In One Hundred Barrels of Whiskey, p. 14, it is held that, under the Internal Revenue Act, he is an informer who gives information of the cause which leads to the condemnation of property, and not he who gives information which leads to the seizure of the property.

In The Mary J. Vaughan, p. 47, a canal boat which had been loaded with barley in Canada, and was on her way to New York, was sunk by a collision on the Hudson River, near Newburgh. The measure of damages for the loss of the cargo was held to be its value at the time and place of shipment.

In The E. C. Scranton, p. 81, it is held that the proceedings on a reference to a commissioner to compute damages under the Forty-fourth Admiralty Rule of the Supreme Court of the United States, are to be conducted in the usual manner in which they are conducted before a referce or a master in chancery; and that, if a commissioner is proceeding irregularly, or refuses to allow necessary testimony to be taken, it is proper to apply to the court for directions; but this is also to be done on the certificate of the commissioner.

In the matter of White, p. 85, decides that no order of court is necessary to authorize an assignee in bankruptcy to sell unencumbered assets of the bankrupt.

Reports of Cases at Law and in Chancery, argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Illinois. By NORMAN L. FREEMAN. Vol. XLIV. Containing the remaining cases decided at the April Term, 1867, and a part of those decided at the June Term, 1867. Chicago: E. B. Myers & Company. 1869.

We use this volume in making up our quarterly digest, but wish to note here one or two curious cases.

In Cumins v. Wood, p. 416, the court held, that, in the case of a bailment for hire, where the property bailed is returned in a damaged condition, the burden of proof is on the bailee to show that the damage was not caused by his own negligence. The court had previously laid down the same rule in the case of a gratuitous bailee in Bennett v. O'Brien, 37 Ill. 250. There is much conflict in the authorities which are collected in the argument of the counsel for the bailee. The court rest their decision on what we conceive to be the only maintainable ground that the proof of the facts lies particularly in the bailee's knowledge. The attempt to place it on any other ground, as in Cass v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co., 14 All. 448, seems to us to lead to inextricable confusion.

In Humphrey v. Clement, p. 299, the court held that a contract payable "in gold" is discharged by payment in legal tender notes, and that the rule is the same in a bill for specific performance as in a suit at law. A like decision was made in Massachusetts in Howe v. Nickerson, 14 All. 400. All this is of course upset by Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wallace, 229; but, perhaps, the profession are hardly prepared to admit that the weight of reasoning as of authority is with the United States Court.

The plaintiff wrote to the defendant: "Inclosed please find twenty dollars, for which please use your influence to get me nominated for police court clerk; if I get the nomination, call on me for twenty more." The defendant pocketed the money, but used his influence against the plaintiff, whereupon the latter brought suit to recover the twenty dollars. But the court said, "We must leave these parties as we find them."— Liness v. Hesing, p. 113.

The great case in the volume is Johnson v. Jones, p. 142. The plaintiff brought an action of trespass against the defendant, the United States Marshal, and alleged that he had been arrested by the defendant in Illinois, carried to Fort Lafayette, afterwards to Fort Delaware, and there imprisoned. The plaintiff was an active member of the Knights of the Golden Circle. The defendant relied on the authority of the President under which he had acted, and also on the Acts of Indemnity passed by Congress, March 3, 1863, and May 11, 1866. The court held, that these furnished no defence. The opinion is dignified, and worthy of the importance of the question at issue. On the main points the court were unanimous. But the majority of the court held, that the plaintiff could show the authority under which he acted in mitigation of damages as rebutting the presumption of malice; while Mr. Justice Breese dissented, holding that evidence of the authority, such authority not being a justification, was inadmissible.

We notice by the table at the head of the reports, that the term for which Mr. Chief Justice Walker was elected having expired, he was re-elected, and took his seat on the court at the foot of the bench as junior justice. This, we must say, appears to us an unseemly custom.

The Chicago Legal News, in its notice of the present volume, bas instituted a rather cruel research into the proportion of cases affirmed to cases reversed, with the surprising result that there are seventy-three of the latter to only fortyfive of the former; it gives the names of the judges from whom appeals have been taken, with the fate that has befallen the decisions of each. One unfortunate man appears to have had seven cases reversed to one affirmed. Of a truth, the inferior judiciary of Illinois would seem susceptible of improvement.

Reports of Cases in Law and Equity, determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. By EDWARD H. STILES. Vol. IV. Being Vol. XXV. of the Series. Ottumwa: 1869.

THIS volume of decisions contains an unusually large number of interesting cases; we here remark upon a few of the questions argued and determined.

In Francis v. Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co., p. 60, the case was this: A railroad company received goods to carry to A., where the consignee resided. The goods arrived at A. at the proper time, about 8 o'clock, P. M. The consignee was not there to receive them, nor was he notified of their arrival, and the goods were unloaded, placed in the company's warehouse, separated and made ready for delivery. During the night the warehouse, with its contents, was burned. Held, that the company were not liable as common carriers. The court, in their opinion, refer to the leading cases in which similar questions have arisen. There is an irreconcilable conflict in them, though the weight of authority seems to support the ruling in the principal case.

In State v. Felter, p. 67, the vexed question of the test of the insanity which relieves from criminal responsibility came before the court. Dillon, C.J., in delivering the opinion, says, "Perhaps the profession of law has not fully kept pace with that of medicine on the subject of insanity. . . . The jury, in substance, should be told that if the defendant's act in taking the life of his wife was caused by mental disease or unsoundness, which dethroned his reason and judgment with respect to that act, which destroyed his power rationally to comprehend the nature and consequences of that act, and which, overpowering his

will, irresistibly forced him to its commission, then he is not amenable to legal punishment. But if the jury believe, from all the evidence and circumstances, that the defendant was in possession of a rational intellect or sound mind, and allowed his passions to escape control, then, though passion may for the time being have driven reason from her seat and usurped it, and have urged the defendant, with a force at the moment irresistible, to desperate acts, he cannot claim for such acts the protection of insanity."

The courts seem slowly and with natural reluctance coming to accept the existence of moral insanity as a fact, and to feel that the old test of the capacity to distinguish right from wrong will have to be given up. See the article on the Law of Insanity in the present number of the American Law Review, and the New Hampshire cases therein referred to.

In Manderschid v. City of Dubuque, p. 108, the plaintiff alleged that, while driving on the highway, his horses became frightened and ran away, and, without his fault, becoming unmanageable, threw him out of the vehicle, and that one of the horses stepped into a hole, negligently left in the highway, and was injured. The defendants demurred because it appeared that the horses were beyond the plaintiff's control, and that he was not exercising due care in their management at the time of the injury. The court overruled the demurrer. This decision is contrary to Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen, 557, on which the court comment at length and severely, declaring it inconsistent with the earlier Massachusetts cases of Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush. 600, and Howard v. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189.

The Revised Code of Iowa, § 2201, provides that no mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor remains in possession, "is valid against existing creditors or subsequent purchasers without notice," unless recorded. In Allen v. McCalla, p. 464, the court held, that the words "without notice" applied to creditors as well as purchasers. The constituents of actual and constructive notice are fully discussed in the arguments and opinion.

In Boardman v. Thompson, p. 487, a contract between an attorney and his client that for prosecuting a certain case the attorney should have a quarter of the amount claimed, if recovered, or if the client settled the case without the attorney's consent; and that the attorney should advance all sums necessary for expenses and costs, and should be reimbursed therefor out of the amount recovered, is champertous, and will not be enforced, though there is no express statute in Iowa against champerty. The opinion of Mr. Justice Wright is elaborate and instructive.

In Franklin v. Twogood, p. 520, a note was transferred before maturity, not by indorsement, but by a separate instrument; the court held, that the transferee took subject to all equities. The note was executed and the transfer made in Wisconsin, and evidence was offered to show that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had decided that under such transfer the note passed free from equities. It was not pretended that there was any statute or local custom in Wisconsin affecting the question, and the Wisconsin decisions professed to expound what was the doctrine of the general law merchant on the subject. Held, that the evidence was inadmissible. The case was twice argued, and the court gives its decision with great confidence, yet we cannot but feel great doubt as to its correctness.

Reports of Cases at Law argued and determined in the Court of Appeals and Court of Errors of South Carolina, Vol. XV. From November, 1867, to May, 1868, inclusive. By J. S. G. RICHARDSON, State Reporter, Columbia, S. C. 1869. Id. Cases at Equity from January, 1868, to May, 1868, inclusive. Vol. XIV. THESE volumes conclude the labors of one who has filled the office of official reporter of decisions in South Carolina for nearly a quarter of a century, with an ability never excelled and rarely equalled. From this time a new reporter will report the judgments of a new court. We presume that hereafter the Law and Equity decisions will be reported indiscriminately, and as a matter of course printed in the same volume; this we do not regret it will be in conformity with the practice of by far the largest number of the States in the Union. Gradually the distinctive features between proceedings of courts of law and those of equity will be abolished, and they will be simply courts of justice.

There are several cases of general interest in the volume of Law Reports. Fluitt v. Nelson, p. 9, is important to many south of Mason and Dixon's line; it decides that where a debt was contracted before the war, and part-payment made during the war in Confederate currency, the creditor is not entitled to have the payment reduced to its value in National currency. The State v. Robertson, p. 17, is hard on offenders, for it says the court may order a fine paid in gold.

That a tax by the State on the gross receipts of express companies is not a regulation of "commerce among the States," and therefore not unconstitutional, is the substance of So. Express Co. v. Hood, p. 66.

The court, in The State v. Starling, p. 120, go into a lengthy disquisition on Magna Charta, and show that "due process of law" does not necessarily mean presentment of a grand jury, and that as far as misdemeanors are concerned the legislature may abolish grand juries. Smith v. Caldwell, p. 365, would seem to be directly in the teeth of Silman v. Silman, 2 Hill (S. C.) 416, although the court do not overrule that case, but say that its principle is not to be extended. Smith v. Caldwell, is not of less weight, from the fact that one judge on the Circuit and one in the Court of Appeals were opposed to the other two, a tie. Silman v. Silman decides that when the Statute of Limitations has not run out the promise of one of two joint makers of a note will prevent its operation against both. This seems to be the settled construction of the rule in South Carolina, and it is better not to change it.

The rights of slaves and their masters in South Carolina, prior to 1865, is discussed in an interesting manner in Blakely v. Tisdale, Eq. p. 90.* We advise its perusal by those who desire correct information on what was at one time the great question of the day.

The Bankers' Common Place Book. Published at the office of the Bankers' Magazine. 1869.

THIS is a curious mixture, in which the "Decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts" appear next to " A Magic Square of Squares. From the 'Young Folks,' published by Ticknor and Fields, Boston; " admonitions “to avoid discussions across your counter on topics of sectarian theology and party politics," and "on the duty of constant attendance at church, even though you cannot worship with persons of your own faith," given by a rural sage of the Poor Richard school,

are followed by a "numismatic dictionary;" and " Banking and Financial Maxims, by Addison" and others, adjoin "A Chapter on Young Men," which though but four pages long covers a vast ground, running from Scipio Africanus, through Fisher Ames and Lord Byron to Dr. Dwight, "whose Conquest of Canaan was commenced at 19 and finished at 22," and who "at the latter age composed his celebrated dissertation on the history, eloquence, and poetry of the Bible, which was immediately published and republished in Europe."

The book contains an excellent little treatise on the "Law of Bills of Exchange, by John Barnard Byles." We do not know whether this was prepared by Mr. Justice Byles himself, or whether it has been extracted from his well-known treatise by some one else; in either case it is well done.

The Three Powers of Government. The Origin of the United States; and the Status of the Southern States, on the Suppression of the Rebellion. The Three Dangers of the Republic. By JOEL PARKER.

EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN LAW REVIEW.

GENTLEMEN, - Do you really think, upon reflection, that your notice of a pamphlet, containing three lectures by me, recently published, is an appropriate one for a legal periodical?

The lectures profess to contain legal discussions upon,

1. The three Powers of Government, with illustrations to show great and unnecessary departures from the principles involved.

2. The origin of the United States, with an application showing the status of the Southern States, controverting the positions of Mr. Loring's pamphlet on that subject, and, by implication, denying the soundness of Mr. Pomeroy's treatise, which aims to become a text-book of Constitutional Law.

3. The three great Dangers of the Republic, with earnest denunciations, I admit, of interested politicians, who, for the gratification of their personal ambition, are endangering the existence of the Republic by perverting the Constitution, and, through Congress, usurping all the Powers of Government. From the nature of the case, this lecture is less exclusively legal than the other two.

I understand from your notice that you do not agree with me. Very well; I do not object to that. But have I not some reason to "take an exception," that, instead of a "Critical Notice," which shall show my errors and expose my fallacies, if such exist, you send out to your readers such a "Book Notice' as might have been expected from some petty partisan newspaper, the editor of which had no comprehension of the principles involved, and only understood that the pamphlet did not favor his party.

The subjects which I have treated are certainly of great interest, of momentous significance. The subject-matter of the second lecture involves a very important part of constitutional history. If I am right, and it is truth which makes these lectures gloomy, the profession of the law should come up to its duty, and endeavor to save the Constitution from subversion by mere party politicians. If I am wrong, unless the facts can be controverted, the arguments seem to me to be strong enough to deserve an attempt at refutation more extended than can be comprised within two inches of one of your pages, and in some other mode than by allegations of hate and bitterness and gloom. If there is hate, it is hatred; if bitterness, it is in speaking of the danger of the overthrow of our republican government by knaves and fools; if gloom, it is because, through the wickedness of some, and the apathy of others, we seem to be going to that political destruction, which Mr. Carlyle, in a recent conver