« PreviousContinue »
found in the account on either side,” the plaintiff proved the delivery of a wagon to him by the defendant within the two years as a payment of a hundred dollars on account. Held, no evidence of a mutual, open, and current account within the meaning of the statute. -Warren v. Sweeney, 4 Nev. 101.
3. A payment by a partner on a partnership debt, after dissolution of the partnership, does not affect the running of the Statute of Limitations in favor of the other partners. — Myatts v. Bell, 41 Ala. 222.
4. Fraudulent concealment of the cause of action prevents the running of the Statute of Limitations. — Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Texas, 475. See FRAUD; TIME, 2.
LOAN. — See VARIANCE.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES. - See DAMAGES.
MINISTERIAL Act. - See JURISDICTION.
MISJOINDER. See PLEADING, 3.
MORTGAGE. 1. S., a mortgagee, conveyed the mortgaged premises to C. without assigning the debt. Held, that the conveyance passed no estate (FRAZER, C. J., dissenting). – Johnson v. Cornett, 29 Ind. 59.
2. H. gave a mortgage in good faith to secure future advances, which did not state this fact upon its face, and subsequently transferred the mortgaged property to D., a creditor, to cover his indebtedness to him. D. bailed the property to the defendant, against whom the mortgagees brought suit. Held, that the mortgage was valid to the extent of the lien therein expressly created. - Tully v. Harloe, 35 Cal. 302.
3. The administrator of a mortgagee sold property under the mortgage, bought it in himself, and afterwards sold at an advance. Held, that he did not by this transaction become trustee for the mortgagor for the profits.
Woodlee v. Burch, 43 Mo. 231.
4. A trust deed contained a provision that the grantee, in case of default, should have the right to “ enter into and upon all and singular the premises herein granted, or intended so to be, and to sell and dispose of the same," &c. Held, that entry was not a condition precedent to the sale. — Kiley v. Brewster, 44 Ill. 186.
See CHATTEL MORTGAGE ; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 7; CONSIDERATION; ESTOPPEL, 1; Frauds, STATUTE OF, 3; PLEADING, 1 ; TENDER, 1; Usury.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. The charter of St. Louis prescribes two conditions upon which streets may be repaved: first, where the city council shall deem it necessary; and secondly, where owners petition. An ordinance was passed authorizing the mayor to cause streets to be repaved at his discretion, and to instruct the city engineer to contract for the work. Held, that the council could only exercise the power to repave in its legislative capacity, and could not delegate it. — Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353; 8. P. City of St. Louis v. Clemens, ib. 395.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1, 7.
NATIONAL BANK. A State cannot tax a National Bank upon its “Promissory notes bearing interest, and secured by mortgage and otherwise." — State of Nevada v. First National Bank of Nevada, 4 Nev. 348. See LEGAL TENDER, 3; LIEN, 1.
NAVIGABLE STREAM, See RIPARIAN OWNER.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1.
NOMINATION. See PUBLIC POLICY.
Non Est FACTUM. See PLEADING, 1.
NOTICE. The provision of the New York Code allowing defendants in certain cases twenty days, after “ personal notice” of judgment, within which to appeal, means twenty days after written notice. — Pearson v. Lovejoy, 53 Barb. 407. See ELECTION, 1; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1.
OFFICE. See ELECTION, 1, 2; PUBLIC POLICY.
See ATTACHMENT; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 4.
ORDINANCE. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8; EVIDENCE, 1; MUNICIPAL COR
PARTNERSHIP. 1. A partner may, after dissolution of the partnership, assign a partnership judgment in the firm name, without special authority. Bennett v. Buchan, 53 Barb. 578.
2. A partner, after dissolution of the partnership, renewed a partnership note including compound interest. Held, that he had no authority to do so. — Myatts V. Bell, 41 Ala. 222.
See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 3 ; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3.
PAYMENT. . The question whether a promissory note was intended as payment is for the jury..— Myatts v. Bell, 41 Ala. 222. See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3; PLEADING, 2.
PENALTY. - See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1.
PERSONAL PROPERTY. See DAMAGES, 2.
PLEADING. 1. To a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage by scire facias, the defendant pleaded non est factum and usury. Held, no defence. — Camp v. Small, 44 Ill. 37.
2. To an action by purchaser against vendor for non-delivery within a stipulated time, the defendant pleaded delivery and acceptance of a part after the expiration of the time, and refusal to pay. Held, a good plea; if the purchaser sought, at the time of the delivery of such part, to pay by setting off the damages for non-delivery of the residue, he should have made a distinct offer to do so, and either traversed the averment of refusal to pay, or replied specially. - Bradley v. King, 44 Ill. 339.
3. A. sued B. in one count, stating facts constituting a cause of action for assault and battery, and also for slander, alleging injury to person, character, feelings, and circumstances, and claiming damages generally. Held, bad on demurrer. - Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 238. See CARRIER, 3; JUDGMENT, 1; STAMP, 1; TROVER.
POSSESSION. See ESTOPPEL, 2.
PRE-EMPTION. 1. The interest acquired by a pre-emption right is not a chattel interest transferable by parol. — Lester v. White's Heirs, 44 III. 464.
2. Plaintiff brought ejectment to recover a tract of land, portion of a larger tract, claimed by plaintiff under a United States patent. Defendant proved a contract between himself and plaintiff, according to which the latter was to obtain title to the whole tract from the United States, and thereafter convey to defendant the land in controversy, in consideration that defendant should refrain from presenting his rightful claim to the larger tract, and should pay the purchasemoney of the smaller, which was within his enclosure. Held, that the contract was neither in contravention of the pre-emption laws nor the Statute of Frauds.Rose v. Treadway, 4 Nev. 455. PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE AND PAYMENT. - See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
PRESCRIPTION. - See ENCUMBRANCES, COVENANT AGAINST.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. An application for a policy of insurance contained questions and answers, by which it appeared that the title to the property was represented to be an unencumbered fee simple. A loss having occurred, the plaintiffs proved that R., the defendant's soliciting agent, had at the time full knowledge of the true state of the title, that he filled up the application in his own language, and assured the plaintiffs that it was all right; that they, believing it to be so, signed without knowing the contents as to title. Held, that, under the circumstances, the fact that the plaintiffs' title was only an encumbered equitable one, constituted no defence. — Combs v. Hannibal Savings and Insurance Company, 43 Mo. 148.
See DELIVERY, 2; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; JUDGMENT, 3.
PRIVILEGE. If a witness refuse to answer a question on the ground that his answer may tend to criminate him, the party calling him may show by other testimony that the circumstances were such that the act as to which the question was put, would not have been criminal, and when this is made clear, the witness may be compelled to answer. - Ford v. The State, 29 Ind. 541. See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, STATE, 9. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. — See ATTORNEY, 1.
PROBATE. — See CONTRACT, 2.
PUBLIC POLICY. L., being desirous of procuring the clerkship of a police court in C., gave H. a sum of money for the purpose of inducing the latter to use his influence to get the former nominated. H. having used his influence against L., the latter brought suit to recover the money. Held, that as the plaintiff's object in furnishing the money had been to secure his election to a public office, without reference to his fitness or the public good, he could not recover. — Liness v. Hesing, 44 III. 113. See CARRIER, 1; GAMING; HUSBAND AND WIFE; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 1;
RAPE. — See EVIDENCE, 3.
RATIFICATION. The ratification of judgments, rendered during the war, by the ordinance of the State Convention adopted Sept. 28, 1865, relieves them from any objection on the ground that, at the time of their rendition, the State was at war with the United States. — Randolph v. Baldwin, 41 Ala. 305.
RECEIVER. — See TIME, 1.
RECORD.— See EVIDENCE, 2.
RELEASE. See LEGAL TENDER, 2.
REPLICATION. See PLEADING, 2.
REPLEVIN. - See SURETY, 2.
REVOCABLE LICENSE. See LICENSE.
RIPARIAN OWNER. A wharf boat, moored to the shore of a navigable river is entitled to the same immunity from trespass, or obstruction by vessels, as is the land to which the wharf boat is moored. - Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364. SALE. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2, 3; JUDG
MENT, 2; MORTGAGE, 4; SCIENTER.
SCIRE Facias. — See PLEADING, 1.
SERVICE. — See JUDGMENT, 3.
SET-OFF. - See PLEADING, 2. SHERIFF.-See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 2; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 4; SURETY, 3.
SLAVE. See DETINUE; SURETY, 2.
SPECIFIC CONTRACT Law. Plaintiff brought suit to recover a certain sum in United States gold coin, payable by the terms of a promissory note. Held, that the Nevada Specific Contract Law is not repugnant to the United States Legal Tender Acts, and judgment should be rendered for coin. — Linn v. Minor, 4 Nev. 462 (overruling Milliken v. Sloat, 1 Nev. 585).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. - See LEGAL TENDER, 2.
STAMP. 1. Assuming that a stamp is essential to the validity of a deed, an averment that the deed was made, imports that it was stamped. — Jones v. Davis, 22 Wis. 421.
2. In a suit upon a written contract, bearing proper revenue stamps cancelled, the defendant offered to prove that he did not affix the stamps, or authorize it to be done. Held, that the evidence was incompetent, as the plaintiff himself might properly have affixed the stamps, and a failure to cancel them would not render the instrument void. -Adams v. Dale, 29 Ind. 273.
3. In the absence of a State law to the contrary, a tax-deed is not invalid for want of a revenue stamp, Congress not having the constitutional power to require one. Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225.
4. To a suit for the purchase-money of land, the defendant answered that the true consideration for the land was much more than that named in the deed, and that the grantor had caused the consideration to be stated in the deed at a less sum than the true amount for the purpose of defrauding the Government of the