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be a most idle proposal and an undeserved slight upon the members of of our profession, and it would very far fall short of the contemplated result. As a matter of fact, solicitors acting for debtors do not generally take proxies in their own names, but in the name of some apparently independent person whom they can rely upon to act in accordance with their wishes. And there is nothing in this proposal to prevent them from continuing to do so. How, too, in case of the bankrupt's solicitor being also a creditor, as very frequently happens? We presume it it not intended to deprive him of a vote in respect of his own debt. Yes such a proposal would only be consistent with the one made by this sub-clause. We have heard it suggested that a solicitor who makes a bad debt with his client ought not to be allowed to prove in competition with other creditors, but we hope the Legislature is not quite so prejudiced against the profession as the gentleman who made that suggestion. By this proposal the brother or any other relative of the bankrupt could hold proxies but not the solicitor! Surely the provision in sub-clause 2 will be sufficient without this.

“Sub-clause (5). The holder of a proxy shall not use it for the purpose of voting for the appointment of himself as trustee unless he is specially authorized to do so by the instrument of proxy."

If this proposal is to have any effect, it should also prohibit the appointee from appointing his partner or, where the appointee is a person in someone else's employment, his employer, as trustee unless specially

authorized.

"Sub-clause (6). A creditor may appoint the official receiver of the bankrupt's estate as his proxy."

We must confess that we view this proposition with a very considerable degree of suspicion. As far as possible, proxies ought to be given only to persons in the bond fide employment of the creditors, but this is not always possible where meetings are held at places distant from where such creditors reside, and it is usual in such cases for trade creditors to combine in appointing some agent in whom they have confidence (and who is nominated by the largest trade creditor or by the majority in value at a meeting) to represent them at the statutory meeting. This practice, although abused in many cases, is on the whole very convenient and useful to wholesale houses, and we do not think they will like it to be altered very materially. But this sub-clause appears practically to suggest that creditors should appoint the official receiver as their proxy when they cannot personally attend, and may be acted upon by some official receivers to ask for proxies, and that would introduce a system of official touting as bad, if not worse, than any now existing. Upon clause 18 generally we would further remark that the marginal entirely take the place of those rules? If so, then it ought to be provided, as in rule 85, that the proxy should be under the hand of the creditor, or, in the case of a limited company, under the hand of an agent duly authorized.

note refers to rules 85 and 86. Is it intended that this clause shall

As regards principle, we think the decision is equally correct. The intention of the parties cannot be that the lease shall commence on the date of the agreement; they contemplate the preparation of a formal lease; the lessor does not usually give possession until such lease is executed, and the lessee does not intend to pay rent without having possession.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ALIENATION OF CROWN LANDS,

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-While transacting business yesterday with a solicitor whose clients are seeking to acquire certain Crown lands from this department, my attention was called to a passage at p. 15 of Messrs. Coulson and Forbes's recently published "The Law of Waters, &c." (London, Sweet, 1880), which contains a statement as to the existing statute law, for the correction of which, as not merely erroneous but calculated to hamper, or tie the hands of, riparian owners desirous of carrying out improvements on tidal lands adjacent to their properties with the consent of the Crown, I trust you may be able to afford space. The passage is as follows:

"There can be no doubt that a subject may be owner of a portion of the sea-shore by express grant from the Crown. The alienation of Crown lands is now, however, prohibited by statule law; and so much, therefore, of the sea as has not actually been aliened still remains vested in the Crown, incapable of alienation except by Act of Parliament."

"statute law" of the above is the Act 1 Anne, st. 1, c. 7-an enactment The italics are mine. A note at foot of the page shows that the which, so far as any of its provisions remained in force after the passing of the 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 2, was wiped out of the Statute Book by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1867 (vide Statutes Revised, II.; Chronological Table, XX.). But besides repealing these provisions of the Act of Queen Anne, which forbid the alienation of Crown lands for a longer term than thirty-one years or three lives, the Act of 1829 empowered the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to sell (section 34) and exchange for valuable consideration (section 42), subject to the provisions "of this and parks. The statute of George IV. has been amended and extended Act," every description of Crown property other than the Royal palaces by a whole row of enactments between the 2 Will. 4, c. 1, and the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 62, which, subject to certain exceptions, transferred to the Board of Trade, so far as tidal waters are concerned, all the powers which preceding legislation had vested in the Commissioners of Woods and

Forests.

Those of your readers who may desire information as to the dealings of the two Departments with Crown property, for the alienation of which statutory powers have not been obtained, will find it in the long series of annual reports of the Commissioners, and in two parliamentary papers, No. 61 of Session 1872, and No. 127 of Session 1877, which show the dealings of the Board of Trade with the foreshores up to 1877. Board of Trade, S. W., Dec. 15. A. R. FAIRFIELD.

RECENT DECISIONS.

AGREEMENT FOR LEASE.

(Marshall v. Berridge, C.A., 30 W. R. 93.)

The question whether specific performance would be enforced of an agreement to grant a lease which does not specify the time for commencement of the term, was formerly considered as settled by Blore v. Sutton (3 Mer. 237). In that case Sir W. Grant held that there was no sufficient agreement in writing, because (among other reasons) the memorandum did not mention the time of commencement of the term. In Jacques v. Millar (25 W. R. 846, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 153), however, Mr. Justice Fry pointed out that the report of Blore v. Sutton in Merivale does not state that the memorandum in that case bore the date at which it was signed, whereas in the case before him, although no date was specified for the commencement of the lease, the memorandum bore the date at which it was signed. He held that the lease was to commence on the date of the agreement, and enforced specific performance of the agreement. In Marshall v. Berridge he followed his previous decision, but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal, who held that the case of Jacques v. Millar was wrongly decided. As regards authority this decision is unquestionably correct. The Court of Appeal sent for the record in Blore v. Sutton, and discovered that the memorandum did contain the date; hence the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Fry fell to the ground. Moreover, the case of Doe v. Benjamin (9 A. & E. 644), on which Mr. Justice Fry relied, was decided (before 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106) on the question whether an instrument operated as a mere agreement for a lease or as a present demise. If it operated as a present demise, then no question arose as to enforcing an agreement.

JUDGES' CHAMBERS,

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, I desire permission to corroborate the sentiments expressed by a "Practising Solicitor in your columns a few weeks since, as the result of his attending upon the hearing of a summons before Mr. Justice judge attended to the statements which I felt it to be my duty to subWatkin Williams, and to record the careful way in which the learned mit in the interests of my client.

So far as my own summons was concerned, it related to a matter of some difficulty, and was by way of appeal from the master's decision, but the judge's knowledge of the subject with which the summons dealt was so comprehensive and clear that much less time was occupied than would have been necessary if the learned judge had not been familiar with the authorities, both from the common law and equity sides of the High Court of Justice, which were submitted for consideration.

The matter being of some difficulty, and acting upon a suggestion made by one of your correspondents, I directed the judge's attention to the orders of the court, and had no difficulty in obtaining from his lordship the allowance of a fee of one guinea for attending the summons, his lordship admitting that the sum of 6s. 8d., which would otherwise have been all I could have claimed, did not represent anything like a fair remuneration.

On the hearing of the summons before the master more time was occupied, and as much labour involved, but I doubt very much if I should attendance. have succeeded in obtaining from the master any additional fee for my

Now that the Incorporated Law Society's Committee on Legal Procedure is sitting, I trust that they will adopt as one of their recommen.

dations what has already been suggested to them by the correspondence in your journal-namely, that the master should attend on the hearing of appeals from his own judgments, and that all actions should be assigned to a particular judge or master, and all other subsequent stages as far as possible taken before such master or the judge, and that there should be an absolute right for the suitor to require the judge's decision, if the party affected should be dissatisfied with the master's decision, without having to observe the formality of taking out a summons by way of appeal, which only adds to the expense of litigation, and is productive of no real good, and is, moreover, not required in the Chancery Division of the High Court.

My experience confirms the views which have been expressed by some of your correspondents as to the way in which business is transacted at chambers, especially so far as the masters are concerned, and I do earnestly trust that one result, at least, of the committee's report to which I have referred, will be such recommendations with respect to the powers and duties of the masters as will, when adopted, entirely remove these imperfections, which do still unquestionably exist in this important branch of the administration of justice.

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did not warrant the extension, and Cruttwell v. Lye was a clear authority that, if the assignors of a bankrupt sold his business and goodwill, the purchaser could not restrain the bankrupt, either from commencing a similar the assignors in that case to sell the goodwill was not questioned, and, so far business, or from soliciting his old customers to deal with him. The right of Bankruptcy Acts then in force did not expressly mention it. as it was property, they apparently had the right to sell it, although the The Bankruptcy Acts of 1861 and 1869 did expressly authorize the sale of a goodwill by a trustee in bankruptcy, and whatever would pass by a mere sale thereof, apart from any covenant or agreement, or representation or fraud on the part of the bankrupt, could be assumed by his trustee in bankruptcy. The bankrupt himself could probably be compelled, under section 19 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, to join in the conveyance or assignment of his business and goodwill for the benefit of his creditors, but he could not be compelled to enter into any contract restricting him from carrying on business in future in any way whatever. An assignment of a business and its goodwill, without more, appeared to their lordships to pass now just as much as, and no more than, in the days of Lord Eldon. As against the assignor, it conferred on the assignee the exclusive right to carry on the business assigned, and, as incidental to this, the exclusive right to represent himself as carrying on the business, and, consequently, the right, not only to sue the assignor for damages, if he had infringed those rights, but also to restrain him from infringing them if he manifested an intention to do so. Moreover, to this extent, a bankrupt who did not concur in his trustee's assignment was in no better position than a bankrupt who did. Every bankrupt, whether he concurred not, Was bound by every lawful disposition of his property by his trustee, and whatever rights such a disposition conferred on a purchaser must be respected by the bankrupt, whether he joined in the cor. veyance or not. But, in their lordships' opinion, the right of the purchaser of the goodwill of a business from a trustee in bankruptcy did not extend to restrain the bankrupt (even if he joined in the conveyance) from bonâ fide commencing a fresh business, and from seeking assistance in it from his old friends and customers. It would be contrary to the policy of the bankrupt laws to extend Labouchere v. Dawson to such a case. not necessary to overrule that decision, it would still be applicable to voluntary sales, but their lordships did not think it ought to be extended to compulsory alienations. When a man sold his own business and goodwill for his own benefit it was thought unfair on his part to avail himself of his personal acquaintance with his old customers, and to induce them to withdraw their support from the business which he had sold, and this element of personal unfairness might be sufficient to justify the decision in Labouchere v. Dawson. In Leggott v. Barrett the case was put by Lord Justice Brett upon the ground of implied contract, and that was, perhaps, the best ground on which to rest the decision. The obligation enforced in Labouchere v. Dawson was, however, a purely personal obligation, and not a mere incident to the transfer of property. If the present case had arisen after the passing of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, or the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, but before Labouchere v. Dawson, it would, their lordships thought, have been decided against the plaintiff, and, notwithstanding Labouchere. Dawson, it ought, they thought, to be so decided now. The defendant, having done nothing personally unfair, and having carefully avoided all appearance of carrying on the business sold by the trustee, could not be restrained from soliciting his old friends and business connections to assist him in carrying on the new business, which he unquestionably had a right to commence. BAGGALLAY, L.J., concurred. But he added that Labouchere v. Dawson had never yet been adopted by the Court of Appeal. In Leggott v. Barrett Brett, L.J., expressed his approval of it, but James and Cotton, L.JJ., intimated a doubt as to its correctness. He, therefore, felt himself at liberty to say that he also doubted the decision in Labouchere v. Dawson. He thought that it went far beyond any previous decision, and, should it hereafter be questioned in the Court of Appeal, he should certainly desire an opportunity of fully considering whether he could agree with it or not. It did not, however, even if it was right, justify what was claimed by the present plaintiff.—SOLICITORS, W. F. Watson; Last & Sons.

SALE OF BANKRUPT'S BUSINESS AND GOODWILL BY TRUSTEE-Right of BANKRUPT TO SOLICIT FORMER CUSTOMERS.-In a case of Walker v. Mottram, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., an important question arose as to the right of a bankrupt, whose business and the goodwill of it have been sold by his trustee, to set up a business of the same kind, and to solicit orders from his former customers. The trustee of a brewer, who had filed a liquidation petition, agreed to sell the brewery, and the plant and stock-in-trade, and the goodwill of the business to the debtor and another person. The debtor was unable to pay his share of the purchase-money, and he surrendered his interest in the purchase to his co-purchaser, the plaintiff in the action. The plaintiff paid the whole purchase-money to the trustee, and took a conveyance of the brewery from the trustee, but no actual assignment of the goodwill was made by the trustee to him. The plaintiff, however, took possession of the property which he had purchased and proceeded to carry on the business. The debtor afterwards purchased another brewery not far from the first, and commenced carrying on business there, and he sent circulars to some of his old customers soliciting orders from them. The plaintiff brought the action against the debtor, claiming an injunction to restrain him from soliciting the custom of his old customers, and from issuing circulars to them advertising to them the fact that he had purchased a brewery, and was carrying on business as a brewer. The plaintiff also claimed damages for the injury already done to him. He moved for an injunction, and his motion was refused by JESSEL, M.R., on the ground that, inasmuch as the defendant had not entered into any personal obligation with the plaintiff, the principle of the case of Labouchere v. Dawson (20 W. R. 309, L. R. 13 Eq. 322) did not apply. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (BAGGALLAY, LUSH, and LINDLEY, L.JJ.). LUSH and LINDLEY, L.JJ., delivered a written judgment, in which they said that, if the defendant had himself sold his business and goodwill to the plaintiff, the decision in Labouchere v. Dawson would be directly applicable. But the defendant contended that that decision, even if right, did not apply, and ought not to be extended to a case in which the business and goodwill had been sold, not by the defendant himself, but by the trustee in his liquidation. The question was one of considerable importance, and was by no means free from difficulty. Labouchere v. Dawson was decided in 1872; it was followed and extended by Jessel, M.R., in Ginesi v. Cooper (L. R. 14 Ch. D. 596), and, although the extension had been overruled by the Court of Appeal in Leggott v. Barrett (28 W. R. 962, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 306), the decision itself was approved by one at least of the members of the court which disapproved its extension. The rule laid down in Labouchere v. Dawson had, it was believed, been recognized and acted on in practice, and, whatever might be said of it, the rule was in accordance with general opinion as to what was fair and right, and was easily applied in practice. At the same time, it was impossible to read the cases relating to goodwill decided before 1872 without coming to the conclusion that Labouchere v. Dawson went considerably beyond them. The judgment of Lord Eldon in Cruttwell v. Lye (17 Ves. 335); his elaborate and carefully worded order in Cook v. Collingridge (Collyer on Partner-hip, p. 215); the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Wood in Churton v. Douglas (Joh. 174), and that of the Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Helleley (2 D. J. & S. 446),

It was

NUISANCE-BONE-BOILING BUSINESS-INJUNCTION-PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, 1875, s. 112.-In a case of Verco v. Morris, before Chitty, J., on the 17th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendants from carrying on a bone-boiling business in the neighbourhood of the plaintiffs' houses. The defendant had carried on the business in his present premises for a period of twelve years, and the plaintiffs had only just entered into occupation of their property. The nearest house of the plaintiffs was 112 yards distant from the defendant's premises. The evidence was to the effect that the smell of the defendant's premises was disagreeable and unhealthy to the inmates of the plaintiffs' houses. It was also contended that the business was a nuisance, as it was mentioned as an offensive trade in the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 112. By that section no person after the passing of the Act shall establish within the district of an urban authority, without their consent in writing, any offensive trade, mentioning (inter alia) that of a “bone boiler," and if he does shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £50 in respect of the establishment, and of 40s. for every day on which the offence shall be continued. The defendant submitted that there was not sufficient evidence of a nuisance, and that the lapse of time constituted a bar to the interlocutory injunction. CHITTY, J., said that the defendant's business caused a nuisance and a substantial nuisance to the plaintiffs. The argument founded on the Public Health Act that the trade was ipso facto a nuisance, was not conclusive, but was, no doubt, an element to be considered. He must grant an injunction until the trial to restrain the continuance of the nuisance, and the defendant would have a month to abate the nuisance.-SOLICITORS, W. Foster; Lewis & Lewis.

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COMPANY-ARRANGEMENT ACT-PROVISIONS FOR PAYMENT OF CREDITORS— SUSPENSE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH NO ACTION TO BE BROUGHT-LEAVE OF COURT SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.-In a case of In re Teign Valley Railway Act, 1881, also before Chitty, J., on the 17th inst., a motion was made by a creditor of the company for leave to commence an action against the Teign Valley Railway Company under the following circumstances:-By the above Act, which was an Arrangement Act to enable the company to tide over its difficulties, certain provisions were inserted enabling the company to create debenture stock to satisfy their creditors, and there was also a section providing that no action or other proceeding should be brought against the company until after a year from the passing of the Act, except by leave of the court, and except in respect of liabilities contracted after the passing of the Act. The applicant was a creditor of the company at the time of the passing of the Act, and he did not state any special circumstances why the court should allow him to bring an action. For the company it was contended that the object of the section was to give the company time to recover its position, and that no action should be allowed except under some special circumstances. They offered to set aside a portion of the debenture stock to be created pursuant to the Act as security for the applicant's debt. CHITTY, J., said it was clear the applicant and all creditors of the company at the time of the passing of the Act were bound by its provisions. No action for the suspense period of one year from the passing of the Act was to be brought against the company except by leave of the court, and the question was upon what terms such leave should be given. There was provision made in the Act for payment of the company's debts by the issue of debenture stock. The Act, however, was silent as to the terms upon which leave to commence an action should be given, but, in his opinion, there must be some special circumstances to justify the court in giving leave. Such a circumstance for instance as where the Statute of Limitations was running out against the creditor, or where his witnesses were old and infirm, and it was necessary to prevent a failure of justice that he should be at liberty to sue at once. Leave no doubt should also be given where the company were acting improperly towards the creditor. The best point made for the applicant was that the action should be permitted to go to judgment and should then be stayed, as in the meantime the company might have received and applied the whole of the debenture stock on payment of other creditors. As, however, the company would undertake to set apart debenture stock to secure the creditor's debt, the above argument would have no weight, and, therefore, he did not see any sufficient ground for giving his leave. The shortness of the time within which the year would expire was also one of the grounds for his decision. He should refuse the motion upon the above undertaking being given, and he should reserve the costs until after the suspense period had elapsed, and the creditor had brought his action, which he must do within a month of the expiry of that period.-SOLICITORS, Barough; Lake, Beaumont, & Lake.

MARRIAGE-EVIDENCE-LICENSE-MISDESCRIPTION-ADDITIONAL CHRISTIAN NAMES.-In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on Wednesday, December 21, judgment was given in the case of Haswell v. Baswell and Gilbert, which was an undefended suit for a divorce on the ground of the respondent's adultery with the co-respondent, and had been tried before the President of the Division without a jury. The adultery was clearly proved, but a question arose as to the evidence of the marriage. The parties were married by license in London according to the rites of the Church of England. The husband's name was "Robert Haswell," but he was described in the license and register as "Robert Luney Wallace Haswell." From an affidavit which was produced, it appeared that the license had been obtained by the wife, who had believed that she had stated her husband's name correctly, The name as given was borne by a son by a former marriage, and she had believed that both father and son had the same Christian names. HANNEN, P., having taken time to consider the question, now observed that the explanation was not quite satisfactory; but since the marriage had been by license, he held that it was not invalidated by the inaccuracy as to the petitioner's Christian name. He therefore granted a decree nisi.-SOLICITORS, Wild, Browne, & Wild.

PRACTICE-REVIVOR-DEATH OF SOLE PLAINTIFF-CAUSE OF ACTION NOT SURVIVING-TITLE OF Cause-Ord. 50, RR. 1, 4.—In a case of Miller v. Huddlestone, before Fry, J., on the 17th inst., the question was raised what is, under the present practice, the proper title of an action when, upon the death of a sole plaintiff, whose interest terminates with his life, an order is made giving liberty to a new plaintiff to carry on the proceedings. The action was brought to administer an estate, the plaintiff being a lady who was entitled under the will of the testator to an annuity for her life; the defendants being the trustees and executors and the other beneficiaries. After the death of the plaintiff the common order was made giving to one of the defendants, who was entitled to a share in the residue of the estate, liberty to earry on and prosecute the action and the proceedings therein against the other defendants in like manner as such proceedings might have been carried on and prosecuted by the plaintiff if she had not died. A petition was afterwards presented by one of the trustees and executors for the distribution of the estate among the persons entitled thereto. The petition was entitled only in the original action. The counsel for the new plaintiff objected that it ought to have been also entitled (in conformity with the old practice) in the action as revived by the order of revivor. The petitioner's counsel said that this was unnecessary under the present practice. FRY, J., after consulting the registrar, said that in such a case as the present, where an order was made substituting a new plaintiff in the place of a sole plaintiff, whose interest had come to an end, the old practice remained in force, and the title of the revived action ought to be added to the old title.-SOLICITORS, R. Smith & Wilmer; Allen & Son; Swann & Co.

VOLUNTARY DEED-FRAUD-INTENT TO DEFEAT CREDITORS-STATUTE 13 ELIZ. C 5.-In a case of Golden v. Gillam, before Fry, J., on the 15th inst., a question arose as to setting aside a voluntary deed as fraudulent under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. The deed in question was executed by a widow, who was carrying on a farming business, and who was, at the time when she executed it, old and bedridden. Her two daughters were then living with her, and they carried on the business of the farm for her. By the deed she conveyed the farm to the daughters, and assigned the farming stock to a trustee for them, the daughters covenanting to pay the mother's farming debts, and to maintain her for the rest of her life. After the death of the mother, the action was brought by one of her creditors, whose debt had not been contracted in relation to the farming business, to set aside the deed as fraudulent and void under the statute, and it was contended that, inasmuch as the necessary effect of the deed was to deprive of their remedies against their debtor's property all the creditors of the grantor, except that class of creditors for whom provision was made in the deed, it must be taken to have been made with intent to delay and defraud creditors, even though there was no actual intention to defraud them. FRY, J., however, held that this was not so. He said that, in matters which were collateral or not present to the mind of a donor, his act might well have a result which he did not contemplate or which was contrary to his intention. And, looking at the apparent motive for the deed, and at all the circumstances, his lordship could not hold that it was fraudulent, and he dismissed the action, with costs.SOLICITORS, C. M. Stretton; Blake & Heseltine.

PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION-GOODWILL-RIGHT TO CARRY ON BUSINESS. -In a case of Cowderoy v. Yates, before Fry, J., on the 15th inst., a question arose as to the right of a partner after a dissolution of the partnership to On the 28th of December, 1877, an solicit the customers of the firm. agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, in consideration of the mutual confidence between them, and of the sum of £100 paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, that they would become and remain co-partners in a specified business from the 1st of January, 1878, until the partnership should be determined as thereinafter stated. It was provided that the partnership might be determined by twelve months' notice in writing by either partner, and that, on the expiration of the notice, the remaining partner should nevertheless be entitled to carry on the business of the partnership solely under the partnership name, and that the outgoing partner should in no way whatsoever receive any sum of money for the goodwill of the business. It was also provided that, on the determina. tion of the partnership, the balance of the assets should (after discharging the debts and liabilities and returning to each partner the capital contributed by him) be divided equally between the partners, but that if the partnership should be dissolved before the expiration of three years, the defendant should return to the plaintiff a proportionate part of the premium of £100 for the time unexpired. On the 1st of October, 1880, the defendant gave a written notice to the plaintiff to dissolve the partnership twelve months after the date of the notice, and, on the 1st of October, 1881, a notice (signed by the plaintiff and the defendant) of the dissolution as from that date was published in the London Gazette, the notice stating that all assets would be received and all liabilities discharged by the plaintiff. On the same day the defendant sent a circular to the customers of the old firm, informing them of the dissolution, stating that he was about to carry on a similar business under a new firm, and soliciting orders from them. The action was commenced on the 3rd of December, 1881. The plaintiff by his statement of claim alleged that on and after the 1st of October, 1881, he became entitled to the goodwill of the partnership business, and he claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from in any way applying to any customer of the late firm and asking such customer to continue to deal with him and not with the plaintiff, or from otherwise prejudicially interfering with the goodwill of the old firm. The plaintiff moved for an injunction in the terms of his claim. FRY, J., held, upon the construction of the agreement, that the goodwill of the partnership business belonged to the plaintiff, and that he had given consideration for it. And his lordship granted an injunction in the form adopted in Labouchere v. Dawson (20 W. R. 309, L. R. 13 Eq. 222), restraining the defendant from soliciting the customers of the old firm.-SOLICITORS, Shaen, Roscoe, & Co.; Trinders & Curtis-Hayward.

SOLICITORS' CASES.

CITY OF LONDON COURT.
(Before Mr. COMMISSIONER KERR.)

Copp v. Lynch and The Law Life Assurance Society.
Crispe (Newson with him) appeared for the plaintiff ;
Cock, for the defendant Lynch; and

Clerk, for the Law Life Assurance Society.

From the evidence it appeared that in 1876 Mr. Copp was acting as solicitor for Mr. Lyneh in carrying out a mortgage on a reversionary interest in some property to which a Mr. Jackson was entitled subject to his surviving two lives. As against the contingency a policy on Mr. Jackson's life was taken out in the Law Life Assurance Society, and Mr. Copp received a commission on the premium for the introduction, the prospectus of the society stating that "assurances may be effected at the society's office or through any solicitor," the latter words being printed in italics. The notices of renewal were then annually sent to Mr. Copp and forwarded to Mr. Lynch, who remitted to Mr. Copp a cheque for the premium, which Mr. Copp duly handed to the society, and received his commission. Although the money was sent by Mr. Lynch it was provided by Mr.

Jackson, and he being in the service of Mr. Lyncb, the amount debited to his salary account.

was

In 1879 Mr. Copp ceased to be solicitor to Mr. Lynch, but, in usual course still receiving the annual notices, forwarded them to his late client. Mr. Lynch sent the premium for 1879 by a boy named Bridge and with the notice addressed to Mr. Copp; the insurance clerk, assuming the boy came from Mr. Copp, gave him the commission, taking his receipt, the boy signing "Frederick Bridge, for Copp & Co." The boy on his return gave the money to his master, who placed it to the credit of Jackson; he also received the commission for 1880, which he also placed to Jackson's credit. On discovering this Mr. Copp brought his action against Mr. Lynch to recover £5 10s. 6d., the two years' premium so received, and Mr. Lynch counter-claimed for the commission received by Mr. Copp, the Law Life being brought in as defendants by direction of the learned judge.

It was urged on the part of the defendant Lynch that the relation of client and solicitor existing between the plaintiff and himself at the time the life was insured precluded the plaintiff from receiving any personal benefit out of the transaction, and that the case fell within the principle of Harrington v. Victoria Graving Dock Company (L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 549).

It was contended by Clerk, on the part of the society, that the defendant Lynch must have known that the plaintiff received the commission, and that such payments were matters of public notoriety.

Mr. COMMISSIONER KERR stopped the arguments, as he thought the case of great importance and one which should be considered in a higher court. He gave judgment, with leave to appeal, for the defendant on the claim, and for Mr. Lynch on the counter-claim, adding Jackson as counter-claimant. Notice of appeal by case has been given.

always the best man in the profession who resisted. He should have been glad had all the members of Parliameut belonging to the profession been associated with the chairman in the presentation of the petition, so as to enable the Home Secretary to see that the movement was not confined to a minority of the profession, but was in reality an outburst of strong profession al feeling throughout the whole country.

The CHAIRMAN said he would have much pleasure in presenting the solicitors' memorial. He understood hundreds of thousands of persons had signed the general memorial, and no doubt the movement among the profession would have been much more pronounced only a feeling existed that this application should be made at once.

beginning had been a most active worker in this matter, to express his Mr. NETHERSOLE (Mayor of Deal) said he attended as one who from the sympathy with the action which the solicitors had taken. He confidently asserted that six out of the seven men now in Canterbury Gaol were the dupes of others. An hour before they gave their evidence to the Commissioners they had intended to make a clean breast of everything; but they had been persuaded to the contrary, and the very men by whom they were induced to suppress a part of the truth were those who afterwards appeared against them. The work of the general committee had been unceasing. Twenty-five thousand copies of the memorial had been distributed, and the solicitors, as a body, had responded most freely, as would be seen when they came to make a digest of the signatures.

The motion asking Mr. Freshfield to present the memorial was carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN said it ought to be understood that they did not find fault with the prosecution, but they believed the intense suffering of the convicted men had vindicated the law, and that this being so the time had come for their release.

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THE BRIBERY SENTENCES.

A MEETING of solicitors was held at the Inns of Court Hotel on Monday for

the purpose of considering the steps to be taken for the immediate presentation JURISDICTION OF THE ENGLISH COURTS

of "The Solicitors' Memorial" to the Home Secretary in favour of the remission, or mitigation, of the sentences passed in connection with the bribery prosecutions. Mr. Freshfield, M.P., occupied the chair.

The following is a copy of the memorial:

"In the matter of James Barber Edwards, John Frederick May, William Mair, and others. To the Right Hon. Sir William Vernon Harcourt, her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State (Home Department).-The humble memorial of the undersigned solicitors of her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature and others showeth, that the above-named persons are now undergoing various terms of imprisonment as ordinary misdemeanants for offences of bribery and corruption committed by them during the Sandwich and Macclesfield elections, 1880. It appeared at the respective trials of the said persons, and from the evidence adduced by them in mitigation of punishment (to office copies of which your memorialists humbly crave leave to refer and pray your attention), that they were in their respective positions in life persons of high respectability and integrity, greatly esteemed by their neighbours and all who knew them, and, until the committal of the said offences, persons of irreproachable character and innocent of offence against the laws of their Queen or country. Your memorialists, therefore, humbly pray that you will consider the good character borne by each of the said prisoners previously to their committing the said offences, the punishment and shame they have already undergone, and that the dignity of the law has been duly vindicated. And that you will be pleased to advise her most gracious Majesty the Queen graciously to remit or mitigate the remainder of the several sentences passed upon the said prisoners as in your judgment you may deem meet and right. And your memorialists will ever pray," &c. The CHAIRMAN said that the profession of solicitors had considered their views ought to be represented in a separate memorial, supplemental to that of the general committee. Believing the case to be one of great hardship, and that there was no chance of getting the convicted men out of prison except on a strong representation to the Secretary of State, he had deemed it his duty to be present and to render any assistance in his power. Justice was said to be blind, and it certainly was so in this instance. The sentences were needlessly cruel, and the treatment of the men while being taken to prison was positively inhuman. The law had now been vindicated, and most people felt that the time for the release of the prisoners had arrivede. He would be happy to present the solicitors' memorial, for which purpose he would communicate with the other committee, and he only hoped that the term of imprisonment of these unfortunate people would be speedily brought Mr. LEAROYD (Learoyd & Learoyd) moved that the chairman be requested to present the solicitors' memorial to the Home Secretary. He said there was but one feeling throughout the profession on this question. He had never heard any solicitor speak of the matter except in terms of sympathy with the convicted men and surprise at the sentences. He knew one of the imprisoned gentlemen and had had frequent professional intercourse with the firm of which he was a member. No member of the profession with whom he was acquainted was a more honourable man than Mr. May, and he believed the same might be said of the other gentlemen. They did not desire to express any sympathy with bribery. But no one who had not gone through the ordeal of a hotly-contested election could understand the pressure brought to bear upon a conducting agent. He had had the experience, and he knew it required a will of adamant to resist. There were the entreaties of one's friends, and the expostulations of eager, disinterested political workers-all endeavouring to persuade the agent that unless he did what the other side were doing, and what had always been done, the election would be lost. An amiable man might yield under these circumstances, and, perhaps, it was not

to a close.

OVER SCOTSMEN.

A MEETING of a joint committee, consisting of representatives of legal bodies from various parts of Scotland, met on Monday in the Advocate's Library, Edinburgh, on the invitation of a committee of the Faculty of Advocates, to consider this question. The following gentlemen were present :-The committee of the Faculty of Advocates, consisting of Messrs. J. Guthrie Smith, H. Johnston, M. T. S. Darling, J. H. Begg, G. Burnett, A. Ure, and A. Jameson, convener; Messrs. J. Clerk Brodie, W.S.; Dr. J. T. Mowbray, W.S.; and John Cook, W.S., representing the Society of Writers to the Signet; Messrs. J. Lamond, S. S.C., president; W. Saunders, S.S.C., vicepresident, and William Miller, S.S.C., of the Society of Solicitors before the Supreme Courts; Mr. G. M. Wood, of the Society of Solicitors at Law; Mr. David Littlejohn, of the Society of Advocates in Aberdeen; Mr. Andrew Hendry, of the Faculty of Procurators, Dundee ; Messrs. J. A. Spens and T. C. Young, of the Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow; Mr. Robert Russell, of the Faculty of Procurators in Paisley; Mesere. Alex. Graham, solicitor, Crieff, president, and J. M. Miller and David Keay, solicitors, Perth, vicepresident and secretary of the Society of Solicitors of Perthshire; Messrs. John Lockhart, secretary, and D. Dougall, member, of the Ayr Faculty of Solicitors; Mr. John Symonds, sen., dean of the Faculty of Procurators of Dumfriesshire; Mr. Alexander Cameron, solicitor, Elgin, representing the Society of Solicitors of Elginshire; Messrs. James Clarke, secretary, and William Burns, of the Faculty of Solicitors of Invernessshire; Messrs. Ebenezer Morrison, dean, and William Stevenson, sub-dean, of the Society of Solicitors and Procurators of Stirling-Mr. Jameson in the chair. A full discussion of the question took place, in the course of which most of the gentlemen present stated their experience of the inconvenience and injustice of the practice of summoning Scotch defenders in the English courts, and thereafter the following resolutions were proposed, seconded, and unanimously agreed to :

1. That in the opinion of this meeting the experience of the past six years has proved that the practice of the English and Irish courts of serving their summonses upon persons resident in Scotland in virtue of the provisions of ord. 11, r. 1, of the rules annexed to the Supreme Court of Judicature (England) Act, 1875, and of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877, has been productive of great hardship, injustice, and inconvenience to Scotsmen in all parts of the country, and especially in the large mercantile centres, and that the subsequent enactment by the English judges of rule la of order 11 of the Rules of Court in England has not had the anticipated effect of abating the grievance complained of.

2. That this meeting is of opinion that the practice introduced by the Acts and Rules referred to in the first resolution, in its application to persons resident in Scotland, involves a breach of the 19th article of the Act of Union, and is, moreover, in violation of the recognized principles of general international law. 3. That the difficulty of determining, under the said Acts and Rules, whether service has been properly made or not, has been frequently found in practice to be very inconvenient, in leading practically to two litigations-one on the question of jurisdiction, and the other on the merits of the case.

4. That this meeting is of opinion that the proper remedy for the grievance complained of is the restoration of the law in this matter, as regards Scotland, to the footing on which it stood prior to the enactment of the Acts and Rules referred to, and that, by the exemption of Scotland from the operation of the same or of any similar enactments, so that in future the plaintiff or pursuer must, in accordance with the rules of international law, sue any person resident in Scotland against whom he has a claim in the courts of that country.

5. That this meeting instruct the convener of this committee to arrange for a deputation to wait on the law officers of the Crown for Scotland, and on Lord Rosebery as Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, to lay before them the views of this committee as representing the various legal bodies throughout the country, and to request them as soon as possible to prepare and bring in a Bill to remedy the evils complained of. Thereafter an executive committee was appointed.

SOCIETIES.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.

The usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, December 14, Mr. P. Rickman in the chair, the other directors present being Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Brook, Hedger, Kays, Keen, Lake, Pennington, Rose, Smith, Veley (Chelmsford), Walters, and Woolbert (Mr. Eiffe, secretary). A sum of £280 was distributed in grants of assistance among necessitous solicitors and their widows and families, twenty-nine new members were admitted to the association, and other general business tran

sacted.

LAW CRICKET CLUB.

On Friday last the members and friends of the Law Cricket Club assembled at dinner at Anderton's Hotel, Fleet-street, the chair being taken by A. L. Smith, Esq. A large number of barristers, solicitors, and law students were present. After the usual loyal toasts had been responded to, a smoking concert took place, and some very good songs and music followed in rapid succession. Amongst the most successful we may mention a song and chorus written for the occasion and sung by Mr. C. E. Baker, which was heartily and deservedly applauded. Mr. P. M. James was in good voice, and sang "Montrose's Love Song" with great effect, besides rendering valuable assistance at the piano. In replying to a vote of thanks for presiding, the chairman expressed his pleasure at being present that evening as a member of the club, which he hoped would continue for long to come to receive, year by year, an increasing degree of support from both branches of the profession. A beneficial opportunity was afforded by the club for members of the profession to meet together for one common object-viz., recreation without regard to professional differences and distinctions. He referred to some parts of Mr. Baker's song, which alluded in a humorous way to the amount of brain work involved in a lawyer's duties now-a-days, observing that it was a part of a lawyer's duties to preserve his bodily strength with healthful pursuits, for which purpose he advised them to become members of the Law Cricket Club and play tennis. The chairman concluded by proposing a toast, "To our next merry meeting."

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

At a meeting held at Clement's-inn Hall on Wednesday, December 14, Mr. Bartrum in the chair, Mr. Brown moved, "That her Majesty's Government does not deserve the confidence of the country," and was supported by Messrs. Mott, Whitehouse, Kains-Jackson, Jenks, and Collyer. The following members spoke in opposition to the motion: Messrs. Richardson, Shirley, and Spence; Mr. Blackwell also addressed the meeting. The debate was sustained until a late hour, and the opener having replied, the motion was put and carried by a majority of five votes. Members present, 21; visitor, 1.

The following moot was discussed at the meeting of the society held at the Law Institution on Monday, December 19:-" A. sends a box to a station belonging to a railway company, with a message that he will take it with him by the first train next morning. A porter receives the box, and puts it into a goods shed. In the night the box is broken open and the goods are stolen. Is the company liable?" The debate was opened in the negative by Mr. Jenks, who was supported by Mr. Parsons, and opposed by Mr. Richardson. The opener having replied, the chairman (Mr. D'Arcy Collyer) summed up the case, and, upon division, the contention of the opener was affirmed nem.

con.

MANCHESTER LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY

The fourth meeting of this society was held on Tuesday evening, the 13th inst., at 6.30, at the Law Library, Cross-street, when the chair was taken by Mr. A. C. Maberly, M. A., barrister-at-law, the question for discussion being as follows:-"A. dies intestate, seised of real estate, his heir-apparent being en ventre sa mere. Between the death of A. and the birth of the posthumons heir, the rents of the real estate are received by the presumptive heir of the intestate. (1) Do the rents so received belong on his birth to the posthumous heir? (2) Would the result be the same supposing the rents had not been actually received by the presumptive heir ?" The affirmative (1) was supported by Messrs. Raynor and Rowland, and the negative by Messrs. Payne, Withington, Solly, Hilditch, Rycroft. and Law. The affirmative (2) was argued by Mr. Taylor and Mr. W. J. Read, and the negative by several speakers. The chairman summed up, and the voting was as follows:-Affirmative (1), 2; negative, 36. Affirmative (2), 32;

negative, 6. The society passed resolutions to give prizes of various amounts for the best essays on given subjects, and to those of its members who pass the final examination with honours. A vote of thanks to the chairman closed the proceedings.

BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

The 698th ordinary meeting of the Birmingham Law Students' Society was holden at the Law Library, Bennett's-hill, Birmingham, on Tnesday, the 20th of December. The chair was taken by Thomas Spencer, Esq. A letter was read from Sir Hardinge S. Giffard, Q.C., M.P., in which he notified his consent to become president of the society for 1882. It was resolved that that meeting should be the last of the autumn session, and that the first meeting of the spring session should be held on Tuesday, the 7th of February, 1882. A debate then took place on moot point No. 657:-" A. is the owner of a number of carrier pigeons. For the purpose of training them he conveys tion that they will return to their dovecote. In their flight homewards the them to a distance from their home and then sets them free, in the expectapigeons pass over the land of B., who shoots some of them. Can A. maintain an action for the wrong? Messrs. Davis, Browett, Saunders, Thompson, G. Huggins, and Ryland; The speakers on the affirmative side were those on the negative were Messrs. Barrows, W. E. Barber, G. T. Edwards, Streetly, and Cochrane. The discussion was sustained with spirit, and the opening speakers on either side having replied, the chairman summed up and put the question to the meeting, when it was decided in the affirmative by a majority of nine. A vote of thanks to the chairman concluded the meeting.

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OBITUARY.

MR. HENRY INGLES DAVIS.

Mr. Henry Ingles Davis, solicitor, died at Coventry on the 23rd ult., after a painful illness. Mr. Davis was born in 1814, and was admitted a solicitor in 1843. He was a commissioner to administer oaths in the Supreme Court, and a perpetual commissioner for Warwickshire, and he had an extensive private practice in Coventry and the neighbourhood. He also held several important public appointments. He was vestry clerk of St. Michael's Parish, clerk to the Cappers' and Mercers' Companies, and to the trustees of the General Charities, and solicitor to the Butcher's Freemen Trustees. He was also for many years registration and election agent to the Liberal party in the borough, Mr. Davis had been for some time a widower, and he leaves two

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MR. ANTHONY BENN STEWARD.

Mr. Anthony Benn Steward, solicitor, late of Whitehaven, died at Buxton, on the 16th ult. Mr. Steward was born in 1805. He was admitted a solicitor about the year 1828, and he practised for many years at Whitehaven. Since his retirement from business he had resided at Newton Manor, High Gosforth. Mr. Steward took an active part in local business. He was for many years chairman of the Cleator and Egremont Railway Company. He was one of the principal leaders of the Liberal party in the Western Division of Cumberland, and at the general election of 1868 he unsuccessfully contested the borough of Whitehaven, in opposition to Mr. Cavendish Bentinck.

MR. JOHN FRASER MACQUEEN, Q.C.

Mr. John Fraser Macqueen, Q.C., died at 4, Upper Westbourne-terrace, on the 6th inst., in his seventy-ninth year. Mr. Macqueen was the son of Mr. Donald Macqueen, of Corryborough, Inverness-shire, and was born in 1803. He formerly practised as a Writer to the Signet, at Edinburgh, but subsequently became a member of Lincoln's-inn, where he was called to the bar in Trinity Term, 1838. He practised in the Court of Chancery, and was made a Queen's Counsel in 1861. Mr. Macqueen was the author of works on Marriage Law, and on Practice before the House of Lords. He was at one time frequently engaged in Scotch appeals, and in proceedings for divorce under the old system. For a few years after the passing of the Divorce Act, he also practised in the Divorce Court. In 1860 he was appointed, by Lord Campbell, to be official reporter of Scotch and divorce appeals in the House of Lords, and be compiled four volumes of appellate reports. He continued his reports for several years after the formation of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, but failing health obliged him to appoint a deputy, and about two years ago he resigned his appointment. Mr. Macqueen was a man of most genial and kindly disposition, and was very highly esteemed in the profession. He was a magistrate and deputy-lieutenant for Inverness-shire, and a bencher of Lincoln's-inn.

MR. HENRY BRITTAN.

Mr. Henry Brittan, solicitor (the head of the firm of Brittan, Press, Inskip, & Crewdson), of Bristol, died on the 5th inst. from paralysis, in his eightieth year. Mr. Brittan was born in 1802, and was admitted a solicitor in 1828, and he had practised for over half a century at Bristol. He was at the head of one of the largest offices in the city, and was thoroughly well versed in every branch of mercantile law. He had been for some time associated in partnership with Messrs. John Latham Press, James Inskip, and Henry Crewdson. Mr. Brittan took an active part in municipal business, and he had been for several years an alderman for the city. He was chairman of the Taff Vale

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