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and are badly reported, but Mr. Brightly has been very happy in giving, concisely and accurately, the points decided.

Mr. Brightly's failing, and though it be a failing which leans to virtue's side it is still a failing, is love of overmuch brevity; especially in a manual which is intended to aid lawyers, whether they have the original authorities within reach or not, a fuller statement would have added to the value of the book. For instance, such a sentence as this: "As to when the Court of Bankruptcy will enjoin proceedings in a State court, see Ex parte Reed, 6 Int. R. Rec. 21; Ex parte Jacoby, Ibid. 149; Ex parte Robinson, 2 Bank Reg. 108; Ex parte Campbell, 16 Am. L. R. 100,' would not materially assist a lawyer who had not by him the Internal Revenue Record, the Bankruptcy Register, and the American Law Register.

The typography and general "get up" of the book are singularly pleasing. Notes on the General Statutes of Massachusetts. By URIEL H. CROCKER & GEORGE G. CROCKER. Little, Brown &, Company. 1869.

THE main design of this book is to give the statutes and decisions since the publication of the General Statutes which affect the law as laid down in that revision of the Laws of Massachusetts. How great assistance such a book, accurately done, would be to every lawyer in the Commonwealth need not be said. It would be in daily use and save an incalculable amount of time and waste of patience; but such a book, inaccurately done, would be worse than useless.

Fortunately, we have a guaranty in Mr. U. H. Crocker's former book, "Notes on Common Forms," of the thoroughness with which he works. The Notes on Common Forms have been growing, and deservedly growing, in popularity since their publication, and we congratulate the profession in Massachusetts that a work which is of so great importance to them has fallen into competent hands. The Messrs. Crocker have also noted many of the decisions prior to the General Statutes which touch directly, or by analogy, on the earlier laws retained in the revision. This collection of earlier decisions does not profess to be full, but Mr. Crocker's incompleteness is better than many people's completeness.

Common Bench Reports. New Series. Cases argued and determined in the Court of Common Pleas, and in the Exchequer Chamber, in Michaelmas Term and Vacation, 1863, and Hilary Term, 1864. By JOHN SCOTT, Esq. Vol. XV. With References to Decisions in the American Courts. JAMES PARSONS, Esq., Editor. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1869.

WE recall no reporter whose career is so long, nor who has been concerned in publishing so many volumes, as Mr. Scott; if, indeed, the John Scott, Esq., who has been so long occupied in giving to the world the arguments and determinations in the Common Pleas be one and the same individual. He began in 1831, near forty years ago, by editing, in conjunction with Mr. Moore, the four volumes of Moore and Scott, then came the eight volumes of Scott's Reports, next eight volumes of Scott's New Reports; then, in company with Mr. Manning and Mr. Granger, he edited the nineteen volumes of the Common Bench Reports, and afterwards he brought out alone the twenty volumes of the New Series of the Common Bench, and when the series of the Law Reports was started he did not retire, but was enrolled among the regular reporters of the Council of Law

Reporting, has edited already three of the annual volumes of the Common Pleas Reports, and is at work, with unabated vigor, at the fourth. In all, he has taken part in the preparation of sixty-two volumes, though but a small part of that number are cited by his name. All of them have now been republished in America, except the sixteenth, seventeenth, and twentieth of the New Series of the Common Bench Reports, the fifteenth of that series is now before us.

The cases it contains were decided five or six years ago, but as this is the first time that they appear in America, in a generally accessible shape, we notice some of the points decided.

The plaintiff had, in a cause of collision in the Admiralty, obtained the whole proceeds of the sale of the defendant's vessel, but the amount so recovered was insufficient to cover the damage he had sustained. Held, that such recovery was no bar to a subsequent action at common law. Nelson v. Couch, p. 99. There is an American note to the case.

It is no defence to an action for money paid at the request of the defendants, to plead that the money was paid in respect of losses on wagering contracts which the plaintiff had made as broker for the defendant with third persons. Rosewarne v. Billing, p. 316.

A. deposited a dock-warrant for brandies with B., as a security for a loan, which was to be repaid on Jan. 29th, or, in default, the brandies were to be forfeited. On the 28th, B. agreed to sell the brandies to C., and on the 29th delivered to him the dock-warrant; C. took actual possession on the 30th. The court agreed that, as A. had the whole of the 29th to redeem, the delivery of the dock-warrant to C. was a conversion; but on the measure of damages they disagreed. Erle, C. J., and Byles and Keating, JJ., held that A. ought to recover the actual damage he had sustained by the conversion, which, as there was no intention on A.'s part to redeem, was merely nominal, but Williams, J., held, that the proper measure of damages was the value of the thing converted. Stear, p. 330. An American note is appended to this case also. v. Cubley, post, p. 701.

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Johnson v.

See Pigot

The head-note to Blackman v. Bainton, p. 432, is quaint. Twenty-five witnesses and a horse on one side, against ten witnesses on the other. Held, not such a preponderance of 'inconvenience' as to induce the court to bring back the venue from the place where the cause of action (if any) arose."

A., B., and C. agreed that each should furnish £3000 worth of goods, to be shipped on a joint adventure, the profits to be divided according to the amount of their several shipments. Held, that this did not constitute a partnership between the three, so as to make B. and C. responsible for goods bought by A. to furnish his quota of the cargo. Heap v. Dobson, p. 460.

In 1851, the defendant forbade his wife to incur debts for clothing for herself and two daughters, telling her he would allow her 501. for that purpose, beside 651. which was settled to her separate use. In 1860, the wife contracted a debt with the plaintiffs for clothing. The plaintiffs had no notice of the revocation of the wife's authority. In an action against the husband to recover the price of the goods, the jury found that the articles were necessaries, that the wife's authority was revoked in 1851, that if the 1157. had been regularly paid it would have been sufficient, but that it was not regularly paid, and that what was paid was insufficient. Held, by Erle, C. J., and Williams and Willes, JJ., that the plaintiffs

were not entitled to recover, but by Byles, J., that they were, on the ground that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the arrangement between the husband and wife. Jolly v. Rees, p. 628.

It is no answer to an action by a ship-owner against the charterer to recover freight, that, by the fault of the master and crew, the cargo was so damaged as, upon arrival, to be of less value than the freight, and that it was abandoned by the charterer to the ship-owner. The point is new in English jurisprudence. Dakin v. Oxley, p. 646.

An agreement between A. and B., that B. may dig and carry away gravel from the land of A., need not be by deed. Smart v. Jones, p. 717.

The additional case" at the end of the volume from the House of Lords, is a suit by the litigious Dr. Philpotts, Bishop of Exeter, against one Marshall, and turns on questions of Canon Law, and the right of presentation to a benefice. Reports of Cases argued and determined in the District Courts of the United States within the Second Circuit. By ROBERT D. BENEDICT. Vol. I., Nos. 4, 5, and 6. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1869.

THESE numbers contain cases decided by Judges Shipman and Blatchford, in July, August, September, October, and November, 1867, and complete the first volume of Benedict's Reports. The first three numbers were noticed in the third volume of the Law Review, pp. 146, 354, 549.

In the case of The Ship Patrick Henry, p. 292, British sovereigns were shipped at Melbourne, under a bill of lading, by which they were to be delivered in New York, on payment of £2 freight. On failure to deliver, it was held that the rule of damages was the market value of the sovereigns as merchandise in the currency of the country at the port of delivery, and that the Legal Tender Act had no application. It was also held that freight was to be reckoned in currency according to the laws of the United States, which fix the legal value of the pound sterling, in commercial transactions, at $4.44.

filed by material-men, and the One of the libels was filed by Held, that the court had no juris

In The Ship Adele, p. 309, several libels were vessel was sold and the proceeds paid into court. a person claiming a lien under a State statute. diction to enforce the lien given by the State law.

In Kennedy v. Dodge, p. 311, the owners of goods brought by a vessel from a foreign port had notice of the landing of their goods, and took part of them away. Before they took the rest, the master of the vessel improperly loaded the pier with other goods in such a way that the pier broke down and the goods were damaged. Held, that although there had been a constructive delivery, the owners of the vessel were liable for the damage caused by the overloading of the wharf.

In the matter of Seymour, p. 348, it was held that under the twenty-sixth section of the Bankruptcy Act, a bankrupt may, notwithstanding the pendency of proceedings in bankruptcy by or against him, be held under arrest in a civil action, if it is founded on a debt or claim from which his discharge in bankruptcy would not release him.

In The Bark Merrimac, p. 490, a Chinaman having been sworn as a witness on the Bible in the ordinary way, objection was made on the ground that the oath was not binding on his conscience. Being examined on the point, he stated that he did not know the name of the book that he was sworn on, but that if he should

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say any thing that was not true, the court would punish him, and after he was dead he should go down there," making an emphatic gesture downward with his hand. Held, that his testimony was admissible.

In The Bark J. G Paint, p. 545, the court sustained an agreement to pay a steamboat $3000, as salvage compensation for towing a bark worth $8000, with a cargo of sugar, from Absecom Light, on the New Jersey shore, to New York. The time occupied in towing the vessel was twenty-seven hours.

The steamer Saragossa was the subject of two suits for salvage, reported pp. 551, 553. In the first, when on a voyage to Charleston, she broke her machinery, though her hull and masts remained sound, and was towed to Charleston, about sixty miles, by another steamer, the latter losing two or three hours, the Saragossa saving three or four days. The salving vessel with her cargo was worth $230,000, while the Saragossa and her cargo were worth $100,000. The court awarded $900 salvage, $400 of which went to the owners. In the second suit the same vessel, while on a voyage to New York, broke her machinery, and was towed by a steamer, the Charles W. Lord, for about thirty-four hours, to Fortress Monroe, and thence to Norfolk, where the Charles W. Lord was obliged to go for coal. After their arrival at Fortress Monroe it stormed so heavily that the Charles W. Lord could not go to sea till the second day after, and was then somewhat injured by the severe weather, and had to return to Norfolk for coal. The court held that the fact that the Charles W. Lord was saved from exposure by going into Fortress Monroe could not be taken into account to diminish her compensation, nor could the storms she afterwards incurred be taken into account to increase it. The Saragossa, with cargo and freight, was worth $100,000, the Charles W. Lord, with her cargo and freight, was worth $434,000, both carried passengers. $9000 was awarded as salvage, half going to the owners.

Reports of Cases determined in the Supreme Court of the State of California, at the April and July Terms, 1868. J. E. HALE, Reporter. Volume 35. San Francisco: Sumner Whitney. 1869.

THIS Volume has not reached us in time to be employed in the digest of American cases for this number; we shall make use of it in January, but we note here some of the cases.

An action was brought in a court, the judge of which was disqualified from hearing the case on account of relationship to one of the defendants. The defendants did not appear, and the clerk entered a default. Held, that the default was People v. De Carrillo,

rightly entered, and judgment could be rendered thereon.

p. 37.

Falkinburg v. Lucy, p. 52, is a case of trade-marks, which will afford the reader both amusement and instruction.

A mortgage given in good faith to secure future advances is valid, though it does not state on its face that it is to secure such advances. Tully v. Harloe, p. 302. A tenant covenanted to keep the demised premises in repair, "damages by the elements or acts of Providence" being excepted. Near the demised premises was a natural reservoir sufficiently protected by an embankment; some strangers meddled with this embankment, and so injured it that it gave way, and the waters rushed over the demised premises. Held, that the damage thus caused was not within the exception. Polack v. Pioche, p. 416.

The California Statute of Limitations provides that civil actions shall be commenced within certain periods "after the cause of action shall have accrued." It was held that the bar of the statute might both commence and continue to run against a claim, though there was no person legally competent to enforce the claim by suit. Tynan v. Walker, p. 634.

A law of mining claims has grown up in California very different in many of its doctrines from the rules affecting other real estate, but in some respects the courts insist on standing in the ancient ways. Thus in People v. Williams, p. 671, the indictment alleged that the defendant "did unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away from the mining claim of A. fifty-two pounds of goldbearing quartz rock, the personal property of said A." After conviction, judgment was arrested on the ground that it did not sufficiently appear that the rock was not a part of the realty, and that if the rock was a part of the realty the act was a trespass and not a larceny.

Reports of Cases at Law and in Chancery argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Illinois. By NORMAN L. FREEMAN. Vols. XLII. and XLIII. Chicago: E. B. Myers. 1869.

THESE two volumes, published in rapid succession, contain the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the course of about a twelvemonth.

The most important and interesting class of decisions are those relating to railroads; there are, in the two volumes, twenty-four cases in which a railroad is either plaintiff or defendant. In St. Louis, Allon, &c., R.R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176, it was held that a railroad company could discriminate in its fares between those passengers who purchased tickets and those who did not, provided it gave a reasonable opportunity for the purchase of tickets, and it was further held that such reasonable opportunity was given if the ticket office was kept open up to the time announced for the departure of a train, though not kept open up to the time of its actual departure.

In Adams's Express Co. v. Haynes, 42 Ill. 89, it was held, reaffirming the law as hitherto laid down in Illinois, that the mere delivery by a common carrier of a receipt for goods to the party sending the goods, does not conclude the sender as having given his assent to the conditions printed on the receipt. To a like effect is a recent decision in Massachusetts. Perry v. Thompson, 98 Mass. 249.

In the same case of Adams's Express Co. v. Haynes, it was held that the exception to the general rule excluding the evidence of parties which permits the owner of a lost trunk to testify as to its contents, in a suit against a carrier, does not extend to the case of a consignor of goods, but is restricted in its application to luggage accompanying a person when travelling.

In the case of Walters v. Smith, 23 Ill. 345, the Supreme Court of Illinois followed the leading case of Walton v. Shelley, 1 T. R. 296, and held that an indorser of a promissory note was not competent to impeach its validity. Walton v. Shelley is now overruled in England, and has not been followed in New York nor in several other States, and in Walters v. Witherell, 43 Ill. 388, a strenuous attempt was made to induce the Illinois court to review their decision on the ground that the question "had not received such fulness of consideration as to finally settle the rule." But the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling.

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