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independently of the Act of 1845, yet the intent was manifest that a general jurisdiction should not be exercised, and that the jurisdiction which should be exercised should not be exclusive.

The Supreme Court of the United States have, however, in a recent case,1 virtually annulled the Act of 1845, and have declared the expressed intention of Congress to be of no force or effect, and they have not only done this, but they have shorn the Act of 1789 of one of its important clauses. The opinion is given by Mr. Justice Nelson; and the learned judge, after stating the question, says, "We have now examined it with care, and given to it our best consideration, and are satisfied that since the decision of the case of The Genesee Chief the court must regard the district courts as having conferred upon them a general jurisdiction in admiralty upon the lakes and the waters connecting them, by the ninth section of the original Act of 1789; and the enabling Act of 1845, therefore, has become inoperative and ineffectual as a grant of jurisdiction ; and as it was an act on the face of it, and as intended, in its purpose and effect, to extend the admiralty jurisdiction to these waters, we cannot, without utterly disregarding this purpose and intent, give effect to it as a limitation or restriction upon it. We must therefore regard it as obsolete and of no effect with the exception of the clause which gives to either party the right of trial by jury when requested, which is rather a mode of exercising jurisdiction than any substantial part of it. The saving clause in this act, as to the concurrent remedy at common law, is in effect the same as in the Act of 1789, and is therefore, of necessity, useless and of no effect."

The learned judge, by a singular mistake, overlooks the clause in the Act of 1845, saving "any concurrent remedy which may be given by the State laws."

The clause in the Act of 1789, relating to waters navigable from the sea, is considered as having been effectual and necessary so long as the tide-water doctrine prevailed. "But since the decision in the case of The Genesee Chief," says the learned judge, "this clause, above recited, is no longer of any force. The general jurisdiction in admiralty exists without regard to it; and if any effect should be given, instead of extending, as was intended, it would restrict it; and for the reason given in respect to the Act of 1845, it has become useless and of no effect."

1 The Eagle, 8 Wallace, 15.

The argument appears to be, that as the doctrine of tide water was given up, because the jurisdiction was expressly declared to extend to waters navigable from the sea, so the doctrine of navigable waters should in its turn yield, because the first part of the sentence read without the last part gives a general jurisdiction. Perhaps the next step may be to lay down the rule, that, as the Constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," this must mean exclusive jurisdiction, and that as soon as courts were established they exercised jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution, that the 9th section of the Act of 1789 was therefore useless, and the clause saving a common-law remedy to suitors, is obsolete, and the admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction in personam as well as in rem.

It seems to be assumed by Mr. Justice Nelson, that the title of an act is of far greater force and effect than the body of it, and he decides that, although the body of the Act of 1845 declares that the district courts" shall have, possess, and exercise" a certain jurisdiction, this is to be considered of no effect, because the title of the act indicates a purpose to extend the jurisdiction, while the body of the act would really limit it. We had, however, supposed it to be elementary law that the title of a statute was only to be regarded when the language of the body of the act was involved in doubt. We commend to the attention of Mr. Justice Nelson the language of the opinion of the court in the case of Hadden v. The Collector,1 decided in 1866. "At the present day the title constitutes a part of the act, but it is still considered as only a formal part; it cannot be used to extend or to restrain any positive provisions contained in the body of the act. It is only where the meaning of these is doubtful, that resort may be had to the title, and even then it has little weight. It is seldom the subject of special consideration by the legislature. These observations apply with special force to acts of Congress. Every one who has had occasion to examine them has found the most incongruous provisions, having no reference to the matter specified in the title."

1 5 Wallace, 107.

HOUSE OF LORDS.1

GEORGE UDNY, Appellant; JOHN HENRY UDNY, Respondent.

Political and Civil Status. Allegiance distinguished from Domicile.

Every individual at his birth becomes the subject of some particular country by the tie of natural allegiance, which fixes his political status; and becomes subject to the law of the domicile, which determines his civil status.

Per Lord Westbury: To suppose that for a change of domicile there must be a change of natural allegiance, is to confound the political and the civil status, and to destroy the distinction between patria and domicilium.

Per The Lord Chancellor : 2 A man may change his domicile as often as he pleases, but not his allegiance. Exuere patriam is beyond his power. Dictum of Lord Kingsdown in Moorhouse v. Lord 3 qualified.

Domicile of Origin.

Per Lord Westbury: It is a settled principle that no man shall be without a domicile; and to secure this end the law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born the domicile of his father if the child be legitimate, and the domicile of his mother if the child be illegitimate. This is called the domicile of origin, and is involuntary. It is the creation of law, not of the party. It may be extinguished by act of law, as, for example, by sentence of death or exile for life, which puts an end to the status civilis of the criminal; but it cannot be destroyed by the will and act of the party.

Domiciles of Origin and of Choice distinguished.

Domicile of choice is the creation of the party. When a domicile of choice is acquired, the domicile of origin is in abeyance, but is not absolutely extinguished or obliterated.

When a domicile of choice is abandoned, the domicile of origin revives,—a special intention to revert to it being unnecessary.

Per Lord Chelmsford: Story says that the moment a foreign domicile is abandoned, the native domicile is re-acquired. The word "re-acquired" is an inaccurate expression. The meaning is, that the abandonment of an acquired domicile ipso facto restores the domicile of origin.

If after having acquired a domicile of choice a man abandons it and travels in search of another domicile of choice, the domicile of origin comes instantly into action, and continues until a second domicile of choice has been acquired.

Per Lord Westbury: A natural-born Englishman may domicile himself in Holland; but if he breaks up his establishment there and quits Holland, declaring that he will never return, it is absurd to suppose that his Dutch domicile clings to him until he has set up his tabernacle elsewhere.

1 L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 441.

2 Lord Hatherley.

8 10 H. L. C. 272.

Legitimation per subsequens Matrimonium.

Per The Lord Chancellor: The status of the child, with respect to its capacity to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its parents, depends wholly on the status of the putative father, not on that of the mother.

According to English law where at the time of a bastard's birth the father has his domicile in England—no subsequent change of domicile can render practicable the bastard's legitimation.

THE late Colonel John Robert Fullerton Udny, of Udny, in the county of Aberdeen, though born at Leghorn, where his father was consul, had by paternity his domicile in Scotland. At the age of fifteen, in the year 1794, he was sent to Edinburgh, where he remained for three years. In 1797, he became an officer in the Guards. In 1802, he succeeded to the family estate. In 1812, he married Miss Emily Fitzhugh, retired from the army, and took upon lease a house in London, where he resided for thirty-two years, paying occasional visits to Aberdeenshire.

In 1844, having got into pecuniary difficulties, he broke up his establishment in London and repaired to Boulogne, where he remained for nine years, occasionally, as before, visiting Scotland. In 1846, his wife died, leaving the only child of her marriage, a son, who, in 1859, died a bachelor.

Some time after the death of his wife, Colonel Udny formed at Boulogne a connection with Miss Ann Allat, which resulted in the birth, at Camberwell, in Surrey, on the 9th of May, 1853; of a son, the above respondent, whose parents were undoubtedly unmarried when he came into the world. They were, however, united afterwards in holy matrimony at Ormiston, in Scotland, on the 2d of January, 1854, and the question was whether the respondent, under the circumstances of the case, had become legitimate per subsequens matrimonium.

The Court of Session (First Division) on the 14th of December, 1866,1 decided that Colonel Udny's domicile of origin was Scotch, and that he had never altered or lost it, notwithstanding his long absences from Scotland. They therefore found that his son, the respondent, "though illegitimate at his birth, was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents." Hence this appeal, which the House regarded as involving questions of greatly more than ordinary importance.

The appellant argued his own case.

Sir Roundell Palmer, Q. C., Mr. Mellish, Q. C., Mr. Fraser, and Mr. Bristow, appeared for the respondent.

The following opinions of the Law Peers fully state the facts, the authorities, and the legal reasoning:

1 Third Series, vol. v., p. 164.

"THE LORD CHANCELLOR:

"MY LORDS, - In this case the appellant prays a judicial declaration that the respondent is a bastard, and is not entitled to succeed to the entailed estates of Udny, in Aberdeenshire.

"The question depends upon what shall be determined to have been the domicile of the respondent's father, the late Colonel Udny, at the time of his birth, at the time of the respondent's birth, and at the time of the colonel's marriage with the respondent's mother.

"The appellant, who argued his case in person with very considerable ability, contended: First, that the domicile of origin of Colonel Udny was English. Secondly, that even if that were not so, yet that at the time of his first marriage, in 1812, he had abandoned Scotland for England, sold his commission in the army, took a house on lease for a long term in London, and resided there till he left England for France in 1844, for the purpose of avoiding his creditors; and that having thus acquired an English domicile he retained it, and never re-acquired his Scotch domicile. Thirdly, that, at all events, if he did recover his Scotch domicile, yet it was not recovered at the date of the respondent's birth in May, 1853, nor even at the date of the intermarriage of the respondent's parents in January, 1854.

"As regards the first question, your lordships did not hear the respondents. You were satisfied that Colonel Udny's father, the consul, had never abandoned his Scottish domicile. Consequently you held that Colonel Udny's own domicile of origin was clearly Scotch, that having been the domicile of his father at the colonel's birth.

"A more difficult inquiry arose as to the domicile of Colonel Udny at the date of the respondent's birth in May, 1853.

"Colonel Udny appears to have left the army about the same time that he married his first wife, viz., in 1812, when he executed a contract and other instruments connected with his marriage, containing provisions referable to Scottish law, and describing himself as of Udny, in the county of Aberdeen. He, on his marriage, however, took a long lease of a house in London, in which he resided till 1844. He made frequent visits to Scotland, but had no residence there. He at one time contemplated restoring Udny Castle; and even three years after he had commenced his residence in London appears to have still thought it possible that he might complete the restoration, and plans were about that time submitted to him for that purpose. For many years, however, he seems to have abandoned all hope of so doing, owing to his means being insufficient. He was appointed a magistrate in Scotland, but appears not to have acted as such. When in Scotland he usually resided with friends, but occasionally at hotels in the neighborhood of his property; and he continually received detailed accounts of the estates, and took much interest in their management. His choice of

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