the want of a quorum in the House of Representatives at the time of its passage. Held, that the authentication by the presiding officer was conclusive evidence of the proper enactment of the law. - Evans v. Brown, 30 Ind. 514.

4. Indictment for subornation of perjury, charging the prisoner with having suborned N. to commit perjury on the trial of R. The defendant prayed the judge to instruct the jury that they could not convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of N., that he committed the crime at the instigation of the prisoner. This prayer was refused by the judge. Held, error (HUNT, C. J., dissenting). People v. Evans, 40 N. Y. 1.

5. The South Carolina ordinance of September, 1865, which makes admissible evidence of the real character and true value of the consideration of contracts, does not apply in the case of a bill in equity to set aside an executed contract. Pope v. Chaffee, 14 Rich. Eq. 69.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 5; RECORD; SPECIAL DEPOSIT; STAMP, 1, 2; WILL; WITNESS, 2.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 6; SHERIFF; TENANT IN COMMON, 2.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRAtor.

1. One of two executors filed a bill in equity against his co-executor, alleging a sale of the testator's property by both, receipt of money by defendant, and that the latter had spent the money. Held, that the bill made a proper case for injunction and security. Sheehan v. Kennedy, 32 Ga., 145.

2. An executor who sells choses in action belonging to the estate, without lawful authority, is liable, in cases where the real value cannot be ascertained, either for the proceeds of the sale, or the nominal value, as the one or the other may be the larger sum. - Smith v. Griffin, 32 Ga. 81.

EXECUTORY DEVISE.

ever;

A testatrix devised land to her nephew T. H., "to him and his children for but should he die before my nephew "L. H., "leaving no children or issue, I then give and bequeath the said real estate to my nephew " L. H., "to him, his heirs and assigns for ever." T. H. entered upon the land and conveyed the same to D. C., and D. C. reconveyed it to T. H. On the same day T. H. devised the land to his wife for life, remainder to his sisters. T. H. afterwards died during the lifetime of L. H., without issue. Held, that the will did not create an estate tail, but one which passed on the death of T. H. to L. H. and his heirs by way of executory devise. - Hilleary v. Hilleary's Lessee, 26 Md. 274.

1. The New York Statute of Frauds provides that in certain cases the contract of sale shall be void unless "the buyer shall accept and receive part of such goods." Held, that a delivery of goods to a general carrier, in pursuance of the order of a purchaser, to be transported to him, is not such an acceptance and receipt"

66

of the goods as takes the case out of the statute (LOTT, J., doubting). — Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519.

2. Suit on the following contract: "I hereby hold myself responsible to W. A. and W. W. Padgett, of Baltimore, Maryland, to the amount of $2000, for any drafts they have accepted, or may hereafter accept, for John Latouche, now of Alexandria, Va. Joseph Hutton." Held, that as to future advances there was a sufficient appearance of consideration on the face of the contract to take it out of the Statute of Frauds.-Hutton v. Padgett, 26 Md. 228.

.

3. The bill of O. alleged that, O. having been for many years the tenant of S., and being in possession of the premises under a lease from Feb. 1, 1864, for one year at a rent of $1100, towards the close of that year it was verbally agreed that if O. would pay an increased rent of $1500, S. would give him a lease for one year with the privilege of two or three; that O. remained in possession after the termination of the lease of 1864, and paid the increased rent " as part and parcel of the agreement aforesaid, and in performance and consideration thereof, and not otherwise." Held, that this was an allegation of such part-performance as would take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. - Spear v. Orendorf, 26 Md. 37.

4. A. purchased an estate of one W., which was at the time leased to B., and promised B. to give him a five-years' lease. The tenant remained in possession. Held, that continuance of possession was not such part-performance as took the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Rosenthal v. Freeburger, 26 Md. 75 (and

see Spear v. Orendorf, ib. 37).

5. The Vermont Statute of Frauds (Gen. Sts. c. 24, § 1) provides that no action shall be brought "upon any agreement not to be performed within one year... unless the promise, contract, or agreement upon which," &c. On March 19, 1864, defendant agreed verbally with plaintiff to furnish a cow for his use on April 1, or within a short time thereafter, or else to furnish money, the plaintiff on his side entering into stipulations not to be performed within a year. On breach by defendant, plaintiff brought suit. Held, that the action was not barred by the Sheehy v. Adarene, 41 Vt. 541.

statute.

6. A. made a verbal contract with B. for the purchase of cheese, which was within the Statute of Frauds. The next day B. wrote to A., "I shall stand to it". (the contract)," but shall want you to pay me fifty dollars to bind it." The day following (July 2) A. enclosed this sum in a letter and sent it to B. by mail, who received it on the 5th, and immediately returned it to A. Held, that the contract was not taken out of the statute. — Edgerton v. Hodge, 41 Vt. 676.

7. A., B., C., and D. agreed to buy real estate jointly; C. and D. agreed to furnish the purchase-money, and C. agreed with D. that the drafts for it should be drawn on D., and that he would reimburse D. for one-half whatever amount D. should pay thereon. All these agreements were oral. Held, that C.'s promise to reimburse D. was not within the Statute of Frauds, as a contract for the sale of lands, and that D. could recover on a count for money paid to the use of C. at his request. Wetherbee v. Potter, 99 Mass. 354.

8. The defendant, having bargained with N. for his farm, stock, and produce, agreed with plaintiff that they should together carry out the contract with N., sell the property in a short time, and divide the profits. The defendant took no deed of the farm, but had it conveyed directly to the persons to whom plaintiff and

defendant sold it in parcels, and it was all sold in N.'s name. Defendant received the proceeds of the sales, and plaintiff brought suit to recover his share of the profits. Held, that the action was not barred by the Statute of Frauds.- Bruce v. Hastings, 41 Vt. 380.

FUTURE ADVANCES. See FRAUDS, Statute of, 2.

GENERAL AVERAGE.

A schooner, loaded with lumber and bound for C., was damaged by a collision, and towed into M., the nearest port of refuge. After some slight repairs, and putting her deck-load on the pier, she was towed to the nearest port of repair, and thence to C. The lumber was delivered to the consignee, upon his signing a general average bond. In a suit on this bond for the expenses incurred in bringing the vessel and cargo from M. to C., it appeared that the entire cargo might have been unloaded at M., where it would have been safe until it could have been taken away by another vessel, and that this would have involved the owners of the cargo in much less expense. It was also in evidence that the portion of the cargo discharged at M., was not taken away until the following spring, and if the master had desired to transship the entire cargo he would probably have been obliged to send to C. or B. for a vessel to come expressly for that purpose. It further appeared that the course pursued had been for the common benefit of all, and the master had acted in good faith. Held, that the cargo was liable. Goodwillie v. McCarthy, 45 Ill. 186.

GOLD. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2; LEGAL TENDER, 2.
GRAND JURY.-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.

GUARANTY.

A guarantor cannot be sued without a previous prosecution of the principal debtor, even though the latter be insolvent. (WOODRUFF, JAMES, & MASON,

See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 5; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2.

GUARDIAN. See COVENANT.

HIGHWAY.

The General Statutes of Vermont (c. 25, § 41) provide that towns shall be liable for damage arising from "insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway." Held, that bales of hay deposited on the margin of a highway by a third person, and negligently allowed by the town to remain there, the bales presenting such an appearance as would naturally frighten horses, rendered the town liable to an action (BARRETT, J., dissenting). — Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435. HORSE.-See REPLEVIN.

ICE.

As to whether there can be property in ice found upon a natural stream, quære. The State v. Pottmeyer, 30 Ind. 287.

ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

Agreement on the sale of a steamboat that the purchasers, their successors and assigns, would not run or employ, or suffer to be run or employed, the said

steamboat on any of the

routes of travelling on the rivers, bays, or waters of Held void, as in restraint of trade. - Wright v. Ryder,

California for ten years. 36 Cal. 342.

See LICENSE.

An indictment charging larceny of the property of "Wells, Fargo, & Co." is bad. People v. Bogart, 36 Cal. 245.

INDORSEMENT.

- See BILLS AND NOTES, 2, 3, 5; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF,

1. Equity will interpose, by injunction, to compel the restoration of running water which has been wrongfully directed from its natural channel (MASON, JAMES, & MURRAY, JJ., dissenting). — Corning v. Troy Iron and Nail Factory, 40 N. Y. 191.

2. Injunction is a proper remedy for breach of a contract restraining the exercise of a trade in a particular locality.― McClurg's Appeal, 58 Penn. St. 51. See BOND; DAMAGES, 5.

INSANITY. See LUNACY, COMMITTEE OF.

Insuring a building as a "dwelling-house" does not imply an engagement that it shall be occupied while the risk endures. · Cumberland Valley Mutual Protection Co. v. Douglas, 58 Penn. St. 419.

-See BILLS AND NOTES, 6; CONFISCATION ACT; SPECIAL DE

1. A testator devised all his property, real and personal, to his wife, provided that she should not marry again. In the event of her marrying a second time, he gave all his property to his daughter. The widow, after the testator's death, married again. The daughter brought a bill in equity to obtain possession, praying for an account, &c. Held, that the devise over to the daughter was valid, and that she was entitled, without instituting proceedings at

law, to recover the rents and profits of the lands. Gough v. Manning, 26 Md.

247.

2. Trustee process against a New York corporation. The trustee admitted the possession of funds, but A. and B. appeared, by leave of court, as claimants under an order of the Supreme Court of New York, appointing them receivers of the corporation, and declaring the corporation dissolved. The statutes of New York were made part of the case. From these it appeared that the Supreme Court of New York had no authority to authorize a dissolution of the corporation. Held, that the decree of dissolution was entitled to no faith and credit in Massachusetts, and that the trustee was chargeable. — Folger v. Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267.

See ASSESSMENT; CONFISCATION ACT; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2;

MANDAMUS.

JURY.-See Constitutional Law, State, 2; EVIDENCE, 4.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. Plaintiff occupied premises as tenant at will of M. M., during this tenancy, gave a written lease to F., and F., M., and the other defendants, entered and removed plaintiff's goods. M. was himself not owner of the premises, but tenant at will. Held, that plaintiff was not estopped to maintain an action for the trespass. Hilbourn v. Fogg, 99 Mass. 11. 2. C. leased premises to H. for a term of years, and covenanted to make necessary repairs, "the said necessary repairs to consist of such work as will make the said premises thoroughly tenantable." Semble, that by this covenant the lessor undertook to put the premises in a condition that they might be used and dwelt in, not only with safety, but with reasonable comfort, by the class of persons by whom and for the sort of purposes for which they were to be occupied. — Cohen v. Habenicht, 14 Rich. Eq. 31.

LEASE. See FRAUDS, Statute of, 3, 4; Waiver.

LEGAL TENDER.

1. The defendants were sentenced, in 1867, to pay a fine of a certain number of dollars for a criminal offence. Held, that they were liable for the nominal amount of the fine in United States currency. - The State v. Robertson, 15 Rich. Law, 17.

2. A testator, by will, directed trustees "to raise the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand francs, money of France, and to apply the same" to certain objects. The testator's domicile was in Boston; his estate was to be settled there, and there was no direction in the will that the sum should be paid in any foreign country. Held, that the sum was payable in Boston, and that the amount payable was such a sum in United States notes as would purchase in Boston one hundred and fifty thousand francs delivered there. — Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 136.

3. Action on a note for "sixty dollars, payable in gold." Held, that