the reduction of the contracts of an insolvent life assurance company. Section 22 of that Act provides that "the court, in the case of a company which has been proved to be insolvent, may, if it thinks fit, reduce the amount of the contracts of the company upon such terms and subject to such conditions as the court thinks just, in place of making a winding-up order." In the present case a petition to wind up the society (a mutual one) was presented on October 28, 1880, by the assignee of a policy which had become a claim against the society. On October 30, 1880, another winding-up petition was presented by the holder of a current policy. On the hearing of both these petitions on November 19, 1880, Hall, V. C., made no order on the first petition, but made a winding-up order on the second petition. On January 19. 1881, the Court of Appeal, on an appeal by the first petitioner, and on an application made by some of the policy-holders that, in place of the making of a winding-up order, an order might be made for the reduction of the contracts of the society, made an order on both petitions, discharging the winding-up order, and referring it to the Vice-Chancellor to settle a scheme for the reduction of the society's contracts under section 22 of the Act. On the 27th of January, 1881, the Vice-Chancellor made an order referring it to a special referee to settle a scheme for the reduction of the contracts for the approval of the court. In the course of the proceedings before the referee the questions arose from what date the scheme to be settled was to take effect, and what contracts of the society were liable to reduction. Hall, V.C., held (30 W. R. 145, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 39) that the date of the presentation of the winding-up petition, which date would, if a winding up order had been made, have been the date of the commencement of the winding up, was the date from which the scheme should come into operation, and that all policies current at that date, and all annuities which had not then become payable, were liable to reduction; but that all policies which had become claims at that date, and all payments in respect of annuities which had become due before that date, must be paid in full, just as if they were debts due to persons who had supplied goods to the society, but that payments accruing due after that date in respect of annuities which had become payable before that date were liable to reduction. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and HOLKER, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that the theory of the Act was this, if the company was insolvent the court might reduce the amount of the contracts instead of making a winding-up order-i.e., might give the persons entitled to the benefit of the contracts a dividend on the amount of their claims. The meaning was this-ascertain what the company can pay and reduce its contracts accordingly. If it can pay only half its liabilities, reduce the contracts by one half. The creditors would thus get a larger dividend, because the costs of a winding up would be saved, and the result would be advantageous to everyone to whom the company was under a liability. This being so, on what principle should the court fix the date from which the reduction was to take effect? It was said by those creditors whose claims had ripened since the presentation of the petition that they ought to be paid in full. But, if the winding up had gone on, they would have only got a dividend from the liquidator, and why should they get a benefit which they would not have got if the winding up had gone on? The reduction was a substitute for the winding up, and the substitution of one form of order for another was not intended to alter the rights of any persons. And, because the creditors who became such before the presentation of the petition would get paid in full, there was no reason that that preference should be extended. The Legislature probably thought that the persons who would get that preference would be few in number, because if an insurance company did not pay its policies, proceedings would soon be taken to wind it up. But the fact that there would be an injustice which could not be remedied was no reason for extending it. His lordship thought that the date of the settlement of the scheme would be an impossible time to fix for the operation of the reduction, for the amounts of the assets and liabilities must be ascertained before the scheme could be settled. Nor would the date of the order directing the scheme to be settled do, for that would make the rights of the parties depend on a mere accident. And this observation applied equally to the date of the order on the appeal. The rights of the parties ought not to depend on such accidents, and the date of the presentation of the first petition, which would have been the date of the commencement of the winding up, if a winding-up order had been made, was the proper date to fix. BRETT, L.J., said that, if a winding-up order had been made, it would have taken effect according to the state of things at the date of the presentation of the petition, and therefore the Vice-Chancellor said that, unless there was some special reason to the contrary, the same day should be fixed for the operation of the scheme of reduction. The question was whether, on the true construction of the Act, this was right? The Act did not fix any time, and his lordship would not say that, under some special circumstances, some other date than that of the presentation of the petition might not be fixed, but, in the absence of any special circumstances, he thought that date was the proper one to fix. HOLKER, L.J., said that section 22 gave a large power and a large discretion to the court, and in determining what was just the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. It could not be just to fix a date the result of which would be to enable a number of creditors to be paid in full who would have only received a dividend if a winding-up order had been made. JESSEL, M.R., added that he did not differ from the view of the Lords Justices as to the discretion of the court. He only intended to lay down that, as a general rule, the date of the presentation of the petition was the proper date. He did not intend to say that the special circumstances of the particular case might not afford a reason for varying the date.-SOLICITORS, Longcroft & Myers; G. Blagden; Crump & Son; Bellamy, Strong, & Co.; Dean, Chubb, & Co.; Miller & Vernon; W. Flux & Co.; Ashurst, Morris, & Co.

paid a premium on his admission to the partnership, was entitled to a return of a part of the sum which he had paid. The parties were solicitors. The defendant was a solicitor of long standing; the plaintiff was a young man of but little experience. In 1879 the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to enter into partnership for a term of twenty-one years. The plaintiff paid the defendant a premium of £2,500, and was to have one-third of the profits of the business. Soon after the commencement of the partnership the defendant alleged that he discovered that the plaintiff was incompetent to discharge the duties of a solicitor, and that he did not attend properly to the business. But some time after he had, as he alleged, made this discovery, the defendant proposed that the plaintiff's share in the business should be reduced. Some negotiation took place about this, but the proposal fell through. After this it was found that more capital was required for the business, and the defendant proposed to the plaintiff that he should bring in some more capital. This the plaintiff declined to do, except on certain terms to which the defendant would not agree. In November, 1880, the plaintiff brought the action for a dissolution of the partnership, alleging misconduct on the part of the defendant. This allegation the court held to be unfounded. The defendant brought a cross-action against the plaintiff for dissolution, charging him with misconduct, and in this action the original plaintiff B- filed affidavits on a motion for a receiver in which he charged the original defendant Ywith misconduct. On the trial of both actions judgment for a dissolution of the partnership was given by Fry, J., and he directed an inquiry whether any part of the premium ought to be returned to the plaintiff B- and under this inquiry an order was afterwards made that 20-21tbs of the £2,500 should be returned to him. In the Court of Appeal it was urged that B― had lost his right to a return to any part of the premium (1) because he had shown himself to be incompetent; (2) because he had refused to bring in more capital when requested to do so by the defendant. In this, it was said, he had violated the provisions of the deed of partnership, and had thus been guilty of misconduct; (3) because he had been guilty of misconduct in making unfounded allegations against Y― in the affidavits which he had filed in the other action. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and HOLKER, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Fry, J. JESSEL, M.R., said that, after Y- had manifested his willingness to go on with the partnership subsequently to his alleged discovery of the plaintiff's incompetency, it was impossible for him to say that that incompetency, even if it had been proved, was the cause of the dissolution. And, as to the refusal to furnish further capital, it could not be called misconduct ; the inability to find it except on certain terms might be a misfortune, but it was not misconduct. It certainly was not within the rule that there must be gross misconduct to disentitle a partner who had paid a premium to a return of part of it in case of a dissolution before the expiration of the And, as to the allegations contained in the affidavits, partnership term. his lordship agreed with Fry, J., that for this purpose allegations made in And, though the affidavits the action for dissolution could not be looked at. The were made in the other action, the two actions were in substance one. second action was in effect a counter-claim to the first. He should have

been of the same opinion, even if the second had been an independent action, for the allegations in question did not amount to a charge of fraud against Y, and there was nothing to show that they were false to the knowledge of B. His lordship added that the mere fact of incompetency was not a bar to a return of premium, though it might be taken into account in estimating the amount which should be returned. Unless it was shown that the incompetency had actually occasioned some loss or damage to the other partner, it ought not to prevent a return of premium. His lordship also said that he thought that in the case of Bluck v. Capstick (28 W. R. 75, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 863), Fry, J., had gone too far in saying that "there is no case in which a return of premium has been ordered when the partner who has paid the premium has himself brought about the dissolution by his own misconduct." There had certainly been cases in which the partner who had been in the wrong, and who had brought about the dissolution, had still got back a part of the premium which he had paid. BRETT, L.J., said it was clear that no part of the premium could be recovered at law; this could only be done by reason of an equity, which appeared to him a very right and just equity. As at present advised he was strongly of opinion that mere incompetency, without any evidence of damage to the other partner, would not be a sufficient ground for refusing a return of premium. Would it be equity that, merely because a man was found to be incompetent, he should be fined £2,500? The other partner might be entitled to get rid of him, but it seemed to his lordship that it would be utterly unjust that he should keep all the premium. If, however, damage had resulted to the business from the partner's incompetent acts, that ought to be taken into account in estimating the amount of premium to be returned. But here the alleged incompetence had manifested itself before Y- had expressed his readiness to continue the partnership on different terms. After this he could not be allowed to say that B- - was so incompetent that he could not go on with him as a partner. It was too late to take the objection. And, as to the objection of misconduct, his lordship thought that it was necessary to show some misconduct in the business. As to the not providing the fresh capital, a mere breach of contract was not only not gross misconduct, but was not misconduct at all, though of course the circumstances under which the breach of contract took place might make it amount to misconduct. It was said, however, that B- had made frivolous, vexatious, and untrue allegations against Y- for the purposes of the action. There was not the slightest evidence that any of these allegations were true, and many of them at first sight looked very frivolous. But they were in effect brought forward in the action for dissolution, and his lordship agreed with Fry, J., that for this purpose nothing which had been done in the action for dissolution could be relied on. Whether anything which had been done in a previous action could be taken into account he would not say. Where, however, there were two

cross-actions of this kind, and a decree for dissolution was made in them both, he thought it would be entirely wrong to treat the two actions otherwise than as one. HOLKER, L.J., would not go the length of saying that incompetency would never, under any circumstances, be a ground for refusing a return of premium, for the partner who had received the premium might have consented to take a less premium than he otherwise would under the belief that the other would be of use to him in his business, and if it afterwards turned out that he could be of no use at all, this might be a good reason for not ordering a return of the whole premium. It was not, however, necessary to decide the point now. As to the imputations made against Y-, his lordship thought that they could not be considered as misconduct on the part of B-, because they were not misconduct in the conduct of the partnership business. And there was nothing to show that the imputations were, to the knowledge of B-, unfounded. The question was also raised whether interest ought to be given on the amount of premium returned, and reliance was placed on the case of Wilson v. Johnstone (L. R. 16 Eq. 606), in which a part of a premium paid by a partner was ordered to be returned to him, with interest thereon from the time of the dissolution, but the question of interest does not appear to have been argued there. The court held that interest should be given, but only from the date of the chief clerk's certificate, inasmuch as the defendant could not pay the sum until the amount had been ascertained.SOLICITORS, 4. Leslie; Merriman, Pike, & Merriman.

PRACTICE-COUNTER-CLAIM-RIGHT TO RELIEF AGAINST THIRD PARTY -JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 24, SUB-SECTION 3-ORD. 16, R. 17-Ord. 19, R. 3—Ord. 22, R. 10.—In a case of Barber v. Blaibery, before Fry, J., on the 15th inst., a question arose as to the right of the defendant to an action to obtain, by means of a counter-claim, relief against a third party whom he makes a defendant to his counter-claim. The plaintiff brought the action against the defendant Blaiberg alone, alleging that a bill of sale of certain chattels had been duly executed in his favour by one Bass, and that Blaiberg had forcibly seized the chattels. And he claimed the return of the goods, and damages for their wrongful detention. Blaiberg delivered a statement of defence and a counter-claim, to which he made Barber and Bass defendants. By his statement of defence he alleged that Barber's bill of sale had not been executed bona fide, and that a bill of sale of the same goods, with others, to secure £110 had been executed by Bass in his favour, without notice of the bill of sale to Barber, and he charged the defendants with fraud. And by his counter-claim he claimed, as against both Barber and Bass, a declaration that he was entitled to the goods comprised in his bill of sale; an injunction to restrain both Barber and Bass from parting with those goods; an order that they jointly and severally should pay to Blaiberg the balance of the debt due to him, after deducting the value of the goods; an order, in the alternative, that Bass should pay to Blaiberg the amount remaining due on his mortgage, with interest and costs; an order, in any case, that Bass should pay to Blaiberg all costs, &c., incidental to the seizure by him of the goods, and damages for his fraud and misrepresentation. Bass by his reply insisted that the bill of sale to Barber was executed bona fide, and denied the validity of the bill of sale to Blaiberg, asserting that it had been obtained from him by fraud. At the trial Blaiberg abandoned the charges of fraud, and also abandoned the relief asked by the counter-claim against Barber, but insisted on the relief thereby claimed against Bass. The objection was then taken that the counterclaim could not be maintained against Bass alone. Relief could not be granted against a third party. In answer to this it was said that Bass had waived the objection by putting in a reply to the counter-claim. FRY, J., said that the relief claimed by Blaiberg against Bass was not a matter" relating to or con. nected with the original subject of the cause or matter." The subject of the original cause was Barber's right to have the goods which Blaiberg had seized. The two matters were totally distinct, and ought to be made the subject of distinct litigation. The other parts of the counter-claim having been abandoned, it must be dismissed, with costs.-SOLICITORS, P. Vernede; Moresby-White & Co.; John Hopkins.

SETTLEMENT-POWER OF SALE-DETERMINATION.-In a case of Cotton's Trustees to the School Board for London, before Fry, J., on the 11th inst., the question arose whether a power of sale, given by a testator to the trustees of an estate which he had settled by his will, had come to an end by reason of the estate having, under the provisions of the will, become absolutely vested in persons who were sui juris. The testator devised the estate to the trustees in fee, upon trust to raise by way of mortgage a sum of £30,000, which they were to hold on certain trusts, and, subject thereto, that the trustees should, for so long as they should think fit, during a period commencing at his decease, and ending at the expiration of a term of twenty-one years from the decease of the last survivor of the several persons named in his will, manage the estate in whatever manner they should deem expedient, they exercising, as regarded such management, all and every or any of the powers and discretions thereinafter given to them, in conformity nevertheless with the express restrictions and qualifications thereinafter contained. And, subject thereto, the testator declared that his trustees should stand seised of the estate in trust for his wife for her life, with remainder in trust for his children in certain shares. The testator then, after stating that the estate consisted in part of building sites and land adapted for building, and in other part of incomplete buildings and works, and that it was his wish that such sites and land should be built upon, laid out for building, and otherwise improved, and that such incomplete buildings and works should be completed as expeditiously as circumstances would reasonably admit of, proceeded to give to his trustees various express powers for the management of the estate, such as a power to grant leases, a power to purchase and to sell building materials, and a power to raise money by mortgage. And, finally, he gave the trustees power, at any time during the period before mentioned, to sell the estate or

any part thereof. The testator died in 1866, and in 1881, after the death of the wife, the trustees, professing to exercise the power of sale, entered into an agreement to sell part of the estate. The beneficial interests under the will had become absolutely vested in persons who were sui juris, and the purchasers objected that, this being so, the power of sale had come to an end, and that a good title could not be made without the concurrence of the beneficiaries. FRY, J., held that the power was still subsisting. He said that it was a question of the intention of the settlor, and if it was his intention that such a power of sale should exist after the estate had become absolutely vested in persons sui juris, there was no reason why it should not be exercised during the period fixed, provided that the period did not (as it did not in the present case) exceed the legal limit. Of this rule the case of Lantsbery v. Collier (2 K. & J. 709), and the recent case of Peters v. The Lewes and East Grinstead Railway Company (29 W. R. 874, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 429), were illustrations. It was clearly the intention of the testator in the present case that the power should continue in any event until the end of the period which he named. Of course, the persons absolutely entitled might now, if they chose, at any time put an end to the trusts altogether, but it was not alleged that they had done so.SOLICITORS, Prideaux & Son; Gedge, Kirby, & Co.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS.
(Before Mr. REGISTRAR HAZLITT, acting as Chief Judge.)
Feb. 10.-Ex parte Shubrook, Re Mannheimer.

abroad to give security for the trustee's costs upon an application to It is contrary to the practice of the court to require a creditor resident admit the creditor's claim against the estate, notwithstanding its partial rejection by the trustee.

This was an application on behalf of Joseph Shubrook, the trustee of the estate and effects of Wolfgang G. Mannheimer, for an order that Heinrich Steinsberg, of Galatz, in Roumania, merchant, might be directed to give security for the said trustee's costs in respect of the application made by him to have his claim admitted against the estate of the debtor, notwithstanding its rejection by the trustee, to the extent of £200, and that, in the meantime, all further proceedings in relation to the said application might be stayed. F. 0. Crump, for the trustee, in support of the application. Yate Lee, for the creditor, took a preliminary objection, on the ground that the application was wholly without precedent.

Crump. Although there is no absolute rule which requires a creditor resident abroad to give security, rule 127 shows that the creditor is to bear the cost of making proof of his debt unless the court shall otherwise specially order. That rule can be of no effect whatever if a person resident abroad can tender a proof without paying the costs. The creditor incurs no risk, whereas the trustee may become liable to serious costs. In 1873, Mr. Registrar Murray made an order, Re Deveze, requiring a foreign creditor, upon an application for the delivery up of bills of exchange, to give security for costs.

Mr. REGISTRAR HAZLITT said that when a creditor received notice that his proof was rejected, it was his business to come to the court and to support the proof, and he must pay the costs of doing so, but the trustee, on the other band, must bear the costs of opposing the proof. The present application must be refused, with costs.

Solicitors for the trustee, Crump & Son.
Solicitors for the creditor, Bolton, Robbins, & Busk.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Sitting in Banc, before POLLOCK, B., and MANISTY and Stephen, JJ.)

February 21.-Re Symons.*

This was a rule calling upon Mr. Symons to show cause why a writ of attachment should not issue against him for contempt of court, in having acted as a duly qualified solicitor, by having sued out a writ in the High Court in an action.

It appeared that Symons, now in business at Barnstaple as an accountant, was formerly, for twenty years, clerk to a firm of solicitors. Since he has been an accountant he wrote to a person named Vicary and demanded payment of a sum of money due to one Docking. The letter concluded with a request that Vicary would not say anything about having received the letter from Symons. A few days after the receipt of the above letter, a writ, purporting to be issued by C. Smale, a solicitor, but which was not signed in accordance with ord. 5, r. 7, was served upon Vicary, the address for service on the writ being Symon's offices in Barnstaple. At the time of the issuing of the writ Sale was in London, but Symons telegraphed to him saying that he had issued the writ in his (Smale's) name, and asking him to telegraph back that he confirmed what had been done. Smale did 80. On being served with the writ Vicary took it to his solicitor, who, seeing that it was unsigned, investigated the matter, and wrote to Smale to ask whether the writ was issued by his authority. Then Smale denied that he had authorized Symons to issue the writ. Smale's explanation was that in a former matter a Mr. Bencraft, a solicitor, acted for him, and that Symons was then Bencraft's clerk, and that when he received Symons' telegram, he thought that Symons was still with Bencraft, and that Bencraft was again acting for him.

H. D. Greene showed cause.-Symons never acted as solicitor. In his affidavit he says that he told Smale that Docking would require a writ to be issued against Vicary, and asked if he should issue it in bis name, and that Smale assented. Symons then issued the writ, and forwarded a copy, together

* Reported by W. Blew, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,

weight of each train, the number of carriages of which it is composed, and the stoppages it makes, are only allowed to be such as will not interfere with its being punctual, and being able to accomplish the journey in the allotted space of time. In these respects it differs from the trains carrying Irish traffic via North Wall, which are not limited to that one purpose, but serve other objects besides, and which working in connection with other trains which meet them at junctions along the line, are necessarily slower trains, and less to be depended upon for punctuality. Charges may not unreasonably be different in the case of trains run under such different conditions; not perhaps because the railway company could not profitably carry a mail train passenger at the same rate as a passenger using their other trains, for the postal subsidy which the company receive and which pays them at the rate of about one shilling a train mile, reimburses the company any special expenses incident to the mail trains, as trains by contract, but because the service is special in the speed and punctuality with which it is performed, and in order to keep so is limited in a way that other trains are not in its power of adapting itself to traffic fluctuating in its requirements, and of increasing the amount of accommodation it can afford. But the difference that is made is the difference between 60s, and 478. 6d. first class, and 45s. and 36s. 6d. second class, or 12s. 6d. and 88. 6d. respectively; and of this the part that is properly attributable to the distance between Holyhead and Dublin is small. The services over that distance are substantially the same; the mileages (adding the railway from Kingstown to Dublin to the mail route) are nearly equal; the accommodation by the North Wall steamers is practically as good as that by the mail, and the vessels of the two companies appear to be worked at about the same cost, such difference as there is telling against and not in favour of the North Wall rouge. The mail through fares are divided by mileage, and the North-Western Company receive for their land portion of the through service 46s. 10d. out of the first-class fare and 35s. 3d. out of the second, their North Wall fares (railway and steamboat combined) being 478. 6d. first class and 368. 6d. second class. In both cases they carry the passengers the same distance by railway, but the passengers to and from North Wall travel in addition 'by the railway company's steamboat. Their boat fare is 8s. first or second class, and they receive, therefore, in respect of the North Wall passengers, 39s. 6d. first class and 28s. 6d. second class for railway fare from London to Holyhead, as against 46s. 10d. and 358. 3d. for the same railway journey, with only the difference in the class of train, in respect of the mail route passenger. The amounts by which the fares by the mail are thus more than those by North Wall, whether in regard to the fares charged for the entire service to Dublin or the portions due to the land journey only, are, in our opinion, excessive, and an undue prejudice to the traffic by the former route, and we must grant an injunction against this continuing. We do not say that there ought to be no difference between the two sets of fares; but we cannot find anything in the circumstances to justify an excess in the total fares to Dublin by the mail of more than, at the outside, the ten per cent. suggested by Mr. Watson in his letter of the 19th of May, 1877, as a reasonabl edifference We do not see any ground for holding that any excess confined within those limits would be undue or unreasonable so long as the existing difference in the quality of the two services is maintained. The application includes complaints on one or two minor points. It is admitted that the North-Western Company's North Wall tickets do not show on their face how much of the total fare is for the railway and how much for the boat, and that section 16 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, requires such a separation of the fare to be made. But the Dublin Company did not show any damage to themselves under this head. Another point is that passengers by any ordinary train requiring to book through via Kingstown are charged the full rates by the mail route, and the railway company admit that they have no other than those rates at which they book through via Kingstown. But the railway company are not under any obligation to issue a through ticket for any train not forming part of the through service, and if such a ticket is given to a passenger by any ordinary train, it must be taken to have been issued to him solely for his own convenience. Any passenger desiring to cross via Kingstown has it in his power to travel at local fares, the sum of which, if he travels by an ordinary train, is somewhat less than the amount of the through mail fare, and if he does not choose to avail himself of the power he has only himself

to blame.

On the question of costs we think these proceedings must be treated as separable; the application for through rates is quite distinct from the complaint of a violation of the Traffic Act, and we think that the two applications ought to be treated as having been separately made. We therefore dismsss so much of the application as seeks for the allowance of through rates with costs, and we direct the respondents to pay the costs of so much of the application as complains of an undue prejudice to the traffic by the mail route; the two sets of costs to be taxed separately, and the one set off against the other, and the respondents are to pay or receive the balance accordingly.

issue until the 1st of October.

The COMMISSIONERS subsequently ordered that the injunction should not Solicitors for the applicants, Carlisle & Ordell, for H. S. Watson, Dublin. Solicitor for the respondents, R. F. Roberts.

At a dinner of the Fishmongers' Company last week, Vice-Chancellor Bacon remarked, with regard to the recent discussion on the Long Vacation, "that her Majesty's judges should not be called upon to work more than three quarters of the year, for they could not work longer safely to themselves and usefully to the public."

to.

abolished.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

A special general meeting of this society was held at the Law Institution on Wednesday last for the purpose of considering the report of the committee which was appointed in November last to deal with the report of the Legal Procedure Committee. A copy of the committee's report has already appeared in our columns. Mr. CHARLES CLARIDGE DRUCE, president of the society, occupied the chair, and there was a large attendance of members of the council, together with about 230 members of the society. The PRESIDENT, in opening the proceedings, reminded the meeting that at the meetings held on the 4th and 11th of November last, the recommendations contained in the report of the Legal Procedure Committee were laid before the council and considered, and it was decided at the special general meeting, on the 18th of the same month, that the subject should be submitted to a committee of the members. That committee had, after three months of continuous labour, produced what was perhaps one of the most admirable reports he had ever had occasion to read. It was not for him, as one of the members of the society, to unduly press that point, and it would be sufficient for his purpose if he referred to an article which appeared in he would otherwise bave had to trouble the meeting. Oddly enough, on that day's Times, which would save him making many remarks with which the day on which the last general meeting_had been held, the Times had announced that the Rule Committee of the Judges were then meeting, and therefore time pressed; and oddly enough the council had received a letter from the Lord Chancellor's secretary two days before the present meeting, stating that the Rule Committee of the Judges were to hold another meeting shortly take an outline of the report of the committee of the society. The on that day, and again, therefore, time pressed in the matter. He would very first heading related to a much-vexed question, on which undoubtedly opinions had differed; but he hoped that in the consideration of such a large measure each and every member would be prepared to sacrifice, as far as necessary, his individual crotchets. He was quite prepared to do so in his own case. The committee had come to the conclusion that pleadings were essential to define the real points at issue, and that the system of pleadings prescribed by the Judicature Act and Rules should be substantially adhered The Lord Chancellor's committee, they would remember, had proposed should hold them to be necessary. The committee of the society had to dispense with pleadings unless a judge, on application being made to him, approached the subject with a desire to see all unnecessary pleadings It would be observed that a very small minority approved of the suggestion of the Legal Procedure Committee with reference to pleadings. They had all agreed to cut off redundant matter, but that in many cases the pleadings ought to remain, and they thought that the expense of an application to the judge would be balanced by the saving that would be otherwise effected. The next point was the jurisdiction of masters, and the committee suggested "that every action should be assigned to a particular master's list, and that work in chambers should be so re-arranged as to provide for designating masters to whom actions should be assigned, and for such masters sitting daily in chambers to hear applications in respect of the matters so assigned to them." Among matters of detail dealt with, they thought the practice of payment into court unnecessarily inconvenient and troublesome in some cases, and that for all sums formally paid into court by the defendant, the receipt of the plaintiff's solicitor should be sufficient. In respect to summons for direction, the committee of the society did not concur in the recommendations of the report; they thought "that the existing practice of requiring a separate summons for each separate matter should not be compulsory, and upon any summons by either party it should be competent for the judge or master to make any order which may seem just, at the instance of either party, in relation to the subject-matter of the sumIn reference to discovery the committee thought "that it is desirable that each party to an action should be entitled, as of right, to deliver interrogatories to, and have the discovery of documents from, the other party, subject, in the case of interrogatories, to an application to a master to strike out questions on the same grounds as at present; but that in order to check any abuse of such a rule, and unnecessary expense, the following course defence, to administer interrogatories, and also without any summons and should be adopted :-Either party should be at liberty, after statement of order for discovery, either party should be bound, if so required by the other party within ten days after statement of defence, to deliver an affidavit of documents; but such discovery should be limited to such points relating to the matters in question in the action as should by notice be required." And "that the costs consequent on interrogatories, and of discovery, unless otherwise ordered, should be bcrne in the first instance by the party asking for discovery, and should be paid by him to the other party, unless payment into court be directed; and such costs should be allowed as costs in the cause where, and where only, such discovery and interrogatories should appear to have been reasonably asked for." The party requiring the discovery would have thus to pay for it in the first instance, and he would have the expense allowed him in the costs, unless it was otherwise ordered. With respect to notice to admit specific facts the committee agreed with the Lord Chancellor's committee. With regard to appeals from chambers he had some difficulty in contrasting the one report with the other, because the committee of the society thought the sittings in Bane should be abolished, and that, as in chancery, one judge should be permitted to settle and dispose of it. Subject to that there was no material difference. With regard to the question of judgment debtors' sum. monses it was the opinion of the committee that "the jurisdiction of the judge at chambers should be transferred to the Court of Bankruptcy," leaving out the word "London," which was in the recommendation of the Lord Chan

mons."