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proper stamp duty, and to render the defendant's deed invalid. Held, that the answer was no bar to the action. — Lamberl v. Whitelock, 29 Ind. 26.
5. Under the Stamp Act of June 30, 1864, an unstamped contract is void unless the person producing it disproves intent to evade the provisions of the act. Howe v. Carpenter, 53 Barb. 382.
6. The defendant, in March, 1866, executed his promissory note to the plaintiff's intestate, unstamped. After the death of the promisee, the defendant, on request, affixed the proper stamps, but not in the manner prescribed in the Act of Congress of March 3, 1865. Held, that the note was void. — Wayman v. Torreyson, 4 Nev. 124,
See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3. STATUTE. — See ATTORNEY, 1; BOUNTY; CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 1, 5, 6;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, State, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8; ESCHEAT; ILLEGAL CON-
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. — See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
STOCK. — See LIEN, 1.
STREET. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2.
SURETY. 1. A husband and wife mortgaged real estate of the wife, to secure accommodation indorsers on a note of the husband; by the same instrument, personal property of the husband was also mortgaged for the same liability. The plaintiffs negligently omitted to have the mortgage recorded within a proper time, and left the personal property in the possession of the husband, who disposed of it. Held, that assuming the wife's rights to be those of a surety, she was not discharged from her liability by this negligence. — Philbrook v. McEwen, 29 Ind.
2. The condition of a replevin bond, executed in 1859 for the production of slaves taken under attachment, having become, by the abolition of slavery before forfeiture, illegal, the surety is discharged. — Glover v. Taylor, 41 Ala. 124.
3. A sheriff, having an execution against A., levied on property of B. Held, that the sureties on the sheriff's official bond were liable to B. — Holliman v. Carroll's Adm'rs, 27 Texas, 23. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.
Tax. — See LEGAL TENDER, 4; NationAL BANKS.
1, 2; SURETY, 2.
TENANCY IN COMMON. Tenants in common of a tract of land had acquired their interests under different instruments, purchased at different times, there was no agreement between
them respecting the title. One of them, in order to protect his own doubtful title, located and caused to be patented the land so held by them in common. Held, that his location did not enure to the benefit of the other, although the latter offered to pay his ratable proportion of the outlay. — Roberts v. Thorn, 25 Texas, 728.
TENDER. 1. In an equity proceeding to redeem a mortgage, a tender by the mortgagor is unnecessary. - Dwen v. Blake, 44 Ill. 135.
2. A., by his agent, purchased grain to be delivered at a future day. He failed to furnish his agent with means to pay for it, and it appeared that the property would not have been received if a tender had been made ; that the grain was ready for delivery under the agreement, and delivery offered but refused. Held, that these facts excused an actual tender. - McPherson v. Nelson, 44 Ill. 124.
See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 1; CONSIDERATION; LEGAL TENDER, 2; PLEADING, 2.
TIME. 1. S. and H. were both appointed receivers of the same bank on the same day, under the orders respectively of Justices F. and P. The first judicial action, the first service of papers, the first granting of the order of appointment, the first perfecting of the appointment by the execution, approval, and filing of the required bond, were before Justice P. Held, that H.'s appointment was valid, and took precedence of that of S. – The People v. The Central City Bank, 53 Barb. 412.
2. Defendant was indicted for an offence which the law required to be prosecuted within two years after its commission. The indictment was found Jan. 1, 1857, and charged the commission of the offence on Jan. 1, 1855. Held, that the prosecution was barred. -- State v. Asbury, 26 Texas, 82.
3. On Feb. 6, 1867, a lien law was approved and went into effect. Held, that no lien could attach for work done before Feb. 7.— Hunter v. The Savage Consolidated Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. 153.
See CARRIER, 2; ConstitUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1; CONTRACT ; ESCHEAT;
TONNAGE. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
TRADE MARK. Semble, that a picture may be matter of trade mark. — Falkinburg v. Lucy, 35 Cal. 52.
TRANSFER. - See CORPORATION. TRESPASS. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; INDICTMENT; RIPARIAN OWNER;
TROVER. Trespassers cut wood on land of plaintiff, and sold it to defendants, who were bona fide purchasers. Held, that no proof of demand was necessary to sustain a suit for the recovery of the value of the wood. - Whitman Gold and Silver Mining Co. v. Trille, 4 Nev. 494. See CHATTEL MORTGAGE; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2. Trust, PAROL. — See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3 ; MORTGAGE, 3, 4.
TRUSTEE. — See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.
UNREASONABLE CONDITION. — See CARRIER, 1.
USURY. E. made a usurious mortgage to V., who foreclosed, and sold to an innocent third party under a power of sale. Held, that E. could not set up the usury against the purchaser. — Elliott v. Wood, 53 Barb. 285. See PLEADING, 1.
VACANCY. — See ELECTION, 1, 2.
VARIANCE. Action for a sum of money paid the defendant at his request, to be returned on request with lawful interest. The evidence was, that the plaintiff had deposited the money with the defendant, to keep for him. Held, that the evidence did not support the action. – Duncan v. Magelte, 25 Texas, 245.
VENDEE's Option. — See DAMAGES, 3.
WAGER — See GAMING.
WAIVER. — See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
War. A way which is not a thoroughfare, but a mere cul-de-sac, is capable of dedication to public use. — Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 5.
WILL. The California Statute of Wills provides that when any testator omits to provide for any child, “ unless it shall appear that such omission was intentional," such child shall share in the estate as in cases of intestacy. G. died, leaving a will, in which he made no mention of his children. — Held, that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the omission was intentional. — Estate of Garraud, 35 Cal. 336. See CONTRACT, 2; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.
WITNESS. - See PRIVILEGE.
“ Bounty." — See BOUNTY. “ Current Paper Funds." — See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 1. “ Damages by the Elements, or Acts of Providence.” — See LANDLORD AND TEN
“ Imports." — See CoxstITUTIONAL LAW, 4. " Mutual, Open, and Current Account." — See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2.
“Non Est Factum.” — Seo PLEADING, 1.
“ Not Exempted.” — See BOUNTY.
Fire; Gasording Officers; Bridges; Canals,
A Treatise on the Law of Negligence. By Thomas G. SHEARMAN and AMASA
A. REDFIELD. New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Company. 1869.
This is a volume of six hundred and seventy-three pages of text and notes. The first chapter of fourteen pages is entitled “The General Subject of Negligence.” The second of eight pages treats of the “Degrees of Negligence." The third of thirty-five pages is upon “Contributory Negligence." Six pages are given to “parties to actions for negligence." The remaining chapters treat successively of Liability of Masters for the acts of their Servants; Liability of Masters to Servants; Liability of Masters to Third Persons; Municipal Corporations; Public Officers ; Animals; Attorneys and Counsellors at Law; Bankers and Bill Collectors; Bridges; Canals ; Carriers of Passengers; Clerks and other Recording Officers; Injuries causing Death ; Driving and Riding ; Fences; Fire; Gas Companies ; Highways; Notaries Public; Physicians and Surgeons ; Construction and Maintenance of Railroads ; Railroad Fences ; General Management of Railroads ; Real Property ; Sheriffs; Telegraphs; Water Courses ; Miscellaneous Cases and Measure of Damages.
It will be seen at once that the book cannot fail to be of value to the practitioner. It embraces a mass of information of importance in every-day practice which is not otherwise accessible. Negligence has now for the first time been treated of as a special subject. The volume is, as its authors claim, “a pioneer in its peculiar field.”
The publishers say, “The authors have constructed their work upon a plan quite their own, at once philosophical and practical.” The plan is practical in the sense in which the plan of a Digest is practical. It is not philosophical. Had the subject been treated philosophically, some questions discussed would doubtless have been presented in a fuller manner, and new light could have been thrown upon some points upon which decisions are at variance. It is the first requisite of a philosophical treatise that its subject should be philosophically defined. We have looked in this book in vain for a proper definition of its subject. A true definition is an analysis. Negligence is a legal term. Like other legal terms, its meaning is complex. A separate statement of each of the elements which go to make up that meaning is essential to its definition. The authors say (2), “Negligence, in correct legal phraseology, is more nearly synonymous with carelessness' than with any other word.” But carelessness is not a word synonymous with the legal term negligence. Even if it were a synonyme it would not be a definition. The subject of the book is not negligence in its popular, but negligence in its legal, sense: that negligence which affects legal rights. What would be thought of one who should define a “contract” as an “agreement” or “larceny" as “stealing?” Had the subject of the book been analytically defined, and each portion of the definition thoroughly treated of in its order, the plan would have been