ib. 397; Norwood v. Mills, ib. 422; Payne v. Douglass, ib. 280; Marcy v. Steele, ib. 413; Lemon v. West, ib. 427; Schlenker v. Taliaferro, ib. 565.

2. A note being nearly barred by the Statute of Limitations, a new one was given and accepted, so antedated as to extend the time of payment only about a year. Held, that the new note was barred in six years from the date when it purported to become due, although six years had not elapsed from the time it was given. —Paul v. Smith, 3 Vroom, 13.

MARRIED WOMAN.

- See ACCESSION, 2; HOMESTEAD; HUSBAND AND WIFE. - See CONTRACT, 6; SEDUCTION.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES. - See DAMAGES.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. - See WAGER.

MORTGAGE.

Plaintiff conveyed land "subject to a mortgage" previously made by him. The purchaser then conveyed said land to defendant's wife. Defendant then bought the mortgage. Plaintiff tendered the sum due and costs, and demanded an assignment of the bond and mortgage to a third person for his benefit. This was decreed, and defendant was enjoined from suing on the bond. — Johnson v. Zink, 52 Barb. 396.

See COVENANT, 1.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. An action will not lie in behalf of an individual who has sustained special damage from the neglect of a public corporation to perform a public duty. Pray v. Mayor of Jersey City, 3 Vroom, 394.

2. A city having the power and duty of lighting its streets is liable for injuries or death caused by a party's falling off a bridge, opened for the passage of a vessel, in consequence of its being insufficiently lighted. - Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 179. See as to sidewalks, Bloomington v. Bay, ib. 503.

See CONTRACT, 2; FIRE.

NATIONAL BANK.

Section 41 of the Act of Congress of June 3, 1864, provides that shares in national banks may be assessed under State authority "at the place where said bank is located and not elsewhere." Held, that these words mean literally at the site of the bank, and are not designed only to define the State authority which is to be allowed to impose the tax (WALTON, DICKERSON, & TAPLEY, JJ., dissenting). — Packard v. Lewiston, 55 Me. 456; Mayor of Nashville v. Thomas, 5 Cold. 600. But see State v. Cook, 3 Vroom, 347; Austin v. The Aldermen, 7 Wallace, 694.

See TAX, 1, 2.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. A child was killed by the fall of a counter on which he was climbing, and which had been left in the street of a city for two or three weeks. The child was

six years old, and at the time of his death was playing, unattended, six blocks from home. Held, that the city was no more negligent than the parents of the child, and was not liable. — Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174.

2. If a child under four years of age is injured by the negligence of third persons in the street of a city traversed constantly by cars and other vehicles, his father cannot recover for loss of service, if he has knowingly suffered the child to be in such street unattended.— Glassey v. Hestonville, &c., Railway Co., 57 Penn. St. 172.

3. Otherwise, of an action by the child itself, although the negligence of a volunteer, undertaking to interfere for the child's benefit, contributed to the injury. — North Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 Penn. St. 187.

4. One who sells gunpowder to a child eight years old, knowing that he is unfit to be trusted with it, is liable if the child, using the care of which he is capable, "explodes" it and is burned by the same, and a license to sell gunpowder is no defence. Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567.

5. One whose servant negligently throws a keg out of a window and injures a person passing through a passage-way below, is liable, although such person was there only by license. Corrigan v. Union Sugar Refinery, 98 Mass. 577.

6. A slight want of care on the part of a plaintiff will not excuse gross negligence of the defendants.-Bequette v. People's Transportation Co., 2 Oregon, 200.

7. Plaintiff was driving in the highway, using due care, when defendant's hog, running at large contrary to statute, frightened plaintiff's horse, and his minor daughter was injured in consequence. Held, that defendant was liable, although he did not know the hog was at large. — Jewett v. Gage, 55 Me. 538.

See CARRIER, 3, 5–8; CHECK, 1-3; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; RAILROAD,

6-8. NOTICE.

See ATTACHMENT; BILLS AND Notes, 3; CARRIER, 11; CHECK, 2, 3, 5; EQUITABLE CONVERSION; LANDLORD AND TENANT; NUISANCE, 6.

NUISANCE.

1. A public bowling alley kept in connection with a lager beer saloon in a populous town is not, per se, a public nuisance; nor is it made a common gaming house by the fact that the loser of the games habitually pays for the use of the alleys. State v. Hall, 3 Vroom, 158.

2. A dense smoke laden with cinders, liable to continue twelve hours twice a month, and to penetrate houses at distances of from forty to two hundred feet, in a part of a town occupied by mechanics for their homes and for trades requiring a certain amount of smoke, was held to be a nuisance, and an injunction granted. ·Ross v. Butler, 4 C. E. Green, 294.

3. Defendants owned very large iron works, in which it was necessary to use semi-bituminous coal, and impossible to consume the smoke without hurting the iron. The plaintiff's house and factory were materially injured and deteriorated in value by said smoke. Held, that in view of the damage which an injunction would cause, and as the injury could be compensated for at law, an injunction ought not to be granted. — Richards's Appeal, 57 Penn. St. 105.

4. The court also refused to enjoin the rebuilding of a planing mill, although it increased the danger of fire, and although it was alleged that it would prevent

"the use of the neighboring ground for such buildings as would, in the ordinary course of affairs, and the extension of the city in that direction, be put up there," in addition to the likelihood of smoke, &c. (READ & SHARSWOOD, JJ., dissenting). — Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Penn. St. 274.

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5. Plaintiff owned land described in the deed to him as running to a on Broad Street, thence easterly along Broad Street," &c. Defendants built a platform in Broad Street, in front of plaintiff's lot and on his side of the way. Held, that as plaintiff presumptively owned to the middle of the street, he could maintain a private suit. — Higbee v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 4 C. E. Green, 276.

6. One who continues a nuisance may be sued without notice or a request to him to abate it.— Conhocton Stone Co. v. Buffalo, N.Y., & E. R.R. Co., 52 Barb. 390.

PARDON.-See SLAVE, 3.

PARENT AND CHILD.

A father cannot sue in his own name for money due his minor son in consideration of his enlistment under a contract made with the father's consent. — Mears Bickford, 55 Me. 528.

Y.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1, 2; SEDUCTION.

PARTIES. See CORPORATION, 3.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. The firm of L. & I. was deeply in debt, and some of its creditors were pressing for payment. While L. was temporarily absent in a neighboring State, I. assigned all the property of the firm for the benefit of creditors, making certain preferences. Then the property was attached in the hands of the assignee by way of garnishment. Later, L. ratified I.'s assignment. Held, that the assignment was without authority and void as against the attaching creditor. — Stein v. Ladow, 13 Minn. 412.

2. When there remains partnership real estate after dissolution and settlement of debts and balances between the partners, equity will not convert it into personalty, although the legal title of each partner does not correspond with his share, but will only direct conveyances to bring about such correspondence. — Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107.

See CONTRACT, 1; FRAUD.

PART PERFORMANCE.-See ASSUMPSIT; HOMESTEAD.

PATENT.-See CONTRACT, 2.

PAYMENT.

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Payment of taxes upon real estate by one having no interest in the same does not enure to the benefit of the owner. Jayne v. Gregg, 42 Ill. 413.

See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 2, 4; INSURANCE, 3; LEGAL TENDER, 1, 2, 5–7.

PERIL OF THE SEA.

A hidden obstruction recently created in the channel of a river is a peril of the

sea. — Redpath v. Vaughan, 52 Barb. 489.

PERPETUITY.

A bequest is valid, which does not, under the circumstances existing when the will goes into operation, violate the rule against perpetuities, although by its terms and under the circumstances existing at the date of the will it was too remote. Hosea v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65.

POSSESSION. See FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

POWER.

A., having an equitable life estate with a power of appointment in fee by will, made a will with specific provisions for some of his heirs, and left "all the rest of my property, real and personal," to the others by name. A. died seised of other land to which this clause applied, and gave his executors power to sell any and all the estate "which I may leave at my decease." Held, that the residuary clause operated as an execution of the power. - Bangs v. Smith, 98 Mass. 270. See CHARITY, 3.

PREFERENCE. See ASSIGNMENT; PARTNERSHIP, 1.

PRESCRIPTION. - See EASEMENT, 2.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The secretary of a company bought a set of books with his own money, and entered in them the minutes of the proceedings of the corporators, and received in them the subscriptions to stock. On going out of office he refused to give up said books. Held, that the books belonged to the company, and that the secretary had no lien on them. Mandamus issued. State v. Goll, 3 Vroom, 285.

See ATTACHMENT; BANK; BILLS AND NOTES, 2; BROKER; CARRIER, 10; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 4; CUSTOM, 1; INSURANCE, 3.

PROMISSORY NOTE.-See BILLS AND NOTES.

PROTEST.-See BILLS AND NOTES, 3.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.

Under a statute making railroad companies liable for fires "communicated” by their engines, a railroad company is liable for the destruction of woods half a mile from its track by a fire started by a spark from one of its engines and spreading across land of different proprietors and a highway in a direct line to said woods. Perley v. Eastern Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 414.

For other cases of fire caused by an engine, see Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 42 Ill. 355; Same v. Mills, ib. 407.

See WAY, 2, 3.

PUBLIC USE. See EASEMENT, 1; FIRE.

RAILROAD.

1. In a contract between companies owning connecting railroads, for the continuous transportation of passengers and freight over both lines, an agreement by which one company allows part of the fares earned on its line to the other company, is valid. So, as to extensions of the road to be authorized by future legislation. Sussex R.R. Co. v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 4 C. E. Green, 13.

2. Defendants, without notifying the consignees, unloaded coal carried by them

upon the bare ground, and so carelessly that different sorts were mixed together and with the soil. Held, that defendants' liability as carriers did not cease until they had unloaded the coal with due care and put it in a reasonably safe place. Rice v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Co., 98 Mass. 212. See Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Scott, 42 Ill. 132.

3. Plaintiff was ejected from a car for refusing to pay for his passage except by a ticket issued on a previous day, and marked "Good for this day only." He then showed a good ticket and attempted to enter the car, which he was forcibly prevented from doing. Held, that his exclusion was justifiable. State v. Camp

bell, 3 Vroom, 309.

4. If a passenger refuses to surrender his ticket to the conductor of a train when called for, as required by the rules of the company, he may be put off at any place not selected as dangerous or inconvenient, and this although the company is forbidden by statute to expel a passenger for non-payment of fare except at a regular station. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420. See Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Flagg, ib. 364.

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5. Railroad passengers who have not purchased tickets before entering the cars, having had a reasonable opportunity to do so, may be charged a larger fare and ejected for refusal to pay; and if the railroad company have kept their ticket office open for some time before and up to the time fixed for the departure of each train and the train is delayed, they need not keep the office open till the actual departure of the train. - St. Louis, Alton, & Terre Haute R.R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill. 176. See Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Flagg, ib. 364; Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 438.

6. Case for personal injuries caused by plaintiff's horse being frightened by two loud, sudden, and sharp whistles from defendants' engine, and upsetting his carriage. Held, that whether or not the above was a proper signal in the use of ordinary care was for the jury. A verdict for the plaintiff was upheld. — Hill v. Portland & Rochester R.R. Co., 55 Me. 438.

7. A railroad company was required by statute to maintain "fences suitable for the security of the land-owner" on both sides of its road. Plaintiff's sheep having been suffered to go unlawfully on land adjoining said road, got through a defective part of the fence upon the road and were killed by the train. It did not appear that the train was negligently managed. Held, that the company was not liable. Eames v. Salem & Lowell R.R. Co., 98 Mass. 560. See Toledo, Wabash, & W.R.R. Co. v. Furgusson, 42 Ill. 449; Price v. N. J. R.R. & T. Co., 3 Vroom, 19. 8. Otherwise, if the company were grossly negligent. - Illinois Central R.R. Co., v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77.

See CARRIERS, 2-11; CONSIGNOR; EASEMENT, 1; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 4; NEGLIGENCE, 2, 3.

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REBELLION. See CONFEDERACY; CONFEDERATE MONEY; CONTRACT, 1, 4; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 1-3; LAW OF NATIONS.

RECONSTRUCTION ACT.

Under the Reconstruction Acts of March 2 and 23, 1867, commanders of military districts could set aside contracts entered into by municipal authorities. State v.

Heath, 20 La. An. 518.