the legislature to persons sustaining an injury in a particular district. — Gibson v. Mayor of Preston, L. R. 5 Q. B. 218.

WILL.

1. The testator requested one person to attend and witness his will, and another to witness a paper. They both attended at the time and place appointed, when the testator produced a paper so folded that no writing on it was visible, and informed them that in consequence of his wife's death it was necessary to make a change in his affairs, and he asked them to sign their names to it, which they did. The testator did not sign in their presence, nor did they see his signature. The paper had an attestation clause upon it in the handwriting of the testator, not quite in the ordinary terms, but showing knowledge of what forms were required in executing a will. Held, that the will was properly executed. Beckett v. Howe, L. R. 2 P. & D. 1.

2. G. made a will, and with it a paper of directions to executors to form a part of it. By a later will, revoking all former wills and codicils, his executors were to dispose of all the chattels in the rooms occupied by G. at the time of his decease "according to the written directions left by me, and affixed to this my will." There were no such directions affixed; but the above paper was found in G.'s private room. Held, that it could not be included in the probate. — Goods of Gill, L. R. 2 P. & D. 6.

3. At the foot of his will, the deceased duly executed in the presence of two witnesses a memorandum that "this will was cancelled this day," &c. Held, that this was not a will or codicil, but only a "writing" (1 Vict. c. 26, § 20), which could not be admitted to probate. Goods of Fraser, L. R. 2 P. & D. 40. 4. "Being obliged to leave England to join my regiment in China, I leave this paper containing my wishes. . . . Should any thing unfortunately happen to me whilst abroad, I wish every thing that I may be in possession of at that time, or any thing appertaining to me hereafter, to be divided," &c. The deceased returned from China to England. Held, that the above will was conditional on the party's death in China. Goods of Porter, L. R. 2 P. & D. 22.

...

5. "I appoint my nephew, J. G., executor." There were living at the date of the will a son of the testator's brother, and a nephew of the testator's wife, both named J. G. He hardly knew of the former, while the latter lived with him, managed his business, and was always spoken of by him as his nephew. Held, that, as the word " nephew" in a popular sense applied to the latter, the above facts could be considered in interpreting it. - Grant v. Grant, L. R. 2 P. & D. 8.

6. A testator left all his property to two persons, whom he appointed executors (one being a neighboring farmer, the other a surgeon, called in during his last illness to make the will), " in and for the consideration of" paying over the rents and profits to his wife for life: Held, that the executors did not take beneficially, but that the estate, subject to the widow's life-interest, was undisposed of. - Bird v. Harris, L. R. 9 Eq. 204.

7. A woman, after a Scotch divorce, invalid in England, and before the death of her husband, made a will purporting to dispose of her separate property. Her estate was about 800l., consisting in part of savings from an annuity settled on her, her executors, &c., for life, by her husband after marriage, and in part

of a legacy paid to her after the divorce. Her husband died, but she did not republish the will. Probate was granted, limited to the separate estate of the deceased. The applicant to file an affidavit, stating of what, in his belief, it consisted. Goods of Crofts, L. R. 2 P. & D. 18.

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8. A. devised his lands in trust for W., the eldest son of A.'s brother, B., in tail then for the first and other sons of A.'s brother, C., in tail; then for the first and other sons of A.'s brother D. in tail; then for the second and other sons of B. in tail. He empowered his trustees to grant leases "during the minority of any infant tenants in tail, or other persons for the time being entitled," and to manage the estates, &c., during the minority of any tenant for life, in tail, or in fee, "entitled to the present possession." A. also left a residuary fund to his nephews and nieces living at his decease, except W., "or others the person or persons entitled" to the lands. W. died before A., an infant, and unmarried. B. died unmarried after A. The second son of B. was now of age, and tenant in tail expectant on the death, without sons, of C., who was sixty-eight, and unmarried. There were other nephews and nieces of A. Held, that B.'s son was not so "entitled" to the lands that he could not share in the funds. · Umbers v. Jaggard, L. R. 9 Eq. 200.

9. Testatrix gave a share of residuary personal estate to such of her four grandchildren, A., B., C., and D., as should be living at the death of E. But if any of the said four grandchildren should die in the lifetime of E., leaving issue, "the share or shares of such of them so dying shall be assigned and transferred to such issue respectively, in equal shares and proportions, on their attaining the age of twenty-one years, and the dividends and proceeds thereof in the mean time to be applied in or towards their maintenance and education." C. died in the lifetime of E., leaving issue, of whom several died under twenty-one. Held, that C.'s share vested in such of C.'s issue only as attained twenty-one. - In re Ashmore's Trusts, L. R. 9 Eq. 99.

10. A. gave a residuary estate to be equally divided amongst his children. He afterwards gave the dividends for the use of each of his children during their respective lives, and, if they had children, then the principal to be at the disposal of the parent to such children. If any of A.'s children should leave no children, his share to revert into the residuum.

A.'s daughter, B., by her will, expressed her intention of appointing her share under A.'s will to her children, but gave them a part only, and after directing debts and legacies to be paid, gave to her son the residue of the personal estate which belonged to her, or which she had any general power to dispose of. Held, that B. took a life-estate under A.'s will, with a power of appointment among her children; that B. had not fully exercised the power; and that the part not expressly appointed was divisible among B.'s surviving children. - Butler v. Gray, L. R. 5 Ch. 26.

11. A testator left his residuary personal estate in trust for his wife during her life, and at her death for his children" or their heirs." One of the children died before the wife, having assigned his share. Held, that the next of kin of the deceased child took, and not the assignee.-Finlason v. Tatlock. L. R. 9 Eq. 258.

12. A testator left a residue to trustees, to collect, &c., and then to divide the whole among his four children, A., B., C., and D., "with benefit of survivorship

in case any of them should die without issue," and if any of them should die leaving children, "the share, whether original or accruing, of him . . . so dying, shall go, belong, and be divided between such children," &c. A., B., C., and D., all survived the testator. Held (reversing the decision of MALINS, V. C.), that they did not thereby acquire indefeasible interests. Bowers v. Bowers, L. R. 5 Ch. 244; s. c. L. R. 8 Eq. 283. Ante, p. 484.

See COVENANT; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2, 3; POWER, 2, 3.

WINDING UP.

1. The Warrant Finance Co.'s Case, L. R. 4, Ch. 643; ante, p. 293, was not merely a rule for the future, but a declaration of the law as it then stood. — Ebbw Vale Co.'s Case, L. R. 5 Ch. 112.

2. But the rule in that case does not prevent a creditor who holds a security (although on the estate against which the proof is made) from receiving dividends to the full amount of the principal, and at the same time realizing his security until the full amount of principal and interest has been satisfied. - Warrant Finance Co.'s Case (No. 2), L. R. 5, Ch. 88.

3. Nor from receiving dividends for the same debts from the estates of two companies in liquidation until the full amount of debt and interest has been satisfied. · Warrant Finance Co.'s Case, L. R. 5 Ch. 86.

4. Upon a petition to wind up a canal company, presented by the company, the corporation of a town within which part of the canal was situated, and a canal company whose canal communicated with that of the petitioning company, were heard in opposition to the petition. — In re Bradford Navigation Co., L. R. 9 Eq. 80.

See COMPANY, 1; Damages, 1.

SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.

[FOR the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports: 54 Barbour (New York); 5 Bush (Kentucky); 37 Georgia; 24 and 26 Iowa; 56 Maine; 14 Minnesota; 44 Missouri; 18 Ohio State; 59 Pennsylvania State; 4 Vroom (New Jersey).]

ACCEPTANCE.

See BANK; BILLS AND NOTES, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6. ACCOMMODATION NOTE.-See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 2, 4.

ACTION.

1. Action on an agreement to pay a certain subscription annually. When the subscriptions for four years were due, the plaintiff, by action, recovered the subscription for the first year. Suit was then brought for the three others. Held, that all should have been included in the first action, and that the judgment obtained in that was a bar to the second. — Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Brown, 54 Barb. 191.

2. Action to recover a mare taken by the United States Government for military purposes, and sold by the Government to the defendant. Held, that the action could not be maintained. Wellman v. Wickerman, 44 Mo. 484.

See ASSUMPSIT; BANK; BILLS AND NOTES, 5; BOND; CARRIER, 2; DAMAGES, 1, 3; EVICTION; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3; JUDICIAL ACT; JURISDICTION; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2, 4; NEGLIGENCE, 3, 4; OFFICER; PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH; TENANCY AT WILL; TRESPASS; WAR, 1; WASTE.

ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

ADMIRALTY.

1. A proceeding against a vessel by name is in the nature of a suit in admiralty, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States; hence a State statute, giving the right to a lien on the vessel, and to proceed against her by name, whatever may be the nature of the claim, is unconstitutional. Ferran v. Hosford, 54 Barb. 200.

2. Plaintiffs, by proceeding in rem, attached a steamer at Louisville, by virtue of a lien given them as material-men by the laws of Missouri, of which State they were citizens, and where they had furnished the boat with materials. Held, that it was a proceeding in admiralty, of which the State courts had no jurisdiction, and that any State law, giving them jurisdiction, was unconstitutional. — Marshall v. Curtis, 5 Bush, 607 (HARDIN, J., dissenting).

3. Proceeding in rem against a steamboat to recover damages for injuries caused by a collision. Held, that it was a case within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. - Walters v. The Steamboat Mollie Dozier, 24 Iowa, 192.

4. Suit in rem against a steamboat. The plaintiff, a passenger on the boat, delivered a trunk to it as a common carrier, and the trunk was lost. The action was brought in the Superior Court of Cincinnati under the Watercraft Law of Ohio: Held, that it was a proceeding in admiralty, and that the court had no jurisdiction (BRINKERHOFF, J., dissenting). — Steamboat General Buell v. Long, 18 Ohio St. 521.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.-See EVIDENCE, 4; TRESPASS.
ASSIGNMENT.-See BANK; COVENANT.

ASSUMPSIT.

One broker purchased of another certain coupons which were genuine, but had been pronounced void by the Supreme Court of Alabama, because they were issued without authority. The seller and buyer were both ignorant of this fact. In assumpsit to recover the purchase-money, held, that the plaintiff must recover (HARRIS, J., dissenting). — McCay v. Barber, 37 Ga. 423.

See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2; INFANT; SAVINGS BANK.

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCES. - See INDICTMENT.

ATTORNEY. - See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 2; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT.

An indictment for murder contained three counts charging the same crime in different ways. The defendant was convicted on the first, and acquitted on the others. A new trial was granted, and at the second trial he was acquitted on the first and second counts, and convicted of manslaughter on the third. The defendant moved the court for his release on the ground that he had once been tried and acquitted on the third count. Held, that the granting of a new trial opened the case for re-trial on all three counts. Leslie v. The State, 18 Ohio St. 390.

BAILMENT.

A naked verbal promise to return a thing hired in good order at a specified time, does not, as matter of law, import a contract on the part of the hirer to insure it against loss occurring without his fault. - Field v. Brackett, 56 Me. 121.

BANK.

The holder of a banker's check may maintain an action thereon against the drawee, having funds of the drawer on deposit, before acceptance; and a general assignment of the drawer for the benefit of the creditors after drawing the check, but before its presentation for payment, will not affect the right of the holder (WRIGHT, J., dissenting). - Roberts v. Corbin, 26 Iowa, 315.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; NATIONAL BANK; SET-OFF.