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money into court and for an injunction, on the plaintiff's giving an undertaking as to damages. Order of MALINS, V.C., reversed.—Manby v. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. 347.

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1. B. made a second mortgage of certain premises to the defendants by an indenture which was executed by B. but not by the defendants, who, however, advanced money on it. B. by the deed conveyed the premises in fee, on trust for sale; "and as a further security for the principal and interest for the time being due from B., . . . B. did thereby attorn and become tenant to the defendants, their heirs, &c., for and during the term of ten years, if that security should so long continue," at a certain rent payable on each 1st of October. "Provided that . . . without any notice or demand. . . it should be lawful for the defendants, their heirs, &c., before or after the execution of the trusts of sale," to enter on the premises, eject B., and determine the said term of ten years. B. accordingly continued in occupation, and, rent not being paid on the first rent day, the defendants distrained. It appeared by the deed that the defendants had only an equity of redemption. Held, that the intention of the parties, as shown by the deed, and that the effect of the Statute of Frauds on the same, was to create a tenancy at will, and that B. became tenant at will on attornment; also that B. was estopped by the deed to deny that the defendants had a legal reversion, although the truth appeared. (Exch. Ch.) — Morton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Q. B. 293; s.c. L. R. 3 Q. B. 658; 3 Am. Law Rev. 703.

2. Defendant entered upon, occupied, and paid rent for premises under a demise for a term of years, made on behalf of a corporation, the owners, but not sealed with the corporate seal. By this agreement, defendant undertook to make certain repairs. Held, that he was bound by his stipulation. He had become tenant from year to year on the terms of the demise applicable to such a tenancy. — Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Merral, L. R. 4 Exch. 162.

See COVENANT, 1.

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LAPSED DEVISE.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 4.
LAW OF NATIONS.-See REBELLION.

See COVENANT, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT; MORTGAGE, 3; VENDOR
AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.

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1. Bequest to testator's son L. for life, and after his decease equally between and amongst the wife of L. (in case she should survive him) and all and every the child and children of L., as they should severally attain twenty-one, at which period the shares of such children were to be vested in them. At the date of the will, L. had a wife and one child, but the wife died before the testator. After the testator's death, L. married again, and died leaving a widow. Held, that L.'s widow took under the will. In re Lyne's Trust, L. R. 8 Eq. 65.

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2. Bequest to A. B. for life, and after her death to eight, equally, their interests to be vested from the death of the testator; and in case of the death of any of the eight before the tenant for life, the shares of those so dying to be paid to the survivors equally. The eight legatees survived the testator, but all died before the tenant for life. Held, that the survivorship was to be referred to the death of the tenant for life, and that, as none survived that moment, each took his original gift. Marriott v. Abell, L. R. 7 Eq. 478.

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3. A bequest to testator's wife and executrix, absolutely, "for the benefit of herself and children," creates a joint tenancy among the children which is not severed by the marriage of a daughter. Semble, the wife takes a life estate. Armstrong v. Armstrong, L. R. 7 Eq. 518. See CHARITY, 1, 2; DEVISE, 1; FORFEITURE; PERPETUITY; WILL, 7–14. - See PARLIAMENT. LIBEL.

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LEGISLATURE.

1. At a meeting of a board of guardians, at which reporters were present, a member, E., said he hoped the local press would take notice of this (the plaintiff's) very scandalous case," and requested the chairman, P., to give an outline of it. P. did so, and said, "I am glad gentlemen of the press are in the room, and I hope they will take notice of it." There was other language to the same effect. A correct but condensed summary of the proceedings, containing remarks defamatory of the plaintiff, which were made at the meeting, was afterwards published in two local newspapers. Held (Exch. Ch., per KEATING, Montague SMITH, & HANNEN, JJ., BYLES & MELLOR, JJ., dissentientibus), that there was evidence to go to the jury of publication of the libel in the newspapers by E. and P.- Parkes v. Prescott, L. R. 4 Exch. 169.

2. A report of the directors of a company contained the following statement: "The shareholders will observe that there is a charge of £1306 for deficiency of stock, which the manager is responsible for. His accounts have been badly kept, and have been rendered to us very irregularly." This report was printed and sent to the shareholders, according to the usual practice, by order of a general meeting. Held, that, in the absence of evidence of express malice, the printing and publication of the report was privileged. — Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262.

3. The defendant, in a privileged communication, described the plaintiff's conduct as 66 most disgraceful and dishonest." The conduct so described was equivocal, and might honestly have been supposed by the defendant to be as he described it. Held, that the above words were not of themselves evidence of actual malice. (Exch. Ch.)-Spill v. Maule, L. R. 4 Exch. 232.

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LIEN. See COLLISION, 3; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 2.

LIGHT.

Plaintiff pulled down a building with ancient lights, and put up a new one with larger windows only partially coinciding with the old ones. There were also additional windows. The owner of the servient estate obstructed the light of the substituted windows. An injunction was refused. - Heath v. Bucknall, L. R. 8 Eq. 1.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.

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- See DEED; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE; SEPARATION DEED; WARD OF COURT; WIFE'S EQUITY.

MARRIED WOMAN. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

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MARSHALLING OF ASSETS.

Land was mortgaged to secure £1500. By a later deed, the same and other land, and some personalty, were mortgaged to secure the old and a new debt. The mortgagor died intestate. In a case between the administrator and heir-atlaw: Held, that the first mortgaged land was first liable for the £1500. The new debt to be apportioned between the realty and personalty. - Lipscomb v. Lipscomb, L. R. 7 Eq. 501.

See BANKRUPTCY, 4, 5; CHARITY, 1; DEVISE, 2; PARTITION.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See CONTRACT.

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MISDEMEANOR. See ASSAULT.

MISTAKE. See AWARD; Bond.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. -See AWARD, 2.

'MORTGAGE.

1. A creditor agreed to remit part of the debt, on the debtor's giving him a mortgage for the balance. A mortgage was afterwards given with a power of sale, but also with a proviso, that, if the mortgage debt should not be paid within two years, or if any other condition should be broken, the whole of the original debt should be recovered. It also recited that the agreement had been made without prejudice to the creditor's original rights. Held, that the proviso was not a penalty against which equity would relieve. Judgment of CHELMSFORD, L.C., reversed. · Thompson v. Hudson, L. R. 4 H. L. 1; s.c. 2 Eq. 612; 2 Ch. 255; 1 Am. Law Rev. 518, 690.

2. A mortgage secured £600, future advances, interest on both, and all costs of any suits under the provisions of the deed or in anywise connected therewith; the total moneys secured not to exceed £1200. On a bill to redeem, a decree was made by STUART, V.C., directing an account of what was due the mortgagee for principal and interest under the deed, and of sale-moneys, rents, and profits received by him. The mortgagee appealed. Held, that the decree was right. (Per SELWYN, L.J.) Because costs properly incurred in actions relating to the property might be claimed, under it as "just allowances." (Per GIFFARD, L.J.) Because they might be claimed as principal due under the deed. - Blackford v. Davis, L. R. 4 Ch. 304.

3. B. mortgaged a term to D. for £3000. D. submortgaged the term, less three days, and the debt, to E., with power to sue for the whole of the same, to secure £1200. B. died, and E. claimed £3000 from B.'s estate. B.'s administrators assigned the equity of redemption to D. D. by registered deed assigned all his estate to trustees for the benefit of creditors. E. foreclosed a second submortgagee, and D., whose trustees disclaimed by answer. E. then ceased paying rent, which he had been doing, and B.'s lessors entered. Held, that the disclaimer only extended to what was in issue in the suit, and did not enlarge E.'s estate,

and that E. could prove against B.'s estate for £3000, but was not to receive more than £1200, interest and costs. - In re Burrell, L. R. 7 Eq. 399. 4. A. and B., mortgagees, transferred their mortgage to W., who gave no notice of the transfer to T., the mortgagor. T., intending to redeem, paid the amount secured by the mortgage to the solicitors of A. and B., who were also W.'s solicitors, without ascertaining that they were authorized to receive it. The solicitors misappropriated the money, and prepared a deed which A. and B. signed, being deceived as to its contents, which contained a recital acknowledging the receipt of the money, and which purported to convey the property to the mortgagor's nominee. No receipt was indorsed on the deed. Held, that W. was entitled to foreclose. Withington v. Tate, L. R. 4 Ch. 288.

See BANKRUPTCY, 6; INSURANCE, 2; MARSHALLING of Assets; Pledge. NAVIGABLE WATER. See NUISANCE, 1; Statute, 3.

NEGLIGENCE.

It was the practice of consignees of coal by defendants' road to go along a flagged path by the side of the road at the station, and to assist in the unloading, which was done by tipping the coal into cells. The plaintiff was consignee of a coal wagon which could not be unloaded in the usual way, as all the coal cells were full. He told the station master that he must have some coals, and, no reply being made, he went to the wagon, took some coal from the top, and descended to the flagged path. The flag he stepped on was worn and gave way, and he fell and was injured. Held, that defendants were liable, although the plaintiff was not getting his coal in the usual manner. — Holmes v. North Eastern Railway Co., L. R. 4 Ex. 254.

See COLLISION, 2; LACHES; PROXIMATE CAUSE.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.-See BOND.

NOTARY.-See EVIDENCE, 3.

NOTICE.-See COMPANY, 3; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 3; MORTGAGE, 4;

WAY.
NUISANCE.

1. The plaintiff, a riparian proprietor on a tidal navigable river, filed an information and bill to restrain the opposite riparian owner from building a jetty in the alveus of the river. It was not proved that the plaintiff's land would be seriously injured by a greater volume of water being thrown upon it. But the public navigation and that of the plaintiff would be interfered with. Held, that the suit was properly framed, and an injunction was granted with costs. Semble, the AttorneyGeneral need not have been joined. — Attorney-General v. Earl of Lonsdale, L. R. 7 Eq. 377.

2. A tenant from year to year obtained an injunction from MALINS, V.C., against the erection of a circus, which was to last only a short time, on the ground that it would draw together a crowd of disorderly persons. Defendant appealed, the land having meanwhile been covered with permanent buildings. Held, that there was not sufficient ground for an injunction, and this having been granted, the appeal was not only for costs.

But an injunction against a circus, the noise of which was so loud as to be distinctly heard in the plaintiff's house when the windows and shutters were closed,

was upheld, without a trial by jury. Since Sir John Rolt's Act, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42, this is not necessary if the evidence satisfies the court. - Inchbald v. Robin

son.

Inchbald v. Barrington, L. R. 4 Ch. 388.

3. A., while lessee of two print-works, erected a weir across the stream which supplied them, and diverted the water from one of them at a point where he was riparian owner, but where defendants, who had no interest in the water, were owners of the bed of the stream. The plaintiff becoming lessee of the last mentioned print-work, and entitled to the water of the stream, removed the weir, which was soon replaced against the will of the defendants. Defendants declined to

remove the weir, but gave plaintiff full liberty to do so. Held, that defendants were not liable for the continuance of the nuisance. - Saxby v. Manchester, Sheffield, & L. Railway Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 198.

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A statute rendering ineligible for Parliament any one who shall "undertake, execute, hold, or enjoy" any contract for the public service, does not disqualify one who has performed his part of such contract before his election, although he has not been paid. — Royse v. Birley, L. R. 4 C. P. 296.

PARTIES. See BANKRUPTCY, 2; NUISANCE, 1.

PARTITION.

A. and B., tenants in common in fee, made an agreement for partition, but both died before the deed was executed. A., the survivor, devised the share agreed to be held in severalty by him, but allowed the legal estate in one moiety of B.'s share to descend to his heir-at-law. Held, that the costs of partition, including those of getting in the legal estate, must be borne by the devisees of A., and not by his personal estate. In re Tann, L. R. 7 Eq. 434. PARTNERSHIP.

1. Money received by one member of a firm of solicitors, in the course of the management and settlement of the affairs of a client of the firm, is money paid to the firm in the course of their professional business; and the firm are liable for any loss from the dishonesty of the partner by whom the money was received. Earl of Dundonald v. Masterman, L. R. 7 Eq. 504.

2. A. and B. were partners under an oral agreement to share profits and losses equally. A. died, having advanced to the firm £1900 more than B. The net assets of the partnership were only £1400. Held, that the deficiency of £500 was a loss to be borne equally by A. and B.- Nowell v. Nowell, L. R. 7 Eq. 538. See BANKRUPTCY, 2; DISCOVERY, 2.

PAWN.-See BANKRUPTCY, 4, 5; DAMAGES; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; PLEDGE. PAYMENT.-See CHEQUE; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 3; Mortgage, 4. PAYMENT INTO COURT. - See INTERPLEADER.

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PENALTY.-See MORTGAGE, 1.

PERPETUITY.

A fund was bequeathed, after the death of an unborn legatee for life, to all the children of A. (who was alive at the date of the will, share and share alike), and to

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