sufficient to produce the sum of the debt where it was made payable. — Marburg v. Marburg, 26 Md. 8.

See CARRIER, 1; LEGAL TENDER, 2.

CONSIDERATION.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 4; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2, 5; Town VOTE.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The South Carolina Constitution of September, 1865, is valid, and legislative acts had thereunder are constitutional. The Act of December, 1866, dispensing with the presentment of a grand jury for misdemeanors in the District Court, and providing for proceeding by information, is constitutional (LESESNE, C., MUNRO, and MOSES, JJ., dissenting). — The State v. Starling, 15 Rich. Law, 120.

2. In 1866, the Legislature of South Carolina imposed a tax "on the gross amount of the receipts of express companies." Held, that the tax was not in contravention of the Federal or State Constitution. Southern Express Co. v.

Hood, 15 Rich. Law, 66.

"that in every

3. The South Carolina ordinance of Sept. 27, 1865, providing action arising on any contract, whether under seal or parol, written or oral, made between the 1st January, 1862, and the 15th May, 1865, it shall be lawful for either party to the action to introduce testimony showing the true value and real character of the consideration of such contract at the time it was made, so that regard being had to the particular circumstances of each case, such verdict, or decree, may be rendered as will effect substantial justice between the parties," does not conflict with the provision of the Constitution of the United States, that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.” — Rutland v. Copes; Thomas v. Raymond, 15 Rich. Law, 84.

4. No provision of the Constitution of Massachusetts is violated by a statute that "in all actions at law in the Supreme Judicial Court, or Superior Court, the court shall, at any time after ten days from the return day of the writ, or as of course on the last day of the return term, enter a default against any defendant on whom legal service has been made, unless the defendant, or some one in his behalf, has filed within said ten days, or on or before the last day of said term, when the same does not exceed ten days, an affidavit that he verily believes that the defendant has a substantial defence to the action on its merits, and intends to bring the same to trial."- Hunt v. Lucas, 99 Mass. 404.

5. The statutes of California (St. 1863, p. 69) provide, that "no Indian, or person having one-half or more of Indian blood, or Mongolian or Chinese, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of or against any white person." Defendant, a mulatto, born within the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, was indicted for robbing one Ah Wang, a Chinaman. The indictment was found exclusively upon the testimony of Chinese witnesses, and for that reason defendant moved to set it aside. It was agreed that no other testimony could be produced on the trial. Held, that the provision of the Civil Rights Act (14 U. S. St. at Large, 27), enacting that "all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary

servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory of the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary, notwithstanding," so far as it applied to the present case, was constitutional; that as the testimony of Chinese witnesses could not be received against whites it could not be received against mulattoes, and that, therefore, the indictment should be discharged (CROCKETT & SPRAGUE, JJ., dissenting as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act). — People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658.

6. The charter of the Bank of the State of South Carolina provided that bills or notes of the bank, "made payable, or which shall have become payable, on demand, in gold and silver coin," should be receivable by the State in payment of all dues; by a subsequent act the receipt of these bills was prohibited. Semble, that if the later act was within the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, the prohibition could only apply to bills in circulation before its passage. - Graniteville Manufacturing Co. v. Roper, 15 Rich. Law, 138.

See CONFISCATION ACT; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3; EVIDENCE, 3; JURISDICTION, 2; STAMP, 1; TAX, 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE.

1. The Pennsylvania Registry Act of April 4, 1868, is unconstitutional and void. - Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 338.

2. The provisions of the charter of the city of Burlington which give the Recorder final jurisdiction of criminal offences within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, are unconstitutional. State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 4; NATIONAL BANK, 2; TAX, 2. CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES. - See ADMIRALTY; CONFISCATION ACT; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2; DEED, 3; EVIDENCE, 1; FRAUDs, Statute of; HIGHWAY; JURISDICTION, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; LICENSE; PROCHEIN AMI; RESIDENCE; SLAVE, 2; STOCK SUBSCRIPTION; TAX, 1; TRUST, 1, 2, 4; TRUSTEE PROCESS, 2. CONTRACT. -See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 2; CARRIER, 2; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 6; CORPORATION, 2; DAMAGES, 1-4, 6; EVIDENCE, 5; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; GUARANTY; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; INJUNCTION, 2; INSURANCE; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; LEGAL TENDER, 3; LICENSE; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3; PLEADING; PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 1, 2; PUBLIC POLICY; REPLEVIN; SALE, 2; SPECIAL DEPOSIT; STOCK SUBSCRIPTION; TENANT IN COMMON OF CHATTELS; Town Vote; Trustee PROCESS, 2; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.

CONTRACTOR. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 2.

CORPORATION.

1. By the 6th section of the charter of the Chicago Board of Trade, power is given to admit or expel such persons as it may see fit, in manner to be prescribed by the rules, &c.; under this grant the board passed a by-law providing that, upon satisfactory proof of the failure of a member to comply with a business contract made with another member, he should be suspended. Held, a valid bylaw. - People v. Chicago Board of Trade, 45 Ill. 112.

66

2. The by-laws of a corporation provided that the members should be liable in their individual as well as their collective capacity" for all moneys lent to it, and that any person might become a member by subscribing the by-laws, &c. The defendant became a member on signing the by-laws. Plaintiff brought suit against him for a debt of the corporation, which the latter had failed to pay. It did not appear that the by-law as to individual liability was made known either to the plaintiff or the public. Held, that the action did not lie. - Flint v. Pierce, 99 Mass. 68.

See CARRIER, 1; JURISDICTION, 2; STOCK SUBSCRIPTION; TAX, 2; Trust, 3.

COUNSEL FEE. — See ATTORNEY at Law, 1; DAMAGES, 5.

COVENANT.

The words "demise and lease," in a guardian's deed, imply no covenant. Webster v. Conley, 46 Ill. 13.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; WARRANTY.

CREDITOR.

See TAX, 3; VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.

CRIMINAL LAW. See EVIDENCE, 4; INDICTMENT; WITNESS, 2.

CROSS-EXAMINATION. See WITNESS, 2.

CURRENCY.-See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2; LEGAL TENDER.

CUSTOM. See SPECIAL DEPOSIT.

DAMAGES.

1. Action against a telegraph company to recover damages for not delivering a message. The message was "sell fifty (50) gold," and was directed to a firm of brokers in New York. There was evidence that among brokers the despatch would be understood to mean "sell fifty thousand dollars of gold," but there was no evidence that the telegraph company so understood it. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that he immediately afterwards sold this amount of gold at a lower rate than he would have obtained had the message been truly transmitted. Held, that an instruction to the jury that plaintiff was entitled to recover to the full extent of his loss by the decline in gold, was erroneous. — U. S. Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232.

2. A trustee, having power to convey lands only on consent of his cestui que trust, contracted, on the faith of the latter's assurances, to convey lands to plaintiff. The cestui que trust afterwards refusing to consent, he was unable to make title. Held, that the measure of damages was the difference between the contract price and the value of the land at the time of breach. (HUNT, C. J., LOTT & DANIELS, JJ., dissenting.) Pumpelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 60.

3. Plaintiff stored wheat for defendant during several years under an agreement by which the latter was to pay for the storage five bushels a year in every one hundred stored. On breach of this agreement, held, that the measure of damages was the value of the wheat at the time the storing for the respective. years was completed, and not the value at the time of demand. - Miller v. Cassady, 25 Iowa, 323.

4. Action by vendor for non-acceptance of goods sold. After suit brought, the plaintiff sold the goods. Held, that the measure of damages was the difference between the contract price and the price obtained at the sale, the suit being sufficient notice to the vendee. Saladin v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 79.

5. In an action on an injunction bond, the plaintiffs claimed to recover counsel fees paid for procuring a dissolution. It appeared that the fees were paid for services in defending the entire original suit, to which the injunction was merely auxiliary. Held, that the plaintiffs could not recover. — Langworthy v. McKelvey, 25 Iowa, 48.

6. Action on warranty of title to a horse. It appeared that D. had brought suit against plaintiff and recovered judgment for the value of the horse, but it did not appear that defendant had any notice of D.'s suit, or that the judgment had been paid. Held, that plaintiff was only entitled to nominal damages. Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 283.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; HIGHWAY; LANDLORD AND TenANT, 2; SPECIAL DEPOSIT; WARRANTY.

DEATH, PRESUMPTION OF. See PRESUMPTION.

DECLARATION.-See PLEADING.

DEED.

1. A conveyance of land, by one against whom the land is held adversely, by claim of title, is void. — Jones v. Munroe, 32 Ga. 181.

2. Plaintiff, owning land, and desiring to sell the same, sent to his agent a deed duly executed, but with the name of the grantee and the consideration left blank, with instructions in writing to the agent to negotiate a sale, fill the blanks, and deliver the deed. This the agent did. Held, that as to one who purchased without knowledge of the circumstances, the deed was valid. — Owen v. Perry, 25 Iowa, 412.

3. A., by a deed held to operate as a covenant to stand seised to uses, conveyed certain tracts of lands to his six sons by name during their natural life," and "if any of my sons die without an issue of the body," the lands to be " equally divided" among the said sons then living. He then, by the same deed, conveyed other lands to his four daughters for life, with the same provision in case of the death of any of them without issue. And further, after reserving to himself a life-estate in all the lands, he directed that at his death they should "be immediately transferred to my sons and daughters, as above mentioned, to their heirs or assigns." B., one of the sons, survived A., and died intestate, without issue, leaving as his heirs two of his brothers and various children of deceased brothers and sisters. Held, that B.'s estate in the lands did not descend to his heirs, but passed to his brothers under the deed. — Bowman v. Lobe, 14 Rich. Eq. 271.

See COVENANT; EVIDENCE, 1.

DEMAND. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5; DAMAGES, 3; SPECIAL DEPOSIT.

DEPOSIT.-See SPECIAL DEPOSIT.

DESCRIPTION. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.

Bill in equity to quiet title to land, complainant being in possession and receipt of rents and profits, and the defendant, as to him, disseised and dispossessed but asserting an adverse title under a mortgage the validity of which is denied by complainant. Held, that notwithstanding the Gen. Sts. c. 134, §§ 49, 50, the complainant might maintain his bill. · Clouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1; INJUNCTION, 1, 2; PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 1.

EQUITY PLEADING.

1. An objection to a bill in equity on the ground that complainant has an adequate remedy at law, comes too late at the hearing. - Bell v. McGrady, 32 Ga. 257.

2. The complainant in a bill in equity cannot under the general prayer have relief inconsistent with that prayed for in the special prayer. - Pensacola & Georgia R.R. Company v. Spratt, 12 Fla. 26.

EVIDENCE.

1. Action of ejectment. Plaintiff and defendant both claimed through separate deeds from T., that of the defendant being the earlier. Held, that plaintiff might prove by parol that defendant's deed was in fact a mortgage (RHODES & CROCKETT, JJ. dissenting). — Jackson v. Lodge, 36 Cal. 28.

2. An impeaching witness, after testifying that he was acquainted with the general reputation of A. for truth and veracity in the community in which he lived, and that it was not good, was asked "whether from that reputation he would believe him on oath in a matter in which he was interested." Held, that the question was competent. - Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194.

3. Prayer for mandamus to the auditor of the State requiring him to draw a warrant for a sum of money appropriated to the use of the plaintiff by an Act of the legislature of Indiana. The defence was that the Act was not valid, owing to