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form of Fallacy, by which a man so often imposes on himself.*
Another common Fallacy is that of treating one Fact as the cause of another Fact, because it accompanies it. This is called, technically, the “Cum hoc ergo propter hoc" fallacy; or the “Non causa pro causâ.” It is best illustrated and exposed by the old story of Tenterden Church Steeple and the Goodwin Sands.
Another Fallacy (often used in elaborate books as well as in off-hand speeches,) is when a proposition which is true respecting a person or a thing under certain circumstances, and with certain limitations, is treated as true absolutely and universally. This is called the Fallacy, “A dicto Secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter."
The last of the Fallacies “ Extra Dictionem," pointed out by Aristotle, that I shall mention, is the “Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum,” which may be named simply “the Fallacy of Interrogation, viz., the Fallacy of asking several questions which appear to be but one; so that whatever one answer is given, being, of course, applicable to one only of the implied questions, it may be interpreted as applied to the other.”+ This is most frequently, and most dishonestly done in the examination of witnesses, and in comments on that examination made by Counsel when the witness has no opportunity of explaining himself.
There is one more “ Artifice” which I must mention; and I prefer to call it " Artifice” to placing it in the dishonour
• Whately's observations on this (Logic, p. 132, et seq.) are peculiarly good. He well remarks that “The English language is the more suitable for the Fallacy of Petitio Principii, from its being formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions, which have no resemblance in Bound and no connexion in etymology; 80 that a Sophist may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin : e.g." to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing bis sentiments,"
able list of Fallacies, such as I have just been describing. I hope that it is not very blameable morally; for I must confess to having won many a verdict by it long years ago, when I had a considerable practice in defending prisoners. This consists of taking the proofs against your client one by one, and, if possible, in various parts of your speech. You urge upon the jury how insufficient the particular piece of proof is to justify them in taking away a man's life, liberty, &c., but you say nothing about the mass of proof collectively. This plan of action, when an advocate has a heavy case against him, is recommended by high authority. Quintilian says of hostile facts, “Quæ turbâ valebunt, diducenda erunt :" and "Urgent universa : singula quæque dissolves.” But it is a tactic to be tried only when you are in great difficulties ; for it will be inevitably defeated by a reminder that the case is to be judged according to the general effect of the proofs in combination or in contrast with each other, and not merely by weighing separately each particle of testimony. The Auctor ad Herennium gives in his 4th book (chapter 41) a very powerful specimen of the argument in reply to the Artifice of Distributions. He calls this argument the “ Frequentatio.”
The last of the parts, into which a speech is commonly divided, is the Peroration. “Here,” says Quintilian, “all the fountains of eloquence must be opened,” and he warns us that the peroration must not be mere repetition. This is the place for working on the jurors' passions and feelings: reasonings and proofs should have gone before. He again urges the importance of thus winning the Judgment through the Will: "Probationes efficiunt sane ut causain mostrain meliorem esse judices putent. Affectus præstant ut etiain velint : sed id, quod volunt, credunt quoquée.”*
* The whole passage on this subject in the 6th book of Quintilian is very fine. Hamilton, too, deserves attention again here. While attributing thu greatest importance to the Passions, he is himself cynical and sneering to the end. He thy: suins w the whole subject:-"Begin with an exordium to gain the good opinion and affections of the audience. State the point in question clearly, briefly, but artfully; produce your proofs, your arguments ; then should follow your peroration, in which you recapitulate succinctly what is for your purpose. Enforce the strong points, and slip over the weak; and then make a push at the passions of your audience; at their pride, pity, or ambition, or their prevailing passions, whatever they may be, get them on your side, and you need not fear their romson."
Quintilian makes it a maxim that the Advocate must feel the Passions which he wishes to excite. The great critic gives advice how this is to be done. The speaker must be able at will and at discretion to conjure up before his mind's eye all the phantasiæ, all the minutiæ, as well as the main facts of the scene. He who can do this well, is what Quintilian calls 'Eupavraciwtos. We should say of him that he has a poetic temperament : and, unquestionably, the imaginative and representative powers of such a temperament, with the contagiousness of its fervour, are very valuable for an orator. And yet, he must not abandon his mind, as the poet does, to their inspiration. He must all the time have an inner self, where he calmly judges every event, and rules the springs of each manifestation of feeling. As you watch the conduct of causes, and still more when you come to take part in them, you will be more and more struck with the similitude between the qualities of a great general and those which are needed in a great advocate. Keen and rapid insight into human nature, the power of promptly comprehending masses of circumstances, the due blending of daring and discretion, the skill to change tactics according to the varying emergencies of the conflict-these are a few of the points of likeness. But pre-eminent is the necessity of perfect self-possession, of ordering the impulsive disposition, which is so natural to men of genius.
I was led to reflect on this by a passage, which I read lately in the “Memoirs of the First Napoleon,” about the nervous and needless retreat of Marshal d'Etrées, at Hamelin, in 1757, when part of his line of communication had been suddenly broken and his original plans for advancing had been thereby disarranged. Napoleon observes that,
“ The first quality of a general-in-chief is to have a cool head, on which each object makes its due impression and no more. He must never become excited, and never turn aghast, or feel intoxicated by sudden news of either ill or of good. He must arrange the sensations which he receives, either successively or simultaneously, during a battle, and take care that each occupies only its merited place. Good sense and reasonable conduct are the results of numerous impressions, which all receive fair attention. There are men whose physical and moral constitution is such that out of anything that happens they construct a tableau of all that is, and is to be. Whatever may be the science, or the intelligence, or the courage, or the other good qualities of such men, they are naturally unfit to command armies and to direct the great operations of warfare."*
I have noticed similar indiscretions in Court. A witness suddenly turns adverse, or an expected point fails. Forthwith the advocate, a brilliant but over-zealous and excitable man, brings rapidly before his mind all the probable and all the possible ill consequences of the awkward event, and embarrasses himself by contemplating them, instead of calmly turning to other modes of continuing the controversy. Such men are often men of genius, but they are perilously wanting in forensic aptitude. A young advocate, who is conscious of such a disposition, should strive very hard to master it (and almost every mental tendency may be mastered), or else he had better change his profession.
The old Rhetoricians give copious instructions as to the Orator's Elocution, that is, on his conveyance by words of his thoughts to the minds of his audience; and they include, under this head, first, his Language, both as to etymology and as to style, and secondly, his Delivery, both as to utterance and as to action. I have already said much on the subject of language, and my limits do not permit me
* Commentaires de Napoléon I., t. vi., p. 858.
to resume the topic here further than earnestly attesting its importance, and recommending the student to read diligently what is written on it in the third book of Aristotle's Rhetoric ;* in the third book of Cicero De Oratore; in the fourth book of the “ Auctor ad Herennium," and in the gth and ioth books of Quintilian. Among modern writers, Whately, in part three of his Rhetoric, gives many shrewd and serviceable observations; but on this matter the second book of Campbell deserves special study. He gives excellent rules accopanied with convincing reasons, about “the lawful authority of Usus, to which there is a general right of appeal from the laws and decisions of Grammarians;" about “Purity in English," and how it may be violated; about the all-importance of Perspicuityt, and the common causes of obscurity. I will add a few cautions to the young speaker. Be very sparing of Metaphors and Similes. Your style will seem uncultivated if they are wholly absent; but (as Corinna warned Pindar about Mythical episodes) “we ought to sow with the hand, and not with the whole sack.” A false Metaphor, or a foolish Simile will give your opponent a terrible opportunity for raising a laugh at your expense; and the Orator, who is well laughed at, is ruined, at least for the case in hand. Practice variety in your speaking, both as regards words and tone. If your periods are in general copious and well-rounded, introduce now and then a short pungent
. See the excellent notes on this in Mr. Cope's Edition, pp. 277 to 331. You may add with advantage & re-perusal of what Professor Jebb in his “ Attic Orators " has written on the style of Antiphon (vol. 1, p. 32); on the style of Lysias (chapter viii.); that of Isocrates (chapter xiv); and of Isæus (chapter XX). Mark also what he says about the causes of the “Depreciation of Style,” in Greek prose after the times of Demosthenes (vol. 2, p. 438).
† Mr. Trevelyan's lately published Memoirs of Lord Macaulay give copious proofs of the laudable and successful pains taken by that great writer to make all his sentences instantly intelligible to what are called the commonest anderstandings. Indeed Macaulay's system of composition is a memorable example of the combination of the highest abilities with the most earnest industry. See especially Mr. Trevelyan's second vol., pp. 230, 235, and p. 224.