ultimately agreed on; and this distribution of the legislative power has, in result, proved itself to be one of the most skilfully devised features of the Constitution.

These two principles — the Massachusetts principle, of annual elections for both branches, and the Virginia principle, of time in tenure of office as an element of difference between them-went forth thus early to be copied into the constitutions thereafter to be framed. The Virginia system was adopted in the great majority of cases; but that of Massachusetts was adopted, and now exists throughout New England, as well as in Tennessee and Ohio, with the difference of biennial instead of annual elections, and was abandoned in Michigan only as recently as 1867. The result has been, that, in the States last mentioned, property qualification and territorial representation having both been swept away, the two bodies have ceased to represent different constituencies, and have also ceased, in a very great degree, to fulfil their intended function of acting as checks on each other; practically they now represent the same interests, are subject to the same impulses, and are stimulated by the same passions. It may indeed admit of question whether the old distinctions had not become obsolete, and should not have been abolished; but it is very clear that this should not have been done until those who did it were prepared to replace the old with new distinctions, more in accordance with the needs of the time. There are in fact but the three bases of property, territory, and time, all of which were contained in the Virginia constitution, upon which the division of the legislative into two chambers in,this country can be sustained. When property and territory were abolished as grounds of distinction, time only remained. Divided on this basis, the two bodies would represent phases of thought. The House would represent the immediate feelings and impulses of the people, it would reflect, as it always has and always should, the existing condition of the popular mind and will, and would ever be the impulsive and propelling power in legislation. The first thought, however, is not always the wisest thought, nor the first impulse the most prudent impulse. Here comes in the function of the Senate. Composed of fewer members, elected for longer periods than its co-ordinate branch,-changing more gradually, and less subject to popular passions, it should represent the sober second thought of the people. Although the exam

ples of the Virginia and the United States constitutions were before the eyes of the innovators this new element of distinction was not introduced, and as a consequence, in many States, all the members of both houses are now elected at the same time and by the same constituencies, the only distinction being that each senatorial district probably includes several representative districts. The two chambers are retained in existence; the diverse interests which the two chambers were skilfully calculated to represent are totally ignored.

Very naturally, serious troubles have ensued wherever this fundamental principle has been thus disregarded. Examples of these derangements could readily be pointed out in the history of any of the States which have evinced such disregard; and it could easily be shown that at all times and in all places the double chambers cease to act as checks upon each other in just that degree in which they cease to represent distinct and different constituencies. As, however, the Massachusetts constitution has always been the chief exponent of the principle of general annual elections, a few examples and illustrations bearing on this question can best be drawn from the recent history of that State. All distinction, between the two houses, through a property qualification of members, was dropped from the Massachusetts constitution by an amendment ratified in 1840. The territorial distinction between the bodies the one representing counties and the other towns-only remained, but was of practical importance, as causing senators to be men of somewhat more extended reputation. The district system became popular, however; and in 1857 it was finally incorporated by amendment into the Constitution of Massachusetts as applying to both Senate and House. These two bodies now represented the same constituency, and the State was liable to all the grave evils incident to government through a single chamber or two identical chambers. The theoretical evils incident to such a system can be found as set forth by James Madison, in No. 62 of "The Federalist." They are-1. The probability of sinister combinations, which will be in proportion to the similarity in the genius of the two bodies. 2. "The propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions." 3. A want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. 4. "The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members."

The two dangers here first suggested may be considered together, for they were both well illustrated in two episodes, following close upon each other, in the recent history of Massachusetts, in which it was seen how paroxysms of popular feeling now and then sweep over the gravest and most self-balanced communities, no less than over the most imaginative and volatile. Only a single year before the first of these episodes took place, the question of increasing the senatorial term had been considered and rejected in a committee of the convention which framed the rejected constitution of 1853. The proposition was then thrown out, on the extraordinary ground that, practically, under the existing system, about half of each senate was annually re-elected, and it therefore amounted to the same thing as if they held over by law. It did not seem to occur to those constitution makers that their work was to be tested by any, except the ordinary strain. In point of fact, any constitution, even the most clumsy, will float in a political calm, but it is when the popular tempest rages, that the skilfully framed constitution reveals its hidden strength, and the cunning art of its framer. It is the exception, and not the rule, which is to be provided against. In this case, the experience of the coming year was to prove the plentiful lack of wisdom of those who sought to frame a government on the practical experience of ordinary times.

Even while the Constitutional Convention of 1853 was sitting, coming events already cast their shadows before, and the old party lines scarcely held together an excited people. Little had been discussed for many years save the questions incident to the slavery agitation, and apparently the whole mind of the community was turned in that direction. In truth, however, it was only turning thither, and for the moment was in that unsettled, doubtful condition, in which any thing or every thing might equally well be anticipated. Never was there a time when a greater necessity existed for some well established check on indiscreet legislation, such as had been so summarily disposed of in the convention of the previous year. Suddenly, to the astonishment of every one, without cause or object, the old "No Popery" cry, which had lost its force in England half a century before, was raised, no one knew where or by whom. It seemed, however, to sweep over the country like a tornado; and in Massachusetts, in particular, it raged wholly beyond control. The old parties the tried and

educated leaders

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were swept out of sight in an instant. years the State had been hotly contested between opposing parties, and during the previous political year the old Whig organization had been in complete control of the government. In a moment all this was changed. The popular frenzy - causeless, unreasoning, aimless seized at once upon the Executive, and both branches of the legislature; indeed it elected four hundred and fourteen out of the four hundred and nineteen members who at that time composed the two legislative bodies. A more heterogeneous mass could not have been collected together, and that it succeeded in transacting business at all spoke well for the general intelligence of New England. Not a single member of the Senate, and but twelve members of the House, had sat in the legislature of the previous year; nor were these twelve members men of any note or mark. But forty-six members out of the whole four hundred and nineteen had ever sat in any legislative assembly before, and only six members of the eight leading committees of the two Houses had ever been in a legislative committee; one of these six also, and he the ex officio leader of the House, belonged to the minority of five, which alone represented the old parties in the State. Under the control of such a mob, the halls of legislature were turned into an obscene pandemonium. The history of that session does not need to be written, save in the few words which Blackstone has applied to the Parliament holden at Coventry, in the time of Henry IV., which "historians have branded with the name of the Parliamentum indoctum, or the lacklearning (Know-Nothing) Parliament; and Sir Edward Coke observes, with some spleen, that there never was a good law made thereat."

Here was an instance in which a separate tenure of office for the two branches would have been of incalculable service. The popular paroxysm did not last two years, but while it did last it was wholly unrestrained. Had two-thirds of the Senate of the previous year held over, and a complete change in that branch of the legislature been possible but once in three years, "the impulse of sudden and violent passion" could not have obtained complete control. A certain weight, knowledge, and consistency in legislation would have been preserved until the sober second thought of the people could have had time to act. The State of Massachusetts did, in fact, pass at that time from Whig to Repub

lican control, the Know-Nothing frenzy was the ugly contortion which ever marks periods of transition; but it is during just these periods of transition that the legislative balance is peculiarly needed. These periods must recur not infrequently in the history of any free community; and, without some legislative check, every recurrence will hold the State completely at its mercy. No rapid change is healthy change; and a political party, or a desired act of legislature, which cannot survive under a year or two of probation, is fit neither to control the government or to find a place on the statute book.

The third theoretical danger to be averted, as mentioned by Mr. Madison, was the mutability of legislation incident to rapidly shifting bodies. Where the two houses practically represent the same constituencies, it will often be found impracticable to make any legal enactment permanent on which the people are not unequally divided. Laws will be placed upon the statute book one year by one party, only to be repealed the next by another, and to be again restored the year after by the first. A more permanent chamber, only partially changing at each election, would, it is argued, obviate this danger. On this point, again, precedents need not be sought far in the annals of Massachusetts. It may safely be said that the present unsatisfactory condition of the liquor laws of that State is almost entirely attributable to the want of some more permanent legislative body. No system can be tried or matured, while subject to constant revolutions. In the year 1867, Massachusetts had a prohibitory liquor law, the enforcement of which was practicable; the attempt to enforce it led to an agitation, and to the formation of secret leagues, not unlike those of 1854; through the agency of these, both branches of the legislature were secured in 1868, and the obnoxious law was repealed. This year the temperance reformers felt the want of a permanent branch of the legislature; had two-thirds of the Senate of 1867 held over the repeal could not have taken place. The next year

the result was different. The secret combination of 1867 had disappeared, with its own success, and the friends of the prohibitory law had rallied once more. This time they carried the day, and. with it, of course, both houses of the legislature. As the temperance men had before felt the need of greater permanence in one of the two chambers, their opponents were made to feel it now. If two-thirds of the Senate of 1868 had held over, the license law