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be a most idle proposal and an undeserved slight upon the members of of our profession, and it would very far fall short, of the contemplated result. As a matter of fact, solicitors acting for debtors do not generally take proxies in their own names, but in the name of some apparently independent person whom they can rely upon to act in accordance with their wishes. And there is nothing in this proposal to prevent them from continuing to do so. How, too, in case of the bankrupt's solicitor being also a creditor, as very frequently happens? We presume it it not intended to deprive him of a vote in respect of his own debt. Yes such a proposal would only be consistent with the one made by this sub-clause. We have heard it suggested that a solicitor who makes a bad debt with his client ought not to be allowed to prove in competition with other creditors, but we hope the Legislature is not quite so prejudiced agaiust the profession as the gentleman who made that suggestion. By this proposal the brother or any other relative of the bankrupt could hold proxies but not the solicitor! Surely the provision in sub-clause 2 will be sufficient without this.

"Sub-clause (5). The holder nf a proxy shall not use it for the purpose of voting for the appointment of himself ss trustee unless he is specially authorized to do so by the instrument of proxy."

If this proposal is to have any effect, it should also prohibit the appointee from appointing his partner or, where the appointee is a person in someone else's employment, his employer, as trustee unless specially authorized.

"Sab-clause (6). Aoreditor may appoint the official receiver of the bankrupt's estate as his proxy."

We must confess that we view this proposition with a very considerable degree of suspicion. As far as possible, proxies ought to be given only to persons in the bond fide employment of the creditors, but this is not always possible where meetings are held at places distant from where such creditors reside, and it is usual in such cases for trade creditors to combine in appointing some agent iu whom they have confidence (and who is nominated by the largest trade creditor or by the majority in value at a meeting) to represent them at the statutory meeting. This practice, although abused in many cases, is on the whole very convenient and useful to wholesale houses, and we do not think they will like it to be altered very materially. But this sub-clause appears practically to suggest that creditors should appoint the official receiver as their proxy when they cannot personally attend, and may be acted upon by some official receivers to ask for proxies, aud that would introduce a system of official touting as bad, if not worse, than auy now existing.

Upon clause 18 generally we would further remark that the marginal note refers to rules 85 and 86. Is it intended that this clause shall entirely take the place of those rules? If so, then it ought to be provided, as in rule 85, that the proxy should be under the hand of the creditor, or, in the case of a limited company, under the hand of an agent duly authorized.


AGREEMENT FOR LEASE. (Marshall v. Berridge, C.A., 30 W. R. 93.) The question whether specific performance would be enforced of an agreement to grant a lease which does not specify the time for commencement of the term, was formerly considered as Bettled by Blore v. Sutton (3 Mer. 237). In that case Sir W. Grant held that there was no sufficient agreement in writing, because (among other reasons) the memorandum did not mention the time of commencement of the term. In Jacques v. Millar (25 W. R. 846, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 153), however, Mr. Justice Fry pointed out that the report of Blore v. Sutton in Merivale does not state that the memorandum iu that case bore the date at which it was signed, whereas in the case before him, although no date was specified for the commencement of the lease, the memorandum bore the date at which it was signed. He held that the lease wns to commence on the date of the agreement, and enforced specific performance of the agreement. In Marthall v. Berridge he followed his previous decision, but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal, who held that the case of Jacques v. Millar was wrongly decided. As regards authority this decision is unquestionably correct. The Court of Appeal sent for the record in Blore v. Sutton, and discovered that the memorandum did contain the date; hence the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Fry fell to the ground. Moreover, the case of Doe v. Benjamin (9 A. & E. 644), on which Mr. Justice Fry relied, was decided (before 8 4 9 Vict. c. 106) on the question whether an instrument operated as a mere agreement for a lease or as a present demise. If it operated as a present demise, then no question arose as to enforcing an agreement.

As regards principle, we think the decision is equally correct. The iutention of the parties cannot bo that the lease shall commence on the date of the agreement; they contemplate the preparation of a formal lease ; the lessor does not usually give possession until such lease is executed, and the lessee does not intend to pay rent without having possession.


THE ALIENATION OF CROWN LANDS. [2*o the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—While transacting business yesterday with a solicitor whose clients are seeking to acquire certain Crown lands from this department, my attention was called to a passage at p. 15 of Messrs. Coulsouand Forbes's recently published "The Law of Waters, &o." (London, Sweet, 1880), which contains a statement as to the existing statute law, for the correction of which, as not merely erroneous but calculated to hamper, or tie the hands of, riparian owners desirous of carrying out improvements on tidal lands adjacent to their properties with the consent of the Crown, I truet you may be able to afford space. The passage is as follows :—

"There can be no doubt that a subject may be owner of a portion of the sea-shore by express grant from the Crown. The alienation of Crown lands is novo, however, prohibited by statute law; and so muoh, therefore, of the sea as has not actually been aliened still remains vested in the Crown, incapable tf alienation except by Act of Parliament."

The italics are mine. A note at foot of the page show3 that the "statute law" of the above is the Act 1 Anne, st. 1, c. 7—an enactment which, so far as any of its provisions remained in force after the passing of the 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 2, was wiped out of the Statute Book by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1867 {vide Statutes Revised, II.; Chronological Table, XX.). But besides repealing these provisions of the Act of Queen Anne, which forbid the alienation of Crown lands for a longer term than thirty-one years or three lives, the Act of 1829 empowered the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to sell (section 34) and exchange for valuable consideration (section 42), subject to the provisions "of this Act," every desoription of Crowu property other than the Royal palaces and parks. The statute of George IV. has been ameuded and extended by a whole row of enactments between the 2 Will. 4, 0. 1, and the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 62, which, subject to certain exceptions, transferred to the Board of Trade, so far as tidal waters are concerued, all the powers which preceding legislation had vested in the Commissioners of Woods and Forests.

Those of your readers who may desire information as to the dealings of the two Departments with Crown property, for the alienation of which statutory powers have not been obtained, will find it iu the long series of annual reports of the Commissioners, and in two parliamentary papers, No. 61 of Session 1872, and No. 127 of Session 1877, which show the dealings of the Board of Trade with the foreshores up to 1877.

Board of Trade, S.W., Dec. 15. A. R. Fair?ibld.

[2*0 the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—I desire permission to corroborate the sentiments expressed by a "Practising Solicitor" iu your columns a few weeks since, as I he result of his attending upon the hearing of a summons before Mr. Justice Watkin Williams, and to record the careful way in which the learned judge attended to the statements which I felt it to be my duty to submit iu the interests of my client.

So far as my own summons was concerned, it related to a matter of Bomc difficulty, and was by way of appeal from tho master's decision, but the judge's knowledge of the subject with which the summons dealt was so comprehensive aud clear that much less time was occupied than would have been necessary if the leorned j udge had not been familiar with the authorities, both from the common law aud equity sides of the High Court of Justice, which were submitted for consideration.

The matter being of some difficulty, and actiug upon a suggestion made by one of your correspondents, I directed the judge's attention to the orders of the court, and had no difficulty in obtaining from his lordBhip the allowance of a fee of one guinea for attending the summons, his lordship admitting that the sum of 6s. 8d., which would otherwise have been all I could have claimed, did not represent anything like a fair remuneration.

On the hearing of the summons before the master more time was occupied, and as much labour involved, but I doubt very much if I should have succeeded in obtaining from the master any additional fee for my attendance.

Now that the Incorporated Law Society's Committee on Legal Procedure is sitting, I trust that they will adopt a9 one of their recommeu. dations what has already been suggested to them by the correspondence in your journal—namely, that the master should attend on the hearing of appeals from bis own judgments, and that all actions should be assigned to a particular judge or master, and all other subsequent stages as far as possible taken before such master or the jadge, and that there should be an absolute right for the suitor to require the judge's decision, if the party affected should be dissatisfied with the master's decision, without having to observe the formality of taking out a summons by way of appeal, which only adds to the expense of litigation, and is pro ductive of no real good, and is, moreover, not required in the Chancery Division of the High Court.

My experience confirms the views which have been expressed by some of your correspondents as to the way in which business is transacted at chambers, especially so far as the masters are concerned, and I do earnestly trust that one result, at least, of the committee's report to which I have referred, will be such recommendations with respect to the powers and duties of the masters as will, when adopted, entirely remove these imperfections, which do still unquestionably exist in this important branch of the administration of justice.

Another Practising Solicitor.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—In this age of "life at high pressure," suggestions tending to economize time are always acceptable to business men. This being so, I venture to suggest that an index to each number of the official journal is desirable. Persons having regularly to oonsult the Gazettes would be saved many precious moments, and the work of prepnring the usual indexes would be much facilitated, as the index-maker would have at hand the material for consolidation. Edward Preston.

1, Great College-street, Westminster, December 17.


Sale Op Bankrupt's Business And Goodwill By. Trustee;Right Op Bankrupt To Solicit Former Customers.—In a case of Walter v. Mottram, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., an important question arose as to the right of a bankrupt, whose business and the goodwill of it have been sold by his trustee, to set up a business of the same kind, and to solicit orders from his former customers. The trustee of a trewer, who had filed a liquidation petition, agreed to sell the brewery, and the plant and stcck-in-trade, and the goodwill of the business to the debtor and another person. The debtor was unable to pay his share of the purchase-money,and he surrendered his interest in the purchase to his co-purchaser, the plaintiff in the action. The plaintiff paid the whole purchase-money to tbe trustee, and took a conveyance of the brewery from the trustee, but no actual assignment of the goodwill was made by the trustee to him. The plaintiff, however, took possession of the property which he had purchased and proceeded to carry on the business. The debtor afterwards purchased another brewery not far from the first, and commenced carrying on business there, and he sent circulars to some of his old customers soliciting orders from them. The plaintiff brought the action against the debtor, claiming an injunction to restrain him from soliciting the custom of his old customers, and from issuing circulars to them advertising to them the fact that he had purchased a brewery, and was carrying on business as a brewer. The plaintiff also claimed damages for the injury already done to him. He moved for an injunction, and his motion was refused by Jessel, M.R., on the ground that, inasmuch as the defendant had not entered into any personal obligation with the plaintiff, the principle of the case of Labouchere v. Dawson (20 W. E. 309, L. B. 13 Eq. 322) did not apply. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (baqgallay, Lush, and Lindley, L.J.I.). Lush and Lindlbt, L.J J., delivered a written judgment, in which they said that, if the defendant had himself sold his business and goodwill to the plaintiff, the decision in Labouchere v. Dawson would be directly applicable. But the defendant contended that that decision, even if right, did not apply, and ought not to be extended to a case in which the business and goodwill had been sold, not by the defendant himself, but by the trustee in bis liquidation. The question was one of considerable importance, and was by no means free from difficulty. Labouchere v. Dawson was decided in 1872 ; it was followed and extended by Jessel, M.R., in Ginesi v. Cooper (L. R. 14 Ch. D. 696), and, although the extension had been overruled by the Court of Appeal in Leggott v. Barrett (28 "W. E. 962, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 306), the decision itself was approved by one at least of the members of the court which disapproved its extension. The rule laid down in Labouchere v. Dawson had, it was believed, been recognized and acted on in practice, and, whatever might be said of it, the rule was in accordance with general opinion as to what waafair and right, and was easily applied in practice. At tbe same time, it was impossible to read the cases relating to goodwill decided before 1872 without coming to the conclusion that Labouchere v. Dawson went considerably beyond them. The judgment of Lord Eldon in Crutlwell v. Lye (17 Ves. 335); Lis elaborate and carefully worded order in Cook v. Collingridge (Collyer on Partner-hip, p. 215); the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Wood in Churton v. Douglas (Joh. 174), and that of the Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Selleleg (2 D. J. & S. 446),

did not warrant the extension, and Cruttwell v. Lye was a clear authority that, if the assignors of a bankrupt sold his business and goodwill, the purchaser could not restrain the bankrupt, either from commencing a similar business, or from soliciting his old customers to deal with him. The right of the assignors in that case to sell tbe goodwill was not questioned, and, so far as it was property, they apparently had the right to sell it, although the Bankraptcy Acts then in force did not expressly mention it. The Bankruptcy Aots of 1861 and 1869 did expressly authorize the sale of a goodwill by a trustee in bankruptcy, and whatever would pass by a mere sale thereof, apart from any covenant or agreement, or representation or fraud on the part of the bankrupt, could be assumed by bis trustee in bankruptcy. The bankrupt himself could probably be compelled, under section 19 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, to join in the conveyance or assignment of his business and goodwill for tbe benefit of bis oreditors, but he could not be compelled to enter into any contract restricting him from carrying on business in future in any way whatever. An assignment of a business and its goodwill, without more, appeared to their lordships to pass now just as much as, and no more than, in the days of Lord Eldon. As against the assignor, it conferred on the assignee the exclusive right to carry on the business assigned, and, as incidental to. this, the exclusive right to represent himself as carrying on the business, and, consequently, the right, not only to sue the assignor for damages, if he had infringed those rights, but also to restrain him from infringing them if he manifested an intention to do so. Moreover, to this extent^ a bankrupt who did not concur in his trustee's assignment was in no better position than a bankrupt who did. Every bankrupt, whether he concurred or not, was bound by every lawful disposition of his property by his trustee, and whatever rights suoh a disposition conferred on a purchaser muBt be respected by the bankrupt, whether he joined in the corveyanoe or not. But, in their lordships' opinion, the right of the purchaser of the goodwill of a business from a trustee in bankruptcy did not extend to restrain the bankrupt (even if he joined in the oonveyanoe) from bond, fide commencing a fresh business, and from seeking assiBtanoe in it from his old friends and oustomers. It would be oontrary to the policy of the bankrupt laws to extend Labouchere v. Dawson to suoh a oase. It was not neoessary to overrule that decision, it would still be applicable to voluntary sales, but their lordships did not think it ought to be extended to oompnlBory alienations. When a man sold his own business and goodwill for bis own benefit it was thought unfair on his part to avail himself of bis personal acquaintance with his old oustomers, and to induoe them to with, draw their support from the business which he had sold, and this element of personal unfairness might be suffioient to justify the decision in Labouchere v. Dawson. In Leggott v. Barrett the oase was pnt by Lord Jnstioe Brett upon the ground of implied oontraot, and that was, perhaps, the best ground on whioh to rest tbe decision. The obligation enforoed in Labouchere T. Dawson was, however, a purely personal obligation, and not a mere inoident to tbe transfer of property. If the present oase had arisen after tbe passing of the Bankruptcy Aot, 1869, or the Bankruptcy Aot, 1861, but before Labouchere v. Dawson, it would, their lordships thought, have been deoided against the plaintiff, and, notwithstanding Labouchere v. Dawson, it ought, they thought, to be so deoided now. The defendant, having done nothing personally unfair, and having carefully avoided all appearance of carrying on the business sold by the trusiee, could not be restrained from soliciting bis old friends and business connections to assist him in carrying on the new business, which he unquestionably ha'l a right to commence. Baqgallat, L.J., concurred. But he added that Labouchere v. Dawson had never yet been adopted by the Court of Appeal. In Leggott v. Barrett Brett, L.J., expressed his approval of it, but James and Cotton, L.JJ., intimated a doubt as to its correctness. He, therefore, felt himself at liberty to say that he also doubted the decision in Labouchere v. Dawson. He thought that it went far beyond any previous decision, and, should it hereafter be questioned in the Court of Appeal, he should certainly desire an opportunity of fully considering whether he could agree with it or not. It did not, however, even if it was right, justify what was claimed by the present plaintiff.—Solicitors, W. F. Watson; Last % Sons.

Nuisance—Bone-boiling Business—Injunction—Public Health Act, 1875, s. 112.—In a oase of Verco v. Morris, before Chitty, J., on the 17th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendants from carrying on a bone-boiling business in the neighbourhood of the plaintiffs' houses. The defendant had carried on the business in his present premises for a period of twelve years, and the plaintiffs had only just entered into occupation of their property. The nearest house of the plaintiffs was 112 yards distant from the defendant's premises. The evidence was to the effect that tbe smell of tbe defendant's premises was disagreeable and unhealthy to tho inmates of the plaintiffs' houses. It was also contended that the bnsinesa was a nnisanoe, as it was mentioned as an offensive trade in the Publio Health Act, 1875, s. 112. By that seotion no person after the passing of the Aot shall establish within thedistriot of an urban authority, without their consent in writing, any offensive trade, mentioning (inter alia) that of a " bone boiler," and if he does shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £50 in respeot of the establishment, and of 40a. for every day on whioh the offenoa Bhall be continued. Tbe defendant submitted that there was not suffioient evidence of a nuisance, and that the lapse of time constituted a bar to tbe interlocutory injunction. Chitty, J., said that the defendant's business caused a nuisance and a substantial nnisanoe to the plaintiffs. The argument founded on the Poblio Health Aot that the trade was ipso facto a nuisance, was not oonolueive, but was, no doubt, an element to be considered. He must grant an injunction nntil the trial to restrain the continuance of the nnisanoe, and tne defendant would have a month to abate the nuisance.—Solicitors, W. Foster; Lewis Si Lewis.

CompanyArrangement ActProvisions For Payment Of CreditorsSuspensePeriod Within Which No Action To Be BroughtLeave Op CodrtSpecial Circumstances.—In a case of In re Teign Valley Railway Act, 1881, also before Cbitty, J., on the 17th inst., a motion was made by a creditor of the company for leave to commence an aotion against the Teign Valley Railway Company under the following circumstances:—By the above Act, which was an Arrangement Act to enable the company to tide over its difficulties, certain provisions were inserted enabling the company to create debenture stock to satisfy their creditors, and there was also a section providing that no action or other proceeding should be brought against the company until after a year from the passing of the Act, except by leave of the court, and except in respect of liabilities contracted after the passing of the Act. The applicant was a creditor of the company at the time of the passing of the Act, and he did not state any special circumstances why the court should allow him to bring an action. For the company it was contended that the object of the section was to give the company time to recover its position, and that no action should be allowed except under some special circumstances. They offered to set aside a portion of the debenture stock to be created pursuant to the Act as security for the applicant's debt. Chitty, J., Baid it was clear the applicant and all creditors of the company at the time of the passing of the Act were bound by its provisions. No action for the suspense period of one year from the passing of the Act was to be brought against the company except by leave of the court, and the question was upon what terms such leave should be given. There wa^l provision made in the Act for payment of the company's debts by the issue of debenture stock. The Act, however, was silent as to the terms upon which leave to commence an action should be given, but, in his opinion, there must be some speoial circumstances to justify the court in giving leave. Such a circumstance for instance as where the Statute of Limitations was running out against the creditor, or where his witnesses were old and infirm, and it was necessary to prevent a failnre of justice that be should be at liberty to sue at once. Leave no doubt should alto be given where the company were acting improperly towards the creditor. The best point made for the applicant was that the aotion should be permitted to go to judgment and should then be stayed, as in tbe meantime the company might have received and applied tbe whole of the debenture stock on payment of other creditors. As, however, the company would undertake to set apart debenture stock to secure the creditor's debt, the above argument would have no weight, and, therefore, he did not see any sufficient ground for giving his leave. The shortness of the time within which the year would expire was also one of the grounds for his decision. He should refuse the motion upon the above undertaking being given, and he should reserve the costs until after the suspense period had elapsed, and tbe creditor had brought his action, whioh he must do within a month of the expiry of that period.— Solicitors, Borough; Lake, Beaumont, is Lake.

Marriage—Evidence— LicenseMisdescription—Additional CHrisTiax Names.—In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on Wednesday, December 21, judgment was given in the case of Haswell v. Has well and Gilbert, which was an undefended suit for a divorce on the ground of the respondent's adultery with tbe co-respondent, and had been tried before the President of the Division without a jury. The adultery was clearly proved, but a question arose as to the evidence of the marriage. Tbe parties were married by license in London according to the rites of the Church of England. The husband's name was "Robert Haswell," but he was described in the license and register as " Robert Luney Wallace Haswell." From an affidavit which was produced, it appeared that tbe license had been obtained by the wife, who had believed that she had stated her husband's name correotly. Tbe name as given was borne by a son by a former marriage, and she had believed that both father and son had the same Christian names. Hannen, P., having taken time to consider the question, now observed that the explanation was not quite satisfactory; but since the marriage bad been by license, be held that it was not invalidated by the inaccuracy as to the petitioner's Christian name. He therefore granted a decree nisi.Solicitors, Wild, Browne, $ Wild.

Practice—RevivorDeath Of Sole PlaintifpCause Of Action Hot Surviving—Titlb Of CauseOrd. 50, RR. 1, 4.—In a case of Miller v. Bvddlestone, before Fry, J., on the 17th inst., the question was raised what if, under tbe present practice, the proper title of an action when, upon the death of a sole plaintiff, whose interest terminates with his life, an order is made giving liberty to a new plaintiff to carry on the proceedings, "heaction was brought to administer an estate, the plaintiff being a lady who was entitled under the will of the testator to an annuity for her life ; the defendants being the trustees and executors and the other benefioiaries. After the death of the plaintiff the common order was made giving to one of the defendants, who was entitled to a ehare in the residue of the estate, liberty to eirry on and prosecute the action and the proceedings therein against the other defendants in like manner as such proceedings might have been carried on and prosecuted by the plaintiff if she had not died. A petition was afterwards presented by one of tbe trustees and executors for the distribution of the estate among the persons entitled thereto. The petition was entitled only in the original action. The counsel for the new plaintiff objected that it ought to have been also entitled (in conformity with the old practice) in the action as revived by the order of revivor. The petitioner's counsel said that this was unnecessary under the present practice. Fry, J., after consulting the registrar, said that in such a case as the present, where an order was made substituting a new plaintiff in tbe place ot a sole plaintiff, whose interest had come to an end, the old practice remained in force, and the title of the revived action ought to be added to the old title.—Solicitors, B. Smith is Wilmer; Allen it Sen; Swarm it Co,

Voluntary DeedFraudIntent To Defeat CreditorsStatute 13 Eliz. C 5.—In a oase of Golden v. Oillam, before Fry, J., on the 15th inst., a question arose as to setting aside a voluntnry deed as fraudulent under tbe statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. The deed in question was executed by a widow, who was carrying on a farming business, and who was, at the time when she executed it, old and bedridden. Her two daughters were then living with her, and they carried on the business of the farm for her. By the deed she conveyed the farm to tbe daughters, and assigned the farming stock to a trustee for them, the daughters covenanting to pay the mother's farming debts, and to maintain her for the rest of her life. After the death of the mother, the action wss brought by one of her creditors, whose debt had not been contracted in relation to the farming business, to set aside the deed as fraudulent and void under the statute, and it was contended that, inasmuch as tbe necessary effect of the deed was to deprive of their remedies against their debtor's property all the creditors of the grantor, except that cUss of creditors for whom provision was made in tbe deed, it must bs taken to have been made with intent to delay and defraud creditors, even though there was no actual intention to defraud them. Fry, J., however, held that this was not so. He said that, in matters which were collateral or not present to the mind of a donor, bis act might well have a result which he did not contemplate or which was contrary to his intention. And, looking at the apparent motive for the deed, and at all tbe circumstances, his lordship could not hold that it was fraudulent, and he dismissed tbe action, with costs.— Solicitors, C. M. Stretton; Blake $ Heseltine.

PartnershipDissolution—Goodwill—Right To Carry On Business. —In a oase of Cowderoy v. Yates, before Fry, J., on the 16th inst., a question arose as to the right of a partner after a dissolution of the partnership t> golioit the customers of the firm. On the 28th of December, 1877, an. agreement was entered into between tbe plaintiff and the defendant, in consideration of the mutual confidence between them, and of th3 sum of £100 paid by tbe plaintiff to the defendant, that they would become and remain co-partners in a specified business from the 1st of January, 1878, until the partnership should be determined as thereinafter stated. It was provided that the partnership might be determined by twelve months' notice in writing by either partner, and that, on the expiration of the notice, the remaining partner should nevertheless be entitled to oarry on the business of the partnership solely under the partnership name, and that the outgoing partner should in no way whatsoever receive any sum of money for the goodwill of the business. It was also provided that, on the determination of the partnership, tbe balance of the assets should (after discharging the debts and liabilities and returning to eaoh partner the capital contributed by him) be divided equally between the partners, but that if the partnership should be dissolved before the expiration of three years, tbe defendant should return to the plaintiff a proportionate part of the premium of £100 for the time unexpired. On tbe 1st of October, 1880, the defendant gave a written notice to the plaintiff to dissolve tbe partnership twelve months after the date of the notice, and, on the 1st of October, 1881, a notice (signed by the plaintiff and the defendant) of the dissolution as from that date was published in the London Gazette, the notice stating that all asset* would be received and all liabilities discharged by the plaintiff. On the same day the defendant sent a circular to the customers of the old firm, informing them of the dissolution, stating that he was about to oarry on a similar business under a new firm, and soliciting orders from them. The action was commenced on the 3rd of December, 1881. Tbe plaintiff by his statement of claim alleged that on and after the 1st of October, 1881, he became entitled to the goodwill of the partnership business, and be claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from in any way applying to any customer of the late firm and asking suoh customer to continue to deal with him and not with tbe plaintiff, or from otherwise prejudicially interfering with the goodwill of the old firm. The plaintiff moved for an injunction in the terms of his claim. Fry, J., held, upon the construction of the agreement, that the goodwill of the partnership business belonged to the plaintiff, and that be had given consideration for it. And his lordship granted an injunction in tbe form adopted in Labouchere v. Dawson (20 W. R. 309, L. B. 13 Eq. 222), restraining tbe defendant from soliciting the customers of the old firm.—Solicitors, Sham, Roscoe, % Co.; Trinders $ Curtis-Hayward.

City Of London Court.
(Before Mr. Commissioner Kerr.)
Copp v. Lynch and The Law Life Assurance Society.

Critpe (Newton with him) appeared for the plaintiff;
Cock, for the defendant Lynoh ; and
Clerk, for tbe Law Life Assurance Sooiety.

From tbe evidence it appeared that in 1876 Mr. Oopp was acting as solicitor for Mr. Lynch in carrying out a mortgage on a reversionary interest in some property to whioh a Mr. Jackson was entitled subject to his surviving two lives. As against the contingency apolioy on Mr. Jaokson's life was taken out in the Law Life Assurance Sooiety, and Mr. Copp received a commission on the premium for the introduction, the prospectus of the society stating that "assurances may be effected at the society's office or through any solicitor," the latter words being printed in italics. The notices of renewal were then annually sent to Mr. Copp and forwarded to Mr. Lynoh, who remitted to Mr. Copp a cheque for tbe premium, whioh Mr. Copp duly handed to the society, and received his commission. Although the money was sent by Mr. Lynoh it was provided by Mr, Jackson, and be being in the servioe of Mr. Lynob, the amount was

debited 10 his salary account.

In 1879 Mr. Copp ceased to be solicitor to Mr. Lynch, but, in usual courso still receiving the annual notices, forwarded them to his late client. Mr. Lynch sent the premium for 1879 by a boy named Bridge and with the notice addressed co Mr. Copp; the insurance clerk, assuming the boy came from Mr. Copp, gave him the commission, taking his receipt, the boy signing "Frederick Bridge, for Copp & Co." The boy on his return gave the money to his master, who placed it to the credit of Jackson • he also received the commission for 1880, which he also placed to Jackson's credit. On discovering this Mr. Copp brought his action against Mr. Lynch to recover £5 10s. 6d., the two years' premium so received, and Mr. Lynch counter-claimed for the commission received by Mr. Copp, the Lair Life being brought in as defendants by direction of the learned judge.

It was urged on the part of the defendant Lynch that the relation of client and solicitor existing between the plaintiff and himself at the time the life was insured precluded the plaintiff from receiving any personal benefit out of the transaction, and that the case fell within the principle of Harrington v. Victoria Graving Dock Company (L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 549).

It was contended by Clerk, on the part of tho society, that the defendant Lynch must have known that the plaintiff received tho commission, and that such payments were matters of public notoriety.

Mr. Commissioner Kerb, stopped the arguments, as he thought the case of great importance and one which should be considered in a higher court. He gave judgment, with leave to appeal, for the defendant on the claim, and for Mr. Lynch on the counter-claim, adding Jackson as counter-claimant.

Notice of appeal by case has been given.


A Hektino of solicitors was held at the Inns of Court Hotel on Monday for the purpose of considering the steps to be taken for the immediate presentation of "The Solicitors' Memorial" to the Home Secretary in favour of the remission, or mitigation, of the sentences passod in connection with the bribery prosecutions. Mr. Freshfield, M.P., oconpied the chair. The following is a copy of the memorial :—

"In the matter of James Barber Edwards, John Frederick May, William Mair, and others.—To the Right Hon. Sir William Vernon H^rcourt, ber Majesty's Principal Secretary of State (Home Department).—The humble memorial of the undersigned solicitors of her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature and others showeth, that the above-named persons are now undergoing various terms of imprisonment as ordinary misdemeanants for offences of bribery and corruption committed by them during the Sandwich and Macclesfield elections, 1880. It appeared at the respective trials of the said persons, and from the evidence adduced by them in mitigation of punishment (to office copies of which your memorialists humbly crave leave tu refer and pray your attention), that they were in their respective positions in life persons of high respectability and integrity, greatly esteemed by their neighbonrs and all who knew them, and, until the committal of the said offences, persons of irreproachable character and innocent of offenoe agaiost the laws of their Queen or country. Your memorialists, therefore, humbly pray that you will consider the good character borne by each, of the said prisoners previously to their committing the said offences, the punishment and shame they have already undergone, and that the dignity of the law has been duly vindicated. And that you will be pleased to advise her most gracious Majesty the Queen graciously to remit or mitigate the remainder of the several sentences passed upon the said prisoners as in your judgment you may deem meet and right. And yonr memorialists will ever pray," &c.

The Chairman said that the profession of solicitors had considered their views ought to be represented in a separate memorial, supplemental to that of the general committee. Believing the case to be one of great hardship, and that there was no chance of getting the convicted men out of prison except on a strong representation to tho Secretary of State, he had deemed it his duty to be present and to render any assistance in his power. Justice was said to be blind, and it certainly was so in this instance. The sentences were needlessly cruel, and the trc tment of the men while being taken to prison was positively inhuman. The law had now been vindicated, and most people felt that the time for the release of the prisoners had arrivede. He would be happy to present the solicitors' memorial, for which purpose he would communicate with the other committee, and he only hoped that the term of imprisonment of these unfortunate people would be speedily brought to a close.

Mr. Learoyd (Learoyd & Learoyd) moved that the chairman be requested to present the solicitors memorial to the Home Secretary. He said there was but one feeling throughout the profession on this question. He had never heard any solicitor speak of the matter except in terms of sympathy with the convioted men and surprise at the sentences. He knew one of the imprisoned gentlemen and had had frequent professional intercourse with the firm of which he was a member. No member of the profession with whom he was acquainted was a more honourable man than Mr. May, and he believed the same might be said of the other gentlemen. They did not desire to express any sympathy with bribery. But no one who had not gone through the ordeal of a hotly-contested election could understand the pressure brought to bear upon a conducting agent. He had had the experience, and he knew it required a will of adamant to relist. There were the entreaties of one's friends, and the expostulations of eager, disinterested political workers—all endeavouring to persuade the agent that unless he did what the ether side were doing, and what had always been done, the election would be loft. An amiable man might yield under these circumstances, and, perhaps, it was not

always the best man in the profession who resisted. He should have been glad bad all tbe members of Parliament belonging to the profession been associated with the chairman in tho presentation of the petition, so as to enable the Home Secretary to see that the movement was not confined to a minority of the profession, but was in reality an outburst of strong profession al feeling throughout the whole country.

Tbe Chairman said he would have much pleasure in presenting the solioitors' memorial. He understood hundreds of thousands of persons had signed tbe general memorial, and no doubt the movement among the profession would have been muoh more pronounoed only a feeliog existed that this application should be made at onoe.

Mr. Nethersole (Mayor of Deal) said he attended as one who from the beginning had been a most aotive worker in this matter, to expreaa his sympathy with the aotion whioh the solioitors had taken. He confidently asserted that six out of the seven men now in Canterbury Gaol were tbe dupes of others. An hour before they gave their evidenoe to the Commissioners they had intended to make aolean breast of everything; but they had been persuaded to the oontrary, and the very men by whom they were induced to suppress a part of tbe truth were those who afterwards appeared against them. The work of tbe general committee had been unceasing. Twenty-five thousand oopies of the memorial had been distributed, and the solicitors, as a body, had responded most freely, as would be seen when they came to make a digest of the signatures.

The motion asking Mr. Fresh field to present the memorial was oarried unanimously.

The Chairman said it ought to be understood that they did not find fault with the prosecution, but they believed the intense suffering of the convioted men had vindicated the law, and that this being so the time bad come for their release.


A Meeting of a joint committee, consisting of representatives of legal bodies from various parts of Scotland, met on Monday in tbe Advocate's Library, Edinburgh, on the invitation of a oommittee of the Faonlty of Advocates, to consider this question. Tbe following gentlemen were present :—The committee of the Faculty of Advocates, consisting of Messrs. J. Guthrie Smith, H. Johnston, M. T. S. Darling, J. H. Begg, G. Burnett, A. Ure, and A. Jameson, oonvener; Messrs. J. Clerk Brodie, W.S.; Dr. J. T. Mowbray, W.S. ; and John Cook, W.S., representing the Society of Writers to the Signet; Messrs. J. Lamond, S. S.O., president; VV. Saunders, S.S.C., vicepresident, and William Miller, S.S.O., of the Society of Solioitors before the Supreme Courts J Mr. G, M. Wood, of the Society of Solioitors at Law; Mr. David Littlejohn, of the Society of Advooates in Aberdeen ; Mr. A ndrew Hendry, of the Faculty of Procurators, Dundee ; Messrs. J. A. Spens and T. 0. Young, of the B'aculty of Procurators in Glasgow; Mr. Robert Kussell, of the Faculty of Procurators in Paisley; Messrs. Alex. Graham, solicitor, Crieff, president, and J. M. Miller and David Eeay, solioitors, Pertb, vicepresident and secretary of the Society of Solicitors of Perthshire; Messrs. John Lockhart, secretary, and D. Dougall, member, of the Ayr Faculty of Solioitors; Mr. John Symonds, sen., dean of the Faculty of Procurators of Dumfriesshire; Mr. Alexander Cameron, solicitor, Elgin, representing the Society of Solioitors of Elginshire; Messrs. James Clarke, secretary, and William Burns, of the Faoulty of Solioitors of Invernesschire; Messrs. Ebenezer Morrison, dean, and William Stevenson, sub-dean, of the Sooiety of Solicitors and Procurators of Stirling—Mr. Jameson in tbe chair. A full discussion of the question took place, in tbe course of which most of the gentlemen present stated their experience of the inconvenience and injustice of the practice of summoning Scotch defenders in the English courts, and thereafter the following resolutions were proposed, seconded, and unanimously agreed to :—

1. That in the opinion of this meeting the experience of the past six years has proved that the practice of the English and Irish courts of serviug their summonses upon persons resident in Scotland in virtue of the provisions of ord. 11, r. 1, of the rules annexed to the Supreme Court of J udicature (England) Act, 1875, and of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877, has been productive of great hardship, injustice, and inconvenienoe to Scotsmen in all parts of the country, and especially in the large mercantile centres, and that the subsequent enactment by the English judges of rule la of order 11 of the Rules of Court in England has not had the anticipated effect of abating the grievance complained of.

2. That this meeting is of opinion that the practice introduced by the Acts and Rules referred to iu the first resolution, in its application to persons resident in Scotland, involves a breach of the 19th article of the Act of Union, and is, moreover, iu violation of tbe recognized principles of general international law.

3. That the difficulty of determining, under the said Acts and Rules, whether service has been properly made or not, has been frequently found in practiceto be very inconvenient, in leading practically to two litigations—one on the question of jurisdiction, and tbe other on the merits of the case.

4. That this meeting is of opinion that the proper remedy for the grievance complained of is tbe restoration of the law in this matter, as regards Scotland, to the footing on which it stood prior to the enactment of the Acts and Rules referred to, and that, by tbe exemption of Scotland from the operation of the same or of any similar enactments, so that in future the plaintiff or pursuer must, in accordance with the rules of international law, sue any person resident in Scotland against whom he has a claim in the courts of that country.

5. That this meeting instruct the convener of this committee to arrange for a deputation to wait on the law officers of the Crown for Scotland, and on Lord Rosebery as Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, to lay before them the views of this committee as representing the various legal bodies throughout the country, and to request them as soon as possible to prepare and bring in a Bill to remedy the evils complained of.

Thereafter an executive committee wag appointed.


SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The usual monthly meeting of the board of direotors of this assooiation was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, December 14, Mr. P. Riokman in the chair, the other directors present being Messrs. Asker (Norwioh), Brook, riedger, Kays, Keen, Like, Pennington, Bote, Smitb, Veley (Chelmsford), Walters, and Woolbert (Mr. Eiffe, secretary). A sum of £280 was distributed in grants of assistance among necessitous solicitors and their widows and families, twenty-nine new members were admitted to the association, and other general business tran


On Friday last the members and friends of the Liw Cricket Club assembled at dinner at Anderton's Hotel, Fleet-street, the chair being taken by A. L. Strath, Eeq. A large number of barristers, solicitors, and law students were present. After the usual loyal toasts had been responded to, a smoking concert took place, and some very good songs and musio followed in rapid succession. Amongst the most sucoessful we may mention a song and chorus written for the occasion and sung by Mr. C. E. Baker, which was heartily and deservedly applauded. Mr. P. M. James was in good voice, and sang "Montrose's Love Song" with great effect, besides rendering valuable assistance at the piano. In replying to a vote of thanks for presiding, the chairman expressed his pleasure at being present that evening as a member of the club, which he hoped would continue for long to come to receive, year by year, an increasing degree of support from both branches of the profession. A beneficial opportunity was afforded by the olub for members of the profession to meet together for one common object—viz., recreation without regard to professional differences and distinctions. He referred to some parts of Mr. Baker's song, which alluded in a humorous way to the amount of brain work involved in a lawyer's duties now-a-days, observing that it was a part of a lawyer's duties to preserve his bodily strength with healthful pursuits, for which purpose he advised them to become members of the Law Cricket Club and play tennis. The chairman concluded by proposing a toast, " To our next merry meeting."



At a meeting held at Clement's-inn Hall on Wednesday, December 14, Mr. Birtrnm in the ohair, Mr. Brown moved, "That her Majesty's Government does not deserve the confidence of the country," and was supported by Messrs. Mott, Whitehouse, Kains-Jackson, Jenks, and Collyer. The following members spoke in opposition to the motion : Messrs. Richardson, Shirley, and Spence; Mr. Blackwell also addressod the meeting. The debate was sustained until a late hour, and the opener having replied, the motion was put and carried by a majority of five votes. Members present, 21 ; visitor, 1.

The following moot was discussed at the meeting of the society held at the Law Institution on Monday, December 19:—"A sends a box to a station belonging to a railway company, with a message that he will take it with him by the first train next morning. A porter receives the box, and puts it into a goods shed. In the night the box is broken open and the goods are stolen. Is the company liable? The debate was opened in the negative by Mr. Jenks, who was supported by Mr. Parsons, and opposed by Mr. Richardson. The opeDer having replied, the chairman (Mr. D'Arcy Collyer) summed up the ease, and, upon division, the contention of the opener was affirmed nem.

MANCHESTER LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY The fourth meeting of this sooiety was held on Tuesday evening, the 13th inst., at 6.30, at the Law Library, Cross-street, when the ohair waB taken by Mr. A. 0. Maberly, M.A., barrister-at-law, the question for discussion being as follows:—" A. dies intestate, seised of real estate, his heir-apparent being en vmtre 1a mere. Between the death of A. and the birth of the poithnmons heir, the rents of the' real estate are received by the presumptive heir of the intestate. (1) Do the rents so received belong on his birth to the posthumous heir? (2) Wonld the result be the same supposing the rents had not been actually received by the presumptive heir?" The affirmative (1) was supported by Messrs. Raynor and Rowland, and the negative by Messrs. Payne, Withington, Solly, Hilditob, Ryoroft. and Law. The affirmative (2) was argued by Mr. Taylor and Mr. W. J. Read, and the negative by several speakers. The chairman gummed up, and the voting was as follows ;—Affirmative (1), 2; negative, 36. Affirmative (2), 32;

negative, 6. The society passed resolutions to give prizes of various amounts for the beat essays on given B objects, and to those of its members wbo pass the final examination with honours. A vote of thanks to the ohairman closed the proceedings.


The 698th ordinary meeting of the Birmingham Law Students' Sooiety was holden at the Law Library, Benoett's-hill, Birmingham, on Tuesday, the 20th of December. The ohair was taken by Thomas Spencer, Esq. A letter was read from Sir Hardinge S. Giffard, Q.C., M.P.. in which he notified his consent to become president of the society for 1882. It was resolved that that meeting should be the last of the autumn session, and that the first meeting of the spring session should be held on Tuesday, the 7th of February, 1882. A debate then took plaoe on moot point No. 657:—" A is the owner of a number of carrier pigeons. For the purpose of training them he conveys them to a distance from their home and then sets tbem free, in the expectation that they will return to their doveoote. In their flight homewards the pigeons pass over the land of B., who shoots some of them. Can A. maintain an action for the wrong?" The speakers on the affirmative side were Messrs. Davis, Browett, Saunders, Thompson, G. Huggins, and Ryland; those on the negative were Messrs. Barrows, W. E. Barber, G. T. Edwards, Streetly, and Cochrane. The discussion was sustained with spirit, and the opening speakers on either Bide having replied, the chairman summed up and put the question to the meeting, when it was decided in the affirmative by a majority of nine. A vote of thanks to the ohairmau concluded th* meeting.



Mr. Henry Ingles Davis, solicitor, died at Coventry on the 23rd nit., after a painful illness. Mr. Davis was born in 1814, and was admitted a solicitor in 1843. He was a commissioner to administer oaths in the Supreme Court, and a perpetual commissioner for Warwickshire, and he had an extensive private practice in Coventry and the neighbourhood. He also held several important public appointments. He was vestry clerk of St. Michael's Parish, clerk to the Cappers' and Mercers' Companies, and to the trustees of the General Charities, and solicitor to the Butcher's Freemen Trustees. He was also for many years registration and election agent to the Liberal party in the borough. Mr. Davis had been for some time a widower, and he leaves two sons.


Mr. Anthony Benn Steward, solicitor, lute of Whitehaven, died at Buxton, on the 16th ult. Mr. Steward was born in 1805. He was admitted a solicitor about the year 1828, aud he practised for many years at Whitehaven. Since his retirement from business he had resided at Newton Manor, High Gosforth. Mr. Steward took an active part in local business. He was for many years chairman of the Cleator and Egremont Railway Company. He was one of the principal leaders of the Liberal party in the Western Division of Cumberland, and at the general election of 1868 he unsuccessfully contested the borough of Whitehaven, in opposition to Mr. Cavendish Bentinck.


Mr. John Fraser Macqueen, Q.C, died at 4, Upper Westbourne-terrace, on the 6th inst., in his seventy-ninth year. Mr. Macqueen was the son of Mr. Donald Macqueen, of Corryborough, Inverness-shire, and was born in 1803. He formerly practised as a Writer to the Signet, at Edinburgh, but subsequently became a member of Lincoln's-inn, where he was called to the bar in Trinity Term, 1838. He practised in the Court of Chancery, and was made a Queen's Counsel in 1861. Mr. Macqueen was the author of works on Marriage Law, and on Practice before tbo House of Lords. He was at one time frequently engaged in Scotch appeals, and In proceedings for divorce under the old system. For a few years after the passing of the Divorce Aot, he also practised in the Divorce Court. In 1860 he was appointed, by Lord Campbell, to be official reporter of Scotch and divorce appeals in the House of Lords, and be compiled four volumes of appellate reports. He continued his reports for several years after the formation of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, but failing I ealtb. obliged him to appoint a deputy, and about two years ago he resigned his appointment. Mr. Macqueen was a man of most genial and kindly disposition, and was very highly esteemed in the profession. He was a magistrate and deputy-lieutenant for Inverness-shire, and a benoher of Lincoln's-inn.

MR. HENRY BRITTAN. Mr. Henry Britten, solicitor (the head of the firm of Brittan, Press, Inskip, & Crewdson), of Bristol, died on the 5th inst. from paralysis, in bis eightieth year. Mr. Brittan was born in 1802, and was admitted a solicitor in 1828, and he had practised for over half a century at Bristol. He was at the head of one of the largest offices in the city, and was thoroughly well versed in every branch of meroantile law. He had been for some time associated in partnership with Messrs. John Latham Press, James Inskip, and Henry Crewdson. Mr. Brittan took an active part in municipal business, and he bad been for several years an alderman for the city. He was chairman of the Taff Vale

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