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PARLIAMENT. Members of either House of Parliament are not criminally liable for a conspiracy to make statements which they know to be false, in the House, to the injury of a third person. - Ex parte Wason, L. R. 4 Q. B. 573.
PARTNERSHIP. — See COMPANY, 2; TENANCY IN COMMON.
PATENT. A. filed a provisional specification and obtained provisional protection. B. afterwards did the like and obtained a patent for a similar invention within the period of A.'s provisional protection. A. then petitioned for a patent dated as of the date of his provisional protection. Held, that A. could only have a patent for such part of his invention as was not covered by B.'s patent, to be dated with the actual date of the petition. — Ex parte Bates & Redgate, L. R. 4 Ch. 577. See DISCOVERY.
PAYMENT. — See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
PERPETUITY. 1. A power coupled with a term for five hundred years given to trustees to enter and manage an estate during the minority of successive tenants in tail, for life, in tail, again for life, and so on, is void for remoteness, although all the tenants for life are in esse. — Floyer y. Bankes, L. R. 8 Eq. 115.
2. A., having a power under her marriage settlement to appoint a fund in favor of the children of the marriage, appointed part of the fund by will to her son C. for life, with remainder to such persons as he should by will appoint. There was a general residuary appointment of the fund, subject to all other appointments of the same, to A.'s daughters, to whom A. left other property also. Held, that the appointment to C.'s appointees was too remote, and that A.'s daughters took that part of the fund; also that said daughters were not put to their election. - Wollaston v. King, L. R. 8 Eq. 165.
Pilot. — See COLLISION.
PLEADING. 1. To a declaration on a bill of exchange by the drawer and payee, the defendant pleaded that he accepted the bill on the condition agreed on by him and the plaintiff as part of the consideration for the bill; viz., that in a certain event which had occurred, the plaintiff would renew the bill. Held, on demurrer, that the plea must be taken as alleging a written agreement, and was therefore good. - Young v. Austen, L. R. 4 C. P. 553.
2. Action on an award adjudging the price to be paid for shares in a bank which the plaintiff had elected, under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 161, to have purchased by the bank before it was voluntarily wound up and its business transferred to another company. Equitable plea, that plaintiff in consideration, &c., promised to consent to the winding up, &c., and to exchange his shares for shares in the new concern. Held, that the plea was bad. The defendant's remedy, if any,
was a cross action for breach of contract. — De Rosaz v. Anglo-Italian Bank, L. R. 4 Q. B. 462.
PLEDGE. — See FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.
POWER. A testatrix, having a general power of appointment over sums of money, gave pecuniary legacies followed by a bequest of the residue of her property. Held, that the legacies as well as the residuary bequest operated as appointments under the power, under 1 Vict. c. 26, $ 27. – In re Wilkinson, L. R. 4 Ch. 587. See PERPETUITY; REVOCATION OF Will.
PRACTICE. — See Costs; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. The defendant, A., having purchased copyhold land, was admitted by C., who had acted as his attorney in completing the purchase, and had been appointed by the steward of the manor as his deputy for that turn to admit A. Nine days afterwards A. gave C. a cheque on A.'s bankers for a sum including the lord's fine, steward's fees, and C.'s charges as A.'s attorney. A. crossed the cheque at C.'s request to C.'s bankers. The amount of the cheque was paid by A.'s bankers to C.'s bankers, who retained the money for a debt due to them from C. The lord sued A. for the fine. Held (per Bovill, C.J., & MONTAGUE SMITH, J., BYLES, J., dissentiente), that if C. had power to receive the fine, he could only receive it in cash or the equivalent of cash, which might be handed over as it was received to the lord; and that as against the lord the crossed cheque for a larger sum was no payment. — Bridges v. Garrett, L. R. 4 C. P. 580.
See COMPANY, 2; MASTER AND SERVANT; SALE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.
PRIORITY. — See MORTGAGE, 2, 3.
PRIVILEGE. — See PARLIAMENT.
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. In an action against a railway company for a personal injury sustained by a passenger on their railway, the court allowed inspection of communications made by agents of the company in the ordinary course of their duty, to inform the company on the subject, whether made before or after litigation was begun, the same not being made confidentially with a view to litigation; those made with such a view are privileged. — Woolley v. North London Railway Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 602.
PROMISSORY NOTE. — See BILLS AND NOTES.
PROXIMATE CAUSE. — See INSURANCE, 3.
REPRESENTATION. — See CONTRACT.
REVOCATION OF Will. By the will of A. a power was given to B. to appoint by will, and in default of her appointment, the property was to go to the persons who at her decease should be her “next of kin.” B. appointed by will to C. and afterwards married him. C. died in B.'s lifetime. Held, that the above words “next of kin” did not imply the same class as under the Statute of Distribution, and that therefore the will was not revoked. 1 Vict. c. 26, § 18. — Goods of McVicar, L. R. 1 P. & D. 671.
See CODICIL; Will, 3.
SALE. The plaintiff, in England, sent an order to P., in Brazil, to buy cotton for him. P. bought cotton, and shipped it in the defendant's vessel; the invoice was made out as shipped on account and risk of the plaintiff, but the bill of lading was taken deliverable to P.'s order or assigns. P. wrote to the plaintiff, advising the shipment and saying, “Enclosed, please find invoice and bill of lading; we have drawn upon you for the amount in favor of our agents, to which we beg your protection." The invoice was enclosed, but the bill of lading, indorsed in blank by P., was sent with the bill of exchange to P.'s agent in England. The agent sent the two documents to the plaintiff, who retained the bill of lading, but returned the bill of exchange unaccepted, on the ground that P. had not complied with his order. The plaintiff presented the bill of lading to the defendant, but he, being advised by P.'s agent, refused to deliver the cotton. On a case stated, the court having power to draw inferences of fact : Held (CLEASBY, B., dubitante), that P.'s intention was, that the bill of lading should not be handed over until the bill of exchange was accepted; that no property, therefore, passed to the plaintiff, and the defendant's refusal was right. (Exch. Ch.) — Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R. 4 Q. B. 498; s. c. ib. 196 ; 3 Am. L. Rev. 713, 714.
SEAL. — Şee COMPANY, 1.
SETTLEMENT. — See Wife's EQUITY.
SLANDER. — See LIBEL.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 1. In a bill filed by a purchaser for specific performance of a contract to sell land, it was alleged that the defendant P. informed the plaintiff that a written agreement was executed, and “that P. entered into the said agreement ... as the agent for” the plaintiff, but that P. refused to give the plaintiff the benefit of the contract. It appeared by the bill that the agent was appointed orally. Demurrers by the two defendants, the agent and the vendor, were overruled. A written contract was sufficiently alleged, and would be enforced, although there was no written appointment of the agent. — Heard v. Pilley, L. R. 4 Ch. 548.
2. The whole of an estate, except a small plot, was put up for sale in lots, subject to the restriction that no public house should be built upon “ the property." In the particulars of sale the property was described as the M. estate, and in the plan annexed, all the lots were colored, but the excepted plot was uncolored like the lands of adjoining owners, though, unlike them, it was not marked with the owner's name. There was nothing else to show that the vendor owned said plot. It was improbable that a public-house would be built on any of the adjoining estates. A suit for specific performance was brought against one who had purchased a lot within a hundred yards of the excepted plot, believing that the whole of the vendor's estate was included in the particulars, and so would be subject to the restriction. Held, that the vendor could only compel it on entering into a restrictive covenant as to the excepted plot. — Baskcomb v. Beckwith, L. R. 8 Eq. 100.
STAMP. 1. S. agreed by writing to become a member of a mutual insurance company in respect of an insurance for £300 on his own ship; but no stamped policy was ever executed. He paid a call for losses of other members, and made a claim for a loss of his own, but before it was paid the association was ordered to be wound up. Held, that S. was not a contributory. The contract was invalid for want of a stamp under 35 Geo. III. c. 63. — In re London Marine Ins. Association, L. R. 4 Ch. 611.
2. A., a married woman, was next of kin to one who died domiciled in England, intestate, and leaving personal property there. A.'s husband, B., did not reduce said property to possession in A.'s life, and after A.'s death did not take out administration to her. A. and B. were always domiciled in America, and died leaving a child, C., there. C. empowered D., in England, to take out administration for him. D. took out one to C.'s father, B., and one to A. Held, that this was right, and that a stamp duty was payable on each. Lord WESTBURY diss. on the ground that by the law of A.'s domicile, of which the court were bound to take notice, it would have been sufficient to take one out to A.
When interest is recoverable by the letters of administration it is chargeable with duty under 55 Geo. III. c. 184. — Partington v. Attorney General, L. R. 4 H. L. 100.
STATUTE. The defendants being empowered by a private act of Parliament to render navigable the River B., in doing so erected staunches therein, which, together with weeds, caused silt to accumulate, and thus caused the river to overflow the plaintiff's bank. The weeds might have been cut, or the silt dredged so as to prevent this. Held, that, as neither cutting nor dredging was shown to be necessary for purposes of navigation, and no negligence was proved, defendants were not liable. — Cracknell v. Mayor of Thetford, L. R. 4 C. P. 629.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1-3; CODICIL; COLLISION; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE; INSURANCE, 1; PATENT; REVOCATION OF WILL; STAMP, 1; VOTER.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. — See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.
TENANCY IN COMMON. Co-owners of lands worked a quarry on part of them, and let the rest to agricultural tenants. Other lands were purchased from time to time out of the profits and for the purposes of the quarry, and were conveyed in fourteen cases in trust
for said co-owners, in ten cases without any trusts declared. One of the coowners, a woman, married, and her share was settled, being treated as real estate, to her separate use for life, remainder to her husband for life, &c. Afterwards other lands were purchased, as above, without any trusts declared. Held, that the latter lands must be taken to have been held on like trusts with the former, and that said woman's share passed as real estate to her heirs ; also that the husband took no interest by the settlement in the after-acquired lands. — Steward v. Blakeway, L. R. 4 Ch. 603 ; s. c. L. R. 6 Eg. 479, 3 Am. L. Rev. 717, 718.
TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER-MAN. Where during the minority of a tenant for life part of the income has been expended under the order of the court in improving the estate, although the order was made in the presence of remainder-men, and was expressed to be without prejudice to the right of the tenant for life to have the amounts so expended recouped out of the corpus of the estate, and although the tenant for life die an infant, there cannot be such a recoupment — Floyer v. Bankes, L. R. 8 Eq. 115.
TROVER. - See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
Trust. A woman conveyed land to her sons in trust for her children for life, remainder to her grandchildren. After giving large powers of management and powers of sale to the trustees, the deed provided that any child advancing money to the settlor should have a charge by way of mortgage on the land, and any child paying off any part of an outstanding mortgage on said land should stand in the place of the mortgagee for the sum so paid. One of the trustees advanced large sums to the settlor and paid part of the mortgage debt. Held, that he was only entitled to a sale and not to a foreclosure; both by the construction of the deed and because he was trustee as well as mortgagee. Held, also, that he could not bid at the sale against the objection of some of the cestuis que trust. Perhaps if no purchaser at an adequate price could be found, the trustee might purchase under proposals to the court. — Tennant v. Trenchard, L. R. 4 Ch. 537.
See CONTRACT; CURTESY; EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT; WILL, 5.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE. A purchaser of real estate upon a sale by the court was kept out of possession for a year by the plaintiff in the cause, who was himself in occupation of the estate. He was then let into possession by virtue of a writ of assistance issued by the court. The plaintiff became bankrupt. Held, that the purchaser was entitled to have paid to him out of the purchase-money in court; (1) the costs ordered to be paid him by the plaintiff by the orders for said writ; (2) an occupation rent for the time during which he was kept out of possession; (3) compensation for deterioration of the property during the same period; (4) arrears of tithes which he had been compelled to pay. - Thomas v. Buxton, L. R. 8 Eq. 120.
See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
VOTER. By 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, § 3, every “man” having certain qualifications and not subject to any legal incapacity is entitled to the franchise. By a previous act,