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the reduction of the contracts of an insolvent life assurance company. Section 22 of that Act provides that " the court, in the case of a company which has been proved to be insolvent, may, if it thinks fit, reduce the amount of the contracts of the company upon euch terms and subject to such conditions as the court thinks just, in place of making a winding-up order." In the present case a petition to wind np the society (a mutual one) was presented on October 28, 1880, by the assignee of a policy which had become a claim against the society. On October 30, 1880, another winding-up petition was presented by the holder of a current policy. On the hearing of both these petitions on November 19,1880, Hall, V.C., made no order on the first petition, but made a winding-up order on the second petition, On January 19. 1831, the Court of Appeal, on an appeal by the first petitioner, and on an application made by some of the policy-holders that, in place of themaking of a winding-up order, an order might be made for the reduction of the contracts of the society, made an order on both petitions, discharging the winding-up order, and referring it to the Vice-Chancellor to settle a scheme for the reduction of the sooiety's cntracts under section 22 of the Act. On the 27th of January, 1881, the Vice-Chancellor made an order referring it to a special referee to settle a scheme for the reduction of the contracts for the approval of the court. In the course of the proceedings before the referee the questions arose from what date the scheme to be settled was to take effect, and what contracts of the society were liable to reduction. Hall, V.C., held (30 W. R. 145, L. R. 19 Ch. I'. 39) that the date of the presentation of the winding-up petition, which, date would, if a winding up order had been made, have been the date of the commencement of the winding up, was the date from which the scheme should come into operation, and that all policies current at that date, and all annuities whioh had not then become payable, were liable to reduction; but that all policies which bad become claims at that date, and all payments in respect of annuities which had become due before that date, must be paid in full, just as if they were debts due to persons who had supplied goods to the society, but that payments accruing due after that date in respect of annuities which bad beoome payable belore that date were liable to reduction. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (jkssel, M.K., and Brett and Holker, L.JJ.). Jessel, M.R., said that the theory of the Act was this, if the company was insolvent the court might rednce the amount of the contracts instead of making a winding-up order—i.e., might give the persons entitled to the benefit of the contracts a dividend on the amount of their claims. The meaning was this—ascertain what the company can pay and reduce its contracts accordingly. If it can pay only half its liabilities, reduce the contracts by one half. The creditors would thus get a larger dividend, because the costs of a winding up would be saved, and the result would be advantageous to everyone to whom the company was under a liability. This being so, on what principle should the court fix the date from which the reduction was to take effect? It was said by those oreditors whose claims had ripened Bince the presentation of the petition that they ought to be paid in full. But, if the winding up had gone on, they would have only got a dividend irom the liquidator, and why should tbey get a benefit which they would not have got if the winding up bad gone on? The reduction was a substitute for the winding up, and the substitution of one form of order for another was not intended to alter the rights of any persons. And, because the oreditors who became such before the presentation of the petition would get paid in full, there was no reason that that preference shonld be extended. The Legislature probably thought that the persons who would get that preference would be few in number, because if an insurance company did not pay its policies, proceedings would soon be taken to wind it up. But the fact that there would be an injustice wbioh could not be remedied was no reason for extending it. His lordship thought that the date of the settlement of the scheme would be an impossible time to fix for the operation of the reduction, for the amounts of the assets and liabilities must be ascertained before the schemo could be settled. Nor would the date of the order directing the scheme to be settled do, for that would make the rights of the parties depend on a mere accident. And this observation applied equally to the date of the order on the appeal. The rights of the parties onght not to depend on such accidents, and the date of the presentation of the first petition, which would have been the date of the commencement of the winding up, if a winding-up order had been made, was the proper date to fix. Brett, L.J., said that, if a winding-up order had been made, it would have taken effect according to the state of things at the date of the presentation of the petition, and therefore the Vice-Chancellor said that, unless there was Borne special reason to the contrary, the same day should be fixed for the operation of the scheme of reduction. The question was whether, on the true construction of the Act, this was right? The Act did not fix any time, and hie lordship would not say that, under some special circumstances, some other date than that of the presentation of the petition might not be fixed, bnt, in the absence of any special circumstances, he thought that date was the proper one to fix. Holker, L.J., said that section 22 gave a large power and a large discretion to the court, and in determining what was jest the court must have regard to all the circumstances o( the particular case. It could not be just to fix a date the result of which would bo to enable a nnmlerof creditors to be paid in full who would have only received a dividend if a winding-up order had been made. Jessel, M.R., added that he did not differ from the view of the Lords Justices as to the discretion of the court. He only intended to lay down that, as a general rule, the date of the presentation of the petition was the proper date, lie did not intend to say that the special circumstances of the particular case might not afford a reason for varying the date.—Solicitors, Longeroft § Myers ; G. Blagden; Crump <fc Son ; Bellamy, Strong, <fc Co.; Dean, Chubb, $ Co.; Miller $ Vernon; W. Flux $ Co. ; Athnrtl, Morris, § Co.

Partnership Dissolution Return Op Premium Misconduct Or Incompetency Of Partner Paying PremiumInterest.—In a case of

B— v. Y , before the Court of Appeal on the 10th inst., the question

arose whether, on a dissolution of a partnership, one of the partner?, who had

paid a premium on his admission to the partnership, was entitled to a return of a part of the sum which he had paid. The parties were solicitors. The defendant was a solicitor of long standing ; the plaintiff was a young man of bat little experience. In 1879 the plaintiff and the defendant agreed tn enter into partnership for a term of twenty-one years. The plaintiff paid the defendant a premium of £2,500, and was to have one-third of the profits of the busines". Soon alter the commencement of the partnership the defendant alleged that he diseovered that the plaintiff was incompetent to discharge the duties of a solicitor, and that he did not attend properly to the business. But some time after he hud, as he alleged, made this discovery, the defendant proposed that the plaintiffs share in the business should be reduced. Some negotiation took place about this, but the proposal fell through. After this it was found that more capital was required for the business, and the defeudant proposed to the plaintiff that he should bring in some more capital. This the plaintiff declined to do, except on certain terms to which the defendant would not agree. In November, 1880, the plaintiff brought the action for a dissolution of the partnership, alleging misconduct on the part of the defendant. This allegation the court held to be unfounded. The defendant brought a cross-action against the plaintiff for dissolution, charging him with misconduct, and in this action the original plaintiff B filed affidavits on

a motion for a receiver in which he charged the original defendant Y

with misconduot. On the trial of both actions judgment for a dissolution of the partnership was given by Fry, J., and he directed an inquiry whether any part of the premium ought to be returned to the plaintiff

B , and under this inquiry an order was afterwards made that 20-21tha

of the £2,500 should be returned to him. In the Court of Appeal it wan

urged that B bad lost his right to a return to any part of the premium

(1) because he had shown himself to be incompetent ; (2) because he had refused to bring in more oapital when requested to do so by the defendant. In this, it was said, he bad violated the provisions of the deed of partnership, and had thus been guilty of misoonduot; (3) because be had been guilty of misconduot in making unfounded allegations against Y in the affidavits whioh be had filed in the other action. The Conrt of Appeal (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Holker, L.JJ.) affirmed tbe decision of

Fry, J. Jessel, M.R., said that, after Y had manifested his willingness

to go on with the partnership subsequently to his alleged discovery of the plaintiff's incompetency, it was impossible for him to say that that incompetency, even if it had been proved, was the cause of the dissolution. And, as to the refusal to furnish farther capital, it oould not be called misconduot; the inability to find it except on oertain terms might be a misfortune, bat it was not misoondnct. It certainly was not within the rule that there mast be gross misconduct to disentitle a partner who had paid a premium to a return of part of it in case of a dissolution before the expiration of the partnership term. And, as to the allegations oontained in the affidavit?, his lordship agreed with Fry, J., [bat for this purpose allegations made in tbe action tor dissolution oould not be looked at. And, though the affidavits were made in the other action, the two actions were in substanoe one. Tbe seoond action was in effect a counter-claim to the first. He should have been of the same opinion, even if the second had been an independent action, for the allegations in question did not amount to a oharge of frand

against Y , and there was nothing to show that they were false to the

knowledge of B . His lordship added that the mere faot of incompetency was not a bar to a return of premium, thongh it might be taken into account in estimating the amount whioh should be returned. Unless it was shown that the incompetency had actually occasioned some loss or damage to the other partner, it onght not to prevents return of premium. His lordship also said that he thought that in the case of Shtck v. Capstiik (28 W. R. 75, L. R. 12 Cb. D. 863), Fry, J., bad gone too far in saying that " there is no case in which a return of premium has been ordered when the partner who has paid the premium has himself brought about the dissolution by his own misconduct." There had oertainly been cases in whioh the partner who had been in tbe wrong, and who had brought about the dissolution, had still got back a part of the premium whioh he had paid. Brett, L.J., said it was clear that no part of the premium could be recovered at law ; this could only be done by reason of an equity, which appeared to him a very right and just equity. As at present advised he was strongly of opinion that mere incompetency, without any evidence of damage to the other partner, would not be a sufficient ground for refusing a return of premium. Would it be equity that, merely because a man was found to be incompetent, he should be fined £2,500? The other partner might be entitled to get rid of him, but it seemed to his lordship that it would be utterly nnjust that he should keep all the premium. If, however, damage had resulted to the business from the partner's incompetent acts, that onght to be taken into account in estimating the amount of premium to be returned. But here the

alleged incompetence had manifested itself before Y had expressed his

readiness to continue the partnership on different terms. After this he coukl

not be allowed to say that B was so incompetent that he could not go oa

with him as a partner. It was too late to lake the objection. And, as to the objection of misconduct, his lordship thought that it was necessary t> show some misconduct in the business. As to the not providing the fresh capita', a mere breach of contract was not only not gross misconduct, but was n jc misconduct at all, though of course the oircumstunces under which the breath of contract took place might make it amount to misconduct. It was said,

however, that B had made frivolous, vexatious, ai d untrue allegations

against Y for the purposes of the action. There was not ths slightest

evidence that any of these allegations were true, and many of them at first sight looked very frivolous, lint they were in effect brought forward in the action for dissolution, and his lordship agreed with Fry, J., that for this purpose nothing which had been done in the action for dissolution could be relied on. Whether anything whioh had been done in a previous action conld be taken into account he would not say. Whtr/3, ho * ever, there were two cross-actions of this kind, and a decree for dissolution was made in them both, he thought it would be entirely wrong to treat the two actions otherwise than as one. Holkeh, L. J., would not go tbe length of saying that incompetency would never, under any circumstances, be a ground for refusing a return of premium, for the partner who had received the premium might have consented to take a less premium than he otherwise would under the belief that the other would be of use to him in his business, and if it afterwards turned out that he could be of no use at all, this might be a good reason for not ordering a return of the whole premium. It was not, however, necessary to decide the point

now. As to the imputations made against Y , his lordship thought that

they oonld not be considered as misconduct on tbe part of B , because

they were not misconduct in the conduct of the partnership business. And there was nothing to show that the imputations were, to the knowledge of B -, unfounded.

The question was also raised whether interest ought to be given on the amount of premium returned, and reliance was placed on the case of Wilson v. Johnstone (L. K. 16 Eq. 606), in which a part of a premium paid by a partner was ordered to be returned to him, with interest thereon from the time of the dissolution, but tbe question of interest does not appear to have been argued there. The court held that interest should be given, but only from the date of the chief clerk's certificate, inasmuch as the defendant could not pay the sum until tbe amount had been ascertained.— Solicitors, A. Leslie; Merriman, Tike, 6f Merriman.

PracticeCounter-claim—Right To Relief Aoainst Third Party Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24, Sub-section 3—Ord. 16, B. 17—Ord. 19, K. 3—Ord. 22, R. 10.—In a case of Barber v. Blaiberg. before Fry, J., on the 15th inst, a question arose as to the right of the defendant to an action to obtain, by means of a counter-claim, relief against a third party whom he makes a defendant to his counter-claim. The plaintiff brought the action against the defendant Blaiberg alone, alleging that a bill of sale of certain chattels had been duly executed in his favour by one Bass, and that Blaiberg had forcibly seized the chattels. And he claimed the return of the goods, and damages for their wrongful detention. Blaiberg delivered a statement of defence and a counter-claim, to which he made Barber and Bass defendants. By his statement of defence he alleged that Barber's bill of sale had not been executed bona fde, and that a bill of sale of the same goods, with others, to secure £110 had been executed by Bass in his favour, without notice of the bill of sale to Barber, and he charged the defendants with fraud. And by his couuter-claim he claimed, as against both Barber and Bass, a declaration that he was entitled to the goods comprised in his bill of sale; an injunction to restrain both Barber and Bass from parting with those goods; an order that they jointly and severally should pay to Blaiberg the balance of the debt due to him, after deducting the value of the goods; an order, in tho alternative, that Bass should pay to Blaiberg the amount remaining due on his mortgage, with interest and costs; au order, in any case, that Bass should pay to Blaiberg all cost?, &c, incidental to tbe seizure by him of the goods, and damages for his fraud and misrepresentation. Bass by his reply insisted that tho bill of sale to Barker was executed bona Jide, and denied the validity of the bill of •ale to Blaiberg, asserting that it had been obtained from him by fraud. At the trial Blaiberg abandoned the charges of fraud, and also abandoned the relief asked by tbe counter-claim against Barber, but insisted on the relief thereby claimed against Bass. The objection was then taken that the counterolaim could not be maintained against Bass alone. Relief could not be granted against a third party. In answer to this it was said that Bass had waived the objection by putting in a reply to the counter-claim. Fry, J., said that the relief claimed by Blaiberg against Bass was not a matter "relating to or connected with the original subject of the cause or matter.'' The subject of the original cause was Barber's right to have tbe goods which Blaiberg had seized. The two matters were totally distinct, and ought to be made the subject of distinct litigation. The other parts of the counter-claim having been abandoned, it must be dismissed, with coats.—Solicitors, JP. Vcrncde; Moresby- White $ Co.; John Hopkins.

SettlementPower Op SaleDetermination.—In a case of Cotton's Trustees to the School Board for London, before Fry, J., on the 11th inst., the question arose whether a power of sale, given by a testator to the trustees of an estate which be had settled by his will, bad come to au end by reason of the estate having, under the provisions of the will, become absolutely vested in persons who were sui juris. The testator devised the estate to tbe trustees in fee, npon trust to raise by way of mortgage a sum of £30,000, which they were to hold on certain trusts, and, subject thereto, that the trustees should, for so lonir as they should think fit, during a period commencing at his decease, and ending at the expiration of a term of twenty-one years from the decease of the last survivor of the several persons named in his will, manage the estate in whatever manner they should deem expedient, they exercising, as regarded such management, all and every or any of the powers and discretions thereinafter given to them, in conformity nevertheless with the express restrictions and qualifications thereinafter contained. And, subject thereto, the testator declared that his trustees should stand seised of tbe estate in trust for his wife for her life, with remainder in trust for his children in certain shares. Tbe testator then, after stating that the estate consisted in part of building sites ami land adapted for building, and in other part of incomplete buildings and works, and that it was his wish that such sites and land should bo built upon, laid out for building, and otherwise improved, and that such incomplete buildiDga and works should be completed as expeditiously as circumstances would isasonably admit of, proceeded to give to his trustees various express powers for the management of the estate, such as a power to grant liases, a power to purchase and to sell building materials, and a power to raise money by mortgage. And, finally, he give tho trustees power, at any time during the period before mentioned, to sell the estate or

Hny part thereof. The testator died in 1866, and in 1881, after the death of the wife, the trustees, professing to exercise the power of sale, entered into an agreement to sell part of the estate. The beneficial interests under the will had become absolutely vested in persons who were suijuis, and the purchasers objected that, this being so, the power of sale had come to an end, and that a good title could not be made without the concurrence of the beneficiaries. Knr, J., held that the power was still subsisting. He said that it was a question of the intention of the settlor, and if it was his intention that such a power of sale should exist after the es:ate bad become absolutely vested iu persons sui juris, there was no reason why it should not be exercised during the period fixed, provided that the period did not (as it did not in the present case) exceed the legal limit. Of this rule the case of Lantsbery v. Collier (2 K. & J. 709), and the recent case of Peters v. The Lewes and East Grinstead Railway Company (29 W. R. 874, L. R. 18 Cb. D. 429), were illustrations. It was clearly the intention of the testator in the present case that the power should continue in any event until the end of the period which he named. Of course, the persons absolutely entitled might now, if they chose, at any time put an end to the trusts altogether, hut it was not alleged that they had done so.— Solicitors, tridcaux $ Son; Qedgc, Eirby, § Co.

(Before Mr. Registrar Hazlitt, noting as Chief Jndge.)
Feb. 10.—Ex parte Shubrook, Re Mannheimer.

It is contrary to the practice of the court to require a creditor resident abroad to give security for the trustee's coats upon au application to admit the creditor's claim against the estate, notwithstanding its partial rejection by the trustee.

This was an application on behalf of Joseph Shubrook, the trustee of the estate and effects of Wolfgang G. Mannheimer, for an order that Heinrich Steinsberg, of Galatz, in Roumania, merchant, might be directed to give security for tbe said trustee's costs in respect of the application made by him to have his claim admitted against the estate of the debtor, notwithstanding its rejection by the trustee, to the extent of £200, and that, in the meantime, all further proceedings in relation to the said application might be stayed.

F. O. Crump, for the trustee, in support of the application.

late Lee, for the creditor, took a preliminary objection, on the ground that the application was wholly without precedent.

Crump.—Although there is no absolute rule which requires a creditor resident abroad to give security, rule 127 shows that the oreditor is to bear the cost of making proof of his debt unless the court shall otherwise specially order. That rule can be of no effect whatever if a person resident abroad can tender a proof without paying the costs. The creditor incurs no risk, whereas the trustee may become liable to serious costs. In 1873, Mr. Registrar Murray made an order, Re Devexe, requiring a foreign creditor, upon an application for the delivery up of bills of exchange, to give security for costs.

Mr. Registrar Hazlitt said that when a creditor received notice that bis proof was rejected, it was his business to come to the court and to support the proof, and he must pay the costs of doing so, but tbe trustee, on the other band, must bear the costs of opposing the proof. The present application must be refused, with costs.

Solicitors for the trustee, Crump $ Son.

Solicitors for the creditor, Bolton, Robbins, <fc Busk.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. (Sitting in Banc, before Pollock, B., and Manisty and Stephbn, JJ.) February 21.—Re Symons.*

This was a rule calling upon Mr. Symons to show cause why a writ of attachment should not issue against him for contempt of court, in having acted as a duly qualified solicitor, by having sued out a writ in the High Court in an action.

It appeared that Symons, now in business at Barnstaple as an accountant, was formerly, for twenty years, clerk to a firm of solicitors. Sinoe he has been an accountant he wrote to a person named Vicary and demanded puyment of a sum of money due to one Docking. The letter concluded with a request that Vicary would not say anything about having received the letter trom Symons. A few days after the receipt of the above letter, a writ, purporting to be issued by C. Smale, a solicitor, but which was not signed in accordance with ord. 5, r. 7, was served upon Vicary, the address for service on the writ being Symon's offices in Barnstaple. At the time of the issuing of the writ Smale was in London, but Symons telegraphed to him saying that he had issued the writ in his (Smale's) name, and asking him to telegraph back that he confirmed what had been done. Smale did so. On being served with the writ Vicary took it to his solicitor, who, seeing that it was unsigned, iuvrstignted the matter, and wrote to Smale to ask whether the writ was issued by his authority. Then Smale denied that he had authorized Symons to issue the writ. Smale's explanation was that in a former matter a Mr. Bencraft, a solicitor, acted for him, and that Symons was then Bencraft's clerk, and that when he received Svmous' telegram, he thought that Symons was still with Bencraft, and that Bencraft was again actiog for him.

11. 1). Greene showed cause.—Symons never acted as solicitor. In his affidavit he says that he told Smale that Docking would require a writ to be issued again it Vicary, and asked if be should issue it in bis name, and that Smale assented. Symons then issued the writ, and forwarded a copy, together

* Reported by W. Blew, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,

with the papers, to Swale Id London, and a>ked by telegram for confirmati< n of whst he had done. [stephen, J.—Why, if he Whs acting with Sinale's authority, did he telegraph for more authority? It looks as though he were confcious of doing wrong.]

Murray, in support of the rule.—The Incorporated Law Society have felt themselves compelled to take up this case, in order to check, if possible, the growing practice on the part of unqualified persons of acting as qualified solicitors. These offenders are generally people with somo legal knowlsdgo, for Symons advertises that he draws wills, agreements, uotiees, and obtains probate. Symons knew he was acting illegally, or why did he tell Vicary not to say anything about the letter threatening proceedings on default nf payment, and why did he telegraph for authority after the issue of the writ?

Pollock, B.—I only hope that, in any expression of o|.ini< 11 to which I may give utterance, I shall not be understood to imply that I am disposed to tolerate such oonduct as that of which Symons has been guilty. But before dealing with his conduct in particular, I think it right to say that there lias been great irregularity on the part of Mr. Smale. I forbear making any further remarks about him, because Mr. Smale is not the person whose conduct is impeached. With regard to Symons I can have no doubt as to what was his position in this case. He was a person who came forward officiously in the matter in the guise of a clerk as it were. Having previously acted for Hencraft as clerk, he pnt himself forward as a person to issue the writ, but I have little doubt be never did intend to put himself forward as a practising solicitor. I think he acted as a tool, to get business with the intention to promote litigation in order to get payment for whatever he did. I think, that this distinguishes this case from Hunt's ease (25 Solicitors' Journal, 722). I think this application has been very properly made by the Incorporated Law Society, but, looking nt the facts, the decision we have come to is that the rule must be discharged upon the terms of Symons paying all costs.

Manisty, J.—I ana of the same opinion.

Stephen, J. —I am also of the same opinion. It appears to me upon the affidavits that it does not admit of a doubt for one iostant that Symons knew he was doing wrong. No man could have issued that writ and omitted to sign it who had the right to sign it. Then, as to the telegram, a man acting in a proper way does not ask for that kind of confirmation. The real truth is that Symons was actiag as Smale's jackal, to get business and promc*e litigation. It is not creditable to Smale, and clearly discreditable to Symons ; but as all the acts of the parties are confined to this case I agree that the rule must be discharged, and Symons let off with paying the costs. Should he offend again the coneequenoes will be more serious.

Rule discharged.

Solicitor, Williamson.

THE RAILWAY COMMISSION.* Aug. 3, 4, 5, 6, 19.—The City of Dublin Steam Packet Company v. The London

and North- Western Hailway Company. Through passenger rates—Steamboat traffic—TJndun preference—Railway and Canal Traffio Aot, 1854, s. 2 (17 & 18 Vict. 0. 31)—Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, a. 11 (S6 & 37 Viot. c. 48)—Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, s. 16 (31 & 32 Viot. c. 119).

Steamers were provided and worked for the conveyance of mails and passengers between Holyhead and Kingstown by D. Steamboat Company, under statutory powers and agreements obtained and made between that company and N. W. Railway Company. It was agreed that the charges for the ronveyanoe of passenger traffio by such route (called the mail route) between Kingstown and London, &c, should be fixed as regards the through rates by N. W. Railway Company. The N. W. Railway Company subsequently established a service of steamers forpaseengers between Holyhead and the North Wall in Dublin (called the North. Wail route). The effect of the statutory agreement between the two companies was to give N. W. Railway Company a complete control over the fares of both routes, as if they were sole owcers of both, and therefore the provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Aot, 1854 (which were made expressly applicable to both those lines of steamers), applied to both routes. The N. W. Railway Company's service of steamers was almost on a level with the mail service in point of speed and accommodation, and its fares were much lower, the first and second clas? passengers who were obarged 60s. and 45s. respectively between Euaton and Dublin, by the mail route, being only charged 47s. 6d. and 36a. 6d. by the North Wall route, being a difference uf 12s. 6d. and 8s. Cd. respectively. The services over the distance between Hulyhead and Dublin were substantially the same; the mileages (adding the railway from Kingstown to Dublin) were nearly equal; the accommodation by the North Wall route was practically as good as that by the mail, and the vessels of the two companies were worked at about the same cost. The mail through fares were divided by mileage, and the N. W. Railway Company received for their land portion ot the through service Ids. 10d. out of the first-class fare, and 35s. 3d. out of the second-class, their North Wall fares (railway and steamboat oombined) being 47s. 6d. first olass and 36s. 6d. seoond olsss. In both cues they carried the passengers the same distance by railway, but the passengers to and from North Wall travelled in addition by the railway companies' steamboat. Their boat fare was 8s. first or second class, and they received, therefore, in respect of the North Wall passengers 39s. Cd. first class, and 28s. 64. second class, for railway fare from London to Holyhead, as against 46s. lOd. and 35s. 3d. for the same railway journey, with only the difference in the class of train, in respeot of the mail route passenger.

Held, that the amounts by which the fares by the mail route were thus more than those by North Wall route (whether in regard to the fares charged for the entire service to Doblin or the portions due to the land journey only) were excessive and an undue prejudice to the traffic by the former route, and that the circumstances did not justify an excess in the total fares to Dublin by the mail route of more than, at the outside, ten per cent.

An application by the D. Steam Packet Company for through rates for

• Reported by W. H. Macnamaba, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

passengers between Kingstown and Loudon, Did the company's steamers and N. W. Company's trains was refused on the ground that the D. Steam Preset Company had agreed (under statutory powers) tbat the oharges for th* conveyance of passengers' traffio between London and Kingstown ware to be fixed from time to time, as regards the through rates, by the railway company.

Semile, that a company or persons using or working steam vessels for the purpose of earring on a communication between any towns or ports are entitled to aDply for through rates under section 11 of the Regulation 0/ Railways Act, 1873.

A lailway company are not under any obligation to issue a through ticket for any train not forming part of a through service.

Upon complaint by the D. Steam Packet Company tbat the N. W. Railway Company had not complied with section 16 of the Regulations of Railways Aot, 186S, which enacts {inter alia) that " where an aggregati sum is charged by the company for conveyance of a passenger by a steam ves<el and on the railway, fhn ticket shall nave the amount of toll charged for conveyance by thn steam ve sal distinguished from the amount charged for oonveyance on the railway," if wis admitted by N. W. Railway Company to be so, but as the D. Steam Faek-t Company did not show that such non-compliance bad caused any damagi to themselves, the Commissioners made no order.

This was an application by the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company, under section 11 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, for 'hrongh rut^s for passengers between Kingstown and Euston Station via the company's steamers and the London and North-Western Railway.Company's trains, and under section 2 of the Railway and Canal Traffio Act, 1854, for an injunction to enjoin the North-Western Company not to subject the applicants to auy undue disadvantage or prejudice.

The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

Benjamin, Q.C., and P. Stephen, appeared for the applicants.

TMeb$ter, Q.C., and Einest Moon, for the respondents.

The Commissioners delivered the following judgment:—

An Act entitled "Improved Postal and Passenger Communication betw< en England and Irelaud Act, 1855." authorized the London and North-Wet-tern Company, the Chester and Holyhead Railway Company, and the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company, conditionally upon an arrangement being made between them and the Postmaster-General with respect to the conveyance of mails in their steamboats, to provide and employ steamboats for the conveyance of mails and passengers between Holyhead and Kingstown, and section S of this Act extended to the steamboats to be Fo provided, and to the passengers and parcels carried therein, the provisions, so far as applicable, of the Railway Traffio Act, 1854. A new Irish postal service between London and Kingstown to be accomplished each way within eleven hours as a maximum, haviug been agreed upon between the companies and the Post Office, the railway companies undertaking the land portion by special mail trains, and the Steam Packet Company tho sea portion (between Holyhead and Kingstown) by special steam vessels of a prescribed numbor, size, and power, a sub-contract of the companies inter se was made on January 3, 1359, which, as varied by a later agreement of November 29,

1860, provides that the charges for the conveyance of passenger traffic are to be fixed from time to time as regards the through rates by the railway companies, as regards the sea service by the three companies, and as regards the land service by the London and North-Western and Chester and Holyhead Companies respectively, and that the receipts from through rt>tes are to he apportioned on the mileage principle, divides the total time of eleven hours in the proportion of six hours and forty minutes to the railway companies for the land service, three hours and forty-five minutes to the Dublin S eamship Company for the sea service, and thirty-five minutes for the transfer at Holyhead, and reserves to the North-Western and Chester Railway Companies lull right to run boats of their own or on their own account, as and when they may think necessary, for the convenience of the public and the proper development of traffic between England and Ireland, with a proviso that if thev should thereby cause the receipts of the Dublin Company to fall below £35,000 per annum they should make good the deficiency. The North-Western Company, with which the Chester and Holyhead Company is now amalgam»t >tf , are also authorized by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 60, 24 & 25 Viot. c. 123, and 33 & 34 Vict. c. 118, to carry on steam communication between Holyhead and Dublin, including Kingstown, in connection with their railway, and in and upon th. ir steamboats to carry passengtrs, cattle, and goods of every description. They have run no steamboats between Holyhead and Kingstown since November,

1861, but they work steamboats regularly between Holyhead and North Wall, Dublin, and it is with the use they make of these steamboats as a competitive passenger lino with tho mail-boats, that the complaints of the Dublin Steam Packet Company are chiefly connected. The through passenger rates by thu Irfsh mail route are regulated, as provided by the sub-oontracc, by the Northwestern Company solely, and these rates are so much higher than the rates the North-Western Company charge to passengers travelling by their own North Wail route, that they subject, as the applicants allege, the mail vesseU to an undue prejudice contrary to the Traffic Act, and the Dublin Company also apply to us to grant through rates by the Irish mail route, the same 111 amount as the rates in operation on the North Wall route.

We will deal with the second point first. The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, has under certain circumstances authorized us to grant through rates, and on the 24th of June last tho Dublin Company gave the North-Western Company a written notioe, conformably to the provisions of section 11 of Act, requiring passenger traffic to be forwarded at the same through rates »s the North-Western Company were charging by the North Wall route. Tho reply of the North-Western Company was a refusal, and the Dublin Company now ask for, amongst other things, an order granting the through rates they proposed in their notice of last June. To this, the respondents take two objections. They say, first, that the Dublin Company are not entitled to apply for through ratss, because tho Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, s. 11, confers such a power on railway or canal companies only; and, secondly, that even it a steam packet company could under any circumstances apply for a. through rate, the Dublin Company are nqt entitled to do so, because the/ have agreed by the sub-contract of January, 1859, that the charges for the conveyance of passenger traffic between London and Kingstown are to be fixed from time to time, as regards the through rates, by the railway companies. As to the first of these objections it is true that the Traffio Act, 1854, and the amendment of the 2nd section of that Act by section 11 of the Regulation of Railways Aot, 1873, do not deal directly with steamboat companies as carriers by sea, and that the special classes of public companies to which they have reference are railway or canal companies. But the llth section of the Act of 1873 ends with the following clause: "Where a railway company, or canal company, use, maintain, or work, or are party to an arrangoment for using, maintaining, or working steam vessels, for the purpose of carrying on a communication between any towns or ports, the provisions of this section shall extend to such steam vessels and to the traffic carried thereby." The terms of this clause do not make it necessary that the steam vessels shall be used or worked by a railway company; they may be nsed or worked by others. The arrangement in the present case for the performance of the sea service by the Dublin Company is clearly an arrangement within the clause, and the provisions of section 11 extend therefore to the mail boats and to the traffio carried thereby, and it is argued with considerable force that they are thus necessarily extended to the company or persons using or working the boats, so as to give them the rights of a railway company nnder that section, including that of compelling through traffic facilities to be gi ten. The steamboat company, it is urged, is under the liabilities and obligations of this section as regards the forwarding of through traffic at through rates at the request of any railway company, and notice would have to be sent to it, and its objections, if any, entertained, the same as if it was a railway company. And if the seotion must be read as applying to a steamboat company to impose liabilities, it cannot consistently, it is said, be otherwise read when it is a question of right or privilege, and we were pressed with the argument that a steamboat having to he treated as if was a railway, and the traffic on board as if it was railway traffic, and the steamboat owners, as regards duties imposed, as if they were a railway company, it follows that a company using the steam vessels and forwarding the traffic is fully, and for all purposes under the section, to be regarded as if it was a railway company. But it it is unnecessary for us to determine this question, because the provision in the suh-oontract that through rates shall be fixed by the railway company presents an insuperable difficulty to our entertaining the application, under present circumstances, so far as it relates to through rates. The contention on the part of the Dublin Company is that the North-Western Company have availed themselves of this power, not bond fde for the purpose for which it was conferred npon them, the benefit of both the companies, but in order to enable thamselves more effectually to compete with the mail route; and if such a misuse of the power had been made out, it would possibly have justified us in disregarding the provision, at least for the present purpose. But we do not think that this case has been established. The Irish mail rates have varied very little. Soon after the new postal service commenced in I860, the first-class fare 62s. 6d., and the second-class 45s. 6d. ; and except in September, 1877, when they were reduced to their present amount of 60s. and 45»., there has been no revision of them. The rates via North Wall have varied as little; they were 46s. first clan, and35s. 6d. second class in 1869, were each advanced Is. in 1873, and are now, and have been since 1877, 47s. 6d. and 36s. 6d. They were meant to be uniform with the rates charged by the Dublin Company for passages by their Dublin to Liverpool vessels, and the North-Western Company desired to afford to that portion of the public who could not pay the express fares of the Irish mail an alternative route via Holyhead, to and from London, Manchester, &c, on the same terms as the Dublin Company were charging, via Liverpool, in connection with the Midland and other railway companies at Liverpool. The service they provided for that purpose was of a character which made it competitive with the Dublin Company's vessels to and from Liverpool, without being so with their mail packets, and so long as it maintained that character the Dublin Company did not complain ot its lower faros. It was cheaper, bat it did not divert traffio from the mail route because it was not so expeditious, and because the passengers by it travelled in vessels which carried cattle as well. But the service has been gradually improved until it has become almost as good as the Kingstown mail service. The steamers of the railway company sail twice a day each way, are express boats as to speed, and carry no cattle; the trains also in connection with them are nearly as fast as the mail trains, and North Wall passengers may, if they like, travel from Holyhead by the Irish day mail train for an extra payment of 5i. 2d. and 3s. 6i, being the difference between the express and ordinary fares as far as to Chester, the fares on from Chester to London being the same for that train as for all ordinary trains. This express passenger service, via Holyhead and North Wall, Dublin, began in 1876 as a day service; the night service was not added till the middle of 1880. Both were regarded by the Dublin Company as run in opposition to the mail packets; that in the day because, except from Holyhead and Kingstown, they had no day service of their own, none at least to Liverpool ; that in the uight because it was timed to leave North Wall, Dublin, for Holyhead at 7.30 p.m., the mail time from Kingstown to Holyhead being 7.20 p.m. (now 7.15 p.m.), and the Dublin Company, finding the number of passengers by the mail packet falliug off, applied in 1876 and again in 1877 to the North-Western Company to counteract the effect of the competition by lowering the mail fares and equalizing them or nearly so, with the North Wall fares. The North-Western Company made some alterations in 1877, bnt the difference between the mail and the North Wall fares was only slightly lessened, and there was still a difference in favour of North Wall of 12s. 6d. first class, and 8s. 6d. second cla-s. The Dublin Company, therefore, continued to complain of their being undersold, and to urge a reduction of the mail fares. But in 1880 the North-Western Company finally declined to comply with their request, stating that having regard to the quicker .service by the mail boats and the low rates charged by the Dublin Company between Dublin and Liverpool, they considered the differential fares to

be reasonable and fair. Now it cannot he held that it is not consistent with the sub-contract that the railway company should develop any route by sea, liable to be used by passengers in preference to the mail boats, because it is expressly provided by that oontract that they may ran boats of their own or on their own account, as and when they may think necessary, and whether the grounds they give why the mail fares should not be reduced notwithstanding the lower fares at which their own boats convey passengers, do or do not justify the difference maintained, we cannot find, even if clause 8 or so much of it as relates to the fixing of through rates could be expunged without vitiating the whole contract, that they have exercised their control over the mail fares in a manner so unreasonable as to be tantamount to releasing the Dublin Company from their engagements, and qualifying them to require traffio to be forwarded at through rates of their own proposing. Wo must, therefore, refuse to allow these through rates.

The complaint of undue prejudice remains to bo considered. It has been already mentioned that by section 8 of the Improved Postal and Passenger Communication between England and Ireland Act, 1855 (which Act authorized the railway companies to contract and agree with the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company to provide steamboats for the conveyance of mails and passengers between Holyhead and Kingstown, and gave the aforesaid companies power to make contracts and agreements with eaoh other in reference to the conveyance of traffic in such steamboats, and with the Post Office in reference to the conveyance of mails in them) the provisions of the Railway Traffio Act, 1854, so far as the same are applicable, are extended to the steamboats to be provided under the provisions of the special Act, and that by the Hub-contract of 1859 the charges for the conveyance of passenger traffic by the postal route between Kingstown and London, &c, are to be fixed from time to time as regards the through rates by the North-Western Company. The Railway Traffic Act is also by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 123, and the Continuation Act (33 & 34 Yict. c. 118), extended and applied to the steamers between Holyhead and Dublin worked by the North-Western Company under those and other speoial Acts. The effect of the provision iu the sub-contract is to give to the North-Western Company, so far as fares are concerned, as complete control over both routes as if they were sole owners of both, and under these circumstances the provisions of the Traffic Act (which are made expressly applicable to both these steamers) apply to both routes precisely as if they formed part of a single system, and any inequality of terms which would constitute an undue preference in the one case would equally do so in the other.

The special mail service comprises two journeys each way daily (two sailings and two trains in connection each way), the mail steamers leaving Kingstown for the up journey at 7 a.m. and 7.15 p.m., and the mail trains leaving Euston for the down journey at 7.15 a.m. and 8.25 p.m. Ooly first and second class passengers are carried through, and the first-class fare is 60s. (including Is. 6d. railway fare from Kingstown to Westland-row, Dublin), and the second-class 45s. (including Is. railway fare from Kingstown to Dublin). When the postal contract was entered into in January, 1859, the gross receipts from the passenger sea traffic between Kingstown and Holyhead were computed at £35,000 per annum, and as it was expeoted Chat they would increase after the commencement of the new servioe, it was provided by the 16th article of the postal contraot that half of any increase should be deducted from the annual subsidy of £85,900 to be paid to the Dublin Company for the sea service to be performed by them nnder the contract. A table of the total annual receipts of the Dublin Company from passengers by the mail packets via Kingstown from 18fi0, put in by the applicants, shows that the receipts increased from £37,630 in 1861 to £49,804 in 1872, £50,000 in 1873, £50,064 in 1874, and £50,582 in 1875, and that in the years since 1875 ,they have successively decreased, fairing in 1876 to £47,573, in 1877 to £41,537, 1878 to £38,083, 1879 to £35,714, and in 1880 to £33,162. Meanwhile the reoeipts of the North-Western Company from the sea journey between Holyhead and North Wall, Dublin, have been steadily increasing. Before 1876 there were no North Wall boats not carrying goods and live stock as well as passengers and parcels. But in this year the railway company put on boats for passengers exclusively, and a train packet servioe for passengers not conveying cattle is now established, which leaves North Wall for Euston via Holyhead at 9.30 a.m. and 7.30 p.m., and Eustou for North Wall at 9 a.m. and 6.30 p.m., the comparative times occupied by the journeys as between the same points (London and Dublin) being 12 hours and 55 minutes North Wall route, and 11 hours and 30 minutes mail route. The effect of the improvements in the North Wall route has been to bring a large accession of traffic to benefit by them, and the gross earnings of the Holyhead and North Wall boats in respect of first and second class passengers have increased from £8,407 in 1875 to £20,327 in 1880, and in respeoc of parcels from £5,995 in 1875 to £10,123 in 1880, the period 1875 to 1880 being that iu whioh the reoeipts from first and second class passengers by the mail packets via Kingstown have decreased from £50,582 to £33,162. The North Wall ssrviee is now almost on alevel with the mail servioe in point of speed and accommodation, and in one particular it has a great advantage over it, and that is that its lares are much lower, the first and second class passengers who are charged 60s. and 45a. respectively by the mail route being only charged 47s. 6d. and 36s. 6d. by the North Wall route. No objection can be made to the North-Western Company fixing the fares by its Nortli Wall route in any manner it thinks best, but their amount is a criterion of the reasonableness ol the fares the same company fix lor the othsr route, and a difference without good cause or one disproportionately large, would in the circumstanoes of this case subject the traffij by the dearer route to an undue disadvantage in contravention of the Aot. Now the less time that is occupied between London and Dublin by the Irish mail than by the other service is nearly one hour and a half, of which nearly one hour is time gained on the land portion of the route between London and Holyhead, the mail trains doing the journey under six hours and forty-five minutes, and the express North Wall trains in a little over seven hours and thirty minutes. The mail trains run for the express purpose of carrying the Irish mail, and the

weight of each train, the number of carriages of which it ia composed, and the stoppages it makes, are only allowed to be snch as will not interfere with its being punctual, and being able to accomplish the journey in the allotted space of time. In these respects it differs from the trains carrying Irish traffic via North Wall, which are not limited to that one purpose, but serve other objects besides, and which working in connection with other trains which meet them at jnnotions along the line, are necessarily slower trains, and less to be depended upon for punctuality. Charges may not unreasonably be different in the case of trains run under suoh different conditions; not perhaps because the railway company could not profitably carry a mail train passenger at the same rate as a passenger using their other trains, for the postal subsidy which the company receive and which pays them at the rate of about one shilling a train mile, reimburses the company any special expenses incident to the mail trains, as trains by contract, but because the service is special in the speed and punctuality with which it is performed, and in order to keep so is limited in a way that other trains are not in its power of adapting itself to traffic fluctuating in its requirements, and of increasing the amount of accommodation it can afford. But the difference that ia made is the difference between 60s. and 47s. 6d. first class, and 45s. and 36s. 6d. second olass, or 12s. 6d. and 8s. 6d. respectively ; and of this the part that is properly attributable to the distance between Holyhead and Dublin is small. The services over that distance are substantially the same; the mileages (adding the railway from Kingstown to Dublin to the mail route) are nearly equal; the accommodation by the North Wall steamers is practically as good as that by the mail, and the vessels of the two companies appear to be worked at about the same cost, suoh difference as there is telling against and not in favour of the North Wall ronje. The mail through fares are divided by mileage, and the North-Western Company reoeive for their land portion of the throngh service 46s. lOd. out of the first-olasa fare and 35s. 3d. out of the second, their North Wall fares (railway and steamboat combined) being 47s. 6d. first olass and 36s. 6d. second class. In both casea they carry the passengers the same distance by railway, but the passengers to and from North Wall travel in addition :by the railway company's steamboat. Their boat fare ia 8a. first or seoond olass, and they receive, therefore, in reepeot of the North Wall passengers, 39s. 6d. first class and 28s. 6d. second class for railway fare from London to Holyhead, as againat 46s. lOd. and 35s. 3d. for the same railway jonrney, with only the difference in the class of train, in respect of the mail route passenger. The amountB by whioh the fares by the mail are thus more than those by North Wall, whether in regard to the fares charged for the entire service to Dublin or the portions due to the land journey only, are, in oar opinion, excessive, and an nndue prejudioe to the traffic by the former route, and we must grant an injunction against this oontinning. We do not Bay that there ought to be no difference between the two sets of fares ; but we cannot find anything in the oiroumstanoes to justify an exoess in the total fares to Dublin by the mail of more than, at the outside, the ten per cent, suggested by Mr. Watson in his letter of the 19th of May, 1877, as a reasonabl edifferenoeWe do not see any ground for holding that any exoess confined within those limits would be undue or unreasonable so long as the existing difference in the quality of the two services is maintained.

The application inoludes complaints on one or two minor points. It is admitted that the North-Western Company's North Wall tiokets do not show on their faoe how mnch of the total fare ia for the railway and how much for the boat, and that Beotion 16 of the Regulation of Railways Aot, 1868, requires suoh a separation of the fare to be made. But the Dublin Company did not show any damage to themselves under this head. Another point is that passengers by any ordinary train requiring to book through via Kingstown are charged the full rates by the mail route, and the railway company admit that they have no other than those rates at whioh they book through via Kingstown. Bnt the railway company are not under any obligation to issue a through tioket for any train not forming part of the throngh servioe, and if such a tioket is given to a passenger by any ordinary train, it must be taken to have been issued to him solely for his own convenience. Any passenger desiring to cross via Kingstown has it in his power to travel at local fares, the sum of which, if he travels by an ordinary train, ia somewhat less than the amount of the throngh mail fare, and if he does not choose to avail himself of the power he has only himself to blame.

On the question of costs we think these proceedings must be treated as separable; the application for through rates is quite distinct from the complaint of a violation of the Traffic Aot, and we think that the two applications ought to be treated as having been separately made. We therefore dismsss so muoh of the application as seeks for the allowance of through rates with costs, and we direct the respondents to pay the costs of so much of the application as oomplains of an nndue prejudioe to the traffio by the mail route ; the two sets of costs to be taxed separately, and the one set off against the other, and the respondents are to pay or reoeive the balanoe accordingly.

The Commissioners subsequently ordered that the injunotion should not issue until the 1st of October.

Solicitors for the applicants, Carlisle &, Ordell, for S. S. Watson, Dublin.

Solicitor for the respondents, R. F. Roberts.

At a dinner of the Fishmongers' Company last week, Vice-Chancellor Bacon remarked, with regard to the reoent discussion on the Long Vacation, "that her Majesty's judges should not be called upon to work more than three-quarters of the year, for they could not work; longer safely

to clum&elves and usefully to the public."



A speoial general meeting of this sooiety waa held at the Law Institution on Wednesday last for the purpose of considering the report of the committee whioh was appointed in November last to deal with the report of the Legal Prooednre Committee. A copy of the committee's report has already appeared in our oolumus. Mr. Charles Claridge Druce, president of the society, occupied the ohair, and there was a large attendance of members of the oounoil, together with about 230 members of the sooiety.

The President, in opening the proceedings, reminded the meeting that at the meetings held on the 4th and 11th of November laBt, the recommendations contained in the report of the Legal Procedure Committee were laid before the oounoil and oonsidered, and it was deoided at the speoial general meeting, on the 18th of the same month, that the subjeot should be submitted to a oommittee of the members. That committee had, after three months of continuous labour, produoed what was perhaps one of the most admirable reports he had ever had oocaaion to read. It was not for him, as one of the members of the society, to unduly press that point, and it would be sufficient for his purpose if he referred to an artiole whioh appeared in that day's Times, which would save him making many remarka with whioh he would otherwise have had to trouble the meeting. Oddly enough, on the day on whioh the last general meeting had been held, the Timet had announced that the Bnle Committee of the Judges were then meeting, and therefore time pressed; and oddly enough the oounoil had reoeived a letter from the Lord Chancellor's seoretary two days before the present meeting, stating that the Rule Committee of the Judges were to hold another meeting on that day, and again, therefore, time pressed in the matter. He would very shortly take an outline of the report of the oommittee of the sooiety. The first heading related to a muoh-vexed question, on which undoubtedly opinions had differed; but he hoped that in the consideration of suoh a large measure each and every member wonld be prepared to sacrifice, as far as necessary, his individual crotohets. He was quite prepared to do so in bis own oase. The oommittee had ooine to the oonolusion that pleadings were essential to define the real points at issue, and that the system of pleadings

prescribed by the Judicature Act and Rules should be substantially adhered to. The Lord Chancellor's oommittee, they would remember, had proposed to dispense with pleadings unless a judge, on application being made to him, should hold them to be necessary. The committee of the society had approaohed the subjeot with a desire to see all unnecessary pleadings

abolished. It wonld be observed that a very small minority approved of the suggestion of the Legal Procedure Committee with referenoe to pleadings. They had all agreed to out off redundant matter, bnt that in many oases the pleadings onght to remain, and they thonght that the expense of an application to the judge would be balanced by the saving that would be otherwise effeoted. The next point was the jurisdiction of masters, and the oommittee suggested " that every aotion should be assigned to a particular master's list, and that work in chambers should be so re-arranged as to

provide for designating masters to whom actions should be assigned, and for suoh masters sitting daily in ohambers to hear applications in respect of the matters so assigned to them." Among matters of detail dealt with, they thought the practice of payment into oourt unnecessarily inconvenient and troublesome in some cases, and that for all sums formally paid into oourt by the defendant, the reoeipt of the plaintiffs solioitor should be sufficient. In respect to summons for direction, the oommittee of the society did not oononr in the recommendations of the report ; they thought "that the existing practice of requiring a separate summons for each separate matter should not be compulsory, and upon any summons by either party it should be competent for the judge or master to make any order which may seem just,

at the instance of either party, in relation to the subject-matter of the summons." In reference to discovery the committee thought " that it is desirable that each party to an action should be entitled, as of right, to deliver interrogatories to, and have the discovery of documents from, the other party, subject, in the case of interrogatories, to an application to a master to strike out questions on the same grounds as at present; but that in order to oht ck any abuse of such a rule, and unnecessary expense, the following course should be adopted :—Either party should be at liberty, after statement of defence, to administer interrogatories, and also without any summons and order for discovery, either party should be bound, if so required by the other party within ten days after statement of defence, to deliver an affidavit of documents ; but such discovery should be limited to such points relating to the matters in question in the action as should by notice be required." And "that the costs consequent on interrogatories, and of discovery, unless otherwise ordered, should be bcrne in the first instance by the party asking for discovery, and should be paid by him to the other party, unless payment into court be directed; and such costs should be allowed as costs in the cause where, and where only, such discovery and interrogatories should appear to have

been reasonably asked for." The party requiring the discovery would have thus to pay for it in the first instance, and he would have the expense allowed him in the costs, unless it was otherwise ordered. With respect to notice to admit specifio facts the committee agreed with the Lord Chancellor's committee.

With regard to appeals from chambers he had some difficulty in contrasting the one report with the other, because the committee of the sooiety thought the sittings in Bane should be abolished, and that, as in ohancery, one judge should be permitted to settle and dispose of it. Subject to that there was no material difference. With regard to the question of judgment debtors'summonses it was the opinion of the committee that "the jurisdiction of the judge at chambers should be transferred to the Oourt of Bankruptcy," leaving out the word "London," which was in the recommendation of the Lord Chan

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