There are several cases on the effect of certifying checks, a subject which has recently called forth much discussion and a good deal of litigation.

In Bickford v. First National Bank of Chicago, 42 Ill. 238, it was held that certifying a check by a bank makes the liability of the bank absolute, but in no way discharges the drawer: he remains liable to the holder after presentation to the bank and protest of non-payment, if sufficient notice thereof is given to him. A like decision is made in Rounds v. Smith, 42 Ill. 245, and also in Brown v. Leckie, 43 Ill. 497; in this last case, it was also held that a bank on whom a certified check is drawn cannot set off the indebtedness of the holder against the check.

The prisoner was indicted for the murder of A. Z., and the killing was alleged to have been by shooting with a gun charged with powder and shot; the prisoner was acquitted. He was afterwards indicted for murdering the same A. Z., and the killing was alleged to have been by striking on the head with a gun. Held, on a plea of autrefois acquit, that the former acquittal was no bar to the second indictment. Guedel v. The People, 43 Ill. 226.

The very large number of cases involving tax titles betokens an amount of litigation on this subject which is surprising, and would seem to indicate a very defective system.

We have before spoken of the character of the Illinois Reports, we still think that the head-notes are constructed upon a radically wrong principle, but we have so often said our say on this head that we spare ourselves and our readers its repetition.

These volumes show an agreeable lack of dissent, which would seem to indicate a more harmonious bench than Illinois has always been blessed with.

Reports of Cases in Law and Equity, determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. By EDWARD H. STILES. Vol. III., being Vol. XXIV. of the series. Ottumwa: Published by the Reporter. 1869.

WE have here the cases decided at the December Term, 1867, and June Term, 1868. We note a few of the more generally interesting.

In Morrison v. Marquardt, p. 35, the question arose as to implied easements of light and air. It was admitted that the general doctrine, as established in England, is that if a man owning two lots, on one of which is a house having windows looking over the other lot, which is vacant, sells the house lot, he cannot build on the other lot so as to shut off the light and air from the house. The court were able, from the special circumstances of the case, to take the case at bar out of this general rule, but they expressed a strong opinion that the rule itself had no existence in the jurisprudence of the State.

In very many of the States it has been decided that no easement of light and air can be acquired by prescription, but we know of no direct adjudication by the court of final appeal in any State, that such easements may not be created by implication.

A question of considerable practical importance is decided in Smith v. McLean, p. 322. A. mortgaged property (cattle and wagons) in Kansas to B. by a mortgage duly executed and recorded as required by the laws of that State. A. took the property into Missouri and sold it to C., who brought it into Iowa. Held, that B. the mortgagee could maintain replevin against C. the purchaser.

In McAfferty v. Hale, p. 355, it is held that where a written instrument is void for want of a stamp, the original contract remains unaffected thereby, and may be proved by oral testimony if not within the Statute of Frauds. This goes a good way in abating the rigor of the Stamp Act; the Supreme Court of Iowa has hitherto been rather stringent in enforcing its provisions.

P., a farmer, insured against fire property described in the policy as follows: "Dwelling-house, $400; grain in stack or crib, $600; seven horses, $750; cattle, $275. Situated section 22, town 99, R. 7 west." The policy by its terms was to become void "if the risk be increased by the erection of adjacent buildings, or by any other means without the assent of the company." P., while hauling his grain to market, stopped for the night at an inn and put his horses in the inn stable, where they were more exposed to risk than on his farm. The stable was burned, and with it one of the horses. The company had given no assent to the removal of the property from "section 22." Held, that they were nevertheless liable, and that the risk assumed by them was not limited to the use of the horses on "section 22," but extended to the usual and ordinary use of them, whether on the farm or temporarily absent therefrom. Peterson v. Miss. Valley Ins. Co., p 494.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. By J. SHAAFF STOCKETT, State Reporter. Vol. XXVIII. Containing Cases in October Term, 1867, and April Term, 1868. Baltimore: John Murphy & Company. 1869.

THERE are about fifty cases in this volume, many on points of practice; but we note here some of those of more general interest.

A husband executed a bill of sale to secure to his wife the repayment of a sum of money, part of her separate estate, which he had previously received with her acquiescence, and which he had not at the time of such receipt promised to repay. Held, that the bill of sale was void as against prior creditors. Kuhn v. Stansfield, p. 210.

In State v. Warren, p. 338, the court held that a bequest to an unincorporated religious society is void. This is in accordance with Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 H. & J. 392; s.c. 6 H. & J. 1, which decided that Statute 43 Eliz., concerning charitable uses, was not in force in Maryland, and that, independent of that statute, a court of equity had no power to sustain a charitable devise which would be void at law. In most of the States, such devises and bequests have been sustained either on the ground that the 43d of Elizabeth was still in force, as in Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146, or on the ground that even without the Statute a court of chancery would sustain such gifts as in Witman v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88. The only States in which distinct determinations against the power of chancery to support charitable gifts have been made would seem to be the three adjacent States of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. Perhaps New York should be added. See Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584, though the decisions in that State have been so conflicting as to leave the matter in some doubt.

In Greenwood v. Greenwood, p. 369, a father was allowed to maintain an action for the seduction of his minor daughter, though she had lived in the defendant's house for two years, and had received wages there for her own use. This is relaxing the doctrine of the common law very far. It may be a great absurdity to

found the action for seduction on loss of service, but to say that there is a loss of service in such a case as this seems a still greater absurdity.

In Schaferman v. O'Brien, pp. 565, 574, the court say that "We are not aware of any case in the judicial history of this State, where the provisions of the statute of Henry VIII. [against champerty] have been enforced-without meaning to assert that there might not be such exceptionable conduct, savoring of champerty and maintenance, as to be punishable, yet there can be no doubt that this statute is, in a great measure, now obsolete."

The arguments in these cases are often reported with a fulness greatly disproportionate to their value.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. ALBERT G. BROWNE, Jr., Reporter. Vol. II., being Massachusetts Reports, Vol. XCVIII. Boston: H. O. Houghton & Company. 1869. THERE are no great cases in this volume, but we have seldom seen a book of reports where so many interesting practical questions have come up for decision. We have drawn liberally from it for our Digest, and will here only notice a few of the decisions on points where there has been a conflict of authority.

In Cook v. Charlestown, p. 80, the court carried out the principle of Kingsbury v. Dedham, 13 All. 186, and Cook v. Charlestown, ib. 190, and held that if a horse becomes frightened at an object in the highway which is an obstruction and defect therein, and with which, but for his fright, he would have come in contact, and by reason of such fright, without coming in contact with it, he runs away and overturns the carriage at a place where there is no defect, the town is not liable for injury to the driver, under a statute making towns liable for injuries caused by defects in public ways. The courts of Vermont, Connecticut, and New Hampshire have held to the contrary, and have decided under similar statutes that objects frightful to horses are obstructions" or "insufficiences." See Morse v. Richmond (Vt. Sup. Ct.), 8 Am. Law Reg. (N.s.) 81; Dimock v. Suffield, 30 Conn. 129; Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N.H. 356; Bartlett v. Hooksett, 3 Am. Law Rev. 385. The case last cited, in which the frightful object was a pigsty occupied by five swine, and the declaration in which alleged that the horse was frightened by the swine's "starting and running about," "and by certain loud noises which the said swine then and there uttered," has the support of Judge Redfield's emphatic approval; he declares that it affords him great support as he travels down the Western declivity of life. 8 Am. Law Reg. (N.s) 94.

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In Tucker Manufacturing Co. v. Fairbanks, p. 101, it was held that on a bill drawn on the P. Insurance Company and signed "F. & Co., Agts. P. Ins. Co.," F. & Co. were liable personally as drawers. The case of Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461, in which a note signed by "J. T., agent for D. P.," was held not binding on J. T., was cited for the defendants, but the court distinguished it by the use of the word "for."

In Wilcox v. Wilcox, 13 All. 252, the court, adopting what may be called the American rule, held, that if on the death of a partner there remained, after winding up the partnership concerns, real estate of the partnership in which the legal title of the deceased partner corresponded to his share in the partnership, such real estate would not be considered in equity as converted into personalty, and that the deceased partner's share would go to his heirs and not to his next of kin.

In Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107, the same rule is extended to the case where the legal title does not correspond to the interest in the partnership. It seems pretty obvious that there can be no distinction between these two cases, nor is it easy to answer the argument against the change from realty to personalty founded on the general doctrines of equitable conversion; yet it seems to us that there are considerations in favor of holding, with the English courts, that partnership real estate is converted out and out, which were not sufficiently adverted to by the court. By these two cases it would appear to lie very much in the power of the surviving partner whether the share of his deceased copartner shall go to that partner's heirs or to his next of kin; and in fact, in the case of Shearer v. Shearer, the surviving partner actually used the personal assets in paying off encumbrances on the real estate of the partnership. Would he have been justified in selling partnership real estate to pay off mortgages on ships? or is this a power which he can exercise only in favor of the heir and not of the administrator?

In Harvey v. Varney, p. 118, the court held that a contract, whether executed or executory, for the conveyance of either real or personal property to defraud the grantor's creditors is good between the parties, though the grantee shared in the fraudulent intent. This is contrary to Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. 24. No part of the law is in a more chaotic condition than those cases which involve the application of the maxim, Ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

A promise to accept a bill of exchange, contained in a letter from the drawee to the drawer, written after the bill has been negotiated, will not enable the holder to sue the drawee as acceptor. Exchange Bank of St. Louis v. Rice, p. 288. The English cases are the other way.

An oral promise to pay the debt of another is within the Statute of Frauds if the original debtor remains liable and no consideration moves from the creditor to the new promisor; although there is a valuable consideration moving from the original debtor to the new promisor. Furbish v. Goodnow, p. 296. There is a great conflict of authority on this point, as the reader may see by consulting the notes to Birkmyr v. Darnell, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. *371.

There are many more cases of interest in the volume, but we have left ourselves no room to notice them.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin. With Tables of the Cases and Principal Matters. By O. M. CONOVER, Official Reporter. Vol. XXII. Containing all the Cases decided before August, 1868, and not previously reported. Chicago: Callaghan & Cockcroft. 1869.

WE shall examine this volume, with care, for the Digest in the next number of the Law Review. In the mean time we insert here some of the more noteworthy

cases.

The first case in the volume is Peterson v. Johnson. A garnishee gave his note to the defendant in the garnishee suit, for the whole claim of the defendant against him, with an oral agreement that if judgment should be recovered against him as garnishee, the amount of the judgment should be deducted from the note. Such judgment was afterwards rendered against him and was paid by him. Held, that these facts might be shown, by parol evidence, in an action on the note to prove a partial failure of consideration.

In Sayles v. Davis, p. 225, it is held that Congress has no constitutional power, without the assent of a State, to impose a stamp duty on tax deeds executed under the laws of the State, such deeds being necessary instruments in raising the revenue of the State; and in Jones v. Davis, p. 421, it was held, that if a stamp is essential to the validity of a deed, an averment that the deed was made imports that it was stamped.

On the question of damages on breach of the covenant of seisin, as to which there has been such a conflict of decision, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin hold in Mecklem v. Blake, p. 495, that if there has been no eviction, or other actual injury, the grantee can recover only nominal damages for the breach.

An oral agreement for a right to draw logs over the defendant's land, for a period less than a year, for a money consideration (the agreement not being an incident to a valid grant), is a mere revocable license. Duinneen v. Rich, p. 550. The consideration money had not been paid in this case, but the court say that its receipt would not have estopped the licensor from revoking the license. Whether if the licensee had expended money on the faith of the license, the license could have been revoked, quære.

In Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R.R. Co., p. 615, the court take a course which we do not remember to have seen adopted elsewhere. In setting aside a verdict for damages as excessive and ordering a new trial, they intimate the maximum amount that they will allow to stand.

This volume contains more than the ordinary proportion of useful cases, and the style of reporting shows the most gratifying improvement.

Report of the Trial of Samuel M. Andrews, indicted for the murder of Cornelius Holmes, before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Dec. 11, 1868. Including the Rulings of the Court upon many questions of law, and a full statement of authorities upon the subject of Transitory Insanity. By CHARLES G. DAVIS, of Counsel for the Prisoner. New York: Hurd & Houghton.

1869.

THIS trial, for the combined reasons that the prisoner was a deacon in an Orthodox church, and that the evidence was particularly nasty, was a popular favorite, but the most important legal, or rather medico-legal, matter in this report of the case (which is very handsomely got up) attaches to the conflict between the medical experts on the possibility of transitory insanity. The jury negatived the theory of insanity by bringing the prisoner in guilty of manslaughter. The jury were right in not finding him guilty of murder, at the same time the court were right in inflicting upon him the heaviest sentence which the statute allows for the crime of manslaughter. Accepting his story as true, the prisoner acted under grievous provocation, but he was greatly to blame for continuing to consort with one from whom he knew such provocation was to be expected.

The Three Powers of Government. The Origin of the United States; and the Status of the Southern States, on the Suppression of the Rebellion. The Three Dangers of the Republic. By JOEL PARKER.

WE cannot recommend these lectures as agreeable reading, but they are salutary and instructive. The Kentucky judge who spoke of Judge Parker as a