subsequently, the time having been prolonged by a second Act, providing only for constructing waterworks and gasworks, not for markets, the board gave plaintiff notice to treat, and ultimately notice of intention to summon jury to assess compensation: motion for injunction to restrain the board from proceeding refused with costs.-Bentley v. Rotherham Local Board, L.R. 4 Ch. 588.

(xi.) Ch. Div. V. C. M. Nuisance - Injunction · Notice of Action.— Where in au action against a Local Board for an alleged nuisance, asking for damages and also for an injunction, plaintiff had not for six months after commencement of the action moved for an interim injunction: Held that defendants were entitled to one month's notice of action under Public Health Act, 1875, s. 264.-Flower v. Leyton Local Board, 36 L.T. 236; 25 W.R. 423.

(xii.) App. Div. Ct.-Voting Paper.-A candidate against whom votes have been fabricated is a party aggrieved within Public Health Act, 1875, 8. 253.-Verdin v. Wray, 46 L.J. M.C. 170; 35 L.T. 942; 25 W.R. 274.

Negligence:

(ii.) C. A.-Horse Mart.-A horse, led by a halter at a horse mart to show his paces, was suddenly struck by defendant's servant, and, there being no barrier, swerved and kicked, and thereby injured plaintiff: Held, reversing decision of Ex. Div., that there was no evidence on which a jury could find negligence.-Abbott v. Freeman, 35 L.T. 783.

Newfoundland, Law of:

(i.) P. C.-Telegraph - Monopoly - Bay-Three-mile Limit. -Where the Legislature gave to a telegraph company a monopoly for fifty years: Held that the laying down by another company of a cable within a well. defined bay on the coast of Newfoundland, but more than three miles from the shore, was, upon the construction of the Act constituting the monopoly, an infringement of the monopoly.-Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co., 36 L.T. 265.

Nuisance :—

(viii.) C. P. Div.-Sewage - Escape - Occupier's Liability.-Occupier of house is liable, even in absence of knowledge or negligence, for escape of sewage from a defective drain under his house to adjoining premises.— Humphreys v. Cousins, 36 L.T. 180; 25 W.R. 371.

Partition:—

(ii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Sale.-Where owner of undivided share of property claims a sale, the fact that another part owner is in occupation of part of the premises and would find difficulty in obtaining premises suitable for his business elsewhere in the neighbourhood, is not good reason to contrary within 31 & 32 Vict., c. 40, s. 4.-Roughton v. Gibson, 36 L.T. 93; 25 W.R. 269.

(iii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Sale of Leaseholds-Infant.-Where plaintiff, en. titled to undivided moiety of leaseholds, claimed a sale: Held that the probability that the income of an infant entitled to the other moiety would be thereby diminished was not a "good reason to the contrary' within 31 and 32 Vict., c. 40, s. 4.-Rowe v. Gray, 25 W.R. 250.

(iv.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Sale of Leaseholds-Investment-Right of Tenant for Life.-Proceeds of leaseholds, sold by order of the Court in a partition suit, were invested and produced an income less than the yearly rents of the leaseholds: Held that a tenant for life of the leaseholds was not entitled to any allowance out of corpus of proceeds of sale to make up deficiency in her income: also that such proceeds could not be invested in East India stock.-Langmead v. Cockerton, 25 W.R. 31.

Partnership:

(iii.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Expiration of Term — Continuation.—Where a partnership is continued after expiration of term, the assumption that it continues on the same footing as before only extends to such of the articles of the partnership as are properly applicable to the new contract.-Hogg v. Hogg, 35 L.T. 792.

Patent:

(xiv.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Infringement. - Plaintiffs were patentees of wooden stoppers for soda-water bottles, such stoppers being of greater specific gravity than water, and self-adjusting as the bottle was filled: Defendants took out patent for wooden stoppers of less specific gravity than water, adjusted, as the bottle filled, by means of a removeable metal clip: Held that defendants' stopper was a colourable evasion of plaintiffs' patent.-Barrett v. Vernon, 25 W.R. 343.

(xv.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Novelty-Ambiguity of Claim.-Where, upon the natural construction of the claim, a patent was bad for want of novelty: Held that patentee was not entitled to refer to the description in and drawing accompanying the specification for the purpose of validating the patent.-Hinks & Son v. Safety Lighting Co., L.R. 4 Ch. D. 607; 46 L.J. Ch. 185.

Peerage:

(i.) H. L.-Shifting Clause.-Held that the validity of a patent of Peerage is not destroyed by invalidity of a single clause: also that a clause in a patent shifting a peerage on the happening of a certain event from the existing peer to another person was invalid.-The Buckhurst Peerage, L.R. 2 App. 1.

Petition of Right:

(iii.) C. A.-Crown Prerogative-Treaty. — Held (affirming decision of Q.B. Div., see Petition of Right (ii.), p. 22) that the Sovereign is not agent or trustee for her subjects, and that a petition of right will not lie to recover money received under a treaty with a foreign power on account of debts to British subjects.-Rustomjee v. The Queen, L.R. 2 Q.B. Div. 69; 46 L.J. Q.B. 238; 36 L.T. 190; 25 W.R. 333.

Poor Law:

(viii.) C. A.-Rateability-Corporation Property. The rateable value of property occupied by a public corporation for public purposes must be ascertained with reference to the profits actually earned.-Mayor, &c., of Worcester v. Droitwich Union, L.R. 2 Ex. D. 49; 36 L.T. 186; 25 W.R. 336.

(ix.) Q. B. Div.-Rateability—Market Tolls-First Charge-By local Act appellants were authorised to regulate markets at B. and receive the whole of the tolls, subject to payment thereout to the corporation of £210 per annum as a first charge thereon: Held that appellants were not entitled to deduct such annual sum in assessment of rateable value.Brecon Markets Co. v. St. Mary's Brecon, 36 L.T. 109.

(x.) App. Div. Ct.-Rateability-Mine.-Where a mine was drowned out and yielding no profits: Held that the land was rateable at its value to a yearly tenant, and that the engine-house, machinery, and plant must be assessed at their value (if any) independent of the mine.-Tyne Coal Co. v. Overseers of Wallsend, 35 L.T. 854.

(xi.) H. L.-Rateability-Moorings-Thames.-C. obtained permission to lay down moorings for two derricks in the River Thames, under a resolu. tion of the Conservators, whereby it was provided that the work was to be done to the satisfaction of the Conservators, subject to payment of rent and to removal, if required by the Conservators, under s. 91 of the

Thames Conservancy Act, 1857: Held (affirming decision of C. A., see Poor Law (v.), p. 65) that, having regard to the nature of the arrange. ment and of the construction of the moorings, C. was liable to be rated in respect of them.-Cory v. Bristow, 25 W.R. 383.

(xii.) C. P. Div.-Rateability-Pier.-A portion of a flying pier below lowwater mark is wholly beyond the jurisdiction, and not rateable.-Black. pool Pier Co. v. Fylde Union, 36 L.T., 251.

(xiii.) Q. B. Div.-Rateability-Woods.-Under the Rating Act, 37 & 38 Vict., c. 54, s. 4, woodlands are rateable according to their value in their natural unimproved state.-Earl of Westmoreland v. Southwick, 36 L.T. 109.

Practice:

(cxxxvii.) C. A.—Appeal-Costs.-Where a respondent who had not been allowed costs in the Court below did not give notice of his intention to raise the question on the appeal under Ord. 58, r. 6: Held that he could not on the appeal ask for his costs.---Harris v. Aaron, 36 L.T. 43; 25 W.R. 353.

(cxxxviii.) C. A.-Appeal-Costs.-Where notice of motion of appeal has been given, but proper steps under Ord. 58, r. 8 have not been taken, so that the case is not in the paper for the day, the other party, without appearing must make a substantive application for costs of motion.Webb v. Mansel, L.R. 2 Q.B.D. 117; 25 W.R. 389.

(cxxxix.) C. A.-Appeal-Costs-Admiralty Action.-Where Court of Appeal varied a decision of the Adm. Div. by finding that not one vessel, but both were to blame for a collision, both parties were ordered to pay their own costs in the Court below and in the Appeal Court.-The Corinna, 35 L. T. 781.

(cxl.) C. A.-Appea!-Costs-Admiralty Action. Where the Court of Appeal varied decision of Adm. Div. by holding that a collision was not owing to one of the parties, but to inevitable accident, both parties were ordered to pay their own costs.-The City of Cambridge, 35 L.T. 781. (cxli.) C. A.-Appeal-Direction to Jury.-On appealing against a judge's direction to a jury, the proper mode of proceeding is to give ordinary notice of appeal.-Cheese v. Lovejoy, 25 W.R. 453.

(cxlii.) C. A.-Appeal-Dissolution Suit-Custody of Children.-An appeal from an order as to the custody of children, made after final decree for dissolution of marriage, lies to the Full Court of the Divorce Division, whose decision is final.-Gladstone v. Gladstone, 25 W.R. 387.

(cxliii.) C. A.-Appeal-Dissolution Suit-Order refusing New Trial.-An appeal from an order made in a suit for dissolution of marriage, refusing an application for a new trial, lies to the Full Court of the Divorce Division, whose decision is final.-Robinson v. Robinson, 36 L.T. 122; 25 W.R. 388.

(cxliv.) C. A.-Appeal-Security for Costs.-Order nisi of Divisional Court of Appeal requiring a County Court Judge to show cause why he should not sign case for appeal from his decision, was discharged after cause shown, and defendants again appealed: on proof that taxed costs already occasioned had not been paid, the Court ordered the appeal to be stayed till payment of a deposit into Court as security for the costs.-Clarke v. Roche, 36 L.T. 78; 25 W.R. 309.

(cxlv.) C. A.-Appeal-Security for Costs-Delay.-Where appellant delayed for nine months to comply with order to give security for costs, the appeal was dismissed on respondent's application for want of prosecution. -Judd v. Green, 35 L.T. 873; 25 W.R. 293.

(cxlvi.) C. A.-Appeal-Separation Suit-Interlocutory Order.-An appeal

from an interlocutory order made in Chambers in a suit for judicial separation, lies to the Full Court of the Divorce Division, whose decision is final.-Wallis v. Wallis, 36 L.T. 161; 25 W.R. 387.

(cxlvii.) C. A.-Appeal-Time.-Notice of appeal from order made under Trustee Relief Act must, under Ord. 58, rr. 9, 15, be given within twenty-one days of the perfecting of the order or of refusal of the application.-Re Baillie's Trusts, 35 L.T. 917; 25 W.R. 310.

(cxlviii.) C. A.—Appeal-Time.-Time for appeal begins to run from refusal of an interlocutory application, though such refusal and an order on further consideration are embodied in one order.-Cummins v. Heron, 36 L.T. 41; 25 W.R. 325.

(cxlix.) C. A.-Appeal-Time.—Similar decision.—White v. Witt, 36 L.T. 123; 25 W.R. 435.

(cl.) C. A.-Appeal in Bankruptcy-Time.-In bankruptcy appeals, notice of motion for appeal must be given within twenty-one days of signature or refusal of order, inclusive of Sundays.-Re Gilbert, Ex parte Viney, 36 L.T. 43; 25 W.R. 364.

(cli.) C. A.-Appeal from Chambers-Time.-Held that notice of appeal from Chambers for a day when the Court did not sit, and more than eight days after the decision appealed against, was bad, although the Vacation commenced within the eight days.-Deykin v. Coleman, 36 L.T. 195; 24 W.R. 294.

(clii.) C. A.--Appeal to House of Lords-Leave.-The Court will not give leave to appeal to the House of Lords unless of opinion that there is a question of law of sufficient importance to justify such appeal.--In re Turner, Ex parte Attwater, 35 L.T. 917; 25 W.R. 328.

(cliii.) P. C.-Appeal to Privy Council-Costs.-An appeal to her Majesty in Council cannot be brought on a mere question of costs.- Credit Foncier of Mauritius v. Patureau, 35 L.T. 869.

(cliv.) C. A.-Appearance-Admiralty Action.-Held that the old practice of the High Court of Admiralty as to appearances under protest is still in force in Admiralty actions.-The Vivar, L.R. 2 P.D. 29; 35 L.T. 782; 25 W.R. 453.

(clv.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Attachment-Contempt.-Held that the circulation by plaintiff among defendant's business correspondents of a statement of claim, charging defendant with unfair and over-reaching conduct, amounted to contempt of Court, and that plaintiff must pay cost of motion to commit; and injunction granted.-Bowden v. Russell, 36 L.T. 177.

(clvi.) C. P. Div.-Costs.-Costs under Ord. 55 follow the event in all jury cases irrespective of amount recovered, except only cases within the provisions of County Courts Act, 1867, expressly preserved by Judicature Act, 1873, s. 67.-Parsons v. Tinling, L.R. 2 C.P.D. 119; 46 L.J. C.P. 239; 35 L.T. 851; 25 W.R. 255.

(clvii.) Ch. Div.-Costs-Abandoned Motion.-On ex parte application made at the close of the seal the Court allowed costs of abandoned motion.— Yetts v. Biles, 25 W.R. 452.

(clviii.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.--Costs-Abandoned Motion.-The Court refused costs of an abandoned motion, where counsel instructed to ask for them had omitted to give notice to the other side.-Aitken v. Dunbar, 25 W.R. 366.

(clix.) Ex. Div.-Costs-Counter-claim.-A plaintiff whose claim is reduced by proof of a counter-claim recovers judgment only for. the balance, and the question of costs is decided according to such balance, under County Court Act, 1875, s. 5.-Staples v. Young, 25 W.R. 304.

(clx.) P. D. A. Div.-Costs-Discontinuance.-Where plaintiff after suc. ceeding in an interlocutory application, the costs of which are made costs in the cause, gives notice of discontinuance, defendant is under rules of Supreme Court, Ord. 23, entitled to costs including costs of the interlocutory application.-The St. Olaf, 36 L.T. 30.

(clxi.) C. P. Div.-Costs-Interest.-Interest on costs runs from date of taxing master's certificate.-Schroder v. Clough, 35 L.T. 850.

(clxii.) Ex. Div.-Costs-Payment into Court.-Where defendant pays money into Court, plaintiff is entitled to his costs up to that time provided he takes the money out under Ord. 30 in satisfaction of his claim.-Lang. ridge v. Campbell, L.R. 2 Ex. D. 281; 36 L.T. 64; 25 W.R. 351.

(clxiii.) Q. B. Div.-Costs-Reference.-Where a cause is referred to master, under Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 3, with powers of certifying of a judge at Nisi Prius, he cannot certify for costs after award has been taken up, unless the case is remitted to him by the Court.Bedwell v. Wood, 36 L.T., 213.

(clxiv.) P. D. A. Div.-Costs-Security.-Where plaintiff has assigned all his property for benefit of his creditors, he will generally be required to give security for costs.-The Lake Megantic, 36 L.T. 183.

(clxv.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Disclaimer-Costs.-By order of pension, leave was given for assignment of chambers in Gray's Inn to A. in trust for B., who mortgaged his interest to C., with notice to A. of such mortgage: A.'s name was never substituted for that of assignor in the books of the society, and by an order of pension in 1873 the previous order was rescinded: A. gave no notice to C. of such last-mentioned order: C. brought foreclosure suit, to which A. put in answer disclaiming all interest: Held that the bill must be dismissed as against A. without costs.-Slipper v. Gough, 36 L.T. 92.

(clxvi.) C. P. Div.-Discovery-Interrogatories—Ord. 31, rr. 4, 5.-A railway company were ordered to give discovery as to entries in their books for several years past as to delivery of goods to them for carriage.— Hall v. London & N. W. Rail. Co., 35 L.T. 848.

(clxvii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-District Registry-Chancery Actions-Powers of Registrars.-Chancery actions, notwithstanding Ord. 35, r. la, must be set down for trial in London: district registrars have no power to appoint receivers or open banking accounts, or, except by special direction of judge, to take accounts in administrative action.-Re Smith. Hutchinson v. Wood, 36 L.T. 178; 25 W.R. 452.

(clxviii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Evidence-Affidavit.-A schedule forming part of an affidavit cannot, except by order of the Court, be filed by the record and writ clerks unless it is printed under Ord. 31, r. 7, but the schedule may be made an exhibit, and the affidavit need then alone be printed.-Webb v. Bomford, 25 W.R. 251.

(clxix.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Interlocutory Order.-Order granted ex parte for entry to inspect and take samples under Ord. 52, r. 3.—Hennessey & Co. v. Rohmann, Osborne & Co., 36 L.T. 51.

(clxx.) C. A.-Leave to Sign Judgment.-An application under Ord. 14, r. 1, that defendant be called on to show cause why final judgment should not be entered against him, must be supported by affidavit of plaintiff of his belief that there is no defence.-Frederici v. Vanderzee, L.R. 2 Q.B.D. 70; 46 L.J. C.P. 194; 35 L.T. 889; 25 W.K. 389.

(clxxi.) Ch. Div. M. R.—Motion for Judgment—Dismissal.—Notice of motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, where plaintiff has become bankrupt, must be served on his trustees.-Wright v. Swindon, Marlborough, & Andover Rail. Co., L.R. 4 Ch. D. 164; 46 L.J. Ch. 199.

(clxxii.) C. A.-Motion for Judgment-Discretion of Judge.-It is within dis.