CASE STATED.-See ERROR. CHARGING ORDER.- See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. CHARITY. 1. A testator, after giving other legacies, gave £4000 to the Royal Society (incorporated "for improving natural knowledge"), £4000 to the Royal Geographical Society (incorporated for “the improvement and diffusion of geographical knowledge"), and like sums to three other charities. He directed the charitable legacies to be paid out of the pure personalty, and gave the residue to his executors for their own use. He left £6711 pure personalty, £8045 proceeds of leaseholds, and £867 proceeds of real estate in Madeira. Held, that the legacies to said societies were to charities within St. 9 Geo. II. c. 36, and that the proceeds of the Madeira estate were not an interest in land within said act. But (varying the order of STUART, V.C.) the debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and costs of suit were payable ratably out of the three funds. Then the pure personalty was to be first applied to the charities, other legacies to be paid out of the impure. The charities, so far as unpaid, were also to participate in the proceeds of the Madeira property, abating in the proportion of the impure personalty to the Madeira property. - Beaumont v. Oliveira, L. R. 4 Ch. 309; s. c. L. R. 6 Eq. 534; 3 Am. Law Rev. 686, 722. 2. A charity was founded in 1626 for the clothing of eight poor boys of the town of E., and causing them "to be put to some petty school, to the end they may learn to read English, and there to be so kept until they shall attain the age of thirteen years, thereby to keep them from idle and vagrant courses, and also instruct them in some part of God's true religion." Held, that the primary object was education, and for very poor boys. Scheme: An elementary school for boys of E., with twenty-five free scholarships, and clothing for twenty, for boys selected for merit, &c., or for poverty, at the option of the trustees. A superior school for boys from the whole parish, with three free scholars selected by competitive examination. Capitation fees to be paid by the boys of both schools. — In re Latymer's Charity, L. R. 7 Eq. 353. 3. The House of Lords had directed that a scheme be framed for a charity, leaving the question whether a proposed building should be erected to the discretion of those who would consider the scheme, and in the exercise of such discretion it had been determined not to build. Held, that said determination was final and conclusive on the House. Clephane v. The Lord Provost, &c., of Edinburgh, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 417. CHEQUE. Plaintiff took from her debtor's agent the agent's cheque for the amount of the debt, and did not present it for payment for nearly four weeks. When presented it was dishonored, but there was a reasonable chance, though not a certainty, that it would have been paid if presented at once. The debtor, a week after the cheque was made, paid his agent a part of the amount, the rest being in the agent's hands already. The agent absconded. Held, that the debtor was discharged. — Hopkins v. Ware, L. R. 4 Exch. 268. CHOSE IN ACTION. - See BOND; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2. CODICIL.-See REVOCATION OF WILL, 2; WILL, 3. COLLISION. 1. In a case of collision, the vessel proved entitled to redress set forth the relative position of the two vessels incorrectly in her pleadings. Both vessels were at anchor at the time of the accident, and there was no ground for the objection that the other side might have been misled. Held, that the rule that a party seeking redress for an injury must recover secundum allegata et probata did not apply. - The "Alice" & The "Rosita," L. R. 2 P. C. 214. 2. In a case of collision occasioned by the fault of a vessel under compulsory pilotage in going at too great speed, where no contributory negligence on the part of the master or crew is proved, the owners of the vessel are not liable. (See G. S. N. Co. v. B. & C. S. N. Co. (Exch. Ch.), L. R. 4 Exch. 238.) Semble, said owners not having adhered to the appeal from the decree that their vessel was wholly in fault, but that they were not liable on the above ground, could not raise the questions whether their vessel was free from blame, or whether both vessels were equally in fault. — Moss v. The African Steamship Co. The "Calabar," L. R. 2 P. C. 238. 3. The maritime lien on a French vessel for damages caused to an English vessel by collision is not discharged by a sale without notice under the French bankrupt laws to a purchaser who did not know of the collision.- The Charles Amelia, L. R. 1 Adm. & Eccl. 330. COMMON, TENANCY IN. - See TENANCY IN COMMON. COMPANY. 1. When one who has been induced to become a shareholder in a company by a fraudulent prospectus has filed a bill to have his name removed from the list of members, his right to this will not be affected by a subsequent order for the winding-up of the company. Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Smith, L. R. 4 H. L. 64. 2. The articles of a company formed for running the blockade during the war in America provided that dividends should not be paid except out of profits, and that the directors should declare a dividend as often as the profits in hand were sufficient to pay five per cent on the capital, subject to the resolutions of a general meeting. In 1864, a dividend was declared, and sanctioned at a general meeting, and subsequently paid, upon a balance sheet in which a debt due from the Confederate government, and a guarantee by the same of part of the value of ships lost in blockade-running, and cotton in the Confederate States, were estimated at their full nominal value. The balance sheet was submitted to the creditor now complaining of it, and advances were made by him, after inspecting it, out of which the dividend was paid. All the above assets were lost and the company was wound up. Held, that as the estimate was made bona fide, and the facts were plainly stated in the balance sheet, the dividend was to be considered as made out of profits, and not as delusive. - Stringer's Case, L. R. 4 Ch. 475. 3. Company C., formed to construct railways, &c., ordered rails of Company E. by letter. Said rails were intended to be used in the construction of a railway which had been undertaken by a firm to which the managing director of C. be longed, but not by the company. The managing director of E. was also a director of C. The rails were made but not delivered, as C. became bankrupt. Held, that the order was binding on C., although not under seal, and whether the managing director of E. knew the purpose for which the rails were to be used or not; and that E. could prove for damages caused by C.'s non-acceptance of the rails. -In re Contract Corporation. Claim of Ebbw Vale Company, L. R. 8 Eq. 14. 4. The chairman of the directors of a company was authorized by them to accept bills drawn on the company by L., on L.'s depositing securities to a certain amount. The chairman accepted such bills with the knowledge of the directors, but securities of the specified amount had not in fact been deposited. Held, that the company was bound. In re Land Credit Co. of Ireland. Ex parte Overend, Gurney, & Co., L. R. 4 Ch. 460. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; LIBEL, 2; STATUTE, 1. COMPOSITION DEED. See BANKRUPTCY, 6. CONDITION.. - See COMPANY, 4; CONTRACT; Devise, 1; InsURANCE, 2; CONDITIONAL LIMITATION. - See FORFEITURE; PERPETUITY. CONFLICT OF LAWS. The legislature of Jamaica passed an act indemnifying the defendant in respect of all acts done by him in suppressing of the rebellion in that island, and this act was assented to by the defendant in his capacity of governor. He was subsequently sued in England for trespasses which were within said act. Held, that the act was a bar to the suit, and that his having aided in its enactment, as above, made no difference. — Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 4 Q. B. 225. See COLLISION, 3. CONSIDERATION. CONFUSION. See TRUST, 4. -See BOND; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; LANDLORD AND CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES. See CARRIER, 1, 2; CHAR- CONTEMPT. See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. Plaintiff shipped under articles drawn in pursuance of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, for a voyage from Shields to Alexandria, and, if required, to ports in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Danube, &c., and home to the final port of discharge in Europe; the voyage not expected to exceed twelve months. 66 In consideration of which service to be duly performed," he was to receive 57. 10s. wages per month. During the voyage the plaintiff was guilty of drunkenness and insubordinate conduct, and by his own negligence only he was left behind at a port on the Danube. He did not, however, desert. Held (Per BYLES & MON TAGUE SMITH, JJ.), that plaintiff was entitled to recover wages up to the time when he was left behind. (Per BRETT, J.) that, construing the articles with the Act, performance of, or readiness to perform the stipulated services throughout the whole voyage was a condition precedent to the right to wages. Thompson, L. R. 4 C. P. 330. Button v. See COMPANY, 1, 3, 4; DAMAGES; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; SALE; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. Under the Copyright Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), the assignor of a copyright may retain copies of the work, and may sell them after his assignment, unless there is a contrary stipulation. — Taylor v. Pillow, L. R. 7 Eq. 418. COSTS. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 4; MORTGAGE, 2; NUISANCE, 1, 2; PARTITION. COURT. Under a statute appointing certain officers commissioners of oyer and terminer, and empowering "any two or more of them to inquire of, hear, determine, and adjudge❞ certain offences, only one member of the commission need actually sit at the trial, if another member is sitting at the same sessions, though in another court. Per MELLOR, LUSH, & HAYES, JJ., COCKBURN, C.J., dissentiente, if a second judge were required, the same one need not be present through the whole trial. Leverson v. The Queen, L. R. 4 Q. B. 394. COVENANT. 1. One who takes an underlease is bound by all the covenants in the original lease. - Feilden v. Slater, L. R. 7 Eq. 523. 2. The sale of spirits in bottles by a grocer is a breach of a covenant that premises shall not be used "as an inn, public-house, or tap-room, or for the sale of spirituous liquors."— 1b. See EASEMENT; TRUST, 1. CREDITOR. -See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; FRAUDULENT CONVEY ANCE. CRIMINAL LAW.-See ASSAULT; COURT; DEATH, 1; EVIDENCE, 2; WRIT OF RESTITUTION. CURTESY.-See BANKRUPTCY, 3. CUSTOM.-See SALE, 2, 3. DAMAGES. A. purchased jute, to be at the risk of the sellers till the prompt day. A. paid a deposit, and received the warehousemen's weight notes from the seller. These A. deposited with B. as a security for advances made to A. by C., and B. agreed to hold them for C. The jute having been destroyed by fire before the prompt day, B. gave up the notes to A. without authority from C., and A. gave them to the seller, and thereupon obtained back the deposit. A. subsequently became insolvent, and failed to repay C. his advances. C. sued B. for his breach of contract in giving up the notes to A. Held, that C. was entitled to substantial and not merely nominal damages. (Exch. Ch.)-Matthews v. Discount Corporation, L. R. 4 C. P. 228. See PROXIMATE CAUSE; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. DEATH. 1. On a trial for bigamy, it was proved that the prisoner married A. in 1836, left him in 1843, and married again in 1847. Nothing had been heard of A. since the prisoner left him, but there was no evidence leading to the inference that A. had died. Held, that there was no presumption of law that A. was alive at the date of the second marriage. — The Queen v. Lumley, L. R. 1 C. C. 196. 2. A person entitled to dividends payable in April and October, for which he was in the habit of applying punctually, and on which he mainly depended for support, was last seen in August, 1860, without money and in bad health, and did not draw his October dividend. Seven years having elapsed: Held, that on the above facts it was to be presumed that he died before Nov. 14, 1860.-— In re Beasney's Trusts, L. R. 7 Eq. 498. 1. On the marriage of A., tenant for life of X. estate, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, a fund was settled (in case there should be children other than an eldest, second, or only son, for the time being entitled to X. estate, for an estate in tail male in possession, or remainder immediately expectant on A.'s death) on such children, after the death of A. and his wife, as A. should appoint, and, in default of A.'s appointment, equally. C., the eldest son of the marriage, joined with A. in barring the entail, and resettling X. estate to A. for life, then to C. for life, with remainder to C.'s sons successively in tail, remainder to C.'s heirs. A. died, having appointed half only of the fund. Held, that A.'s death was the period for ascertaining whether C. was excluded from a share in the fund, but (reversing decision of WOOD, V.C.) that C., having had the benefit intended, notwithstanding the resettlement of X. estate, was excluded. — Collingwood v. Stanhope, L. R. 4 H. L. 43; s.c. L. R. 4 Eq. 286; 2 Am. Law Rev. 467. 2. A fund was settled after A.'s death on A.'s child J. and A.'s future children, and in case either of them should happen to be dead leaving issue, to such issue, equally to be divided amongst them or their issue respectively, to each being a son at twenty-one, being a daughter at twenty-one or marriage. In case J. or other child should die without issue before his share should become "due and payable," such share to survivors and issue of deceased child equally, when and as their original shares should become "due and payable." If at A.'s death neither J. or other child, nor issue of J. or other child, were living, or if all should die before their shares were "payable, then" over. The trustees had a power of advancement. J. died without issue, living A. Held, that J.'s share was divested, and went to the survivors. — In re Wilmott's Trusts, L. R. 7 Eq. 532. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; MORTGAGE, 2; SEPARATION DEED; TRUST, 1. DEMAND.-See AWARD, 2. |
