by statute to testify in his own behalf, no inference of guilt can properly be drawn on that account, and the prosecuting officer should not be permitted to comment on his failure to testify. — People v. Tyler, p. 522.

In a collateral action, the sufficiency of the stamp on the probate of a will cannot be inquired into. Satterlee v. Bliss, p. 489.

When the sheriff, going to execute a writ of possession, finds in possession other persons than those named in the complaint, who claim that they are rightfully in possession, not in privity with the defendants, and the circumstances are such that a reasonable doubt exists whether the sheriff has a right to turn them out, he may demand indemnity, and, unless it is given, refuse to execute the writ; and this, even if the premises are described in the writ. - Long v. Neville, p. 455.

The most important case in the volume is People v. George Washington, p. 658, indicted for the murder of Ah Wang. For a statement of this case, which involved the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill, we refer the reader to 3 Am. Law Rev., p. 574.

INDIANA.

Two cases of great importance have been recently decided by the Supreme Court at November term, 1869; we much regret that our narrow limits enable us to give only the following brief statements of the points decided:

:

MONTGOMERY COUNTY v. ELSTON. -The main question here was, whether notes issued by National Banks were exempt from State taxation. The court held, that they were not exempt, distinguishing them from Treasury notes which they held were exempt. The ground of decision is briefly stated in the following extract from the opinion:

“Clearly no exemption in any act prior to the authority given to issue national currency' can apply, and as they [the National Bank notes] are not obligations of the United States in any proper sense of that expression; as they do not rest primarily on the promise of the Government to pay them as her own debt, but simply on her promise, that she will amply indemnify herself in her own bonds; only after failure of the bank and forfeiture of the bonds to her, will she regard herself as finally liable. Certainly there is nothing in the letter of the law exempting this circulation from taxation; and though we do not discuss the power of Congress to make such exemption, we are free to admit that we see nothing in the paper itself, or the circumstances of its issue, which would authorize such a limit to be placed on the power of the State to tax.

"It follows that the amount of the assessment on the moiety, consisting of Treasury notes, was unauthorized and illegal; that the amount rated upon that portion, consisting of currency of the National Banks, was legal and proper."

STATE v. GARTON. - The principal point raised in this case was, whether the official bond of a sheriff was subject to stamp duty. The court hold that it is not, on the ground that the United States can impose no tax on the agencies of the State government. They say,

"If a State is to exist as a sovereign, it must of necessity have the power to select its agents to execute its laws, and must be empowered to exact from them such

pledge for the faithful discharge of their duties as may seem best calculated to secure their performance. In exacting such security, it must be as independent of all control as in enforcing the condition of the bond when forfeited..

"The power of taxation, existing alike in the General Government and in the States, co-extensive and concurrent by virtue of the sovereignty of each, has then for each this limit: Neither may tax-because neither may take away - the legitimate machinery or agencies employed by the other in the exercise of its governmental powers and functions.

"The limitation upon the power of the State to tax the agencies and minute machinery employed by the General Government to carry out its constitutional functions, must in turn equally restrain the power of Congress to tax, to trammel, or destroy the means used by the State to perpetuate an existence as sacred under the National Constitution as the national life, because a constituent of that life."

IOWA.

A WOMAN ADMITTED TO THE BAR. -A few weeks since, Mrs. Arabella A. Mansfield, A. B., of Mount Pleasant, Iowa, was admitted to the bar, and authorized to practise law in that State.

The Mount Pleasant Journal, in giving an account of her admission, says, "Mrs. Mansfield is a young married lady, of about twenty-four years of age, is a graduate of the Iowa Wesleyan University, and a lady of a strong mind. That she has the brains and the necessary ability to make a good record for herself in the profession of her choice, no one will dispute. Her husband, Prof. J. M. Mansfield, was also admitted at the same time."-2 Chicago Legal News, 20.

MARYLAND.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT. Stewart v. National Union Bank of Maryland. In this case, Judge Giles, in an opinion which is found reported in full in 2 Baltimore Daily Law Transcript, 964, decided the following question. The 29th section of the National Banking Act provides that the liabilities to any bank of any person for money borrowed shall at no time exceed one-tenth part of the amount of the capital stock actually paid in. A. had borrowed from a National Bank an amount greater than one-tenth of the capital of the bank, and had deposited with the bank securities as collateral for the loan. A. having become bankrupt, his creditors filed a bill praying that the loan might be decreed void, and the bank ordered to surrender the securities to the assignee of A. The bank demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer, holding that the contract of loan between A. and the bank was not void, and even if it were, the court would leave the parties as it found them, and would not order the giving up of the securities. This decision is important, as similar violations of the law are believed to have been common on the part of National Banks.

MASSACHUSETTS.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.- Commonwealth v. John Dorsey. The question involved in this case was the constitutionality of the act passed by the legislature of last year giving to the Commonwealth the right of peremptory challenge

in criminal cases. It was an indictment in Hampshire County, in which John Dorsey was charged with the murder of his wife, by striking her on the head with a club on the first of May, 1869. Upon the empanelling of the jury the Attorney General challenged a juror under the statute of 1869. The defendant objected that the Commonwealth had no right of challenge, and that the statute of 1869 was unconstitutional. The objection was overruled at the trial, and the challenge allowed. Exceptions were taken to this and other rulings of the court, and the question of the constitutionality of the law was, with other questions, argued before the full court in November last. The principal ground upon which the argument of the counsel for the defendant rested was that such a right of challenge was peculiarly the right of the prisoner, and not of the government. The same question was raised in a criminal case in Essex County, in which the defendant was charged with keeping a liquor nuisance. This case was submitted to the full court by the Attorney General upon briefs, but there was no appearance for the defendant. The Supreme Court have now overruled the exceptions taken in both cases, holding that "the law which authorizes peremptory challenges by the Attorney General is constitutional." - Boston Daily Advertiser.

MICHIGAN.

Or the cases decided by the Supreme Court at the October term, the following may be mentioned as of more than local interest:

Sage v. Lorrain, was an action against highway commissioners for maliciously causing proceedings to be taken for the opening of a street through the premises of the plaintiff, which proceedings had been set aside on appeal. Held, that the action would not lie.

In Clemens v. Conrad, it was decided that the act of Congress inhibiting the admission of unstamped instruments in evidence does not apply to the State

courts.

Newell v. The Great Western Railway Co., was an action against a foreign corporation, which was commenced by the service of process upon the treasurer of the corporation, who happened to be found within the State. The corporation had no place of business within the State, and the treasurer was not on the business of the company when the service was made. The corporation pleaded these facts in abatement. Held, that the statute authorizing the commencement of suits against corporations by making service on one of the principal officers of the company, will not warrant service on an officer of a foreign corporation who has not come within the State on the business of the company; that such officer does not represent the company or carry with him his official capacity in a State within which the company transacts no business, and that the writ must consequently be abated.

The case of The East Saginaw Salt Manufacturing Co. v. The City of East Saginaw, presented an important question of constitutional law, which does not appear to have arisen in precisely the same form in any previous case. It appears that, in 1859, the legislature passed an act entitled "An act to encourage the manufacture of salt in the State of Michigan," the first and second sections of which were as follows:

"SECT. 1. The people of the State of Michigan enact: That all companies and corporations formed or that may be formed for the purpose of boring for and manufacturing salt within this State, and any and all individuals engaged, and to be engaged in such manufacture, shall be entitled to the benefits of the provisions of this act.

"SECT. 2. All property, real and personal, used for the purpose mentioned in the first section of this act, shall be exempt from taxation for any purpose."

A third section gave a money bounty on the salt produced.

The East Saginaw Salt Manufacturing Company was formed after the passage of this act, and in 1860, entered successfully upon the manufacture of salt, and has continued in that business ever since. In 1861, the legislature passed another act, limiting the exemption from taxation to five years from the time when any manufacturing company or corporation was formed, and limiting the money bounty that should be paid to any one company or corporation to $1000.

In 1867, the city of East Saginaw proceeded to levy taxes on the property of the company mentioned, claiming a right to do so under the act of 1861. The company thereupon filed their bill in equity for a perpetual injunction, on the ground that the act of 1859, when accepted by the company by their entering upon the manufacture of salt, became a contract of perpetual obligation between the State and the company, and that under the Constitution of the United States it was not in the power of the State to impair the obligation of this contract by repealing or modifying the act.

Held, that the act of 1859 was in its nature and purpose a bounty law only; that as such it was subject to repeal at any time except as to any bounty previously earned; that the bounty offered by way of exemption from taxes would, in case of repeal, be earned to that time and no longer, and consequently the act of 1861 impaired the obligation of no contract, and the bill must be dismissed. CAMPBELL, J., dissented.

MISSOURI.

ECCLESIASTICAL CASE.

SUPREME COURT. State v. Farris. During the late war, the General Assembly of the Old School Presbyterian Church issued some deliverances, which took strong ground in favor of the United States, and denounced slavery. Some members of the church dissented from these deliverances, and published a paper called the "Declaration and Testimony," in which they assailed the General Assembly, alleging, amongst other matters, as follows:

"The whole Mediatorial glory and dignity of the Messiah has been thus tarnished; and all the offices of prophet, priest, and king, which he executes for the salvation of his people, are subverted and surrendered. If this, then, be not apostasy, surely it needs but little to make it so, clearly, unmistakably, fatally. Nothing can prevent this, but the blessing of Almighty God upon the efforts which his faithful witnesses may make, to arouse the people to the reality and extent of the evil and danger, and to bring them, by prompt and decided action, to purge the church of the evil influence which has corrupted and betrayed her. Against this corruption and betrayal, therefore, we testify in the sight of God and angels and men. We wash our hands of all participation in its guilt. We declare our deliberate purpose, trusting in God, who can save by few as well as by many, to use our best endeavors to bring back the church of our fathers to her ancient purity and integrity, upon

the foundation of the apostles and prophets, and under the banner of our holy King, Priest, and Prophet, the Lord Jesus Christ. In this endeavor we pledge ourselves to assist and co-operate with each other. And, by the grace of God, we will never abandon the effort, no matter what sacrifices it may require us to make, until we shall either have succeeded in reforming the church and restoring her tarnished glory, or, failing in this, necessity shall be laid upon us, in obedience to the apostolic command, to withdraw from those who have departed from the truth."

"We will not sustain, or execute, or in any manner assist, in the execution of the orders passed at the last two Assemblies on the subject of slavery and loyalty, and with reference to the conducting of missions in the Southern States, and with regard to the ministers, members, and churches in the seceded and border States."

day of

"We do earnestly recommend that on the -, A. D. 1865, a convention be held in -, composed of all such ministers and ruling elders as may concur in the views and sentiments of this testimony, to deliberate and consult on the present state of our church, and to adopt such further measures as may seem best suited to restore her prostrated standards, and vindicate the pure and peaceful religion of Jesus from the reproach which has been brought upon it through the faithlessness and corruption of its ministers and professors.”

The General Assembly thereupon, in May, 1866, resolved as follows:

1. "Resolved, That this General Assembly does hereby condemn the Declaration and Testimony as a slander against the church, schismatic in its character and aims, and its adoption by any of our church courts as an act of rebellion against the authority of the General Assembly.

2. "Resolved, That the whole subject contemplated in this report, including the report itself, be referred to the next General Assembly.

3. "Resolved, That the signers of the Declaration and Testimony, and the members of the Presbytery of Louisville, who voted to adopt that paper, be summoned, and they are hereby summoned, to appear before the next General Assembly, to answer for what they have done in this matter, and until their case is decided, they shall not be permitted to sit as members of any church court higher than the Sessions.

4. "Resolved, That if any Presbytery shall disregard this action of the General Assembly, and at any meeting shall enrol as entitled to a seat or seats in the body, one or more of the persons designated in the preceding resolutions, and summoned to appear before the next General Assembly, then that Presbytery shall ipso facto be dissolved, and its ministers and elders who adhere to this action of the General Assembly, are hereby authorized and directed, in such cases, to take charge of the Presbyterial records, to retain the same, and exercise all the authority and functions of the original Presbytery until the next meeting of the General Assembly."

In September of the same year the St. Louis Presbytery met, and after a confused" row," the particulars of which do not very clearly appear, split into two bodies, one adhering to the General Assembly, the other to the Declaration and Testimony. The General Assembly recognized the first body as the true Presbytery. The Presbytery of St. Louis has the right of appointing trustees for the Lindenwood Female College, and both bodies made appointments. The question now came up which were entitled to the office. The court held, that the decision of the General Assembly, on the question of which body claiming to be