of rigid uprightness and scrupulously faithful to his engagements is he chary of entering into engagements involving large obligations. So we may regard it as a sign of a growing morality among nations when Governments hesitate more and more to commit themselves to contracts of indefinite extent and duration, the fulfilment of which is left very much to the chapter of accidents.

Treaties should be made for a limited time, and with provisions for revisal at stated intervals. No doubt there are some treaties that must be permanent. Such are treaties of cession, boundary, or exchange of territory. But nothing can be more preposterous than "the perpetual and eternal" engagements often entered into between nations. "An individual," says Mr. Stuart Mill," has no power of promising anything beyond the duration of his mortal life; but nations have the wild folly to make, and to exact, engagements for all time." In 1871, I moved in the House of Commons for copies of all such Treaties of Guarantee, now existing and still obligatory, under which the Government of Great Britain is engaged, separately or in conjunction with any other Power or Powers, to interfere by force of arms, or by armed demonstration, to attack or defend any Government or nation with reference to its internal arrangements, or foreign relations, or any other contingency whatever. The return forms a notable monument of the folly of our ancestors. It relates to only one class of treaties-namely, Treaties of Guarantee. There are in all thirty-seven different instruments binding Great Britain to onerous and lasting obligations in all parts of the world. There is a series of treaties with Portugal, dating from the time of Edward the Black Prince, in 1373, more than 500 years ago, all of which, according to the terms of the return, are "still obligatory."

Some of the provisions contained in these treaties, which are declared to be "inviolate and to endure for ever," are infinitely absurd when viewed in the light of the changed

circumstances of the present day. The first article in a treaty signed in 1386 between Great Britain and Portugal, binds the two Sovereigns in in a solid and perpetual league, not only on behalf of themselves and their heirs and successors, but also in favour of kingdoms, lands, dominions, and countries, and their subjects, vassals, allies, and friends whatsoever, so that either of them shall be bound to succour and afford aid to the other, against all men that may live and die who shall attempt to violate the peace of the other, or injure his state in any way; "wherefrom, however, shall, by desire of the King of England, be excepted our Lord the Supreme Pontiff Urban, now reigning, and his successors canonically elected, and the Lords Wenzeslas, by the grace of God King of the Romans and of Bohemia, and John, by the same grace King of Castile and Leon, Duke of Lancaster and uncle to the said illustrious Lord King of England."

It would probably astound most nations if there were brought forth from the musty archives of diplomacy, and exposed before their eye all the uncancelled bonds which still remain against them, and which are the legacies bequeathed to them by the wisdom of their ancestors. Into many Treaties of Commerce a limitation of time is introduced. That was the case with the treaty between Great Britain and France negotiated by Mr. Cobden. That was the case with the Treaty of Tientsin between England and China, with the power, in this latter case, of revisal on the demand of either of the contracting parties. Surely there are many other treaties which might be and ought to be made subject to the same wise condition. "Nations,"

* Article xxvii.—“It is agreed that either of the high contracting parties to this treaty may demand a further revision of the tariff and of the commercial articles of the treaty at the end of ten years; but if no demand be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the tarift shall remain in force for ten years more, reckoned from the end of the preceding ten years, and so it shall be at the end of each successive period of ten years."

says Mr. Stuart Mill, "cannot rightfully bind themselves or others beyond the period to which human foresight can be presumed to extend; thus aggravating the danger which, to some extent, always exists that the fulfilment of obligations may, by change of circumstances, become either wrong or unwise. I am not aware of any good reason why engagements reciprocally entered into between nations for their joint advantage should not be subject to periodical renewal. There are few, if any, contracts between nations the terms of which might not be so framed as to protect either party from sustaining undue loss or injury in case of the non-renewal of the contract."*

Another rule that may be laid down is this, that Governments or nations, if they wish treaties to be faithfully observed, should as seldom as possible put into them hard, penal, or oppressive conditions; or, to use the language of Mr. Stuart Mill, "they should abstain from imposing conditions which, on any just and reasonable view of human affairs, cannot be expected to be kept." To the same effect is the remark of Immanuel Kant in his "Essay on Perpetual Peace," that at the end of a war we should not make treaties which contain the seeds of another war. If, as is often alleged, the object of war should be to establish a lasting peace, this rule would undoubtedly be observed. But, unhappily, during war passion comes into play, and over-rules judgment and the sense of right. Cupidity, ambition, vindictiveness, often dictate the terms of treaties; and conditions are inserted, under the plea of being securities of peace, which prove to be infallible provocatives of war. It would be easy to cite many instances illustrative of this. In the Treaty of Utrecht the King of France, under hard necessity, consented to destroy Dunkirk, and bound himself by a solemn obligation, which was renewed on two successive occasions, never to rebuild it. But what happened? A few years afterwards, a war Fortnightly Review, Dec. 1870, p. 718.

breaking out between England and Spain, the French Government took advantage of our being engaged elsewhere, and rebuilt the fortifications stronger than ever.

But there is another example much nearer to our own day, which is fresh in the remembrance of us all. I allude to the articles imposed upon Russia in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 for the neutralisation of the Black Sea. It was acknowledged at the time that these articles inflicted a great humiliation upon Russia; and it was scarcely disguised that such was their object. It is, perhaps, not so well known that in the Conference held at Vienna, in March, 1855, negotiations for peace broke off on this very point, the insistance-as it was understood by England alone-upon the insertion of these or similar articles as a conditio sine quâ non of peace. Russia then refused to submit to them, and the war was resumed, and continued for many months longer. A memorable debate took place in the House of Commons on the occasion, in the course of which almost every distinguished Member of that Assembly, except those actually in the Government, condemned the rupture of negotiations on such an issue, and several denounced the condition exacted of Russia as both worthless and insulting. Lord Beaconsfield said:

"I think the proposition, as regards the limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea, was inefficient and impolitic. Because nothing can be more unwise than to insult an enemy with whom we are going to enter into terms of peace, or to seek to humiliate a power that we recognise as a portion of the great European system. I refer to this point, which is the cause of the war that is now being waged; and I say the condition laid down was not merely inefficient, but most impolitic, humiliating, and unnecessarily humiliating, to Russia."

As was predicted by several of the speakers in that debate, Russia seized her opportunity, when some of the Great Powers who were parties to the treaty were otherwise engaged, to shake off this obligation. It is deeply to be regretted that she did so in a manner calculated to

undermine public faith. But no doubt she was encouraged to take this course by the fact, which afterwards came out in diplomatic correspondence, that she had previously ascertained that all the Governments who were parties to the treaty, excepting England, and not excepting even Turkey herself, had encouraged her to find means of escaping from that stipulation of the Treaty of Paris.

One good result, however, followed from this act of repudiation. For when the signatory Powers met in London to consider the communication made by Russia, all of them agreed, including Russia herself, to the solemn declaration. which it is to be hoped may take lasting effect in the future relations of States-" that it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can release itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify any of its stipulations, save with the assent of the contracting parties, by means of an amicable understanding."

Another suggestion may be made of a means likely to contribute to the maintenance of the faith of treaties. Let there be introduced into treaties a clause, providing for some judicial and peaceable means of deciding any disputed questions that may arise, in regard to the matters to which the treaty relates. It is obvious that honest differences of opinion may arise between States as between individuals, as to the construction or interpretation of any agreement which they have mutually signed. And it is surely wise to provide for such a contingency beforehand. It is, happily, not uncommon in modern times to introduce into treaties a clause in favour of stipulated arbitration for this purpose. The most perfect case of that nature with which I am acquainted is that of the treaty entered into in 1854, between the United States and Great Britain, for regulating the Fisheries Question. It is there provided that, "in order to prevent or settle any disputes," in relation to the matter with which the treaty deals, each of the contracting parties shall appoint a Commissioner, and the Commissioners shall name some