I will relate.

I was once called in with another commissioner, who was rather

interested in the transaction, to take an examination. On proceeding to put the usual question whether she acted voluntarily and without compulsion, the lady said, "I suppose I must." "No," I replied, "not if you are unwilling; it is our duty to ascertain whether you are willing." After a little hesitation she said, "Well, if he performs his agreement, I have no objection." I then informed her we should have to know what the agreement was, and see it carried out. My colleague concurring, we sent for the husband; before he arrived, however, the wife said, "Shan't I catch it for this;" and when the gentleman came into the room he certainly did look thunder and lightning. He had married the lady for her property solely, which he wanted to get under his own control. The business was then postponed, eventually deeds were prepared with which the lady was satisfied, and then she gave her consent.

ANOTHER COMMISSIONER.

THE LAW SOCIETY'S PROCEDURE MEETING.
[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

I seconded an amendment "that that portion of the report which said Sir,-At the meeting of the Incorporated Law Society, last Wednesday, that the ordinary mode of trial should be by a judge without a jury should not be agreed to."

Although the importance of this question of detail demanded lengthened discussion, I made my remarks very short, as it was evident that the meeting was impatient of any discussion on the subject. The meeting could not forget that it was their own committee; the practical and literary ability shown in the report, and the decided support accorded to sufficient discussion had taken place in committee, and that the report it by the president and council. There was an evident feeling that should be adopted as a whole. Still, as it was evident that the report was that of the majority of the committee only, the view of the minority should have received more attention at the meeting than was the case; and I believe at a later date it will be a matter of regret that the discussion on the points of difference was so summarily disposed of.

Take, for instance, resolution 12 of the Chancellor's Committee: "The mode of trial shall be by a judge without a jury, but in the summons for directions on the application of either party an order shall be made that the cause be tried by a jury if it shall appear that the questions involved can conveniently be so tried. Provided always that in the following cases the right of either party to a trial by jury shall be absolute-libel, slander, seduction, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, breach of promise of marriage."

What is the meaning of this rule? I can only read it as followsviz., that the exceptions, contrary to most rules, are to be larger than the rule itself, and that, although the method of trial was to be by a judge, the majority of cases are intended, as heretofore, practically to be tried by a judge and jury whenever they could be conveniently so tried.

It may be that the judges, the bar, solicitors, and litigants may be persuaded to accept the silent revolution of our own committee by which trial by jury is to be nearly abolished, and that the common law courts are to be assimilated to the dull and insipid, and, by way of comparison, unsatisfactory, trials prevalent in the Chancery Division.

The arguments founded on county court experience, by reason of the small amounts involved, are inapplicable, and besides, even in the county court, both plaintiff and defendant have an absolute right to trial by jury.

With regard to the reservations made by the rule, they are singularly insufficient. For instance, in what respect should a breach of promise of negligence, tort, including all actions for damages in respect of accidents.

I think the advertisement will be considered as unique. Perhaps we shall see next the medical profession invited to tender for the amputation of a leg or for the cure of some long-standing rheumatic affection. The "secresy" to be observed will probably prevent us from ever knowing the extent to which "Box will be bitten. The advertisement suggests painful reflections as to what will be done when the scale comes into operation. SUBSCRIBER.

trial by jury is to be discouraged, and there is too much reason to fear The fact is, that in some quarters an opinion is already expressed that that, unless the right to a jury be made absolute, the judges may in a short time refuse a jury on the alleged principle of the rule.

I concede that there is some considerable difficulty in framing the rule to meet the just requirements of all branches of the profession, litigants, and the public generally. I am afraid it may seem presump. tuous on my part to repeat that the rule should be larger than the exceptions, but I hope that a large number of the profession would prefer that the rule should be: "That the ordinary method of trial shall be by judge and jury as heretofore, but juries only to be granted on application of either party, and with power for the judge, subject to appeal, to