mittee of Experts appointed under Trade Marks Rules of 1876, r. 59, was, in the absence of special circumstances, binding on the registrar.— Ex parte Orr Ewing & Co., 38 L.T. 695.

Trustee :

(viii.) C. A.-Investment-Real Securities.-Decision of V.C.H. (see Trustee vii., p. 108) reversed.-Jones v. Cherwell, 38 L.T. 494; 26 W.R. 595. (ix.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Maintenance Order-Infant-Succession Duty-33 & 34 Vict., c. 93, s. 12; 37 & 38 Vict., c. 50.-Real and personal estate having been given to A. and B. in trust in remainder on the death of the life-tenant for the use of an infant: the life-tenant being dead, an Order of Court directed the trustees to pay the whole income to the guardian of the infant (who was a widow in poor circumstances) for maintenance: the trustees never paid succession duty: the widow's circumstances improved shortly after the order: A. died in 1861, and the widow married first, in 1863, W., who died in 1872, and afterwards R.: Held that the order for payment of the whole income meant the whole net income after payment of succession duty: that subject to the succession duty it protected the trustees during their joint lives, but not after the death of A.: that the trustees were liable for succession duty, but not for interest on it, and that W.'s liability in respect of his wife's receipts of income terminated with the coverture, and his estate was liable for payments from 1863 to 1872: and that R. was also protected by section 12 of 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93.-Brown v. Smith, 46 L.J. Ch. 866.

(x.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-New Trustee-Out of Jurisdiction.-On an appli. cation to appoint new trustees of a fund settled for the separate use of a married woman residing in Ireland for life, with remainder in default of her appointment to her executors and administrators, the Court appointed two persons residing in Ireland.—Re Austin's Trusts, 38 L.T. 601. (xi.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Payment into Court-Costs-Trustee Relief Act. The surviving executor of the last surviving trustee of a will whereby property was settled on B. for life, with remainder to her surviving children, paid the income to B. during her life, and then paid the money into Court: Held that he had accepted the trusts, and as there was no difficulty in ascertaining the persons entitled he could not be allowed his costs.-Re Abbot's Trusts, 38 L.T. 442.

(xii.) C. A.-Tenant in Tail-Unsound Mind-Vesting Order-Trustee Act, 1850.-Where by an order under the Trustee Act, 1850, the estate of a trustee tenant in tail of unsound mind is vested in any person, the order need not refer to the execution of a disentailing deed or to the Fines and Recoveries Act, but should only direct the land to be vested for all the estate which the trustee, if sane, could convey.-Mason v. Mason, L.R. 7 Ch. D. 707; 26 W.R. 565.

Vendor and Purchaser :

(xxiii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Building Covenant-Right of Assignee.-The owners of an estate sold adjoining land to defendant's predecessor in title, who covenanted with the owners, their heirs and assigns, not to build in a certain way: the owners afterwards sold the estate to plaintiff's predecessor in title but no reference was made to the restrictive covenant: Held that the plaintiff could not sue upon the covenant. -Renals v. Coulishaw, L.J. 8 L.T. 503; 26 W.R. 754.

(xxiv.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Contract-Immediate Possession-Right to Pull down House.-A contract for sale of a house provided that the purchaser should be entitled to immediate possession on depositing the purchase. money but that he was not to be considered as accepting the vendor's title: the vendor, at the time of entering into the contract, knew the object of the purchaser, in desiring possession, was to pull down the

house: Held that after deposit of the purchase-money, the vendor could not be restrained from pulling down the house.-Bolton v. London School Board, L.R. 7 Ch. D. 766; 47 L.J. Ch. 461; 26 W.R. 549.

(xxv.) C. A.-Specific Performance.-Defendant offered to sell to plaintiff an estate for a certain sum, which plaintiff accepted, subject to the title being approved by his solicitor, and afterwards a verbal arrangement was made that the purchase-money was to be paid by instalments which arrangement never resulted in any binding agreement: Held by V.C.M. (47 L.J. Ch. 519; 38 L.T. 341; 26 W.R. 532) that the second arrange. ment did not amount to an abandonment of the original contract, but, by the Court of Appeal, that there was originally no binding contract, as the approval of the title by purchaser's solicitors was an additional term not accepted by defendant.-Hussey v. Payne, 38 L.T. 543; 26 W.R. 703.

(xxvi.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Specific Performance-Notice of Contract—Counter Claim-Foreclosure.-H. contracted with R. and L. as tenants in common for the purchase of leaseholds at £200, subject to a mortgage for £400: it afterwards appeared that L. had no title, and that R.'s moiety alone was subject to the mortgage: the mortgagees having notice of H.'s contract bought the whole of the property: H. brought an action for specific performance with abatement against R. and the mortgagees, and the mortgagees by counter claim called on H. to redeem or in default for foreclosure: Held that H. was entitled against R. for specific performance with abatement, and as against the mortgagees for the assignment of R.'s moiety: that the purchase-money payable by H. should be retained towards paying off the mortgage, and that though R. would receive no money the lessee's covenants entered into by H. were sufficient consideration: judgment given for the mortgagees on the counter claim with costs.-Horrocks v. Rigby, 38 L.T. 782; 26 W.R. 714 (xxvii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Statute of Frauds-Auction.-At a sale by auction the auctioneer entered in the sale book the names of the vendor and purchaser, and the property sold, and the amount of the purchasemoney, but made no reference to the conditions of sale: Held no suf. ficient contract in writing within the statute of frauds.-Rishton v. Whatmore, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 467.

(xxviii.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Statue of Frauds-Description of Vendor— Pleading.-Plaintiff, to whom the owner of a quarry had agreed to grant a lease, agreed, on behalf of himself and all persons interested, to sell the quarry to defendant, and that the lease agreed to be granted by the vendor should be granted as defendant might direct: Held a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds: a defence founded on the Statute of Frauds cannot now be raised by demurrer.-Morgan v. Worthington, 38 L.T. 443.

Water :

(x.) H. L.-Statutory Duty-Negligence-Liability-Damages.-Defendants were empowered by Act of Parliament to construct a reservoir for the purpose of supplying water to the river B, and for that purpose to enter upon the river M and the lands adjacent, and to make, alter, repair, widen, cleanse, and keep proper conduits and watercourses, &c. : under the powers of the Act they sent water down the channel of the M into the B, having previously altered the channel in some places: owing to their manner of using the M, its bed became silted up, and in consequence water overflowed its banks, and damaged the plaintiff's land: Held that they were liable for the damage.—Geddis v. Proprietors of the Bann Reservoir, L.R. 3 App. 430.

(xi.) H. L.—Tidal River-Obligation to Fence-Riparian Owner.-By the

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Glasgow Police Act, 1866, s. 384, the master of works may require any proprietor of land within the city to fence the same or repair any chimney-stack or flue or other thing connected with or appertaining to any building thereon which appears to be dangerous: Held that this gave no power to compel a riparian owner to fence his land from a tidal navi. gable river, though a public right of way along the river bank was alleged to be dangerous in consequence.-Lang v. Kerr, Anderson, & Co., L.R. 3 App. 529.

(lxxx.) C. A.-Accumulation-39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98. Decision of V.C.H. (see Will i., p. 36) affirmed.-Weatherall v. Thornburgh, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 261; 26 W.R. 593.

(lxxxi.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Charitable Bequest-9 Geo. 2, c. 36.-A gift of money to support or found a school of a particular description, such a school being in existence at the date of the will and partly supported by the testator, but held only in a hired room: Held a good charitable gift. -Morley v. Croxon, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 156; 26 W.R. 674.

(lxxxii.) C. A.—Charitable Bequest-9 Geo. 2, c. 36.--Decision of V. C. H. (see Will xlii., p. 74) reversed.-Attree v. Hawe, 38 L.T. 733.

(lxxxiii.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Codicil-Partial Revocation.-Bequest of personalty to be laid out in the purchase of land to be settled to the uses in the will declared of testator's D. estates: by a subsequent codicil testator revoked the uses by the will declared of the D. estates, and declared new uses: Held that the codicil did not affect the bequest of personalty.-Bridges v. Strachan, 38 L.T. 502; 26 W.R. 691.

(lxxxiv.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Construction-Annuity-Charge on Corpus.Testator, after bequeathing life annuities, bequeathed his general personal estate to trustees upon trust, out of the income thereof to pay and keep down the annuities, and " subject thereto" on trusts for his children: Held that the annuities were chargeable on the corpus.Mason v. Robinson, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 411; 26 W.R. 734.

(lxxxv.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Construction—Conditional Bequest.-- Testatrix by her will, gave a legacy to B., provided that B. remained in her service. In June, 1876, she became insane, and B, who was entitled to three months notice, was dismissed by a person without authority and against B.'s wish. In July, 1876, testatrix was found a lunatic, and an order was made for the sale of her household furniture, and in the following December the lunatic died: Held that B.'s legacy failed.—In re Hartley's Trusts, 26 W.R. 590.

(lxxxvi.) H. L.-Construction-Conversion of Realty - Residuary Legatee—Unattested Paper.-Testator's will, after directing his executors to pay debts out of the proceeds of his property, directed them to sell certain landed property for its full value, and then after giving certain legacies and devising another property specifically, he constituted T. his residuary legatee: Held that the will directed a conversion of the real estate into money out and out, so that the surplus went to the residuary legatee. Where a will refers to a paper, such paper cannot be incorporated with the will, unless it is clearly identified with the description in the will and is shown to have been in existence when the will was executed.-Singleton v. Tomlinson, L.R. 3 App. 404; 38 L.T. 653; 26 W.R. 722.

(lxxxvii.) C. A.-Construction-Equitable Estate. Decision of V. C. M. (See Will xi., p. 37), affirmed.-Yarrow v. Knightly, 26 W.R. 704.

(lxxxviii.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Construction-Gift to Class-Survivorship.— Devise in trust during the lives of the children of A. (who was dead at date of will), and survivors of them to pay income to them equally, and the shares of those dying in the lifetime of the others leaving issue, to be

paid to such issue. And after death of survivor of children of A., the property to be sold and divided equally between the children of A., and the shares of those dying under age and without issue, to accrue to the others, but the shares of such as died under age leaving issue, to belong to such issue: Held that the issue of such of the children of A. as were dead at date of will took no benefit.-Kelsey v. Ellis, 38 L.T. 471.

(lxxxix.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Construction- Heirs-Gavelkind-Falsa Demonstratio.-Devise of gavelkind lands upon trust for G. for life, the remainder on trust for W. G., the eldest son of the said G., for life, upon trust for first and other sons of W. G. in tail: in default of such issue remainder unto and to use of testator's own right heirs: G. had two sons, J. G. the eldest, and W. G.: Held that W. G. was the person designated in the will, and that the common law heir took under the ultimate devise to testator's own right heirs.-Garland v. Beverley, 26 W.R. 718.

(xc.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Construction-Heirs-Next-of-Kin.-Gift of real and personal property between five sisters for their lives, or till marriage, and direction that on death or marriage of all five the said property should be divided equally between testatrix's brothers and sisters then living, or their heirs: Held a good gift to all brothers and and sisters living at the period of distribution, and to the heirs of such as were then dead, whether they died before the date of the will or not; but that a brother who died before testatrix was born was not included that as to personalty the word heirs was to be read as statutory next-of-kin, including widows, and that the next-of-kin of the brothers and sisters who pre-deceased testatrix must be ascertained at her death, and as to those who survived her at their respective deaths.-Wingfield v. Wingfield, 26 W.R. 711.

:

(xci.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.--Construction-" Issue" read "Children."-Gift of a fund in trust for the lawful issue of F. surviving him equally to be divided between them, if more than one child share and share alike, and if but one, then for such only child, with a gift over in default of issue of the said F. becoming entitled: Held that issue must be restricted to children of F.-Re Hopkin's Trusts, 26 W. 629.

(xcii.) Ch. Div. F. J.—Construction—Real Estate-Leaseholds-Possession of Title Deeds.-A testator, after charging his real estates with certain payments, gave and devised all the rest and residue of his manors, messuages, farms, and real estate whatsoever and wheresoever, in possession as in reversion, remainder or expectuary, and whether vested in him or any other person in trust for him, or which he was entitled to at law or in equity, to the uses in the will mentioned: Held that leaseholds did not pass under this devise, although at the date of the will they were let together with part of the freeholds to one tenant: the fact that a mortgagee of a term is in possession of the title deeds does not raise any presumption of a conveyance to him of the reversion: a presumption that the fee simple of property, formerly leasehold, has been acquired, may arise from the act of parties during a long period, so as to estop persons claiming under them from denying that the property was so held.-Holmes v. Sayer-Millward, 47 L.J. Ch. 522; 38 L.T. 381; 26 W.R. 608.

(xciii.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.—Construction—Residuary Gift.—▲ will contained a devise and bequest of all testator's real and personal property, except such parts as were or should be at his decease, subject to the trusts of his marriage settlement, and were thereinafter otherwise disposed of to T. There was a subsequent gift of £1,000 out of the settled property to R., and of the rents and profits of the rest of the settled property to R.'s wife in case R. should pre-decease T., but if R. should survive T. then on other trusts: Held that the income of the settled property, during the

joint lives of T. and R., passed to T. under the general residuary gift.— Torrens v. Millington, 26 W.R. 753.

(xciv.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Construction-Residuary Gift-Real Estate.Testator by his will, after giving pecuniary legacies, gave his sheep and the rest, residue, and all moneys, chattels, and other his effects, to be equally divided between his brothers: Held that his real estate passed by the gift.-Smyth v. Smyth, 38 L.T. 633; 26 W.R. 736. (xcv.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Construction-Residuary Gift-Failure of Trust for Investment-Restraint on Anticipation.-Testatrix gave real and personal estate or trust for conversion, and after payment of debts and legacies, to invest and pay income to A. for life, and after A.'s death to divide the corpus between B. and C., a married woman, for her separate use without power of anticipation: A. died in testatrix's lifetime: Held that the gift became one of the corpus of a fund not producing income, and that C. was entitled to her share free from restraint.—In re Croughton's Trusts, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 460; 38 L.T. 447; 26 W.R. 574.

(xcvi.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Gift over an Alienation.-Testator made a bequest to his wife for life, with remainder to his son, if at the wife's death he should not have done anything which would make the subject of the bequest payable to, or vested in, or chargeable for the benefit of any other person: but if before the decease of the wife he should have done so then over on other trusts: the son assigned, by way of mortgage, all his interest under the will subject to the proviso or condition in the will contained: the mortgage was paid off before the death of the tenant for life: Held that there was no forfeiture of the son's interest.Samuel v. Samuel, 26 W.R. 750.

ADDENDA.

(Cases reported only in the Law Times and Weekly Reporter for July 27th.)

Company:

(lxxxviii.) C. A.--Winding-up-Contributory-Registration of Contract.-A. sold property to a company, which was paid for partly in shares issued as fully paid-up, but the contract was not registered. He afterwards transferred some of the shares to B. for valuable consideration, B. having notice of the circumstances under which the shares were issued: Held, on the winding-up, that B. must contribute in respect of these shares.-Re British Farmers' Co., Potter & Brown's Case, 38 L.T. 737. Crimes and Offences:

(xxxv.) C. C. R.-Larceny-Wild Rabbits.-Prisoner, who was employed to trap rabbits and take them to the head keeper, trapped and took some to and put them in a bag, where another keeper found them, and nicked them so that he might know them again, and put them back again. Prisoner afterwards took them away with the intention of appropriating them: Held that the rabbits had never been reduced into the possession of the master, and that prisoner was not guilty of stealing them.Regina v. Petch, 38 L.T. 788.

(xxxvi.) C. C. R.-Receiving Stolen Goods.-A lad, on being searched, was found in possession of a stolen cigar, which was returned to him with five others, and the lad gave these to the prisoner: Held that the prisoner could not be convicted of feloniously receiving the cigars, knowing them to be stolen.-Regina v. Hancock, 38 L.T. 787.