bills for the price, a long credit being given, that remittances might be made from the proceeds of sale in Hong Kong, to meet the acceptances. L. & S. then employed agents to secure tonnage in the M., and to receive the goods from the vendor and forward to Hong Kong, which was done. Before the goods or bills of lading reached Hong Kong, L., S. & Co., being insolvent, assigned to their bankers, in consideration of an antecedent debt, “the whole of their property, &c., specified, &c., with all the estate, right, title, interest, claim, or demand of L., S. & Co., arising thereout or therefrom," inter alia, “bills of lading, &c., for all goods now on the way hither." The above bills were afterwards indorsed to the bankers, who then knew the insolvency of L., S. & Co. The vendors stopped the goods at Hong Kong. Held, that the transitus was not at an end; and that an antecedent debt was not a sufficient consideration to support the transfer, and that the assignment was not to be interpreted as conveying any greater rights than the assignors had, but was made subject to the vendor's right of stoppage. · Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R. 2 P. C. 393. SUCCESSION DUTY.-See LEGACY DUTY.

SURETY.-See SET-OFF.

TAX.-See LEGACY DUTY.

TELEGRAPH.

Plaintiff A., having ice, wrote asking B. to make an offer by telegraph. B. answered by the defendants' telegraph, "We can give you 23s.," &c., and paid for the message. By custom, when such offers are accepted, the cost of the message is repaid to the vendee by the vendor. By defendants' mistake, "27s." was sent in place of "23s." A. accordingly sent on the ice, which B. refused to accept except at 23s. A. sues the telegraph company for the consequent damage. Held, that the action could only be maintained by reason of privity of contract, which did not subsist between A. and the defendants. One to whom a telegraphic message is sent, cannot be said to have a property in it. Playford v. United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 706.

TENANCY IN COMMON.-See PARTITION.

TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER-MAN.

The obligation of the tenant for life of an estate subject to encumbrances, to keep down interest on the encumbrances, exist only as between him and the remainder-man, and not as between him and the encumbrancers. — In re Morley, L. R. 8 Eq. 594.

See APPORTIONMENT; COSTS, 1, 2.

TENDER.

The defendant in a cause may, by act in court, tender a sum of money in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, and reserve the question whether he is liable to pay costs. The Hickman, L. R. 3 Ad. & Ec. 15.

TRADE-MARK.

An injunction was granted against the imitation of a trade-mark of linen thread, by which the thread, although not patented, was called "patent thread,"

it being sworn that that was the designation used on a certain class of thread by the trade, irrespective of its being patented. Marshall v. Ross, L. R. 8 Eq. 651.

TRUST.

1. The acceptor of a bill paid the amount to his bankers in order to meet it, but died indebted on his general balance on the day the bill matured, and the bankers dishonored it. The drawer, having been forced to pay it, brought a bill to compel the bankers to make good the amount, as having received money in trust for the purpose. Held, that there was no privity between the plaintiff and defendants, and the bill was dismissed.— Hill v. Royds, L. R. 8 Eq. 290.

2. A trustee, who had committed a breach of trust, died in 1847, leaving real and personal property to his widow for life, remainder to his two sons. The widow proved the will, but refused to take steps which it was her duty to take to make good the breach. She died in 1865, and her sons, who had notice of the breach of trust, took out administration to her, and received the property left by their father. After citation of them and refusal, an administrator ad litem was appointed to their father. Held, that the assets of the father, in the sons' hands, were liable to make good the breach of trust; that lapse of time was no defence; and that the father's estate was sufficiently represented in the suit. - Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, L. R. 8 Eq. 514.

See APPROPRIATION OF PAYMENTS; CHARITY; COMPANY, 2, 3; CONTRACT, 1; COSTS, 1, 2; EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 1; FOREIGN OFFICE; MINISTER; MORTGAGE, 1; PRIORITY; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE; WILL, 12, 13. ULTRA VIRES.

See BANK; COMPANY, 1, 2, 3; RAILWAY, 3; VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATION.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.

1. At a sale by auction, the property sold was stated to contain "753 square yards, or thereabouts," whereas it contained about 573. By the conditions of sale, if any error, &c., in the particulars should be discovered, no compensation was to be allowed in respect thereof, and the right to rescind the contract was taken away. Held, that compensation for so large a deficiency was not excluded; and it was allowed. Whittemore v. Whittemore, L. R. 8 Eq. 603.

2. A. agreed to buy land in fee of B., supposing him alone to own the same. In fact B. had an estate pur autre vie, and C., B.'s wife, the remainder in fee. D., with notice of A.'s contract, took a conveyance of said land from B. and C. Held, that A. was entitled to a conveyance of B.'s interest, and to compensation for C.'s interest. - Barnes v. Wood, L. R. 8 Eq. 424.

See DAMAGES, 1; RAILWAY, 3.

VENDOR'S LIEN. See RAILWAY, 3.

VENIRE DE Novo.

After a prisoner had been tried on a good indictment, and by a competent tribunal, and had been convicted of a capital felony, and the judgment entered

upon the record, the Supreme Court of New South Wales ordered a venire de novo, upon an affidavit that one of the jury had told the deponent that, pending the trial and before verdict, the jury had access to newspapers which contained a report of the trial as it proceeded, with comments thereon. Held, that in a case of felony, like the above, the court could not grant a venire de novo, and that if they could the evidence did not justify their doing so.. Queen v. Murphy, L. R. 2 P. C. 535.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION.

A court of law will not interfere with the rules of a voluntary association, unless to protect some civil right or interest which is said to be infringed by their operation. On this principle, a civil suit by a clergyman of the Scotch Episcopal Church, to set aside certain canons passed by a general synod in 1863, and now alleged to be ultra vires, was dismissed, no damage being proved to the court to have accrued. Forbes v. Eden, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 558.

See MINISTER.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.

A married woman of middle age and infirm health appointed the bulk of her property in favor of a volunteer, by a deed which was drawn by his solicitor at his costs, and which reserved no power of revocation. It was sworn that she was told that the deed was irrevocable, but her subsequent acts indicated that she was not aware of the fact. Held, that the deed must be cancelled. Where under such circumstances the volunteer's solicitor is employed, it is his duty to insist upon the insertion of a power of revocation. The want of one is a strong ground for setting aside the deed. — Coutts v. Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558.

1. A codicil concluded as follows: "I give my wife the option of adding this codicil to my will or not, as she may think proper or necessary." The wife elected against the codicil, whereupon it was not included in the probate. — Goods of Smith, L. R. 1 P. & D. 717.

2. A testator gave real and personal estate to A., charged with the payment of annuities to the testator's six children, "or their heirs respectively." One of the children was dead at the date of the will. Held, that her statutory next of kin were entitled. The annuity was personal estate. R. 8 Eq. 260.

- Parsons v. Parsons, L.

3. A testator left a residue to trustees, to collect, &c., and then to divide the whole among his four children, A., B., C., and D., "with benefit of survivorship in case any of them should die without issue;" and if any of them should die leaving children, the share of him so dying to go to such children. A., B., C., and D. all survived the testator. Held, that they took indefeasible interests. Dying in the lifetime of the testator was meant. · Bowers v. Bowers, L. R. 8 Eq. 283.

4. A testator gave a residue to trustees to assign, &c., to, &c., such child or children of M. as should be living at testator's decease, to be equally divided among them, if more than one, when they should attain the age of twenty-one, and if there should be but one who should attain the age of twenty-one, then the whole to such child. The trustees had a power of maintenance during the minority of the children, and during the suspense of absolute vesting were to accumulate the rest of the income for the benefit of the persons who should become entitled to the principal. Held, that no child of M. who did not attain twenty-one could take a vested interest. — Merry v. Hill, L. R. 8 Eq. 619.

5. Testator bequeathed a legacy to his first cousins, to be equally divided between them. The shares of those "who may die in my lifetime, unto all and every the children of all my first cousins who may so die in my lifetime, share and share alike, such shares to be taken per capita and not per stirpes." Held, that the children of a first cousin, who had died before the date of the will, took nothing by the legacy. — In re Hotchkiss's Trusts, L. R. 8 Eq. 643.

6. A testator directed his executors, after the death of his wife, A., to invest one-sixth of a residue in an annuity during the life of B. for his support; and in case B. should anticipate, assign, charge, or encumber the annuity, or become a bankrupt or insolvent, the annuity was to go to the other residuary legatees. B. died in A.'s lifetime, without having assigned, &c., or become bankrupt, &c. Held, that the gift to B. failed, and that that one-sixth was undisposed of at A.'s death. Power v. Hayne, L. R. 8 Eq. 262.

7. A testator made a gift of "all my ready money, bank, and other shares, freehold property, . . . and any other property that I may now possess." Held, that personal property, acquired after the date of the will, passed by the bequest. - Wagstaff v. Wagstaff, L. R. 8 Eq. 229.

8. A testator holding three messuages in X. by separate leases, and two more in X. and one in Z. by one lease, bequeathed his "four leasehold messuages in X.," with other tenements in trust out of the rents to pay the ground-rents of the same and of that in Z., and to pay over the surplus. Held, that the five messuages passed. Sampson v. Sampson. L. R. 8 Eq. 479.

9. A., an executor, was entitled to residue X., subject to a legacy to B. in trust for C. No sum was appropriated to the legacy, but A. paid interest on it. B. had, however, invested part of X. on mortgage in his own name, with A.'s assent. A. died, leaving a bequest of "all my money and securities for money of every description." Held, that B.'s investment did not pass. Neither did bank stock nor canal shares; but a part of X. remaining invested on mortgage, in the name of A.'s testatrix, did. Ogle v. Knipe, L. R. 8 Eq. 434.

...

10. A. borrowed part of a fund which was settled on him absolutely, subject to a life-estate in his wife if she survived him, and mortgaged his Z. estate for its repayment. A. afterwards devised Z. to his wife for life, remainder to B. in fee. A. also bequeaths "all and every the . . . sums of money. upon government or real securities which I shall die possessed of, or in anywise entitled to," in trust for his wife for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to B.'s wife for life, remainder to B.'s children absolutely. There was also a residuary clause. A. died before his wife. Held, that the mortgage debt did not merge in the Z. estate; and that A.'s interest in said fund passed by the specific bequest. Wilkes v. Collin, L. R. 8 Eq. 338.

-

11. A testator gave property in trust to pay annuities, &c., and subject thereto to the "sole use of my daughter H. and her assigns." H. was unmarried, and a devise to a married daughter was expressed in words apt to create a trust for her separate use. There were further gifts to H., which clearly did not exclude H. afterwards married. Held, that " sole" did not mean free from the control of any husband. "Sole" in a will, without the word "separate" has not a technical meaning, unless the rest of the will furnishes evidence of that intent. Massy v. Rowen, L. R. 4 H. L. 288.

the marital right.

12. A Frenchman left all his property to A., B., and C., his executors, in trust to sell, and the "moneys arising from the said sale, &c., . . . after payment of... debts [and other expenses], shall be paid by my said trustees, and I hereby give and bequeath the same to D. absolutely, trusting that she will carry out my wishes with regard to the same, with which she is fully acquainted." Testator had, before the date of the will, told D., (to whom he was engaged), his wishes, and repeated them after the date of the will, and D. wrote them down on a paper not shown to him. Held, that D. took the fund beneficially, subject to the performance of the above wishes. Parol evidence of an intent to make a beneficial gift to D. excluded. — Irvine v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673.

13. A testator, in 1641, gave lands to Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, and Trinity College, Oxford, for the only use of education in piety and learning, of ten descendants of the brothers and sisters of the testator, and of his two wives, and in default of such to their poor kindred. An intention to benefit the colleges appeared. Held, upon the construction of the will, confirmed by the unvarying usage of the two colleges, that descendants claiming the benefit by the gift, must be educated at one of the colleges, as members, and that, subject to that trust, the colleges were entitled to the lands in equal moieties. — Attorney General v. Sidney Sussex College, L. R. 4 Ch. 722.

See APPORTIONMENT; CHARITY; CONTRIBUTION; COVENANT; DOWER; LEGACY; MORTMAIN; POWER, 1, 2; REVOCATION OF WILL.

WINDING UP.

A creditor of a company who holds its acceptances for his debt, and also its debentures as collateral security, cannot prove for more than the amount of his debt when the company is winding up. — In re Blakely Ordnance Co., L. R. 8 Eq.

244.

See PAYMENT.