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holes, the weighing plate being level with the ground, but which were not fixed to the brickwork, were not fixtures, and passed to the assignees. — In re Richards, L. R. 4 Ch. 630.

2. A steam-engine and boiler, annexed to the freehold for the more convenient use of them, and not to improve the inheritance, and capable of being removed without any appreciable damage to the freehold, pass under a mortgage of the freehold (Exch. Ch.). - Climie v. Wood, L. R. 4 Ex. 328; s. c. L. R. 3 Ex. 257; 3 Am. L. Rev. 271.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. By a convention between the government of Peru and a Peruvian company, all guano to be shipped from Peru to England and Ireland was to be consigned to the company, which was to sell the same, and hold the net proceeds at the disposal of said government. Said government afterwards negotiated a loan in England, hypothecating for the same all the guano to be shipped as above, and agreeing that out of the proceeds of said guano a certain sum should be applied halfyearly in redemption of the loan bonds. Bondholders sued to enforce the application of the proceeds in England to redemption as agreed. The Peruvian government was made a party, but did not appear. Held, that the court had no jurisdiction.

The loan was governed by the law of Peru.

The above redemption was to be made by paying off at par bonds to be drawn by lot when the bonds should be above par, and by purchasing at the market price when the bonds should be at or below par. The government cancelled bonds which had been given up to it in exchange for bonds of a subsequent loan, to the stipulated amount at the price at which the subsequent loan was contracted, being a higher price than that of the bonds of the first loan, as quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Held, a compliance with the contract. — Smith v. Weguelin, L. R. 8 Eq. 199.



FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. A debtor, at a time when he knew that a writ of sequestration would be issued against him, mortgaged all his property to trustees for five of his creditors. By the deed the debtor was to remain in possession of his property for six months, but not so as to let in any execution or sequestration, and in case any such should be enforced, his possession was to cease. A writ of sequestration was subsequently issued. Held, that the deed was not void under 13 Eliz. c. 5, as against the sequestrators. — Allon v. Harrison, L. R. 4 Ch. 622.



GUARANTEE. 1. The defendant gave to the plaintiff, a cattle dealer, this guarantee: “501. I, J. M., of, &c., will be answerable for 501. sterling that W. Y., of, &c., butcher, may buy of Mr. J. H., of, &c.” It appeared from the circumstances under which the guarantee was given, that the parties contemplated a continuing supply of stock to W. Y. in his trade as a butcher. Held, a continuing guarantee to the extent of 501. Heffield v. Meadows, L. R. 4 C. P. 595.

2. The following: “In consideration of the Union Bank agreeing to advance and advancing to R. & Co. any sum or sums of money they may require during the next eighteen months, not exceeding in the whole 10001., we hereby jointly and severally guarantee the payment of any such sum as may be owing to the bank at the expiration of the said period of eighteen months ; " is a continuing guarantee. — Laurie v. Scholefield, L. R. 4 C. P. 622.




INSURANCE. 1. Trustees under a will agreed to advance to A. a sum to which his wife would be entitled at twenty-one, if B. would be surety for repayment of the sum if A.'s wife should die before that age. B. consented, on condition that the wife's life was insured. The sum was advanced, and A. effected an insurance in his wife's name on her own life. Held, that as A. was interested in the policy, and his name was not inserted therein, it was void under 14 Geo. III. c. 48, § 2. Evans v. Bignold, L. R. 4 Q. B. 622.

2. Plaintiff obtained insurance from defendant on bone-ash on board his vessel “ cleared from A. and port or ports of loading in the province of B.," to port, &c., knowing that the vessel was to load at L., a geographical port in the province of B., but not informing the defendant of the fact. Had the latter known it, he would have charged a higher premium; but underwriters did not then know that L. was a port of loading. Vessels loading at L. had to return to and to clear from A. The vessel and cargo were lost in so returning. Held, (1), that L. was a port of loading within the policy ; (2), that there was no concealment; (3), that there was no deviation. — Harrower v. Hutchinson, L. R. 4 Q. B. 523.

3. Defendants in London insured the plaintiffs upon gold “in the ship called the Dutchman," for a certain voyage, against, inter alia, perils of the seas, with the usual suing and laboring clause. The ship was at the time English, but afterwards became a Russian ship, without the knowledge of either plaintiffs or defendants. The ship was wrecked in Turkish waters, and the gold was taken in charge by the Russian consul. By the judgment of his court, which had jurisdiction, the gold was ordered to pay a much larger sum, by way of contribution, than it would have been had the ship remained English. An appeal might have been, but was not, taken, and the sum was paid in order to get back the gold. In an action to recover a part of the sum so paid from the insurers, held, (1), that as there was no express warranty that the ship should continue English, none could be implied; (2), that whether the Russian judgment was according to law

or not, the compulsory payment was a direct consequence of the wreck, and so was a loss by perils of the seas; (3), that the plaintiffs were not bound to have appealed. — Dent v. Smith, L. R. 4 Q. B. 414.

4. Insurers agreed that if the plaintiff should be compelled to pay “as damages" for running down any other ship any sum, &c., they would repay him a certain proportion of such sum. The policy also contained the usual suing and laboring clause. Plaintiff successfully defended the action against him for running down another ship. Held, that he could not recover the costs of defence from the insurers (Exch. Ch.). – Xenos v. Fox, L. R. 4 C. P. 665; 8. C. L. R. 3 C. P. 630; 3 Am. L. Rev. 701.


INTEREST. In the winding up of an insolvent company, dividends are to be paid on the debts as they stand at the date of the winding up. Subsequent interest is to be allowed only in case of a surplus, when dividends will be applied first to interest then due, and then to principal. — Warrant Finance Co.'s Case, L. R. 4 Ch. 643. See LEGACY, 3 ; STAMP, 2.


LANDLORD AND TENANT. In 1860, A. made a lease to B., who covenanted therein not to assign or part with the possession of the premises without A.'s written consent, and there was a re-entry clause. In 1865, B. with A.'s written assent to the transfer on the old terms, sold to C., and let him into possession without a formal assignment. In 1867, C., with A.'s written assent, assigned the term to trustees for creditors. The trustees sold to defendant, who took possession. Held, that there had been no forfeiture. There was never an assignee of the whole term, so as to be subject to the covenants in the lease, and B.'s covenant was not broken by letting C. into possession as he did, nor by the transfer by the trustees to defendant. — West v. Dobb, L. R. 4 Q. B. 634. See COVENANT, 2.


LEGACY. 1. A testator gave to his wife “ any money that I may die possessed of, or which may be due and owing to me at the time of my decease.” He had insured his own life. Held, that the debt accruing under the policy at his death passed by the above bequest. — Petty v. Willson, L. R. 4 Ch. 574.

2. Bequest to A. and B. as tenants in common, “ and their respective heirs or representatives." A. died before the testator. Held, that A.'s share lapsed. The words were words of limitation. — Appleton v. Rowley, L. R. 8 Eq. 139.

3. A contingent legacy which is given to an infant, and which, or the income of which, the executors are empowered to apply for his maintenance, or education,

or benefit during minority, as they shall think proper, carries interest from the death of the testator, although he may not have stood in loco parentis to the infant. - In re Richards, L. R. 8 Eq. 119. See POWER; WILL, 5. LEX Loc. — See FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

LIBEL. To charge A. in the newspaper with ingratitude in politically opposing B., and to allege that at a past time A. was in pecuniary straits, and was aided by B., . and had since paid his debts, as the only support of the charge, is libellous. Cox v. Lee, L. R. 4 Ex. 284.

LIEN. A policy of insurance was assigned by A. to B. as a security for a judgment debt due from A. to B., on which B. had created a charge in favor of C. The premiums were paid by B. during his life, and after his death by his administrator, at first of his own authority, and afterwards by the direction of the court in an administration suit. Held, that, as against C., the administrator of B. had a lien upon the money payable under the policy for the premiums paid by him, but not for those paid by B. – Norris v. Caledonian Insurance Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 127. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.



MASTER AND SERVANT. Defendant sent his carman and clerk with a horse and cart to deliver some wine, and bring back some empty bottles. Instead of returning directly, as was his duty, the carman, when about a quarter of a mile from the defendant's offices, drove off in another direction on business of the clerk's; and, while he was thus driving, negligently ran over the plaintiff. Held, that defendant was not liable. — Storey v. Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476.


MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. The defendant received money for å married woman, and wrote to her that he held it at her disposal. The wife died, and then the husband, who had not interfered in the matter; and the wife's administratrix sued the defendant for money had and received to the use of the wife. Held (KELLEY, C. B., dissentiente), that the action could be maintained, and by the wife's representative (Exch. Ch.). -- Fleet v. Perrins, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500 ; s. c. L. R. 3 Q. B. 536 ; 3 Am. L. Rev. 273. See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

MORTGAGE. 1. A mortgagee is bound to convey the legal estate in the mortgaged property, and to deliver up the title deeds, to a person from whom he has accepted a tender

of his principal, interest, and costs, although such person may have only a partial interest in the equity of redemption. — Pearce v. Morris, L. R. 8 Eq. 217.

2. A party entitled to funds A. and B. made three mortgages : (1) of A. and B.; (2) of A. only; (3) of the surplus of both funds after payment of 1 and 2. Fund A. was absorbed in paying mortgage 1. Held, that fund B. must be applied in satisfaction of mortgage 2 in full, in priority to mortgage 3. — In re Mower's Trusts, L. R. 8 Eq. 110.

3. A second mortgagee, with notice of a prior mortgage to secure a sum and future advances, is not affected by advances made by the first mortgagees after they have notice of the second mortgage.

The mortgagor was a publican, the first mortgagee a brewer, the second a distiller. A contrary custom was alleged in such cases. Held, that it was not proved, and was bad for want of mutuality and defined limits. – Daun v. City of London Brewery Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 155. See FIXTURE; LIEN; Trust.



NEGLIGENCE. 1. A bank received gratuitously a box of which the owner kept the key. The box was placed in the outer of three strong rooms, together with other customers' boxes and much property of the bank. The cashier of the bank had access to this room and abstracted some of the contents of said box. After this was discovered some further precautions were taken by the bank. Held, that there was no evidence on which the jury could properly find that the bank was wanting in ordinary care. — Giblin v. McMullen, L. R. 2 P. C. 317.

2. The plaintiff on getting into a railway carriage, having a parcel in his right hand, placed his left hand on the back of the open door to aid him in mounting the step. It was after dark, and he could see no handle, if there was one. The guard, without warning, slammed the door, throwing the plaintiff forward and crushing his hand between the door and door-post. Held, that the defendants were not entitled to a nonsuit. The jury were justified in finding that the guard was negligent and that the plaintiff was not. (Exch. Ch.) — Fordham v. Brighton Railway Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 619; s. c. L. R. 3 C. P. 368; 3 Am. L. Rev. 105. See MASTER AND SERVANT.


NovATION. A. advanced money to B., with which to build a railway; then B. transferreil his business to C. and afterwards gave his note to A. for the above money, A. writing that he looked to B. and knew nothing of C. in the matter. C. had the benefit of A.'s advance. A year afterwards, A. applied to C. for a year's interest, which C. paid, and sent to A., B.'s cheque for the sum remaining to his credit, directing A. to place it to the credit of C. Held, that C. had not become debtor to A. in B.'s place, and that A. could not prove against C.'s estate. — In re Smith, Knight, & Co., L. R. 4 Ch. 662.

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